



THE INSURGENT BARRICADE

MARK TRAUGOTT

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*To Patticat
for your willingness to always stand
on the same side of all my barricades*

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The construction and defense of barricades, along with the practical and symbolic functions they perform in violent confrontations, have fascinated me since I first undertook the study of French revolutionary history. Part of the barricade's allure is its close association with moments of dramatic upheaval and accelerated social change. Equally intriguing to me has been the fact that barricades in their purest form are artifacts of the popular imagination, the collective and spontaneous creations of anonymous crowd members who base their actions on knowledge that has been sustained, transmitted, and applied without the benefit of formal organization or institutional hierarchy. How and why do people manage, despite formidable difficulties and tremendous risks, to re-create the complex sequence of behaviors that typify even the humblest barricade event? And how did these behaviors, repeated at irregular intervals over hundreds of years, end up taking on a cultural meaning that had made the insurgent barricade all but synonymous with the European revolutionary tradition by the mid nineteenth century?

Though this study takes up many aspects of the "barricade phenomenon," there are three that remain a consistent focus in the pages that follow. The first has to do with continuities in barricade use. Not only has the concept of the barricade survived intact over several centuries (despite remarkable variations in the physical makeup or method of deployment of the actual structures), but it has given rise to a widely recognized "routine of collective action" that even inexperienced and otherwise unrelated insurgents can reproduce on a moment's notice. Understanding the recurrent quality of the barricade will be a constant preoccupation in this work, beginning with the early chapters. Demonstrating the remarkable parallels among events separated by vast distances or long lapses of time is an important advantage of the comparative perspective and comprehensive frame of reference evident in [chapters 4 through 6](#).

Precisely the opposite concern constitutes a second theme of this inquiry: the

equally significant discontinuities in barricade use. We begin by noting that barricades underwent a more or less continual process of adaptation and change, largely as a by-product of the opposition between insurgents and repressors that defines the insurrectionary situation. But it is also important to recognize that barricades, which developed as the unique and exclusive property of French society for the first two hundred years of their existence, eventually underwent a process of diffusion that would, in the course of the nineteenth century, make them a pan-European phenomenon. Understanding what made this transformation possible and the pattern and logic of their spread will absorb much of our attention in the middle section of this book.

A third motif, which combines the other two, asks how the function of the barricade has changed over time; and how, paradoxically, the specific shift from pragmatic tactic of insurrection to preeminent symbol of the revolutionary tradition accounts for the persistence of the practice of barricade construction throughout the modern era, when other forms of early-modern protest have disappeared. The final two chapters of the book place these developments in the context of the long-term evolution of methods of contention in the European world, for in the end, the significance of the barricade is its utility as an indicator of the changing dynamic of violent protest and revolutionary transformation.

The research style adopted in this work reflects my commitment to combining the two disciplinary perspectives that have shaped my personal outlook. Trained as a sociologist and personally inclined toward the search for patterns and regularities, I have ended up in a department of history where reliance on primary sources and the importance of context are axiomatic. My work has always been uncomfortably poised between these divergent ways of viewing the world, and while I aspire never to lose sight of either one, they are not always equally well represented or seamlessly integrated in what I write. In this book, there are certain chapters more likely to appeal to the historically oriented reader for whom the setting in which the facts are embedded is crucial; and others that will inevitably be more to the liking of social scientists for whom the attempt to generalize comes naturally. This preface seeks to direct these different but overlapping audiences toward the segments of this work that they will find most rewarding.

Organizing an investigation of this kind around a concept like the barricade may seem unorthodox, but it has its virtues. Insurrections and revolutions are not only infrequent events, but ones whose outcomes and consequences often require years or decades to reveal themselves. They tend to be unplanned—or, if not, to be organized in secrecy—and in either case are unlikely to generate

extensive documentation. The study of individual instances of barricade use, especially the exceptional cases where insurgents are victorious, tends to present an incomplete or distorted view of reality. Alternatively, choosing to focus in a systematic way on a technique of insurrection in general—*all* instances of barricade use—takes in events both large and small, successful and unsuccessful, and deriving from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. In surveying the full range and diversity of this type of civil conflict, we are able to form a broadly based image of barricade combat. And because the barricade constituted the most striking embodiment of the classic revolutionary episode and therefore elicited frequent comment by contemporary observers, it has been possible to document more than 150 events involving its use during the time period covered by my research.

A few words about the limits I have imposed upon this study are in order. Some readers may be surprised to find that some of the most important barricade events of all time get short shrift in my account. The French revolutions of 1830 and 1848 and the failed insurrections of June 1848 and May 1871 figure in these pages, but only briefly, and mainly to evoke, however summarily, the role they played in the barricade's evolution (or vice versa). My decision to confine consideration of these major events to the necessary minimum is explained by the fact that every one of them has been subjected to extensive scrutiny by historians, to the point where there is little that I could add to what is already known beyond assessing the barricade's part in determining the course and outcome of those events.

Other readers may have cause to regret that that period covered by this study does not extend beyond the end of the nineteenth century. The reasons for this are simple. The modern European barricade had already taken shape by that time, and venturing into the twentieth century would have required that I examine the much broader diffusion process involved in its spread to the non-European world, a much more ambitious effort, which lay beyond my practical, historical, and linguistic resources.

A further limitation of this study is that not everything that someone has called a barricade will merit our attention. [Chapter 1](#) tackles the problem of how the term “insurgent barricade” is interpreted here and tries to provide examples, starting with the account of the Paris insurrection of 1832 that begins the book, of what has been included and excluded from that category. It also introduces the concept of the “repertoire of collective action”—the array of all protest techniques available at a given place and time—which has been a touchstone in this research. Those with little interest in or tolerance for definitional or

methodological discussions might be better advised to skip or skim that chapter and proceed directly to the early-modern history of the barricade that is the focus of the two substantive chapters that follow.

[Chapter 2](#) has ostensibly been structured around the attempt to identify the first barricades, a search that initially takes us back to the great Parisian insurrection of 1588. We are, however, ultimately forced to delve still further back in time and to acknowledge that with the barricade, as with so many similar historical phenomena, there can be no discrete, discoverable moment of origination, nor any readily specifiable inventor. What we learn, in the process of addressing these questions, is that the difference between history-as-lived and history-as-written has often been mediated by memorable events of presumed world-historical significance. This is notably the case with what has been dubbed the “First Day of the Barricades,” the incident that set in motion the downfall of the Valois dynasty in France.

[Chapter 3](#) extends consideration of early barricades through the great Parisian insurrection of 1648 that clearly established their recurrent character. This “Second Day of the Barricades” climaxed the period of intense civil conflict known as the Fronde parlementaire, but it also proved to be a turning point in the history of French contention, for as the central state’s control over French territory began to be consolidated during the long reign of Louis XIV, the barricade went into eclipse. Together, [chapters 2](#) and [3](#) delineate the contours of the early-modern barricade, the foil against which the most distinctive properties that the barricade developed during the 1800s are later contrasted. To do so, they cover ground extending from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries at breakneck speed, and readers unprepared for a raft of dense historical detail should be forewarned.

The fourth chapter is briefer and based on different types of evidence than those that precede it. It makes use of a database (included here as [appendix A](#)) to reconstruct the distribution of barricade events and to graphically represent their incidence and magnitude, year by year, from 1569 to 1900. Even a cursory glance at the accompanying charts tells us that barricade events have been concentrated into a small number of sharp peaks, corresponding to key moments in the history of European contention. This chapter also provides an initial introduction to the modern barricade, discussing the four occasions on which barricades were built during the French Revolution of 1789, incidents that historians have long ignored, when they have not denied their existence outright.

The diffusion of the barricade is the subject of the next two chapters. The first examines the important contributions of the Belgian people, who hold the honor

of having been the first to build such structures outside their country of origin. Their claim to that distinction goes all the way back to 1787 and the Brabant revolution, though that rebellion's ultimate lack of success explains why a further Belgian revolution, also the occasion for widespread barricade construction, was necessary in 1830 to definitively establish their nation's independence. The successful adaptation of this technique in the respective struggles against the Austrian and Dutch armies naturally raises the question of why it was the Belgians who ended the French monopoly on the use of this insurrectionary technique. [Chapter 5](#) weighs the relevance of the two countries' close economic, political, linguistic, and cultural ties in determining this result.

[Chapter 6](#) recounts the story of the barricade's spread to dozens of new locations scattered across the Continent in the spring and summer of 1848. The February revolution in Paris gave the signal for these uprisings, which in most cases borrowed their political vocabulary, demands, and symbols from the French, along with the tactic of barricade construction. This chapter also looks at the threads of human agency that connect these events to one another, paying particular attention to the role of students, political exiles, and itinerant workers in determining the path followed by this process of dissemination.

The final two chapters attempt to place my research findings in some larger perspective. [Chapter 7](#) explores the wide variety of functions that the barricade can perform in the context of a highly charged insurrectionary situation, breaking them down according to whether they are essentially pragmatic, sociological, or symbolic. Taken together, these different types of function go some way toward explaining the recurrent character of the routine of barricade construction, the question that provided the point of departure for this investigation. But though the various functions of the barricade frequently overlap and co-exist, there has also been a discernable tendency over time for their more practical uses to recede in importance in favor of the more symbolic. The concluding chapter tries to make sense of that shift by relating it to the displacement of an early-modern repertoire of collective action by its modern equivalent. This underscores the fact that the barricade is all but unique in having survived the wholesale elimination of the methods of contention in widespread use in the eighteenth century and earlier and their replacement by new ones introduced in the nineteenth century, which remain familiar to us today. Thus, the study of the barricade not only sheds light on a particular form of insurrectionary behavior that flourished in Europe over the past four centuries but also teaches us how people select, sustain, and symbolize the forms of contention through which they seek to achieve their collective aspirations.

• • •

When I first undertook this study, I had no idea of where it would lead me. The search for the origins of the barricade required that I learn about periods of French history that lay well outside my field of specialization, just as the attempt to understand the diffusion of the barricade to other European countries obliged me to acquaint myself, however superficially, with their experiences in 1848. A study of this kind relies utterly on the work of other scholars, most of whom I have never met, but whose writings, cited in the pages that follow, have been invaluable to me. And there are also those to whom I owe a more direct and personal debt of gratitude for the kind assistance they have provided. The list is really too long (and my memory really too short) to do them all justice, so I simply beg the indulgence of those that I have inadvertently left out in the following remarks.

The influence of Charles Tilly will be obvious to anyone who reads this book. His ideas—in particular the concept of the repertoire of collective action—have been so central a point of reference in this research that I often find others assuming that I was either his student or a close associate, neither of which is true. Despite the lack of such ties, I always found him to be incredibly generous in offering assistance and feedback. His death in 2008 deprived those who work in the interstices of history and the social sciences of a model and an inspiration. I very much regret that he has not lived to see this book in print, but I count myself fortunate that he was one of the then-anonymous reviewers whom my editor at the University of California Press, Niels Hooper, chose to review my manuscript.

I subsequently learned that the other anonymous reader was none other than William H. Sewell. I am not convinced that I have satisfactorily corrected the shortcomings he identified in the version of the manuscript he reviewed, but his comments were always acute and have helped me to improve my earlier draft enormously. I took them all the more seriously because I consider him the outstanding exemplar of what a social science historian can be, and his writings—not only his books but his often gem-like articles—have the amazing ability to range effortlessly (or so he makes it appear) from the specificity of thoroughly researched historical particularities to the power of well-grounded generalizations.

Within my own department at the University of California at Santa Cruz, I have many valued colleagues. I think immediately of Buchanan Sharp, who first called to my attention the importance of early-modern barricades and the use of chains in Flanders and England, and who was always willing to read a chapter,

regale me with an anecdote, or share his love for “the dust of the archives.” And I have long relied on Terry Burke and Mark Cioc for help with barricade events and associated documents from the parts of the world that they know best. But I would like to reserve special recognition for my fellow French historian Jonathan Beecher. Despite overlapping interests in the nineteenth century, our intellectual styles remain quite different. Perhaps for that reason, he has, in his unassuming way, taught me an enormous amount about France, about history, and about what it means to have a vocation for intellectual work. I have him to thank, not only for having brought me into the Santa Cruz History Department in the first place, but for having been so warmly and unwaveringly supportive at every stage of a project that took far longer than I had ever imagined.

For the rest, constraints on space restrict me to mere mentions of individuals who have made contributions that deserve much fuller acknowledgment. The list includes:

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This project has been so long in the making that there are surely others who have an equal claim to my gratitude whom I have forgotten to mention. I may not always have managed to do justice to the advice I received, but my sense of indebtedness for the assistance they generously offered is genuine.

Boulder Creek, California

The Insurgent Barricade

Barricade: Type of entrenchment that is usually made with barrels filled with earth for the purpose of defending oneself or finding cover from the enemy.

DICTIONNAIRE DE L'ACADÉMIE FRANÇAISE (1694)

In the early morning hours of June 5, 1832, crowds of workers, students, militants, and a scattering of political refugees began to gather in the streets of Paris.¹ The intent of most participants was to express displeasure with the Orleanist July monarchy, which had been installed just two years earlier, though the occasion for their protest was provided by the death of General Jean Maximilien Lamarque. Once a stalwart of the First Empire, this military hero had undergone a political rebirth as an opposition leader in the Chamber of Deputies during the last years of the Bourbon Restoration and the first years of the July Monarchy. Parisians critical of the new government sought to honor this service by accompanying the general's mortal remains on a last tour of their city before the hearse departed for Lamarque's native province in the southwest of France.

There was nothing novel in thus taking advantage of the death of a public figure to make a political statement. The earliest precedents, associated with the state funerals of kings and princes, went back centuries into the Old Regime, but the revolutionaries of the 1790s had been quick to devise republican variants on this venerable practice for the processions honoring Mirabeau, Voltaire, and Marat before their induction into the Panthéon. More recently, funerary rites had been used by the political opposition to galvanize support in 1825 (for General Foy), 1827 (for Jacques Manuel), and late in 1830 (for Benjamin Constant). Thus, by 1832, events of this kind followed a pattern that was both long

established and freshly imprinted in people's minds.²

In the spring of 1832, France was struck by a deadly cholera epidemic, which compounded an economic crisis so severe that it had precipitated the previous fall's insurrection by Lyon silk workers. This combination raised the level of tensions within the Parisian working class to fever pitch. By June 2, when the popular Lamarque was struck down by the disease, fear and resentment over the threats to the population's physical and economic well-being had reached a critical stage. They built upon simmering political discontents, especially strong among republicans, who felt that they had spilled their blood on the 1830 barricades only to have their revolution "stolen" by a coterie of opportunists, who managed to get Louis-Philippe crowned king. Leftists were struggling to form their own alliance of convenience. Their partners included both Bonapartists, who claimed Lamarque as one of their own, and Legitimists, who were willing to lend their financial and logistical support to any initiative that, by overthrowing the upstart junior branch of the House of Bourbon, might rekindle hope for the restoration of the senior line of descent.³ This convergence of political forces explains why the cortège that accompanied Lamarque's casket attracted a crowd numbering in the tens of thousands.

ANATOMY OF A BARRICADE EVENT

The coffin's route across Paris on Tuesday, June 5, has been traced on [map 1](#). The procession departed at 10 A.M. from the general's house in the rue Saint-Honoré, not far from the place de la Concorde. Its intended trajectory would have followed the *grands boulevards* across the northern periphery of Paris to the obligatory stop in the place de la Bastille. Soon after setting out, however, militants diverted the hearse to make a symbolic tour of the column in the place Vendôme, in homage to Lamarque's close ties to Napoléon. This was followed by a second unplanned stop, this time in the boulevard Montmartre, where the horses were cut from the traces and replaced by students, military veterans, and decorated heroes of the July revolution, who vied for the honor of pulling the hearse. Clearly, the crowd—which, by some accounts, had swelled to more than 100,000—was not allowing its enthusiasm to be dampened by the heavy rains that fell intermittently on this and the following day.

Once arrived at the place de la Bastille, militants tried to convince the column of marchers that Lamarque's body should find its final resting place, not in his ancestral home in the Landes near Mont-de-Marsan, but instead in the Panthéon, in the heart of Paris. Others argued in favor of proceeding directly to the Hôtel

de Ville to proclaim a new French Republic.⁴ On the esplanade at the north end of the pont d'Austerlitz, a series of speeches, delivered from a podium draped in black, further inflamed the crowd. After listening to the words of the marquis de Lafayette, Maréchal Clausel, and representatives of the Polish and Italian expatriate communities, participants became aware of a spectral figure, towering above the crowd on a black stallion. Tall and gaunt, with a long, cadaverous face and flowing mustache, he was dressed entirely in black. Still as a ghost, he held aloft a red flag embroidered with a black border and the words "Liberty or Death!" This apparition had an electrifying effect on the crowd, almost as if "... the holy spirit had descended upon them prematurely; they began to utter the strangest prophecies as the sight of the red flag, acting like a magic charm, caused them to take leave of their senses."⁵

The tense standoff between protesters and a corps of dragoons, under strict orders to refrain from the use of deadly force, was suddenly ended when a shot rang out from an unknown quarter.⁶ Members of the crowd began throwing stones at soldiers and municipal guardsmen and, for the first time that day, the time-honored cry "To the barricades!" echoed through the streets of Paris.⁷ The sound of the *tocsin*—the rapid ringing of church bells that served as both an alarm and a call to arms—soon pervaded the city, drowning out all casual conversation. Insurgents began uprooting the saplings planted to replace the larger trees cut down during the July Days. They also scavenged planks and beams from nearby construction sites and improvised tools for prying up paving stones.⁸ These classic raw materials were natural choices because they added mass, helped knit the structure together, and were usually found in abundance right at the site of barricade construction. Between 5 P.M., when the first sporadic gunfire was exchanged, and 6:30, when pitched battles were initially reported, dozens of barricades had been completed on both the right and left banks of the Seine. Individual structures took as little as fifteen minutes to erect.

Even as the first barricades were going up, a frantic search for arms began. Some rebels had to be content with sabers, staffs, or scythes, but rifles were the weapons of choice, and bands of insurgents boldly seized them from small patrols of soldiers encountered in the streets. Others joined in pillaging the premises of Lepage frères, the largest of the several Paris gunsmiths whose establishments were looted. (Figure 25 on p. 188 shows the same establishment being attacked during the revolution of 1830.)⁹ Still others assaulted a Municipal Guard post in the place de la Bastille, a barracks near the Jardin des Plantes, and a lightly guarded magazine, from which they made off with several barrels of

powder.¹⁰ Soon small-arms and rifle fire was being directed against the mounted infantrymen who had been dispatched to hot spots on both banks of the Seine to prevent the unrest from spreading. Insurgents tried to fraternize with the troops, but their scattered initial success proved to be short-lived. Worse yet, only 500 to 1,000 of the original demonstrators arrived ready to fight, and their pleas for their fellow marchers to join them generally fell on deaf ears.¹¹

By early evening, the first deadly clash broke out near the porte Saint-Denis, where a number of barricades had been erected. It soon spread to traditional sites of resistance in the quartier Saint-Martin and further east in the faubourg Saint-Antoine. The affected area included the rues Aubry-le-boucher, Beaubourg, and Transnonain and the entire neighborhood surrounding the Eglise Saint-Merri—territory that would also lie at the heart of another celebrated insurrection in April 1834.

LEGEND

1. Residence of General Lamarque
2. Place de la Concorde
3. Place Vendôme
4. Boulevard Montmartre
5. Place de la Bastille
6. Pont d'Austerlitz
7. Panthéon
8. Hôtel de Ville
9. Porte Saint-Denis
10. Faubourg Saint-Antoine
11. Eglise Saint-Merri
12. Place du Carrousel



MAP 1. The insurrection of June 5–6, 1832, in Paris: funeral procession and centers of combat (outlined here with dashed lines and based in part on Bouchet 2000, 36, map 2.2). The underlying map is used with the kind permission of the David Rumsey Map Collection (www.davidrumsey.com).

Informed of the initial scope of the unrest, Louis-Philippe immediately returned from Saint-Cloud to rally his forces. He conducted a review of the troops on the place du Carrousel around nine or ten o'clock on the evening of June 5 and was received with enthusiasm. Troop strength was rapidly augmented thanks to the arrival of National Guard forces from the suburbs and the deployment of additional army units from garrisons in the Paris basin. The army was prepared to make use of every weapon in its arsenal. The newspaper *Le Temps* reported that dragoons had even built a “barricade” of their own and forced the inhabitants of nearby houses to place lighted candles in upper-story windows as a sign of support.¹² More critical to the victory of the forces of order

was the military's willingness to bring cannon to bear against the insurgents' best-entrenched positions. The thunder of artillery barrages could be heard throughout that night.¹³

By the morning of June 6, the last pockets of resistance on the left bank had already been contained and the insurrection confined to the three right-bank neighborhoods marked as centers of combat on [map 1](#). Counting all units of the National and Municipal Guards in addition to the larger complement of soldiers from the regular army, the forces at the government's disposal now approached 60,000 men. Given the lack of popular response to the insurgents' appeals, the outcome could no longer be in doubt. At noon on the second day of fighting, the king again reviewed the troops on the place de la Concorde before setting out on an intrepid (and still quite perilous) horseback tour that took him across the city to the place de la Bastille via the *grands boulevards* and back again through the faubourg Saint-Antoine and along the quays.

Despite their fading chances of victory, militants continued the struggle through the daylight hours of Wednesday in isolated locations like the Marché des Innocents and, as evening approached, staged a desperate last stand in and around the Eglise Saint-Merri ([fig. 1](#)). The rebels, led by army veterans and commanded by a decorated hero of the July Days, had taken over the café Leclerc and the rest of the building located at 30, rue Saint-Martin, where they established their “headquarters, fortress, and first-aid station.”¹⁴ This complex was flanked on either side by a huge barricade, whose defenders were protected by snipers posted at the windows of the adjoining buildings. About one hundred of the most committed insurgents—predominantly the young, but joined by a few elderly veterans of previous revolutionary conflicts—had resolved to die with arms in their hands.

With all other districts of the capital pacified and the opposition press muzzled, the full weight of the repression could be concentrated on this last remaining stronghold of rebellion. Successive attacks by the Parisian National Guard, the National Guard of the suburbs, and the Municipal Guard were repulsed, but a final assault by regular army units, supported by four large cannon, reduced the last pair of barricades to rubble. The last guns were silenced barely twenty-four hours after hostilities had begun. The casualty toll among the insurgents, mounting as high as 800 dead and wounded, was particularly heavy because the people of Paris withheld their support, leaving most of the committed insurgents of June 1832 to pay for their rebellion with their lives.¹⁵




FIGURE 1. Barricade before the Eglise Saint-Merri. The insurgents' last stand in June 1832 took place before the cloister of the Eglise Saint-Merri in a district that was a center of combat in several nineteenth-century uprisings. Martin 1868-85, 6: 9.

WHAT IS AN INSURGENT BARRICADE?


Though it culminated in a spectacular armed confrontation, the 1832 revolt was in many respects unremarkable. Gauged in terms of numbers of participants, it was of no more than average size. It never seriously imperiled the regime in power and had no lasting political impact. Indeed, it would doubtless have been dismissed as just one more unsuccessful nineteenth-century insurrection had Victor Hugo not chosen it as the setting for the climactic scene of his epic novel, *Les misérables*.¹⁶ Like that other classic of the literature on barricades, Gustave Flaubert's *Sentimental Education*, Hugo's actually dates from the 1860s and illustrates the heights to which insurrectionary consciousness had vaulted by the second half of the nineteenth century, when, for Europeans, the very word "barricade" had become all but synonymous with the concept of revolution.

MAP 2. LOCATION OF BARRICADES IN THE SAINT-MERRI


DISTRICT, PARIS, JULY 1830 AND FEBRUARY 1848



MAP 2A. Barricade locations in July 1830.



MAP 2B. Barricade locations in February 1848.



MAP 2C. Circles indicate identical locations in both insurrections.

Though barricades had by then been an established element in Parisian insurrections for nearly two and a half centuries, the uprising of June 5–6 has inevitably been measured against the standard set by the successful revolutions of 1830 and 1848. However different in scale and outcome, the disturbances associated with General Lamarque’s funeral shared with these far more consequential events a number of remarkable similarities, starting with the patchwork of Parisian neighborhoods most affected and extending even to the physical location of individual barricades.

Although no systematic inventory of the structures erected during the 1832 insurrection has survived, we do possess highly detailed maps that pinpoint the site of each such structure in both July 1830 and February 1848. If we focus on the Saint-Merri district, which was a principal locus of combat in both those conflicts (as it was on June 6, 1832), we come across an observation familiar to anyone who has studied the revolutionary struggles of that period. [Maps 2A](#) and [2B](#) show precisely where each barricade was situated in each of the two major revolutionary conflicts of the mid-1800s. [Map 2C](#) transposes this information onto a single map and uses small dark circles to highlight instances where barricades reappeared in the exact same location in the two uprisings. In quantitative terms, 72 of 140 specific sites within this one, arbitrarily defined

quarter where barricades were built in 1848 had been occupied, eighteen years earlier, by similar structures.¹⁷

BARRICADES AS MATERIAL STRUCTURES

The 1832 uprising makes a useful backdrop against which to explore the question of what should count as a barricade. The challenge lies in arriving at a definition that can be applied regardless of the size, objectives, social base, outcome, or other characteristics of the event in question, but that nonetheless delimits a coherent and recognizable category, the contents of which can be understood in common terms.

If one were to take at face value the 1694 definition offered by the Académie française in the epigraph to this chapter, the essence of the barricade consisted in either the materials from which it was fashioned or the purpose it fulfilled. Yet, with the benefit of over 300 additional years of experience, we can see that neither of those considerations is determinative. Though specific components like barrels played a noteworthy role in the origin of the barricade, an incredible diversity of raw materials has been used in their construction over the centuries without ever rendering the resulting structure any less identifiably a barricade. And though the first barricades were built for protection, they have since shown that they are capable of performing a remarkable range of functions. Some of their most important uses defy straightforward classification as defensive or offensive and may in fact have little to do with military or practical objectives at all.

What is truly remarkable about the barricade is, not its physical form in any particular era, but rather the fact that, despite all its varied manifestations, it has retained its identity, making it possible to speak of the barricade as having a history of its own. The barricades of 1648, the barricades of 1795, and the barricades of 1832 shared common characteristics that allowed observers and participants alike to see them all as part of a single insurrectionary lineage. Allowing for differences in weaponry, ideology, and political context, the same sort of underlying continuity linked those who participated in the June Days of 1848 to the partisans of the Holy League in 1588.

Such continuity seems all the more noteworthy given the absence of pre-existing organization that typified most barricade events. Participants came together more or less spontaneously, sometimes without ever having met those who fought shoulder-to-shoulder alongside them. At best, their experience might have been acquired in some earlier insurrection, which was likely to be just as

lacking in coordination or planning. Yet when the call came to man the barricades, they knew just what to do, and managed to concert their actions with great efficiency, even without benefit of the most rudimentary of command structures. This uncanny convergence in the behavior of individuals thrown together by their common desire to protest presents us with a mystery that the study of the barricade can help explain by unraveling the logic that inheres in even the most unstructured and chaotic instances of civic rebellion.




FIGURE 2. General Christophe Juchault de Lamoricière parleying with the insurgents before the barricade at the Saint-Martin Barracks, Paris, June 1848. The classic insurgent barricade, built and defended by civilians, provides a window on the dynamic of revolutionary conflict. This image shows the crucial interaction, perhaps only moments before actual combat was to begin, between a military commander and insurgents holding their rifles with the stocks pointing upward to signal that they had no immediately hostile intent. Nineteenth-century barricades like the one pictured here could be massive—as high as second-story windows and as much as ten yards thick. *Journées illustrées de la révolution* (1848-49), 189.

It is the desire to understand the inner dynamic of the insurrectionary situation that explains my exclusive preoccupation with the *insurgent* barricade (as depicted, e.g., in [fig. 2](#)). Structures that were not constructed and defended by civilian insurgents, although perhaps identical in all other respects, are considered here only as a point of contrast with the revolutionary barricade proper. Even one and the same structure, built by insurgents but captured and turned to account by a military force attempting to quell their rebellion, will, from the moment it changes hands, cease to be treated as a barricade under the definition adopted in this study.¹⁸ After all, the ability of a military unit—adequately equipped, intelligently organized, incessantly drilled, and competently commanded—to create or exploit practical means of success in battle is hardly an enigma. Analyzing training manuals or observing the rigors of the socialization process to which soldiers are subjected is a more promising approach to explaining the advantage they enjoy over hastily recruited bands of street fighters. The fascination of the barricade lies instead in helping us to understand how the other side, despite its lack of organization, sometimes manages to hold its own, and may, on rare occasions, even triumph. So while all insurgent barricades must have a physical embodiment of some kind, differences in their size, composition, and outward aspect can be vast, and their material properties are at best a necessary but never a sufficient basis for determining whether they qualify for consideration here.

These man-made objects, hurriedly but deliberately constructed by combatants, are also unlike fortuitously encountered and passively exploited features of the natural terrain. They are purposeful products of the ingenuity of insurgents who, appropriating found materials of every kind, adapt them to new political objectives (see [fig. 3](#)).¹⁹ For this reason, any definition that places primary emphasis on the intrinsic importance of specific raw materials runs the risk of abstracting the barricade from its historical and sociological context.

Thus, by stipulating that barrels, carts, posts, chains, and paving stones were the standard elements consistently used to construct barricades, an 1887 *Grande encyclopédie* entry presents us with a dilemma.²⁰ Barrels certainly deserve pride of place in any such list, not only because they were an ever-present component of early structures of this kind but also because they gave rise to the word barricade itself. Old French used many words to designate different shapes and sizes of wooden casks, among them *tonneau*, *muid*, *pipe*, *futaille*, and *barrique*. By converting the last of these terms into a collective noun through the addition of the appropriate suffix, the French term *barricade*—literally, an assemblage of barrels—was derived.²¹

Barrels were, in fact, a ubiquitous element in urban commerce and daily life in the sixteenth century, and they continued to play a conspicuous role in barricade construction throughout the period covered by this study (as many of the illustrations accompanying later chapters will confirm). Their great advantage was that, when empty, they could be rolled into place with little effort. Once stood on end and filled with earth, gravel, mud, or manure, they instantly became solid barriers.

That same advantage applied to carts, the second item on the list of classic materials, and by extension to wagons, coaches, carriages, cabs, brewers' drays, omnibuses, and all the other forms of wheeled vehicles that turn up with some regularity in historical accounts of barricade construction. Indeed, in one exceptional case, which certainly proves the adage about many hands making light work, a crowd in the rue Saint-Denis was reported to have retrieved a locomotive from the Cavé ironworks to make a barricade in June 1848.²² What recommended these objects to insurgents was the ability to control how easily they could be moved. The point is illustrated by a carriage mentioned in the government inquiry into the Lyon insurrection of 1834 as having done double duty. It was originally commandeered and hauled to a site where it could be overturned and used to block off an intersection. But when it was subsequently needed elsewhere, insurgents righted the vehicle and rolled it to a new location, where it could again serve as the foundation for a barricade.²³



FIGURE 3. Barricade in the rue Saint-Martin. This barricade from the February

Days of 1848 exemplifies the sort of improvised structure typical of insurrectionary situations. Note the mix and haphazard arrangement of the found materials from which this barricade has been fashioned. *Illustrated London News*, March 4, 1848, 131.

G. Richardet, a correspondent for the Paris newspaper *Le National*, reported that when he tried to engage a carriage to take him to the faubourg du Temple on the evening of February 8, 1870, the driver refused out of concern that his vehicle would be seized for use in constructing a barricade. Instead, the reporter took an omnibus. His account suggests that the driver's fears were entirely justified, for when his alternative conveyance arrived in the rue Saint-Maur, it was stopped by a crowd of 100 to 150 insurgents. Asked to get out, all but one of the passengers quickly complied. The lone holdout, described as an old man wearing his military decorations, refused to disembark until he had been reimbursed his thirty-centime fare. His request brought peals of laughter from the rioters, but they did not hesitate to take up a collection on behalf of the initially disgruntled passenger, who, thus compensated, agreed to step down.²⁴

Of course, to be truly effective, a barricade had to accumulate a certain bulk. For this, insurgents had recourse to that other great staple of barricade construction, the *pavé*. Quarried paving stones were often used to fill barrels or to wall in an upended cart, but mostly they were just piled up in a dense, disorderly heap. Cobblestones were an ideal material, because they were available in unlimited quantity as the pavement beneath the insurgents' feet (figs. 1, 2, and 3 above). They could be transported individually without great difficulty yet, once loosely tied together—for example, with balustrades torn from stairways and balconies or wrought-iron gates pilfered from a neighborhood park—they became an almost immovable mass. Paving stones were so consistently employed for the purpose that the French term *pavé* became a common synonym for the barricade.

Additional materials used to build upon this solid foundation might come from anywhere. Houses in the process of construction or repair supplied beams, planks, and posts. A metal banister and enormous flagstones from a stairway landing were used in one 1851 barricade. In the 1839 insurrection, centered in a part of Paris bordering the market district known as les Halles, insurgents made use of vegetable baskets, egg crates, brooms, and counters from merchants' stalls. During the February Days of 1848, militants must have taken special pleasure in chasing a gendarme from the sentry box where he was stationed,

before hoisting it on top of the barricade they had begun nearby, expressing in one succinct gesture the shift in who controlled the street.

Insurgents' standard practice was to scour the surrounding neighborhood in search of anything that might suit their needs. They were reported to have torn out public urinals, hauled away bales of wool from the display in front of a draper's shop, pulled down lampposts, and removed window shutters from the walls of adjoining buildings. They scavenged street benches, cut down the trees that provided the benches with shade, and returned to lug away the heavy metal grates that had protected the trees' roots.²⁵ Mattresses "liberated" from nearby barracks and hospitals served not just to make the rebels' stony redoubt more comfortable but also to reduce the risk of ricocheting bullets. Home furnishings were offered by sympathetic residents (or simply confiscated if cooperation was withheld). Books, tables, chairs, beds, armoires, and chests of drawers were frequently mentioned, but the list of materials occasionally included more unusual items, such as pianos, bathtubs, a perambulator, commodes, dead horses, and, on one occasion, a blacksmith's anvil.

This variety betrays the fact that, while the barricade always implies some type of physical embodiment, a simple list of acceptable materials, no matter how comprehensive, can never capture its essence. The proof is that two formally equivalent structures built in 1871—one improvised by ragtag civilian insurgents, the other deliberately planned and executed by the Paris Commune's Commission of Barricades—differ profoundly in what they tell us about the nature of solidarity among those participating in their construction. The contrast is plainly visible if one compares [figure 4](#), which depicts all segments of the population collaborating in the spontaneous construction of a neighborhood barricade, with [figure 5](#), which shows the "Château Gaillard," the largest of the projects undertaken by Napoléon Gaillard, the Commune's "Director of Barricades," and the paid labor force he assembled for the purpose (here represented by the workmen in the left foreground).²⁶ Everything about this structure marks it as what we might call a prefabricated or "industrial barricade": the uniform, rectilinear outlines of what amounts to a military fortification; the presence of uniformed members of the Parisian National Guard, pretending to be on the lookout for the enemy, who would not appear for several weeks; and even its location in one of the vast public squares of the French capital rather than a residential neighborhood with its own built-in complement of defenders.²⁷ The stark difference between these structures and impromptu barricades extends even to their value in insurrectionary combat. During the "Bloody Week" of May 1871, the Versailles army had little difficulty capturing monumental showpieces

like the one pictured in [figure 5](#) (which Gaillard had pronounced “impregnable”) by the simple expedient of detouring and capturing them from behind, often without firing a single shot. By contrast, many of the spontaneous barricades set up on the spot by unorganized insurgent forces put up a fanatical resistance and long held out against overwhelming odds.



FIGURE 4. Paris during the Commune. The image shows the construction of a barricade during the *journée* of March 18, 1871. Paving stones were the preferred material for barricades throughout the nineteenth century. Note the mixed composition of this group of barricade builders, among whom women and children are prominent. *Histoire illustrée de six ans de guerre et de révolution, 1870-76* (n.d.), 476.



FIGURE 5. Sample “barricade” of 1871. This structure, viewed from the center of the place de la Concorde, was the largest of those erected by the Paris Commune’s Commission of Barricades. When the Versailles army attacked in May 1871, it was simply outflanked and captured from behind. This picture, taken in early April, shows uniformed national guardsmen and hired laborers proudly striking poses before their creation. Dayot [1901] n.d., 247.

A BARRICADE BY ANY OTHER NAME?

If physical form were all that mattered, then a rapid review of military history would undoubtedly establish that barricades are at least as old as the invention of projectile weapons. *La grande encyclopédie* of 1887 seemed to credit this view in an article that cited examples harkening back to classical Greece and Rome. In 273 B.C.E., for instance, Pyrrhus, king of Epirus and Macedon, defeated the armies of Laconia and began his march on Sparta. The assault on that city was, however, initially turned back thanks to barriers constructed by that city’s women. In 219 B.C.E., at the start of the Second Punic War, Hannibal’s army was delayed for months before Saguntum, a Spanish seaport allied to Rome, due to the improvised ramparts raised by its desperate residents. And in 146 B.C.E., during the Roman conquest of Carthage, it took six days to reduce the citadel of

Byrsa because of the implacable resistance of defenders who took up positions behind heaps of rubble consisting of the remains of their own houses.²⁸

At the risk of being accused of misguided literalism, I would like to argue that these fortifications of the ancient world, which might seem perfectly analogous to those discussed and illustrated in the preceding section, should nonetheless be excluded from consideration as barricades. The simple reason is that no such concept yet existed, as evidenced by the absence of a consistently applied, dedicated term to express it. Suitable structures may have appeared from time to time, but until there was a category that participants could use to place them, both cognitively and linguistically, they would not have been thought of as a discrete phenomenon, and separate instances or episodes involving their construction would not readily be linked together. Under such circumstances, any notion of a history of the barricade was, in effect, unthinkable, and any effort to include these early artifacts as part of a coherent and self-conscious practice of barricade construction would require that we impose upon their creators' actions an externally derived meaning.

Until the sixteenth century, when the term *barricade* was coined, people described structures of this kind with a vocabulary borrowed from the architects of military fortifications. Thus, the Greeks and Romans would have designated the ancient precursors of the barricade as breastworks or ramparts, by analogy to their equivalents in siege warfare, just as inhabitants of the medieval or early-modern world might have spoken of bulwarks, mantelets, or abattis. An incident that took place in 1425 illustrates the significance of the linguistic distinction I have in mind.

England, which stands virtually alone among European nations in never having experienced a barricade event as defined in this study, was in 1425 a country nominally ruled by Henry VI, but in fact divided into warring factions led by the duke of Gloucester and Henry Beaufort, bishop of Winchester.²⁹ When Gloucester was called to the Continent to oversee the invasion of Hainaut in 1425, Beaufort took advantage of his absence from London to concentrate a sizable force of men-at-arms and archers in Southwark, just across the Thames River. Gloucester's return set the stage for a fateful confrontation between the bishop's supporters, assembled at the south end of London Bridge, and angry Londoners, manning the city gates at the bridge's north end, but threatening at any time to pour across the river.

Between nine and ten on the morning of October 30, the bishop's men drew chains across the pillars (stulpes) at the south end of London bridge and proceeded to erect a structure that was a barricade in all but name. Contemporary

accounts make mention of barrels (pipes) and barriers (hurricanes) that would have given the resulting structure the unmistakable contours of a barricade.³⁰ From the shelter of these improvised fortifications, Beaufort's forces launched their attack on Gloucester and his retinue.³¹ Thus, a century and a half before Parisians are reputed to have "invented" the barricade, Londoners, by stretching chains across a road and taking positions behind barrels and a palisade, were using similar materials in a similar way. Should we therefore draw the conclusion that the first barricades were English in origin?

Though such an inference might seem perfectly reasonable, it must ultimately be rejected. Though indistinguishable in physical terms from edifices that *would* later qualify, the structure as described by contemporary sources represented a "barricade" *avant la lettre*—before the very term existed. The English of that period had no word that specifically designated such an entity; their language lacked the means of differentiating it as a technique of urban insurrection or of connecting it to like practices employed either before or after that time. Observers managed to describe its component parts (chaynys, pypys, and hurdeyses) and apply to it preexisting terms (e.g., bulwerkes) borrowed from the idioms of warfare. If the English had continued to improvise this type of temporary fortification, and had they come to view it as a standard tactic worthy of note, they might have been expected to devise a new word to describe it or modify the meaning of one already in existence. In reality, though the conflict that gave rise to this hostile confrontation across the London bridge on October 30, 1425, lasted well into the following year, I have found no evidence to indicate that the protagonists made any further use of such structures, introduced a new term to refer to them, or conceived of their having a history of their own. They exhibited, in short, no barricade consciousness.

I have already argued that impromptu barricades built on the fly by civilian insurgents need to be distinguished from planned structures methodically erected by trained troops, corps of sappers and military engineers, or government commissions. But barricade construction is also different from the unthinking impulse that anyone might have when confronted by a mortal threat, to take shelter behind whatever protective cover happens to be available. Building a barricade implies collaboration in a witting act whose shared meaning is most clearly and straightforwardly conveyed by use of that particular label to designate it.

Tracing the etymology and early usage of that term will prove helpful in later chapters in establishing the origin and pattern of dissemination of the barricade itself. At present, I only hope to show that we are dealing with a unitary practice

by pointing to the common origins of the words used in the European languages spoken in each city where at least one barricade event had occurred by the end of the nineteenth century. In every case, the local expression was either identical to the French original (for example, *barricade* in English and Flemish) or some close approximation (*Barrikade* in German, *barricata* in Italian, *barricada* in Spanish, *barikáda* in Czech, *baricadă* in Romanian, *barikád* in Hungarian, and *barykada* in Polish).³² The evidence suggests that the object, like the words used to signify it, was a product of diffusion rather than independent invention, and we need to consider the likelihood that this consistency in language is indicative of still more deeply rooted patterns of recurrence.

REPERTOIRES AND ROUTINES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

The concept of the “repertoire of collective action” was introduced into historical discourse by Charles Tilly in the 1970s.³³ At its core lies the observation that any given population tends to choose from a fairly limited and well-established set of alternative methods for organizing its protest activities.³⁴ Rather than invent techniques *de novo*, groups typically revert to one of a handful of familiar options, even when those might be less than ideally suited to achieving the desired outcome.³⁵ For example, in the present-day American context, the demonstration and the sit-in are widely recognized techniques of contention. University students who wish to protest some institutional policy are likely to adopt these or similarly recognizable tactics as a way of making their point (even if a novel approach could be shown to hold promise of an improved likelihood of success). Regardless of size or level of sophistication, groups seeking to lodge claims or effect change in this society are inclined to favor familiar techniques of protest—for example, those previously employed by the Civil Rights, anti-war, feminist, environmental, and other highly visible movements known to participants.

The collection of all such methods in use at any given time and place constitutes a population’s repertoire. Like its theatrical equivalent, the notion implies a group of actors capable of staging performances based on the availability of key resources (material, conceptual, organizational, etc.) as well as on the possession of culturally transmitted knowledge or, in some cases, prior experience.³⁶ Noting that social protest can rarely be scripted down to its minutest details, Tilly has also likened it to a game involving a set of underlying rules, around which a considerable degree of extemporization is permitted, or to the improvisation of a jazz ensemble around a basic theme. Just as with a

musical riff, the process implies a “paradoxical combination of ritual and flexibility,” in which neither element is allowed to completely dominate the other, lest the performance lose either its trenchancy or its effectiveness.³⁷

Tilly’s extrapolation from the characteristics of theatrical repertoires formalized an insight that came naturally to observers of revolutionary upheaval in nineteenth-century France. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon was among those who interpreted the February Days in this light: “Carried away by the intoxication of our historical novels, we took part in a rehearsal based on August 10 [1792,] and July 29 [1830]. Without being aware of it, we all became the characters in a play.”³⁸ Almost identical observations were penned by Alexis de Tocqueville and Heinrich Heine, both present at the overthrow of the Orléanist monarchy.³⁹ The simple truth that all of these authors were trying to convey concerned the remarkable continuities or rhythms of return that characterize even the most turbulent historical episodes. Tilly’s concept of the repertoire of contention helped refocus attention on this underlying logic of collective action and contributed toward a more systematic and revealing examination of the powerful cultural currents that influence the choices people make even in moments of acute upheaval.

Obviously, barricade construction is just one component of such an all-inclusive repertoire. It corresponds to what I have called a “routine”—a sequence of loosely prescribed behaviors that help define the roles and constrain the actions of participants. To sustain the analogy to the theater, we might say that routines—being rooted in concrete situations that impose a unity of time and place—tend to resemble the acts of a classical play. This sort of repertoiral conduct is so striking because the actors appear to be working from a script, even though it is one that has never been written down; and because they are manifestly collaborating in a joint production for which there could never have been a formal rehearsal, not just because the authorities would bring down the curtain with brutal repression but also because most participants have never previously met.

The food riot was just such a routine. During the subsistence crises that periodically plagued European societies during the early modern period, an anxious crowd might gather outside a baker’s shop, reacting in anger to the news of another jump in the price of bread or to the low quality of the goods on offer. Rather than lash out at random, participants, most of them women, were more likely to follow a set routine that involved seizing control of the establishment, chasing the proprietor from behind the counter, and proceeding to sell the remaining stock to the other customers at what they considered the “just

price.”⁴⁰ Members of the general public were capable of reproducing stock elements of such routines with great fidelity, whether the historical setting was fourteenth-century England or eighteenth-century France.⁴¹ Whether the behavior in question involved the tax revolts or shaming ceremonies (*charivaris*) of the Old Regime—or, in more modern times, the strike, the demonstration, or even the “media event” of the present day—complex sequences of protest activities could be acted out with a bare minimum of formal organization. The construction of barricades, and the constellation of insurrectionary activities that typically accompanied the practice, became an accepted part of French contention.

TOWARD A WORKING DEFINITION OF THE BARRICADE

What, then, constitutes a barricade and, by extension, a barricade event? Since nothing so simple as a list of prescribed materials can serve to rule specific structures into or out of consideration, we need to highlight the process whereby insurgents spontaneously joined in collective action, even as they interacted with the representatives of the social order they were seeking to overthrow.⁴² In the most straightforward examples, participants engaged in self-conscious acts of rebellion, often signaled by the repetition of seditious cries, political slogans, or demands for reform, but most succinctly communicated by their decision to build barricades, explicitly so named, as a method of challenging the authorities. To summarize these key considerations, let us adopt the following provisional definition:

A barricade is an improvised structure, built and defended by civilian insurgents as a means of laying claim to urban space and mobilizing against military or police forces representing the constituted authorities. In the clearest examples, contemporary observers and/or the insurgents themselves will explicitly label such a structure a barricade, though their reversion to recognizable patterns of behavior long associated with barricade construction may also be sufficient to confirm the attribution.

By extension, a “barricade event” is any insurrectionary episode that involves the construction, on one or more consecutive days, in a single or adjacent towns, of any number of barricades.

We are now equipped to go in search of the original barricade.

The First Barricades

That [day in May 1588] taught Parisians the authentic method of fortifying themselves, each in his own quarter, far more sturdily and securely with barricades of this kind than by simply extending and stretching the chains. And you can well believe that even with the gates wide open, a hundred thousand men would have been unable to take the city by force.

ANONYMOUS

The search for origins comes naturally to historians, presumably because they attach special significance to the logic of temporality. Believing that the course of human affairs is influenced by all that went before, they are inclined to trace events back to the circumstances of their beginning in an effort to understand their import.

Unfortunately, unraveling the fabric of history runs the risk of disrupting the semblance of coherence it presents to the world. A seemingly straightforward innovation may prove, on inquiry, to have assumed many guises. Each variation has, in turn, multiple points of origin, each with plausible but competing claims to precedence. Their paths of development, once reconstructed, turn out to be, not linear and continuous, but rather full of starts and stops, and these converge and combine in ways that further confound efforts to sort them out. Whether the historian's subject is the stirrup and moldboard plow or the photographic image, the attempt to settle the question of origins in a definitive way often proves futile.¹

Still, even when it proves impossible to settle the question once and for all, the search for origins can be an instructive exercise, if only for what it tells us about how history is written. In the case of the barricade, historians of France had arrived, by the late 1700s, at a consensual account of its invention. Over the

next half century, popular histories even added romanticized engravings depicting the crucial moment of creation. The simplicity and drama of this story may have lent itself to retelling, but on close inspection, the consecrated version more nearly resembles an origin myth than well-documented historical fact. In the interest of restoring some of the complexity lost in the process of mythification, I will present alternative accounts of the barricade's beginnings in reverse chronological order, begging the reader's indulgence for the fact that as we recede in time, the question of origins inevitably becomes more nebulous.

VERSION 1: THE FIRST DAY OF THE BARRICADES, MAY 12–13, 1588

There is a certain comfort in being able to assign a precise date and location to an event of historical moment. The standard history of the barricade allows us to do still better, by specifying the individual widely credited with the invention of this novel technique of urban insurrection. Though Guillaume Girard could already claim in the middle of the seventeenth century that “all the world has heard of the barricades of Paris,” even today few will be familiar with the exploits of Charles II de Cossé, comte de Brissac, or with his role in the religious conflicts that beset France in the sixteenth century.²

From its beginnings in the German and Swiss states, the Protestant Reformation's progress across western Europe was uneven. Its early successes came mainly in the north, notably in the Netherlands and England, whose rulers' attitude toward religious nonconformism was relatively tolerant. Spain and Italy became, on the contrary, strongholds of orthodox Catholicism, doing their utmost to suppress heresy in whatever form it appeared. France was intermediate in doctrinal as well as geographic terms. Even before the spread of Martin Luther's example, Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples developed an indigenous strain of Reformed thought and had already printed a vernacular version of the New Testament by 1523.

A vigorous reaction, emanating from Paris, wiped out that first wave of French Protestantism; but it was followed in the 1540s and 1550s by a second, based on the teachings of John Calvin. This too was the object of intense persecution, initially carried out by the Paris *parlement*, which condemned scores of Huguenots to death. This culminated in the Saint Bartholomew's Day massacre of 1572, which claimed the lives of more than 2,000.³ Among those present in the French capital was Henri de Bourbon, ruler of Navarre, a kingdom that spanned the slopes of the Pyrenees mountains between Spain and France,

who was spared only because he agreed to convert on the spot to what the Church faithful called the “Catholic, apostolic, and Roman religion.”

For the remainder of the sixteenth century, wars of religion dominated European politics. One obvious manifestation was the bitter rivalry between Spain and England, countries separated not only by religious differences but also by their desire for naval, colonial, and commercial supremacy. But Spain, which was struggling to maintain its foothold in the Netherlands, was increasingly at odds with France as well. In 1574, as these two great Catholic powers were teetering on the brink of war, the French king died and was succeeded by his younger brother, Henri de Valois, who assumed the throne as Henri III.

Though the new king married in the year following his accession, he would remain without an heir.⁴ As a result, France became polarized around the question of who would succeed Henri III. The heir apparent was his brother François d’Alençon, who headed the faction known as the Politiques, which favored an accommodation with the Protestants. Worse yet, from the point of view of Catholics, the king’s cousin and brother-in-law was next in line—the very same Henri de Bourbon, who had relapsed into heresy since his conversion at the time of the Saint-Bartholomew massacre. Even the king himself was suspect, having settled the civil war that broke out soon after he ascended the throne on terms deemed favorable to Protestants, who were granted territorial concessions and freedom of worship (except in the region surrounding Paris). Many Catholics wondered whether Henri III might be a misguided Protestant sympathizer, if not an undeclared heretic in his own right.⁵

In reaction, defenders of the Church formed the Holy League (or Holy Union) in 1576. It began as an association of cities, dedicated to reestablishing Catholicism as the exclusive religion of France. Though Henri III insisted on becoming titular head of this coalition in a futile effort to control its activities, its animating spirit was Henri de Lorraine, duc de Guise. The League’s immediate objectives were to undo the recent peace accord, aggressively pursue the war against the Huguenots, and exclude Henri de Navarre from the succession. With time, it also hoped to get the government to submit to the control of the Estates General, which it expected to be dominated by proponents of the Catholic cause. This effort to limit the power of the central state gave the alliance something of an anti-absolutist tenor.

Though Henri III managed to ignore certain League demands—for example, that he set up an inquisition that would help fund military expenses by confiscating the property of Protestants—he was forced to appease this powerful coalition by resuming the war against Navarre and convoking the Estates

General toward the end of 1576. When, however, a new peace was signed in September 1577, Henri seized this opportunity to disband the Holy Union.

Though compromise and temporization served him well in moderating opposition over the next few years, the death in 1584 of François d'Alençon meant that Navarre had become the presumptive heir. The prospect of a Protestant king fanned the flames of Catholic fanaticism and led to the reconstitution of the Holy Union. This second League boldly made an agreement with Philip II of Spain and the pope that would have resulted in the crown of France eventually passing to the duc de Guise. This attempt to exclude Navarre's claim to the throne, along with Henri III's rejection of the offer of direct Spanish assistance in the campaign to extirpate French Protestantism, produced the War of the Three Henris, or Henriade. The differences among the protagonists (and the constituencies they represented) tell us a great deal about the age in which they lived.

Rivals for the Throne of France

In 1585, Henri de Lorraine, both a brilliant general and standard-bearer of the ultra-Catholic cause, enjoyed more enthusiastic popular support in most French cities than the king himself. This was notably the case in Paris, where his advocacy on behalf of the Estates General was interpreted, however naively, as support for the principle of popular sovereignty. Though there can be no doubt that Guise was committed to the triumph of the Catholic faith and the annihilation of French Protestants, these objectives also served his personal ambitions, which almost certainly included the desire to succeed the king and perhaps to supplant him outright. His two great victories over Protestant forces at Vimory and Auneau in the fall of 1587, though not militarily decisive, so enhanced Guise's standing in the eyes of the Catholic majority that the king was helpless to prevent him from recruiting a vast army, headquartered in Soissons, a hundred miles northeast of Paris. Ostensibly intended to pursue the war against Navarre, this force represented a direct threat to the king's authority.

The position of Henri de Bourbon was nearly the polar opposite. Reviled by most French subjects as a heretic, he was obliged to wage a largely defensive struggle against the combined royal and Leaguer armies on one flank, and their Spanish allies on the other.⁶ In October 1587, a series of adroit diversionary tactics enabled him to defeat a force commanded by the duc de Joyeuse, at Coutras, near Bordeaux. To Navarre's disappointment, he was unable to capitalize on this victory by convincing Henri III that he and Guise should be left to work out their differences without the intervention of the king's own army.⁷

Even more dispiriting, his success actually had the effect of resuscitating the campaign against the Huguenots. Yet, however dim his prospects might have appeared, Navarre's victory also rekindled the rivalry between the French king and the duc de Guise, which would ultimately assure their mutual destruction.

For his part, Henri de Valois, though he ruled the most populous nation in Europe, could not escape constant reminders of the limits of his power. For the past decade, his efforts to promote policies of religious toleration had proved largely ineffectual. Though he had arguably done more even than Guise, the great military hero, to prevent German and Swiss intervention on behalf of French Protestants,⁸ he earned only scorn from League supporters and was unable to prevent Guise from recruiting a powerful private army. He had also failed to moderate the high price of bread or to contain periodic riots, some in the capital itself, provoked by supply crises. In all his activities, he was hampered by a chronic shortage of revenues, despite a level of taxation that was already so high that any further increase was sure to cause widespread protest. His reliance on favorites like Jean-Louis de Nogaret de La Valette, whom he made duc d'Epemon, Baron René de Villequier, and Marquis François d'O intensified the hatred of League sympathizers, who despised them for their tolerance of Protestantism, corrupt practices, or debauched personal conduct. Henri III had little room for maneuver, trapped as he was between French Huguenots and their allies the Politiques on the one hand, and Catholic extremists, most of whom were concentrated in the major cities, on the other. Because he was not strong enough, personally or militarily, to force either side into submission, his inclination during the crisis of 1588 was to offer compromises to his enemies in the hope that time would allow him to gain the upper hand.

The Paris Sixteen

In March 1587, residents of the French capital had received an unwelcome reminder of what it could mean to live under a Protestant monarch. The bells of Notre-Dame summoned them to a mass for the repose of the soul of Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots. After eighteen years of captivity, this former queen of France had been beheaded by order of Queen Elizabeth of England, from whom she had once sought asylum. Mary was the niece of the duc de Guise, and her execution drove his ultra-Catholic supporters into paroxysms of rage.⁹

As a hotbed of anti-Protestant sentiment and the hub of the Holy Union's network of rebellious cities, it was perhaps natural for Paris to have spawned a local association, the Sixteen, that operated at times in parallel to, and at times

independently of the League itself.¹⁰ Its leaders, a mix of local magistrates and sharply partisan clerics, conducted a relentless propaganda campaign against the royal administration and the king's chief favorite, d'Epernon. Indeed, representatives of the Sixteen gradually usurped the authority of both royal and municipal officials by levying taxes, raising armies, and setting policy for the Paris region with little effective oversight. Though strictly local in scope, the Sixteen's political influence in the capital of the realm meant that its actions had national repercussions. In 1587, it addressed a series of appeals to sister cities within the Holy Union. Its manifesto called for a collective response to the threat of invasion by a German Protestant army and an independent resolution to the problem of royal succession.¹¹

The leaders of the Sixteen also hatched several plots against the person of Henri III himself. Of these conspiracies to kidnap or do away with the king, few ever got beyond the planning stage and none succeeded. Indeed, we know of their existence thanks only to the presence, in the innermost circles of the Sixteen, of a spy named Nicolas Poulain, who was reporting their every move directly to the king.¹² Poulain testified that, as each successive plot came to grief, the Paris Sixteen became ever more desperate to contrive a new course of action that would forestall discovery of their earlier treason. It was this dynamic that propelled them toward a plan for the general insurrection of May 1588.¹³



FIGURE 6. A panoramic view of Paris in the sixteenth century: an engraving by Arthur Hauger, “6^e Tableau du Diorama—Vue d’ensemble de Paris au XVI^e siècle—Journée des Barricades, 12 mai 1588,” Hist PC 001C: 86 CAR 1046, Cabinet des arts graphiques, Musée Carnavalet, Paris. To the best of my knowledge, no contemporaneous image of the First Day of the Barricades, May 12, 1588, has survived. The oldest representations of the 1588 events that we do possess date from the nineteenth century, an era in which barricade consciousness had reached its height. This artist’s rendering shows what Paris may have looked like on that morning. In the middle ground, stretching across the river in front of the Ile de la Cité, are the foundations of the Pont-Neuf, then in the process of construction. Barely discernable in the left foreground, residents have built a barricade on the ramparts of the quays. Unfortunately, the image presents us with a mix of aesthetic and historical compromises. For example, from this peripheral vantage point (facing east, or upstream) it was possible to present a sweeping panorama of the city; but, in order to make the barricades visible (just barely, I am afraid, in the much reduced format that book reproduction imposes), they had to be situated in an outlying location on the right bank of the Seine rather than in the crowded districts of the left bank, where the initial confrontations occurred.

Guise Precipitates the Crisis

The king, fully informed of these machinations, tried to prevent simmering passions in the capital from reaching the boiling point by forbidding Guise from entering the city.¹⁴ The Sixteen, meanwhile, were insistently urging the duke to come without delay, convinced that his mere presence would assure the success of a Parisian uprising. When he in fact arrived, around midday on May 9, the news spread like wildfire, and a crowd estimated at 30,000 gathered along his route to shower the leader of the Holy League with expressions of affection and acclaim.¹⁵ Guise proceeded directly to the residence of the queen mother, and it was through her intercession that he was able to obtain an immediate audience with the king.¹⁶ En route to the Louvre, the people again turned out in throngs, shouting, “Long live Guise! Long live the pillar of the Church!” and treating him as their savior.¹⁷

LEGEND Events of 1588

Notre Dame (1)
Ile de la Cité (2)
Pont-Neuf (3)
Louvre (4)
Hôtel de Guise (5)
Faubourg Saint-Denis (6)
Place Maubert (7)
Petit Châtelet (8)
Cemetery of Saints-Innocents (9)
Tuileries (10)
Bastille (11)
Hôtel de Ville (12)
Palais de Justice (13)


Events of 1648 *(including path of royal procession from Palais-Royal to Notre Dame)*

Notre Dame (1)

Palais-Royal (14)
Palais de Justice (13)
Ile de la Cité (2)
Porte Saint-Honoré (15)
Rue Saint-Honoré (16)
Pont-Neuf (3)
Pont Saint-Michel (17)
Quai des Grands Augustins (18)
Grand Châtelet (19)
Rue de l'Arbre-sec (20)
Porte Saint-Denis (21)
Faubourg Saint-Antoine (22)
Bastille (11)
Porte Saint-Antoine (23)

Events of 1789-95

Hôtel de Ville (12)
Faubourg Saint-Denis (6)
Bastille (11)
National Convention (24)
Faubourg Saint-Antoine (22)
Panthéon (25)
The “Whiff of Grapeshot” in Vendémiaire (26)



MAP 3. Parisian landmarks, listed in the order they are mentioned in [chapters 2–4](#), denoting key locations in the barricade events of 1588, 1648, and 1789–1795. The underlying map is used with the kind permission of Historic Urban Plans, Inc., Ithaca, New York, USA.

The reception Guise received from Henri III was an entirely different matter. The king was livid with anger. He immediately demanded that Guise explain his disobedience. Guise claimed both that he felt obliged to come to defend himself against the scurrilous attacks of his enemies who appeared to have convinced the king of his treasonous intent; and that he had never understood the king to have formally barred him from the capital.¹⁸ Perhaps realizing what a powerful irritant his sole presence was proving to the king, he then hastened back to the Hôtel de Guise, his Paris residence, for a meeting with representatives of the Sixteen and a few of his trusted lieutenants.¹⁹

Having defied the will of the king with impunity and having now gathered his forces, Guise arrived for a second audience on Tuesday, May 10, with an escort of 400 well-armed men. Such a show of strength was not calculated to place the

king at ease nor to encourage a reconciliation.²⁰ Indeed, at a third meeting, held on the following day at the queen mother's residence, strained relations degenerated into recriminations and reproaches. Unable to get the king to agree to a convocation of the Estates General, which he expected to be able to dominate, Guise was forced to reconsider alternatives to peaceful persuasion.

The king had also made his preparations. In normal times he relied solely on a personal bodyguard, the "Forty-five," and a few hundred royal guardsmen to maintain order in Paris, a city of a quarter million residents. As a precaution, he had, as early as May 5, reinforced the guard around the Louvre and summoned 2,000 French and 4,000 Swiss guardsmen, all seasoned troops, to the faubourg Saint-Denis, just outside what were then the boundaries of the city proper.²¹ On May 9, the day that Guise arrived in the capital, the Paris militia was placed on alert, and inhabitants were forbidden to leave their homes with arms other than a sword or a dagger on their persons.²² Reports that Guise's men were continuing to drift into the city caused the king to order militia colonels to mount a strict guard on the city gates and conduct searches at all inns and rooming houses for "vagabonds and strangers." By May 11, as prospects for an amicable accommodation with Guise appeared to vanish, Henri III attempted to reclaim the initiative in this test of wills by ordering an "extremely meticulous search" of all private dwellings early the next morning.²³ Those unable to establish that they were habitual residents would have their arms and horses confiscated. Because members of the bourgeois militia refused to serve outside the quarter where they lived, responsibility for carrying out these searches fell to the Swiss and Royal guards who had recently been stationed in the suburbs of the city. It was their entry into the capital at 5 A.M. on May 12 that provoked the rebellion known as the Day of the Barricades.

Paris Takes Up Arms

The king's action represented a violation of customary practice and local privilege. The capital had long been protected by a ban on the billeting of troops within the city limits, and its residents took enormous pride in the fact that its home-bred militia retained the exclusive right to police their neighborhoods. When residents awoke on May 12 to find that the king's guards had taken up positions throughout the capital, it simply confirmed the disturbing rumors that had been circulating, with the connivance of the Sixteen, since the beginning of the month. The king, it was said, intended to establish a permanent garrison in the capital and use it to arrest prominent Parisians and have them hanged as examples of what was in store for rebellious subjects. One of the king's

lieutenants had supposedly been overheard making scarcely veiled threats about what his men would do to the wives and daughters of those found concealing prohibited weapons.²⁴

Parisians considered the “new and unaccustomed spectacle” of 6,000 elite soldiers occupying the bridges, squares, and marketplaces of their city a provocation.²⁵ Merchants and workshop owners closed their doors, as knots of apprehensive residents gathered in the streets to discuss recent developments and consider their options. René de Villequier, the governor of Paris, made the rounds of the city insisting that shops reopen, but compliance was grudging and lasted only as long as the king’s guards remained in sight.

Faced with this intrusion, Parisians reverted to a pattern more than two centuries old. In anticipation of civil unrest, residents assembled in their neighborhoods and proceeded to “stretch the chains.” This involved lifting and extending a length of heavy iron links, one end of which was solidly anchored in the masonry of a corner building, and the other end of which could be fastened to a hook similarly embedded in a wall or a pillar on the opposite side of the street. By strategically locating a few such roadblocks at the main entry points to their neighborhood, inhabitants could bar access to interlopers by taking up positions behind the chains (see [fig. 10](#) on [p. 61](#)). In many quarters, the chains were stretched each night, but at the first sign of a public disturbance, they might also be deployed in daylight hours.²⁶

What happened next was, however, no part of the customary pattern. According to contemporary chroniclers, Charles II de Cossé, comte de Brissac, one of Guise’s most trusted advisors, directed supporters in the place Maubert to reinforce the line of demarcation represented by the chains by filling barrels with earth and paving stones. “The bourgeois from around the Saint-Séverin crossing had been stirred up and assisted by the comte de Brissac, who had arrived in the university quarter early that morning, armed the students, and caused them to build the first barricades near the rue Saint-Jacques and the quarter around the place Maubert,” a contemporary historian noted.²⁷ They thus created a formidable obstacle, capable of withstanding an assault by the king’s soldiers ([fig. 7](#)). By 9 A.M., the entire Latin quarter was studded with these structures, and Brissac had been immortalized as the inventor of the barricade.²⁸

The tactic proved decisive. A contingent of the Swiss Guard led by Louis de Crillon, one of the king’s most zealous men-at-arms, had been ordered to occupy the place Maubert. Their advance was halted by the fortifications the people had built at the Saint-Séverin crossing.²⁹ Under fire from the barricades themselves

and from the windows of adjoining buildings, the troops were forced to withdraw after four of their number had been killed and many others disarmed.³⁰ Word of this success quickly spread, and by noon, the rest of the city had followed the example set by Brissac. By nightfall, the issue had been decided: for the first time, the people of Paris had used barricades to carry out an armed insurrection.



FIGURE 7. Charles II de Cossé, comte de Brissac, presiding over barricade building in 1588. This somewhat allegorical nineteenth-century woodcut evokes Brissac's legendary role in the First Day of the Barricades. The barricade

consists primarily of loose paving stones, along with a piece of furniture and a wheeled vehicle—elements more characteristic of the barricades of later centuries. The artist has, however, included a barrel and even an iron chain (although connected only to a broken post). Genouillac [c. 1880?] n.d., 2: opposite [p. 92](#).

VERSIONS 2 AND 3: PLANNING FOR THE FIRST BARRICADES

The story I have told thus far may seem straightforward. It recounts an initiative taken on a specific date in 1588, at a specific location in Paris, by an individual whose life is relatively well documented. But sorting out the confusing flow of historical events is rarely so simple. And so it proves in the case of the first barricades.

The Role of Oudin de Crucé

Brissac's claim to precedence as originator of this tactic can only be sustained if we ignore other, discordant accounts of how the first barricades were conceived. The chronicler Pierre Palma Cayet (1525–1610) makes no more than offhand mention of Brissac, focusing instead on preparations begun long in advance of the actual outbreak:

In accordance with a decision agreed to more than a year earlier, [the followers of the Sixteen] made barricades everywhere in the vicinity of the university and as far afield as the Petit Châtelet. And as the king's guards had posted sentinels along one side of the street, Crucé positioned musketeers along the other. As soon as certain members of the Sixteen who lived in the rue Neuve saw that the Swiss guards were taking up positions in the Marché Neuf, they had the chain stretched across the rue Neuve Notre-Dame and lined it with barrels. The members of their faction—and there were many in those quarters—all immediately manned this barricade with muskets and showed the Swiss, just by their bearing, that the guardsmen would do better to withdraw.³¹

This version does single out a specific individual, Oudin de Crucé, a prosecutor at the Châtelet, as having exercised some personal responsibility for the uprising, but not specifically in connection with building barricades.³² Instead, that construction process was overseen by unnamed local members of the Sixteen, who had the presence of mind to issue orders to reinforce the chains, thus resulting in the first barricade.

The 1587 Council of War

While Cayet alludes vaguely to these ringleaders, he also points in a completely

different direction by referencing a decision made early in 1587 that provided the framework for insurgent activities on the Day of the Barricades. Unfortunately, he offers few details on the nature of that arrangement. For that we must turn to the only witness who has provided an insider's perspective on the earlier conspiracies of the Paris League.

We have already made the acquaintance of Nicolas Poulain, who was recruited into the highest echelons of the organization plotting against the king, only to betray its secret workings to the intended victim. Because the deposition which he recorded in the summer of 1588 was a justification of his personal conduct as well as a recounting of events, it deserves to be viewed with a skeptical eye. Poulain was, however, uniquely placed. No one else who had intimate knowledge of what transpired in the inner circles of the Sixteen was inclined, then or later, to discuss the experience. His account contains a great deal of circumstantial detail, some of which can be verified in the narratives of other authors, making it an invaluable source on the clandestine activities of the ultra-Catholic faction.³³

Most of Poulain's narrative recounts the half-dozen preliminary plots against the king that partisans of the Holy League in Paris tried to carry out. He notes that, in the final months of 1586, the Sixteen, again fearful that their treasonous projects of the past two years were about to be discovered and punished, began pressing the Holy League to take immediate action. When the leaders of the national organization proved reluctant to precipitate a direct confrontation with the king, the Paris Sixteen considered whether a bold stroke in the capital might not succeed in forcing the rest of France to follow its lead. Local militants initially proposed an abduction. This plan was rejected by their aristocratic allies in the League on grounds "that a king is not taken in this way, that it could not be done with causing a stir, and that if it could be done, it would require a prince of mark to carry it off."³⁴ The objection was sufficient to cause the plan to be set aside pending the long-hoped-for visit of the duc de Guise.

In the event, it was Guise's brother, the duc de Mayenne, who came to Paris in February 1587, fresh from new military triumphs against the Huguenots in Guyenne. Within hours of his arrival, the leaders of the Paris Sixteen had gathered at Mayenne's temporary residence. They shared with him their concerns, and he promised them the full support of the House of Lorraine. In the days that followed, this group laid plans for the capture of the city's major strong points in case of a general insurrection. The plotters' single-minded focus on prisons, forts, and arsenals aroused concern in some quarters over how the general population might react. It was pointed out that as many as 6,000 to 7,000

thieves and common laborers were to be found in the city at any given time.³⁵ Since the conspirators could hardly take advance precautions without betraying their intention of fomenting an insurrection, they needed a plan that would prevent disorderly elements from taking advantage of the suspension of normal police and military control by pillaging the city. The concept of the barricade was intended as a response to this prospect of popular anarchy. Poulain describes the scenario the conspirators conjured up in these terms:



FIGURE 8. Building a Holy League barricade in 1588. Like [figure 7](#), this latter-day image is allegorical. It simultaneously shows how barricades were built and

conveys their association with the Catholic cause. Anquetil [1805] 1851, 393.

This gang [of lawless individuals] would be like a snowball, growing ever larger [as it rolled along], and would finally bring ruin and total confusion both to the enterprise and to those who had initiated it. Following this advice, which seemed weighty and very pertinent, the invention of barricades was proposed, discussed, and approved. As finally agreed upon, the chains would be stretched, barrels full of earth would be placed so as to prevent passage and, once the password had been given out, no one would be allowed to pass through the streets unless he knew the word and the sign. Everyone would construct barricades in their own quarter according to the instructions that would be sent to them.³⁶

Poulain goes on to say that barricades were also expected to prevent members of the nobility housed in different parts of the capital from coming to the aid of the monarchy. Though he did not assign responsibility to any particular individual for having conceived the idea, the obvious candidate was Mayenne, a professional soldier with years of experience in combat at close quarters and the individual who presided over this secret meeting. It could, however, just as easily have come from one or more members of the Sixteen, who were arguably more familiar with the constricted layout of the early-modern capital and more attuned to the demands of leading the insurgent population of Paris in a civil conflict.

We are unlikely ever to know who came up with the original idea for the simple reason that, since the proposed 1587 uprising never took place, none of the other participants ever had occasion to record the details of the plot. Poulain seemed to suggest that the principal reason for its postponement was the tightening of security that followed his own betrayal of the League's early plans to the king.³⁷ Indeed, through the spring of 1588, each new intrigue—however carefully nurtured—had to be abandoned when it became apparent that the king remained one step ahead of the conspirators. Eventually, the Sixteen concluded that they harbored a traitor within their ranks, and attempts were made to smoke him out.³⁸ In the final analysis, what led to Parisians' building the first barricades was not a deliberate plan but an impulse on the part of the duc de Guise.

Aftermath of the Day of the Barricades

Despite all the high-grade intelligence provided by his personal spy, Henri III was thus, in the end, unable to prevent the insurrection that would drive him from his capital. The insurrection united all segments of the population against him, and, according to one eyewitness, "In no time at all, everyone had stretched

the chains and made barricades at the corners of the streets. The artisan put aside his tools, the merchant his business, the university its books, the prosecutors their briefcases, the lawyers their *cornettes*, and even the presidents and councilors [of the Paris *parlement*] took up halberds.”³⁹ The crowd that built and defended the barricades was mixed in age and gender as well as class origins. Youth predominated, and accounts single out students for the conspicuous role they played, but sources also note the presence of old men carrying weapons and reproaching their younger colleagues for having waited so long to “dispatch these foreigners.”⁴⁰ Some observers called attention to the presence of women and children, who appeared at windows to rain down tiles they had dislodged from the roof or paving stones they had carried up from the street.⁴¹

The king had placed the Swiss Guard at a fatal disadvantage by forbidding “all his men from drawing their swords more than halfway, on pain of death, hoping that temporizing, along with soft and pretty words, would tame the fury of the rebels and little by little disarm this foolish people.”⁴² Insurgents raised their barricades, sometimes no more than thirty feet away from royal guardsmen, who looked on, “though they could easily have prevented it.”⁴³ Troops stationed in the Cemetery of Saints-Innocents had to stand by and watch as insurgents manning a nearby barricade intercepted a shipment of bread and wine intended for the soldiers and proceeded to eat and drink these spoils right before their eyes. Asked whether he was comfortable with his men’s position, a captain in the king’s service complained that he was not, “because the *prévôt de marchands* [i.e., the mayor], who had assured the king of [the support of] thirty thousand residents, was doing a poor job of keeping his word, for he [the captain] was beginning to realize that the thirty were on his side and the thousand on Guise’s.”⁴⁴

By midday on May 12, resistance to the initial deployment of soldiers had grown so spirited that all the king’s forces had to be recalled to the Louvre. However, even retreat proved difficult, because any troop movement necessarily involved highly charged confrontations with insurgents. The deadliest collision of the day took place not far from the banks of the Seine on the Ile de la Cité.⁴⁵

That scene bears comparison to the 1832 insurrection recounted in the previous chapter. With Swiss guardsmen and crowd members drawn up face to face, a shot again rang out from an unknown quarter. What makes the sixteenth-century episode stand out, however, is that the troops were the ones to suffer the reversal of fortune. Isolated and vastly outnumbered, their ranks were decimated by the civilian population. Forbidden to defend themselves, many Swiss threw

down their weapons, some even pulling scapulars from beneath their tunics and crying out in broken French, “Good Christians!” in the hope of obtaining mercy from the crowd.⁴⁶ Estimates of casualties ranged from twenty to sixty dead, and from twenty-five to as many as eighty wounded, almost entirely among the king’s soldiers.⁴⁷

With this disastrous turn of events, the king was forced to swallow his pride and send repeated messages to Guise pleading that he intervene to pacify the crowd and spare the royal guardsmen. Guise initially demurred, claiming that it was beyond his power to control the “rampaging bulls” who had taken over the streets.⁴⁸ But he soon consented to make a tour of the city to help secure the release of the Swiss guardsmen who had been taken captive. As he made his way through the central districts, he was greeted by shouts of “Long live Guise!” on all sides. Perhaps because he was still in the presence of the king’s emissary, he felt obliged to respond by saying, “My friends, you’ll be the ruin of me. Shout instead, ‘Long live the king!’”⁴⁹

On the morning of May 13, Henri III acceded to the main demand of the Parisians by promising to withdraw all but his normal complement of soldiers to a distance of seven leagues from the capital. He made this concession contingent upon Parisians dismantling their barricades and relinquishing their weapons, but the level of distrust among residents was so high that they refused to comply until the troops had already departed.⁵⁰ The king was thus compelled to accept yet another humiliation and to run the added risk of falling into the hands of his enemies by ordering his forces to leave the city at midday.

In the judgment of Pasquier, “the morning, until 10 A.M., was the king’s; the rest of the day belonged to the duc de Guise.”⁵¹ It was the construction of barricades that had enabled Parisian insurgents to effect this dramatic shift in the balance of power in the span of a few hours. But the fortunes of the principal actors had not yet ceased to vacillate. By the afternoon of May 13, the king received reports that new barricades were being constructed in the immediate proximity of the Louvre, and that some insurgents were preparing to storm this stronghold and effectively take him prisoner. Whether as a ruse or in a final effort to strike a compromise, Henri sent his mother, Catherine de Médicis, to speak with Guise.⁵² She initially set out to cross Paris in her coach, but soon had to abandon it in favor of a sedan chair when the insurgents proved unwilling to remove more than “one barrel per barricade” to allow her to pass.⁵³ When she at last arrived, Guise’s intransigent attitude quickly convinced her that no accommodation was possible. She then dispatched her companion, Secretary of

State Claude Pinart, to warn the king that he was in danger and recommend that he flee the capital.⁵⁴

As if he were taking his customary evening promenade, Henri III strolled from the Louvre to the Tuileries gardens. His true objective was the royal stable, where, accompanied by a handful of his closest advisors and a contingent of the Swiss Guard, he set out on horseback for the Porte-Neuve on the road to Saint-Cloud. But he did not make his escape without suffering the final indignity of having forty rebel harquebusiers fire on the royal party from the guard post at the porte de Nesle. Henri's parting gesture was to turn back upon Paris and curse it for its ingratitude, swearing to himself that he would never enter the city again except as commander of a full-scale military assault.⁵⁵

The "King of Paris" Takes Command

Guise gave this spur-of-the-moment assessment to the queen mother, still present when he learned of Henri III's departure: "This means my death, Madame. While Your Majesty entertains me, the king runs off and seals my fate." Guise's analysis would prove accurate. In one bold stroke, Henri III's timely withdrawal accomplished a dramatic reversal. The League was denied the critical advantage it had hoped to gain from the Day of the Barricades: the king's capture, or at least a degree of control over his movements and actions. But though Henri had managed to retain his independence, it would be months before he was in a position to act assertively. While the League rapidly consolidated its control over the capital, the king continued to give ground to his rival, whom he ironically called the "king of Paris."

Though the queen mother remained behind in the city as the king's representative, and though Guise made a consistent show of respecting royal prerogatives and maintaining the outward forms of monarchical authority, it was clear to all parties that in the aftermath of the barricades, "nothing took place except by order of the duke."⁵⁶ This de facto seizure of power operated at several levels. To begin with, a word from the leader of the Holy League was sufficient to accomplish what all the king's pleas had been powerless to effect: the removal of the barricades and the resumption of circulation through the streets of Paris.⁵⁷ Guise next moved to secure complete military control over the capital. On May 14, with the accord of the Sixteen, he placed one of his lieutenants in command of the Bastille.⁵⁸ In the days that followed, Guise's authority was extended first to the Arsenal, then to the fortified castle at Vincennes, and finally to the peripheral forts that guarded access to Paris. The Holy League now held sway over every important military facility in the

vicinity, effectively shielding the city from attack.

Guise soon turned to the task of purging the municipal administration. The Paris *prévôt de marchands*, Nicolas-Hector de Perreuse, was arrested on May 15 and imprisoned in the Bastille, where he would remain until July.⁵⁹ Guise also sought to replace the sheriffs who had served under Perreuse as well as other municipal officers who “smelled royalist” (*sentoyent le Royal*).⁶⁰ This was accomplished through a hastily called “election” over which Guise personally presided.⁶¹

In a scene that anticipated one of the oft-repeated rituals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a throng gathered on the square before the Paris Hôtel de Ville to approve by acclamation a slate of new city leaders.⁶² Unsurprisingly, three of the four newly elected sheriffs owed allegiance to the Sixteen.⁶³ The new municipal authorities handpicked the colonels, captains, and *quartiniers* who took charge of the Paris militia. Without even the pretense of respecting the king’s authority, the League then named a new lieutenant general of Paris and placed its own representatives in key positions within the University of Paris.⁶⁴

The Holy Union even made a bid to extend its gains beyond the limits of the capital. Guise’s brother, the duc de Mayenne—one of our candidates for the distinction of having invented the barricade—had attempted to seize Lyon, the second largest city in the realm, on May 12. His attack was repulsed by the inhabitants.⁶⁵ On May 17, Guise himself addressed a letter to municipal authorities in the other cities of the League, justifying his activities in Paris and asking for their support.⁶⁶ Soon thereafter, the new municipal officials in the capital wrote to their counterparts in Rouen, Troyes, Sens, and other cities to make a similar appeal. Neither effort produced immediate results. This did not prevent Guise from making a backhanded bid for a kind of international recognition by dispatching Brissac to the English ambassador to offer a guarantee of safety.⁶⁷

In brief, the rebellion staged by Guise and his allies succeeded in gaining complete ascendancy over Paris, though the rest of France and the world at large maintained their distance and—most ominously—the king remained at large. Since neither camp was strong enough to dominate its rival, French politics slipped into a state of temporary paralysis. A public façade of compromise and conciliation concealed a renewal of behind-the-scenes conspiracies.

Epilogue to the Day of the Barricades

The position of Henri III, living in effective exile from his own capital, was

uncomfortable but not untenable. To gain time and to curry favor with the Catholic majority, he offered major concessions to Guise and the League. D'Epemon and la Villette, his most trusted advisors, were dismissed and obliged to publish apologies.⁶⁸ Others, like d'O, de Biron, and de Crillon, were effectively banished from court and excluded from the councils where governmental policy was deliberated. At the same time, prominent Guisards were showered with rewards. Brissac was placed in charge of the defenses of the capital, while relatives and allies of the duc de Guise received choice provincial posts. Though enraged at Guise's temerity in asking for such favors, the king was as yet in no position to refuse.

Guise himself was named lieutenant general of the entire realm. In this way, the king's army, effectively merged with the forces of the League (now commanded by Mayenne) was mobilized for a resumption of the war against Navarre. This time the campaign would be financed through the confiscation of Protestant property, a move that became a practical necessity once the king was obliged to repeal the recently imposed taxes on salt, cloth, and leather.⁶⁹ Resources were also committed for the fortification of ten new Leaguer strongholds throughout the kingdom.⁷⁰

For the most part, the wishes of the people of Paris were also granted. The king belatedly confirmed the newly elected municipal officers and even agreed to pardon any offenses arising from the Day of the Barricades. He also consented to the League's two major political demands. First, he declared all members of the House of Bourbon excluded from the royal succession. Second, he agreed to call a meeting of the Estates General early that fall, but in Blois, not Paris. Since League supporters were certain to dominate the delegations from all three estates, and Brissac, Guise's ally, was designated to serve as spokesperson for the nobility, it appeared that Guise had emerged victorious on every salient point.

The one request the king pointedly ignored was that he move back to the capital. Since he had already given in to residents' desire that he withdraw the Royal Guard from their city, his return could only have made him the prisoner of the Sixteen. He chose instead to retain his freedom of movement and the opportunity it offered to indulge his thirst for revenge. On the morning of December 22, 1588, while the Estates General were still in session, the king sent word to the duc de Guise and his brother, Louis de Lorraine, Cardinal de Guise, that he wished to consult them at his headquarters in Blois on a matter of great importance. After a brief wait, as the duke proceeded from the vestibule to the royal chambers, he was ambushed by a dozen members of the king's personal

bodyguard and stabbed to death. The cardinal was imprisoned and executed the next day.⁷¹

On Christmas Eve, as news of the killings reached Paris, the people again took up arms. The Sixteen cried out for vengeance and mounted a tight guard, day and night, over the city. Immediate retaliatory measures were limited to searches of the houses of known royalists (including that of L'Estoile) and the removal of symbols of royal authority like the king's coat of arms from the walls of public buildings. Soon, however, Paris took the lead in organizing a concerted revolt of French cities.⁷² It was the stubborn resistance of this urban coalition that eventually persuaded Henri III to seek a reconciliation with the king of Navarre, leading to plans for a joint siege of Paris. Under the terms of their alliance, Henri III, still without an heir, revoked his earlier declaration of exclusion and now proclaimed Navarre his legitimate successor.

The throne actually became vacant more quickly than either of the two cousins had imagined. On August 1, 1589, Jacques Clément, a Dominican monk and fanatical Guisard, obtained a private audience with Henri III and brought the Valois dynasty to a sudden end by driving a dagger into the king's chest. Ironically, he thus delivered France into the hands of a Protestant king, though it was far from obvious that the newly designated heir would be able to bring the country into submission. Four years of civil war, fought among constantly shifting coalitions, helped decide the issue in Navarre's favor. More than his skill in battle, however, it was his wisdom and insight that earned him the French crown and a revered place in that country's history. In July 1593, Navarre underwent his second conversion to the Catholic faith, opening the way for a reconciliation of the warring parties. In February 1594, he ascended his new throne as Henri IV, the first Bourbon king of France. One month later, he entered Paris, receiving the keys to the city from none other than Guise's erstwhile retainer, Brissac.⁷³ The French state's policy of accommodation was reaffirmed when, four years later, the new ruler issued the Edict of Nantes, establishing the principle of religious toleration under a regime of civic equality and bringing to an end the era of the great wars of religion.

VERSION 4: THE BARRICADES OF MONT-DE-MARSAN AND RABASTENS-DE-BIGORRE

The richly documented history of the Paris League offers a satisfying solution to the mystery of how the barricade originated. Indeed, period sources furnish a

wealth of circumstantial detail, to the point where no fewer than three distinct interpretations have been handed down. Each specifies the person or group responsible for this innovation as well as the precise moment when it was conceived and the exact location where it was supposedly realized. Although historians have differed on the relative merits of the competing explanations, they have been all but unanimous in associating the first beginnings of the barricade with the insurrection of 1588.

There is, however, one insuperable difficulty that stands in the way of anointing any account that situates the invention of the barricade in 1588. All three of the versions previously presented are demonstrably wrong, for the simple reason that we possess clear evidence that barricades already existed some twenty years earlier. Why hasn't this evidence been integrated into the story of the barricade's origin? One reason is that the revelation derives not from chroniclers or historians but is based on a different type of evidence altogether.

Authoritative sources on the first usage of French words have dated the entry of the term "barricade" into the written language no later than 1570 or 1571. It was over a seven-month period spanning those years that Blaise de Monluc dictated the text of his *Commentaires*. Although the memoirs of this future *maréchal de France* were not actually published until 1595, the work was placed in circulation as a manuscript text in 1571, the year of its dedication, or possibly in 1572, when it is believed it was read by King Charles IX of France. The date of drafting is significant, for it establishes Monluc's claim to having been the first to make a reference to barricades part of the historical record.⁷⁴

Monluc devoted a portion of his memoir to describing the sieges he conducted against the rebellious Protestant strongholds of Mont-de-Marsan in 1569 and Rabastens-de-Bigorre in 1570. He recounted the efforts made by the defenders of those embattled towns to repel his army's attacks by building structures that would not only impede the advance of his soldiers but help plug the gaps his siege guns had made in their fortifications.⁷⁵ Monluc had good reason to call attention to the efficacy of this tactic. During the assault on Rabastens, he received a hideous wound when a musket shot, fired from behind a barricade, struck him full in the face. It was during his convalescence from this life-threatening and disfiguring injury that the *Commentaires* were drafted. His description of the techniques used by residents in their attempt to stave off his assault—in particular, their use of barrels (*tonneaux*) filled with earth—made it obvious that Monluc's usage of the term *barricade* was consistent with the meaning it has had ever since.⁷⁶

Why, then, have these events been systematically overlooked by those who

have tried to retrace the origins of the barricade? After all, they took place in two towns—one, the principal grain storehouse for the Landes region; and the other, among the most heavily fortified citadels in the kingdom of Navarre—that were of great strategic importance in the war of religion then raging in the southwest. But as crucial as they were to Monluc’s mission, they nonetheless remained, from the vantage point of Paris, provincial centers of moderate size and limited political significance. Moreover, Monluc’s text remained the *sole* source that made any mention of these incidents, and it was never as widely disseminated as any of the epic accounts of the 1588 uprising in the capital. Instead of singling out a recognizable individual on whom the distinction of having invented the barricade could be conferred, Monluc’s description only made vague mention of an indeterminate number of anonymous barricade-builders. Perhaps most damaging of all, the *Commentaires* never actually pretended that the tactic was in any way novel. In short, Monluc failed to furnish the elements essential to the sort of narrative that would possess widespread appeal—much less the high drama from which an enduring origin myth could be fashioned. Far more promising material was available in the many celebrated chronicles of what soon came to be known as the “Day of the Barricades,” one of the landmark events of the sixteenth century, which brought the most important city on the Continent to a standstill, opposed the most noteworthy personages of the day in a conflict that would prove to be a fight to the death, and set in motion a series of violent confrontations ending with a momentous change of dynasty. On the principle that every good story deserves a memorable tagline, historians of the period were soon advancing the spurious claim that 1588 marked the earliest known use of barricades.

VERSION 5:
ETIENNE MARCEL AND
THE PREHISTORY OF THE BARRICADE

Yet there is reason to doubt whether in Mont-de-Marsan we have at last isolated the authentic origin of the barricade, some twenty years prior to the date that is commonly cited. After all, if Monluc wrote the word in 1571, it was doubtless employed in everyday speech still earlier, and even the verbal expression must logically have been preceded by a material reality that people saw as widespread and consistent enough to warrant a name.

By its nature, a “routine” cannot originate in a discrete act of personal creativity that marks a complete departure from past practice. It represents

instead an accretion, extension, or synthesis of preexisting techniques, undertaken by many actors in a variety of situations. We have seen, for example, that barricades were an outgrowth of the use of heavy iron chains for the purpose of neighborhood defense. But for the hundreds of years before the French began reinforcing them, chains had been in common use in European cities, apparently without ever resulting in the creation of the barricade. To understand the unique and culturally specific character of that process of innovation requires that we delve a little deeper into the prehistory of the barricade.

France on the Eve of the Hundred Years' War

In the first half of the fourteenth century, France, with its sixteen million inhabitants, could boast of being the most populous realm in Christendom. But because it remained deeply fragmented by dynastic disputes, foreign invasion, and civil unrest, its rank among the great European powers was equivocal. In 1328, the Capetian dynasty ended when King Charles IV died without a male heir. It was replaced by the lineage of the Valois kings after an assembly of notables chose Philippe VI over two powerful rivals: Philippe d'Evreux, king of Navarre; and Edward III, king of England. The parallels with the late sixteenth century—especially the drawn-out three-way contest for the crown—are obvious enough, although this earlier crisis unleashed a period of violent political conflict that lasted a century rather than a generation.⁷⁷

Philippe VI's reign began auspiciously enough with a 1328 victory against the Flemish at Cassel, but that remained the only significant military triumph he would achieve. The early phase of the Hundred Years' War was marked by an almost unbroken string of French reversals. In 1340, Philippe's navy was destroyed at the battle of Sluys, giving the English fleet complete mastery over the channel. A direct confrontation in August 1346 produced a second and even more ignominious French defeat at Crécy. Outnumbered more than two to one, the English army was able to score a decisive victory thanks to the use of foot soldiers armed with longbows and battle tactics developed in the war with Scotland. Edward III followed up his advantage by laying an eleven-month siege to Calais. With the capture of that port city, the English controlled a crucial point of debarkation for future campaigns on the Continent.⁷⁸

These military disasters were soon overshadowed by an even greater calamity. A midcentury epidemic of black plague, the most virulent ever experienced in the European world, forced a temporary suspension of hostilities. In just over two years, beginning in 1347, France lost between one-third and one-half of its population. When Philippe VI died in 1350 and was succeeded by

his son, Jean II, the country was in a seriously weakened state. The new king had to confront not only the continued depredations of the English in the north and southwest but also the threat posed by the new king of Navarre, who had also renewed his claim to be the rightful king of France. Jean II's fortunes in war would prove to be even more disastrous than Philippe's, for in 1356 he would suffer the greatest military defeat ever sustained by a French king. At Poitiers, a numerically inferior English army commanded by the Black Prince (Edward III's eldest son) inflicted extremely heavy casualties on French forces. Not only were the ranks of the aristocracy decimated, but the king himself was taken captive. By the late spring of 1357, Jean II had been transported to London and was being held for ransom.

The Paris of Etienne Marcel

In the middle of the fourteenth century, France's largest city may already have counted as many as 250,000 residents.⁷⁹ To sheer size was added its status as the seat of French government, the primary residence of the king, the home of the most celebrated university on the Continent, and a center of commerce and skilled trades. The capital city's preeminence fully justified, in the minds of most Parisians, the exceptional degree of autonomy it enjoyed. Command over the municipal government of such a metropolis had the potential—then as now—to serve as a springboard to national political prominence. With the country still reeling from stunning military defeats, the capture of its king, and the demographic and social dislocation attendant on the plague, the moment was ripe for an ambitious and opportunistic leader to emerge.

This was the unsettled context for Etienne Marcel's meteoric rise to power. Born no later than 1310 to one of the wealthiest non-noble families of the capital, he would prove to be a leader of remarkable energy and insight. For four generations, his forebears had been highly successful cloth merchants (*drapiers*) whose names regularly appeared on the list of those who paid the highest taxes in France's richest city. By 1352, Marcel had inherited the mantle of family patriarch. His position within the oligarchy that dominated the commercial affairs of Paris explains why, late in 1354 or early in 1355, we find him being elected *prévôt de marchands* and assuming administrative control over the city.⁸⁰ His duties in that office were extensive and varied. Public order and well-being depended on his ability to ensure a steady supply and regulate the prices of essential foodstuffs and to adjudicate disputes among corporate bodies and private individuals. In addition, this individual was responsible for assessing and collecting taxes; overseeing the disbursement of city revenues; maintaining the

ramparts, gates, streets, quays, bridges, and fountains of Paris; and commanding the city's militia.

Increasingly, however, protecting the interests and even the security of the capital required action at the national level. Marcel's willingness to seize the initiative had already been demonstrated at the December 1355 assembly of the Estates General, where he served as spokesperson for the Third Estate. In this role, he attempted to broker a historic compromise between that body, which had only been created in 1302, and the French king.⁸¹ This agreement sought to allow Jean II to replenish the royal treasury and quickly raise an army to defend his throne by introducing a new sales tax and *gabelle* (salt tax). In return, the king would have abandoned his right to appropriate goods at will (*droit de prise*) and renounced plans to impose forced loans and further debase the currency. Often singled out for its "democratic" spirit, the 1355 assembly was noteworthy for its insistence that all exemptions from the new levies be eliminated and that it retain oversight of tax collections in order to prevent corruption. Above all, the accord would have established the principle that the Estates shared responsibility for the conduct of fiscal affairs with the king.

Unfortunately, the arrangements painstakingly negotiated by Marcel and so favorable to the interests of the merchant class unraveled within a year. Despite the Estates' endorsement of the new taxes, revenue collection ran far behind the estimates on which the king had based his plans to raise an army of 30,000. Reconvened in March and again in May of 1356, delegates tinkered further with the tax structure without ever achieving a satisfactory outcome. Unable to pay his existing army, much less engage new soldiers, and confronted with the imminent bankruptcy of the state, Jean II was forced to revoke the commitments he had made and fall back upon that perennial stratagem of cash-strapped governments everywhere, the dilution of the currency.⁸²

This expedient required neither consultation with nor the approval of the Estates General, but it was not without political cost, particularly for the Valois, whose legitimacy had been diminished by their disastrous military record. Even the poor, who might expect to benefit from the opportunity to repay their debts with less valuable coins, regarded the devaluation of the currency as an unwelcome sign of economic instability. The commercial classes recognized this manipulation as a surreptitious form of taxation aimed squarely at them. As far as they were concerned, the king's abrogation of his commitments released them from their pledge to support Jean II's military operations by outfitting 500 men-at-arms (Parisians and mercenaries) at the city's expense. The resulting collapse of the king's agreement with the urban middle class that Marcel represented

meant that the French army that confronted the Black Prince near Poitiers on September 19, 1356, consisted almost exclusively of members of the aristocracy.

That crucial defeat proved especially costly to the French nobility. In addition to the staggering loss of life, the second estate's failure to fulfill its primary responsibility of protecting France against foreign invasion dealt a crippling blow to its prestige. The king's capture had equally dramatic repercussions, for it deprived the country of its lawful ruler while rendering a swift and uncontested succession impossible. The king's eighteen-year-old son, the dauphin Charles, assumed the title of royal lieutenant (and later regent), but his youth and inexperience prevented him from providing strong leadership. The *prévôt de marchands* was quick to capitalize upon this unparalleled opportunity to advance the interests of his principal constituency.

The Introduction of Chains

Marcel, now under intense pressure to take sides in the bitter struggle for the French throne, realized that whatever choice he made had the potential to expose Paris to grave threats, whether from the presence of Edward III's soldiers on French soil, assaults by armed bands loyal to Charles of Navarre, or depredations by the undisciplined armies of Charles of Valois. Forced to rely on his own resources, he had, within one month of the debacle at Poitiers, accelerated projects begun earlier that year aimed at fortifying the capital city against attack. He proposed to finance the planned improvements through an increase in the *octroi*.⁸³ His program called for enlarging the existing system of ramparts on the right bank of the Seine, clearing the area immediately outside the city walls of buildings and other obstructions that had been illegally constructed over the years, mounting wooden sentinel boxes on the battlements, and digging enormous entrenchments fifteen feet deep and thirty feet wide at their base.⁸⁴ In addition, and, for the first time, "chains were forged to close off the Seine and barricade the streets during the night."⁸⁵ According to Dulaure, "[Etienne Marcel] imagined barricading each street by stretching across it a heavy chain that was solidly attached to the walls of the houses that formed the entrance of each street. This was the first time that such a means of defense had been employed in Paris."⁸⁶

It was natural enough for nineteenth-century historians, steeped in the lore of the barricade, to equate the stretching of chains with the building of barricades. That did not make it any less anachronistic, since neither the word nor the concept yet existed in the fourteenth century. Strictly speaking, the object itself was also lacking, since Parisians' early use of chains, involving neither

barriques (barrels) nor any other form of reinforcement, hardly fulfilled the meaning of the term as it later developed.

So, while the connection between chains and barricades is real, it is by no means straightforward. The clearest proof is that of all the European cities where the custom of stretching chains was established (often long before it migrated to France), none independently developed the barricade routine.⁸⁷ In the Flemish city of Ghent, for example, chains were in use by the end of the thirteenth century. *The Chronicle of Bury St. Edmunds* recounts how an English army of occupation was attacked and many of its soldiers killed because residents of the city employed huge chains to close off individual quarters and prevent isolated units from coming to each others' aid.⁸⁸ Chains were also crucial to the initial success of the 1338 Flemish revolt led by Jacob van Artevelde, captain general of Ghent, the architect of Flanders' "alliance of three cities," a rebellion that managed for a time to make good their claim to regional autonomy.⁸⁹

There can be little doubt that Etienne Marcel was aware of these precedents. He was, after all, a member of one of the elite merchant families of Paris and a successful cloth wholesaler in his own right. We know, moreover, that he specialized in the importation of *camelin fin* and *écarlate*, varieties of high-quality striped fabric whose manufacture was peculiar to Ghent, the acknowledged center of the vital textile industry of Flanders and Brabant.⁹⁰ Marcel's business affairs therefore necessitated frequent visits to that region and inevitably acquainted him with the history and local customs of a city that was a major trading partner of Paris and the source of his own livelihood. Castelnau has also suggested that Marcel was as much impressed by the freedoms and independence that Flemish towns enjoyed as by their prosperity.⁹¹ His reorganization of the bourgeois militia and his introduction of chains to the French capital thus amounted to a borrowing of known techniques that had already proved their worth in local struggles for self-determination.

Marcel continued his efforts to effect a reconciliation between the dauphin and Charles of Navarre and devise a tax structure that would adequately fund the French army.⁹² When these negotiations reached an impasse, he managed to block the dauphin's attempt to further debase the currency.⁹³ A struggle now ensued in which Marcel sought to build a coalition of French cities while Charles of Valois forged a new alliance with the clergy and aristocracy and tried to isolate Marcel within his Parisian base of support, calling on him to restrict his activities to the administration of the capital.⁹⁴

In the final months of 1357, as the country slid back toward the abyss of civil

war, Paris was one of the few areas largely spared the ravages of warring armies, thanks to the foresight of its *prévôt de marchands*. Anxious to secure his local political standing, Marcel resumed work on the capital's defenses. This time, as many as 3,000 workers were employed, sometimes day and night, widening and deepening the moats that surrounded the city, extending walled fortifications into the faubourgs, building new battlements at the city gates, and adding more chains.⁹⁵ Froissart, a contemporary observer who never hesitated to criticize Marcel on other grounds, offered this positive assessment of the new projects: "Given the enormous circumference of Paris, managing to close off such a city and surround it with secure defenses in the space of a year was a great feat. In my view, this was the greatest benefit that the *prévôt de marchands* realized in his life, for otherwise the city would since have been overrun, despoiled, and looted all too many times."⁹⁶

Of course, these labors on behalf of the residents of Paris in no way dispelled Charles de Valois' conviction that Marcel was a dangerous rival. A further standoff at the meeting of the Estates General held in January 1358 set the stage for a direct confrontation. The occasion was provided when the dauphin's right-hand man, Robert de Clermont, maréchal de Normandie, hunted down a murderer in the Eglise Saint-Merri, thus violating both the right of sanctuary and the city's prized autonomy. As a result, Paris was thrown into a state of turmoil, which not even the stretching of chains could contain, and Marcel calculated that the alignment of political forces had shifted once again in his favor.

On February 22, a crowd led by Marcel and his close associates swept into the private apartments of the dauphin in what today is the Palais de Justice. After a brief exchange in which Marcel was unable to extract a promise that Paris would be protected from attack, Marcel gave a sign to the armed men who accompanied him. They proceeded to slaughter Jean de Conflans, maréchal de Champagne, before the eyes of the incredulous dauphin. They next pursued Robert de Clermont, maréchal de Normandie, défilé of the sanctuary of Saint-Merri, to an adjoining room, where he too was killed. In a gesture intended to extend his protection to the terrified dauphin, the *prévôt de marchands* removed his ruler's hat and exchanged it for the blue-and-red cap that he, like all his followers, was wearing.⁹⁷ Convinced that his life would be the next to be taken, the dauphin agreed on the spot to the crowd's demands.⁹⁸

In the end, Marcel's rash actions proved fatal. Charles soon found a pretext for leaving Paris, immediately broke with the rebels, and took steps aimed at bringing them to heel. By early April, his army had seized the cities of Montereau and Meaux, which controlled access to the capital via the waterways

of the Seine, the Marne, and the Yonne, thus cutting off the routes by which the city was provisioned. A sharp reaction against the barbarity of the attacks on the dauphin's lieutenants had already undermined provincial support for the Paris *prévôt de marchands*; now the precarious state of the capital's economy compromised his standing among his local supporters.⁹⁹ This shift in public sentiment intensified when the dauphin laid siege to Paris. Though the fortifications Marcel had set in place prevented the city from being overrun, he was able to remain in power only by instituting severe repressive measures, including the execution of partisans of the dauphin.¹⁰⁰ In a final desperate act, on July 31, 1358, when Marcel attempted to open a city gate—whether to the soldiers of Navarre or to bands of English mercenaries has never been made clear—he was surprised and struck down by a crowd that had rapidly assembled. Among its members were a number of former supporters and even some members of his own extended family.

Marcel's Lasting Imprint

No other champion capable of wielding the authority that Marcel had briefly exercised materialized, and the events of the decade following his death sadly fulfilled his direst premonitions.¹⁰¹ But that does not mean that he failed to leave an important legacy with regard to the role of Paris and of the Third Estate in French political affairs. Indeed, the events of 1355 to 1358 have been viewed by some observers as a prefigurement of the great French Revolution of the late eighteenth century.¹⁰² In both periods, France's richest and most populous city staged a challenge to a monarchy jealous of its prerogatives but incapable of discharging its most basic responsibilities. Military fiascoes, the mismanagement of the currency, and fiscal imbalances resulting from an inefficient and corrupt system of taxation created political opportunities for the leaders of the urban middle classes to claim a larger role in the conduct of government. As if to remind participants of the strong parallels between the two set of events, the tricolor flag that France adopted in 1789 married the white of the Bourbon dynasty to the same blue and red banner that Marcel and his adherents had defiantly displayed in 1358.

The fourteenth century did not produce a single barricade. It did, however, set in place some of the crucial preconditions, political and practical, that made possible the eventual emergence of this technique. From the time of Etienne Marcel's stewardship over the city, a spirit of revolt lingered. Like the coals of a banked fire, this propensity for urban insurrection never lay very far beneath the surface of French politics and threatened to reignite the capital whenever fanned

by the winds of change.

Chains were, in a sense, the material precondition of the rebelliousness of Paris. Because they tended to appear each time residents sought to control movements within the city, chains naturally became a point of friction with royal authorities, anxious to stifle the capital's propensity to revolt. With Charles V's death in 1380, the crown passed to his twelve-year-old son, Charles VI, whose three uncles collaborated in a joint regency. Their frequent raids on the royal treasury and insatiable thirst for new sources of revenue eventually produced a tax rebellion, known as the revolt of the Maillotins (because of the *maillets* [mallets] wielded by the rebels), that spread from Paris to the provinces in 1381–82. As part of the brutal repression that followed that uprising, the king's uncles took steps to deprive Parisians of their most effective instrument of insurrection by removing all chains from the capital and having them locked away in the castle at Vincennes.¹⁰³

Even after Charles VI came of age, he was unable to provide the strong leadership that France desperately needed. The nation's political fortunes underwent a further and precipitous decline during his recurrent bouts of mental illness, and the Orléans and Burgundy branches of the royal family fought a series of civil wars to decide who should govern in the mad king's name. Worse yet, the war with England revived, and in 1415 French armies suffered another crushing defeat at Agincourt. With the monarchy in a state of disarray, John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy, succeeded in capturing Paris. In a bid to win popular favor, he restored the previously confiscated chains to city residents, who proceeded to deploy them several times in the course of the fifteenth century in much the same way they had in the 1350s. The custom was therefore very much alive in the sixteenth century, when Parisians turned it to account in the construction of their first barricades.¹⁰⁴

THE EMERGENCE OF BARRICADES

Without ever arriving at its nominal objective, our inquiry into the origins of the barricade has nonetheless yielded a wealth of possibilities. Even limiting ourselves to structures explicitly labeled barricades, the choices initially appear to be many, though in the end, those dating from 1588, a year long accepted as the moment of inception, must ultimately be rejected. Monluc's report may not document the very first use of the tactic, but the *Commentaires* at least demonstrate that the concept was in existence no later than 1571. They also establish to a near certainty that the identity of the "inventors" of the technique

will forever remain unknown to history, since if they were not Monluc's anonymous adversaries of Mont-de-Marsan in 1569, they were protagonists in some still earlier and more obscure conflict.

We are also in a position to stipulate that the barricade was a *collective* innovation, not just because its construction is by its nature a collaborative act, but also because, in its quality as a novel routine, it could only have arisen over time, out of small, simple variations on long-established practices. We have traced the associated custom of stretching the chains back to the fourteenth century, at which time it already had a close connection to a tradition of urban insurrection, allowing chains to function as proto-barricades, serving to isolate neighborhoods and impede the circulation of outsiders.

By the second half of the sixteenth century, these elements had come together to form a recognizable pattern of sufficient distinctiveness and stability to merit a name of its own. This new routine of collective action caught on so quickly that it was soon being used to define the climactic event of the late Valois monarchy as the "Day of the Barricades." The great insurrection of 1588 was not, however, the last event to be so honored. In the next chapter, we turn to the mid-seventeenth century and the Parisian rebellion that definitively established the recurrent character of barricade construction.

The Barricades of the Fronde

The disappearance of [royal councilor Pierre] Broussel caused Parisians to become deranged, to run through the streets crying out that they were done for, that they must have their protector, that they would gladly die for his cause. They assembled, stretched chains across all the streets, and in a few hours had set up barricades in every quarter of the city.

FRANÇOISE DE MOTTEVILLE, *MÉMOIRES*

If historians have largely overlooked barricade events prior to May 12, 1588, it has been in part because earlier incidents produced no obvious sequel and appeared to be without lasting historical consequence. In contrast, the Day of the Barricades in Paris can be shown to have had a far-reaching impact, both in the capital and beyond. The city registers document what we might call “barricade consciousness”: an emerging awareness on the part of residents of the power that chains, barrels, and paving stones had placed in their hands.

Over the months that followed the 1588 uprising, Paris was kept on almost constant alert by apprehensive municipal authorities, who ordered the chains to be inspected three times by spring 1589. As the king’s army approached the city in early July of that year, deputies were commanded to collect 2,000 casks from inns, taverns, and wine merchants’ shops. These were to be stored in the suburbs, where they would be available for the construction of barricades should an attack materialize. A similar alarm was issued on August 31, less than a month after the assassination of Henri III. This time, militia colonels and captains were ordered to fill barrels with earth and position them in front of houses in the central districts, but not to deploy them to block streets without express orders of the *prévôt de marchands*.¹

Although none of these scares resulted in the actual construction of barricades

in Paris, the technique was rapidly spreading to new locations, thanks to the activities of the Holy Union. Lyon, the second largest city in the realm and another Leaguer stronghold, reacted to the killing of the duc de Guise and his brother the cardinal by revolting against the king. On February 23, 1589, residents spent the night building barricades. Though their mobilization was poorly organized and short-lived, its impact was immediately felt in the next most populous of French cities; the historian Antoine de Ruffi says that the news of barricades going up in Lyon was what caused Marseille to join the Holy League.² Two years later, Marseille itself would build its first barricades when control over the city was being disputed by rival factions of the League.³ And in 1594, it was again Lyon's turn to resort to the use of barricades as part of a protest concerning the Spanish succession.⁴

Thus, in the span of five short years, a spree of barricade construction had broken out, involving each of the country's three largest cities. After a thirty-year lull, Bordeaux and Dijon were the next regional centers to be added to the list of sites adopting the new tactic (in 1625 and 1630 respectively). A series of related incidents in southwestern France, offshoots of the rural tax protest movement known as the *jacquerie des Croquants*, provided the first occasion, in 1635, on which multiple barricade events were recorded in a single year. These continued through 1637, by which time a reproducible pattern of behavior involving barricade construction seemed well established. It was based, however, on small to medium-sized events, none of which could even remotely compare with the 1588 insurrection. What was needed to enshrine the barricade as part of a uniquely French repertoire of collective action was for it to be associated with some new event of major proportions that would validate the tactic's claim to historical significance.

That event occurred in 1648 in circumstances reminiscent in certain respects of those we have encountered in earlier eras. Parisians of that period, like contemporaries of Etienne Marcel, had to endure their own unrelenting cycle of violent conflict, known as the Thirty Years' War, even as the reverberations of the Reformation still managed to give these struggles a religious cast that recalled the Wars of Religion. Though the treaty of Westphalia brought hostilities among major continental nations to an end by October of that year, the French monarchy remained in financial disarray, exhausted by decades of war and the continual struggle against the Spanish Habsburgs and burdened by rising taxes and failing harvests. Ironically, the same year that brought peace to Europe also witnessed the onset of a series of civil wars in France—and with them, the return of the barricade.

THE TROUBLED SEVENTEENTH CENTURY IN FRANCE

Like much of the rest of Europe, French society was dramatically affected by the rapid demographic advance that characterized the first half of the seventeenth century. In the countryside, heightened population pressure tended to increase the value of land and depress the level of real wages, making it difficult for the rural poor to survive. Even better-off peasants were hurt by a combination of high taxes and disappointing grain harvests from 1630 onward. One result was a massive exodus from rural areas.

Conditions in the cities were hardly better. The agricultural crisis caused the price of foodstuffs to spike higher even as it led to the stagnation of the urban economy. Paris suffered these consequences in a particularly acute form because in-migration had swelled its population to nearly a half million.⁵ At times, the capital seemed to be a cauldron of unrest, and its municipal administration, now called the Bureau de Ville, had at its disposal only a token force of unarmed policemen and 300 “archers.”⁶ Any sizable disturbance would have to be handled by the urban militia (*milice bourgeois*) or by the roughly 4,000 Swiss and 6,000 French guardsmen stationed in or near the capital for the protection of the royal family and King’s Council. The potential for unrest seemed ever-present, and although the city jealously guarded its special privileges—including the traditional exemption from the billeting of troops—its status as the seat of royal government still meant that local political turmoil inevitably had national repercussions.

Despite these challenges, and though it could be recognized only in retrospect, the death of Louis XIII found France poised on the brink of one of the most glorious periods in the history of the monarchy. The continuity in leadership made possible by Louis XIV’s long reign—from 1643 until his death in 1715—would provide a respite from the succession crises and contested rule that had plagued earlier eras. The Sun King’s strength of will plus the ample time he had to shape consistent policies together helped establish the preeminence of the central state in France.

But Louis was not yet five years old at the time he ascended the throne. His father, who distrusted his own wife, left a will that made his brother Gaston, duc d’Orléans, the real power in the Regency Council. With the complicity of the Paris *parlement* and the acquiescence of Gaston, this arrangement was overturned, and Louis’s mother, Anne of Austria, was granted the authority to manage affairs of state until the king’s assumption of personal rule in 1661. Throughout this period, the queen regent relied heavily on the counsel of

Cardinal Mazarin, who had effectively inherited the position left vacant by the death of Cardinal Richelieu in 1642.⁷ A gifted strategist when it came to foreign policy, Mazarin was far less skillful in the conduct of domestic affairs. His profligate spending, cynical manipulation of rival factions, and high-handed personal style made him extremely unpopular with the general population and with Parisians in particular.

The Estates General, so active in the time of Etienne Marcel, had not been convened since 1615 and seemed moribund. Its role in advising the crown and moderating government policy had to some extent been assumed by the *parlements*, to which the people looked as the only possible check on Mazarin's seemingly unlimited power.⁸ In effect, certain types of new laws—including the all-important category of new taxes—had to be registered by *parlement* before they could be enforced. It was usually the 120 members of the Paris *parlement* who discussed and commented upon such proposals and who had the right to present “remonstrances”—objections based on members’ judgment that the new legislation was inconsistent with existing laws or would have adverse consequences for the kingdom. Remonstrances might result in the modification or abandonment of the proposed legislation, but if the King’s Council persisted, the normal outcome was the registration of the new statute.

Beginning under Richelieu, however, the *parlement* would sometimes make a point of offering new rounds of remonstrances, declining to accept the royal will until the extraordinary measure known as the “bed of justice” (*lit de justice*) had been invoked. This was a procedure, reserved for those supposedly rare cases where the normal process had not led to mutual accommodation, through which the government could break the stalemate by arranging for the king to appear in person before a special session of the *parlement*. After explaining why he was not disposed to take that body’s advice and having thus assumed personal responsibility for the new law, the king was then within his rights to force its registration over members’ objections. But in the 1640s—with a child king seated on the throne of France and the government led by the hated Cardinal Mazarin—the *parlement* of Paris dared to claim for itself unprecedented authority over the creation and even the implementation of certain statutes. By presenting remonstrances to laws that had already passed through a *lit de justice*, it contested the right of the King’s Council to govern without the *parlement*’s express consent.⁹

This opposition was motivated by an intriguing mix of principle and self-interest. The creation and sale of new offices in the royal courts caused existing *parlementaires* to object that this means of raising cash was an abuse of royal

authority designed to circumvent the power of the *parlements* to consent to fiscal legislation. Like the recently instituted appointment of *intendants* and other royal officers responsible only to the king, it was seen as a power grab on the part of the increasingly centralized and absolutist state. But at the same time, members' objections could also be seen as an attempt to protect their own prerogatives and to prevent the dilution of the value of property, in the form of offices, that they (or their ancestors) had previously purchased.

It is difficult to assess the political thrust of the resistance. The position adopted by the more outspoken *parlementaires* might well be viewed as "revolutionary," since, in refusing to be bound by the *lit de justice* and by violating long-established practice, they were also challenging the notion that the sovereign's will, as communicated through his ministers, was the highest expression of the interests of the nation. But, as the historian Roland Mousnier has pointed out, their actions were in another sense profoundly conservative, since their goal was often to preserve the fiscal and social privileges that members of the *parlements* and other officeholders enjoyed.¹⁰ Similarly, their classic liberal desire to resist centralization and act as a counterweight to the increasingly concentrated powers of the monarchy often led them to oppose the essentially progressive tendency to replace privileges and exemptions with a more even-handed treatment of different regions or different categories of subjects by the state. Far from upholding the notion of the separation of powers, they proposed to rein in the unchecked power of the sovereign by adding new legislative and even executive authority to their own judicial responsibilities. It required only the right precipitating incident to escalate this muddle of contradictory political impulses into the period of incipient civil war known as the Fronde.¹¹

THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE

Anne of Austria and the members of the Royal Council clearly considered the enlarged role that the Paris *parlement* was claiming for itself an illegitimate usurpation of the government's authority. Despite the important customary role reserved for that body in the approval of new taxes, its involvement in "political affairs" was viewed by the king's ministers as meddling, motivated only by members' personal animus for Mazarin (or perhaps the hope of gaining favor among the people) in flagrant disregard for the consequences that could follow if the country went bankrupt in a time of war.

Bankruptcy was a distinct possibility. The French treasury was so seriously

depleted at the time of Louis XIII's death in 1643 that the state had already spent the next three years' anticipated tax revenues.¹² High on the Paris *parlement's* list of complaints was the government's failure to pay timely interest on the *rentes*, the bonds through which loans had been obtained from well-to-do members of the city's power structure. Most troubling of all, in 1647, Maréchal Henri de la Tour d'Auvergne, vicomte de Turenne, was obliged to put down a mutiny, because France had fallen so far behind in paying the wages of its mercenary soldiers.

Desperately short of funds and unable to count on the *parlement's* cooperation, the King's Council explored every alternative. In 1644, it declared that it would enforce a neglected, century-old statute that imposed heavy fines on the owners of buildings constructed without authorization outside the walls of the capital. When surveyors were sent into these areas to determine the amount of the fines, they were chased out by owners angered at the prospect of increased taxes and renters anxious over increases in the cost of housing.¹³ The *parlement* did its best to defend residents' interests, though it was unable to negotiate a satisfactory compromise with the king's ministers. When surveyors were sent back into the suburbs, this time with armed guards, riots ensued. Omer Talon, acting as the *parlement's* spokesperson, secured an interview with Mazarin at which he made a point of reminding the cardinal that the immediate cause of the barricades of 1588 had been just such an ill-considered show of force.¹⁴ When, despite this warning, the government persisted in trying to complete the survey, the result was widespread agitation, and the project had to be abandoned. By that time, however, the *parlement* had positioned itself as the champion of the popular cause, and a pattern had taken firm hold linking street protests to any attempt on the part of the crown to extract revenue by coercive means.

The government next tried to raise the level of excise taxes on provisions brought through the city gates and, after being stymied in its efforts to further manipulate the rates on bonds, threatened to pass legislation that would suspend interest payments altogether. The popularity of *parlement* soared when its members refused to register the proposed new laws. Members openly attacked the corruption and inefficiency that characterized the cumbersome system of tax collection and criticized the council for being unwilling to undertake the sort of fundamental reforms that alone might correct the state's chronic fiscal imbalance.¹⁵

Now on the defensive, the crown came up with a series of plans aimed at splintering the opposition and relieving the budgetary shortfall at the expense of the royal courts. It proposed using its leverage over a special tax that

officeholders paid on a nine-year cycle to ensure that their positions would remain hereditary, called the “Paulette” (after Charles Paulet, who came up with the idea), as a means of gaining compliance from the *parlement* on proposals for new taxes.¹⁶ However, all of its efforts managed only to forge a new sense of solidarity among the royal courts, which soon formed a coalition that began to elaborate its own program of fiscal reforms.

Over the regent’s objections, deputies from all four courts began work in mid-June 1648 on a new charter whose principal aims were to protect the effective monopoly that officers of the royal courts held over the dispensing of justice in France and to assign to the *parlements* responsibilities for the collection as well as the approval of new taxes.¹⁷ In the process, they were able to demonstrate that the prime cause of the budgetary difficulties of the French state was the disorderly administration of the revenue system, thus creating the presumption that the entire tax structure would have to be revamped. Fearing efforts by the monarchy to intimidate members of the royal courts, delegates also sought to abolish *lettres de cachet* and provide legal safeguards against arrest and imprisonment for more than twenty-four hours without due process.¹⁸

These reform efforts, which struck at the core of the absolutist conception of the monarchy, quickly garnered support from provincial *parlements* and municipalities. After energetically resisting them for weeks, Anne of Austria appeared to capitulate in mid-July 1648, when she dismissed her superintendent of finance, Michel Particelli d’Hémery, in disgrace and appointed Maréchal Charles de La Porte, duc de La Meilleraye, as his replacement. At the same time she renewed the Paulette tax on terms very favorable to the members of the royal courts and accepted all of the reform proposals except the restrictions on the crown’s powers of arbitrary arrest and detention. The formal granting of this package of reforms on July 31 was met with jubilation by the population of the capital, which identified strongly with the *parlement*. What the revelers did not immediately realize was that the regent and her advisors were merely bargaining for time and had a pointed reason for rejecting any limitation on the use of *lettres de cachet*.

THE SECOND DAY OF THE BARRICADES

On August 22, Paris learned that French armies under the command of Louis de Bourbon, prince de Condé (known to history as the Grand Condé), had decisively defeated the Spanish army near the town of Lens, in the Pas de Calais.¹⁹ The king, still a child of ten but already wise in the ways of the court, is

said to have responded to the news with glee, remarking that the gentlemen of the *parlement* were going to be very angry, since this great military victory would, in all likelihood, shift the balance of power in favor of the government's war policy.²⁰

The queen mother, urged on by Mazarin and other members of her entourage, resolved to seize this opportunity to break the back of the *parlement*'s resistance by banishing key opposition leaders.²¹ She arranged for a Te Deum, a formal mass of thanks, to be celebrated in Notre-Dame on August 26. That morning, rows of royal guardsmen lined the route that led the king and queen mother from their residence in the Palais-Royal to the city's cathedral (to follow the 1648 events, see [map 3](#), pp. 28-29). The delegation from *parlement*, dressed in ceremonial red robes, was quite large, perhaps because members hoped to dispel the suspicion that this triumph of French arms, which added luster to the French crown and might increase support for a costly war, was unwelcome to them.²²

When the service ended shortly after noon, the royal family departed, but the ranks of royal guardsmen did not immediately withdraw.²³ Small detachments were sent to the homes of at least three members of the *parlement* with *lettres de cachet* ordering their arrest. Président Edouard Charton was alerted in time to escape by climbing the wall of his garden. Less fortunate was Président René Potier de Blancmesnil, who was seized and quickly taken off to the prison at Vincennes. The most difficult task, the arrest of Pierre Broussel, a councilor in the Grande Chambre, was undertaken by Lieutenant Comminges of the queen regent's personal guards.²⁴

The plan for a stealthy abduction fell to pieces when Broussel's household servants began to shout from the windows that their master was being kidnapped. The squadron of soldiers that had accompanied Comminges managed to spirit the councilor, still wearing slippers, into a waiting coach.²⁵ Neighbors failed in their attempts to cut the horses from their traces and then to smash the coach itself, and the party made good its escape. But before it could rejoin the larger groups of guardsmen still posted along the royal family's route, the coach broke down in the vicinity of the Palais de Justice. A new crowd—this time composed of boatmen and porters from the nearby Seine as well as artisans from the Cité quarter and a scattering of “beggars and vagabonds”²⁶—had begun to gather before a carriage could be commandeered from a passing noblewoman. A second hair's-breadth escape, followed by a change to yet another coach, brought the occupants to the Château de Madrid near the Bois de Boulogne. Broussel is reported to have had a chance encounter with Queen Henrietta of

England, who was staying there, after taking refuge in her native France from the civil war then raging in her adopted country. He was soon whisked away to the château at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, en route to his intended place of detention in the fortress at Sedan.²⁷



FIGURE 9. The people demand royal councilor Pierre Broussel's freedom during the Fronde. A handful of rebels—diverse in terms of class, age, and gender—have taken up positions behind a partially completed barricade at left and threaten a group of royal guards, while a cleric (possibly Coadjutor Paul de Gondy, the future Cardinal de Retz?) attempts to intervene. By convention, a vestigial chain, no longer part of the actual barricade, is pictured in the right foreground. Genouillac [c. 1880?] n.d., 2: opposite p. 372.

At seventy-three years of age, Broussel was among the most senior and most respected members of the royal court. Unlike many of his colleagues, whose purchase of judicial office was aimed at achieving noble status, Broussel had no thought for social advancement. Though comfortably well off, he passed for being poor. He owned no carriage, affected a simple lifestyle, and was considered incorruptible. This already gave him one claim upon the loyalty of

the people of Paris. A second was his inveterate opposition to autocratic power, most concisely summarized in Broussel's view that "the Sovereign is best served by being disobeyed."²⁸ His neighbors in the rue Saint-Landry, near Notre-Dame, were passionately attached to this venerable figure, whom they were used to seeing pass through the streets on foot, on his way to the nearby Palais de Justice.

It was thanks to this sense of personal loyalty to a man seen as the advocate of ordinary Parisians that news of Broussel's arrest propagated like a thunderclap through the charged atmosphere of the Ile de la Cité. The response was immediate. Shops closed. Local residents stretched the chains at the ends of their blocks. The alarm bell of the nearby church of Saint-Landry rang out. People gathered in the streets, broke the windows of houses whose occupants refused to pledge their solidarity, and prepared to confront companies of the Royal Guard. As it happened, most of those units were hastily withdrawn once commanders realized that the rank and file were unwilling to confront angry residents. Maréchal de la Meilleraye had to bring up the only mounted soldiers immediately available—the *chevaux-légers*, no more than fifty men in all—to clear the streets and urge merchants to reopen their shops.²⁹

Although chains had been drawn in most quarters of the city on August 26, the preponderance of the evidence suggests that barricades only appeared during the night that followed or on the next morning.³⁰ This was a direct response to two actions taken by the authorities. First, the queen ordered all units of the French Guard stationed in the suburbs to enter the city and take up positions in battle formation before the poorly defended Palais-Royal. This measure, thought to portend an all-out attack on insurgents, first frightened, then angered Parisians, who jealously guarded the bourgeois militia's exclusive right to police the city.

The second and even more critical strategic error was a directive from the *prévôt de marchands*, Jérôme Le Féron, for militia officers to place their units and their weapons in a state of readiness. The city fathers apparently continued to believe that, whether from attachment to the monarchy or out of fear of civil unrest, the militia would remain unquestioningly loyal. That view overlooked the fact that many militia units were led by officers who were themselves members of the *parlement*, and that the rank and file were overwhelmingly hostile to Mazarin and his policies.³¹ The municipal authorities' action accomplished what the initial mobilization of the common people had not, for the respectable middle class, which constituted the backbone of militia units, had previously been reluctant to take up arms. Now, with explicit orders to intervene, "the fire was

completely lit.”³²



FIGURE 10. Chains and barricades during the Fronde. This image, from a popular latter-day history of France, presents a scene that must have been common during the Second Day of the Barricades. Chains have been stretched across a narrow residential street and lightly reinforced so as to serve as a neighborhood checkpoint. Local residents are shown mounting guard behind this temporary barrier, ready to challenge anyone seeking to enter. A discussion seems to be in progress in the background, no doubt taking as its themes slogans such as those on the placards: “Long Live the King!”; “Free Broussel!” Anquetil [1805] 1851,

Most sources relate that the night of August 26 passed peacefully enough, even though both camps were caught up in frenetic activity. Royal troops were busy securing an avenue of escape for the royal family by seizing the porte Saint-Honoré and the roads leading to it.³³ On Mazarin's advice, the queen mother dispatched Pierre Séguier, her chancellor, to appear before the *parlement* on the morning of August 27. He had been instructed to make known her displeasure at members' recent behavior, declare the annulment of all the actions they had undertaken since July 31, and announce her intention of initiating a *lit de justice* to impose the legislation proposed by the government over their objections. He was specifically to forbid the chambers from assembling to discuss political matters and enjoin them to return to the business of meting out justice to individual petitioners.

Unfortunately, Séguier was unable to carry out his mission, because he never reached the Palais de Justice that morning. He encountered chains stretched across the rue Saint-Honoré and learned that two of the main bridges that would normally have provided access, the Pont-Neuf and the pont Saint-Michel, had been similarly closed off, forcing his coach to take an alternate route. Soon after coming up against the first barricades, he abandoned his vehicle along the quai des Grands Augustins and tried to reach the Palais de Justice on foot. Recognized and quickly surrounded by an angry mob, he retreated to a nearby house to seek protection from the rabble, which had progressed from shouting curses to throwing stones. There Séguier hid in a closet, while his pursuers conducted a frantic but futile search. A detachment of French and Swiss guardsmen, soon followed by a small cavalry force under the personal command of Maréchal de la Meilleraye, came to his rescue, but not before an officer, three or four Swiss guardsmen, and an adjutant in the chancellor's guard had been killed in fighting at close quarters, and the chancellor's daughter and another passenger in his carriage were wounded by shots fired from a distance. When Meilleraye's soldiers fired into the crowd, several more were killed. Five or six hundred local residents responded by raising a flag, made by tying a linen rag to a stick, and marching on the Grand Châtelet. As they approached their objective, the local militia captain sounded the alarm and ordered the chains extended. Neighborhood residents immediately began reinforcing these barriers. The mobilization quickly spread to other quarters and, within a half hour, the city, now bristling with barricades, was on full alert.³⁴

Meanwhile, in the *parlement*, members had suspended the hearing of legal cases and turned to a discussion of the actions they should take on behalf of their imprisoned colleagues. With the arrival of news of the preliminary skirmishes in the city, they decided to proceed en masse to the Palais-Royal in order to place their urgent recommendations before the queen mother. At least 150 members, dressed in their somber black robes, set out together. Their route obliged them to cross eight barricades, made of “beams placed crosswise and barrels filled with paving stones, or earth, or rubble.”³⁵ Most were defended by twenty or thirty armed men who, when the delegates came in sight, raised a welter of apparently contradictory cries, including “Vive le Roy!” “Vive le parlement!” and even “Vive M. de Broussel!”³⁶ Once the barricades had opened and the *parlementaires* had passed through, streams of supporters—perhaps as many as 20,000—followed in their wake.³⁷

When admitted into the queen’s presence, the group’s spokespersons respectfully requested the release of their colleagues. Their petition was met with utter intransigence on the part of Anne of Austria, who accused them of having stirred up the people and declared that she would not act on their requests until they had managed to restore order to the streets. Though senior *parlementaires* tried to point out that it was impossible to compel obedience from an emotional crowd that recognized no leader, and insisted that nothing less than the loyalty of the capital city was at stake, their entreaties appeared to fall on deaf ears.

As the delegation prepared to leave, the *premier président* of the *parlement*, Mathieu Molé was admitted to private chambers, where he was able to speak with the queen mother in the presence of her senior advisors. With difficulty, she was persuaded to relent so far as to promise the return of Broussel and Blancmesnil if the *parlement* would agree to stop dabbling in political affairs and spend the remainder of its session handling the individual cases brought before it.

When Molé reported this outcome to his colleagues, some insisted that they adhere strictly to their rules of procedure by returning to their own chambers to discuss the proposal in a setting where there could be no suspicion that they had acted under compulsion. Talon reported that as the delegates made their way out of the palace, they were given encouragement by domestic servants in the royal household, who whispered, “Hold firm and you will get your councilors back,” and that some of the French guards even declared out loud that they would lay down their arms rather than fight against the city’s residents.³⁸

But the delegation was about to learn that not everyone approved of the

conciliatory stance that the *parlement* had adopted. Hardly had its members begun to make their way along the rue Saint-Honoré when Premier Président Molé was brought to a complete halt before an imposing barricade at the crossing of the rue de l'Arbre-sec by a man brandishing a pistol in one hand (fig. 11). He brought his other hand to rest on Molé's arm, warning him that he would not be allowed to pass unless accompanied by Broussel.³⁹ He even threatened to take Molé hostage to secure the release of Broussel. His words and manner were sufficiently menacing to persuade a number of the officers of the *parlement* standing in the forward ranks of the delegation that they would do better to retreat into nearby houses or adjoining streets. With great dignity and courage, the *premier président* reproached his aggressor for his disgraceful impudence and, with the help of Président à mortier Henri de Mesmes, tried to explain that Broussel was not being held in the Palais-Royal, as members of the crowd believed, but far away in Saint-Germain. Soon, however, as it became apparent that no amount of argument would overcome the crowd's refusal to let them pass, the remaining members of the delegation retraced their steps to the Palais-Royal.



FIGURE 11. Premier Président Mathieu Molé confronted by insurgents. At the corner of the rue Saint-Honoré and the rue de l'Arbre-sec, Molé is stopped at a barricade and refused passage until he has secured Broussel's release. Anquetil [1805] 1851, 536.

After being admitted a second time, the *parlementaires* were given the light refreshment they had been denied earlier, as well as a room in which to conduct their discussions. Deliberating in the presence of the duc d'Orléans, the chancellor, and other high officials, they were able to set aside the procedural objections of 40 of the 120 remaining members and agree upon an *arrêté*, or

formal declaration, that ostensibly satisfied the queen mother's requirements.⁴⁰ Knowing they would have to face the crowd outside, they were careful to arrange to have letters prepared in the king's name ordering the release of the prisoners and the dispatch of royal coaches to bring them back to Paris. Blancmesnil, held on the outskirts of the city, had already regained his freedom late that evening, but only Broussel mattered in the eyes of the people, and the barricades therefore remained in place, secured by armed residents, through the night.

At five o'clock the next morning, the municipal authorities were still unable to persuade residents to remove their barricades. Those on guard held their ground—obstinately, if somewhat apologetically—saying that they needed to remain armed until the issue had been finally settled for fear that vagabonds and disorderly persons circulating through the city might begin stealing and pillaging.⁴¹ And indeed, when Broussel still had not arrived by eight A.M., the situation in the capital seemed on the verge of deteriorating all over again.

Fortunately, Broussel's coach finally entered the capital at the porte Saint-Denis around ten o'clock on the morning of August 28. Along the route leading to his home, the barricades opened and the people greeted him with shouts of joy and by discharging their muskets in the air. With their "protector" safely returned to their midst, Parisians grudgingly complied with the *parlement's* directive to remove the barricades and lay down their arms. In most parts of the city, calm was restored almost as quickly as it had been disrupted two days earlier, and by two o'clock that afternoon, the chains had been lowered, the barricades demolished, and the shops reopened.⁴²

Just two incidents marred this swift demobilization of the capital. The first was an inadvertent result of Broussel's return, for inhabitants made so much noise with their shouts of joy and celebratory gunshots in the streets through which he passed that residents of other quarters, unaware of the reason for the clamor, thought they were hearing the reaction to a cavalry charge and began building barricades anew. Fifty additional structures were raised in the space of one half hour.⁴³ In the faubourg Saint-Antoine, the departure from the Bastille, between five and six P.M., of three wagons loaded with powder, bullets, and wicks, caused a fresh commotion. Believing this to be a prelude to an attack by royal forces, local residents seized these supplies and placed their quarter on an emergency footing. In a twinkling, barricades were rebuilt there and in adjoining districts. The people refused to listen when Maréchal de la Meilleraye explained that this transfer of munitions resulted from an order he had issued several days before, and that he had, in the subsequent tumult, forgotten to countermand.

Fortunately, the daily bread shipment arrived on time, at six o'clock the next morning. When no further sign of military action materialized, the barricades were removed, and this last pocket of insurgency stood down.⁴⁴ This peaceful outcome was also facilitated by the queen mother's decision to grant a request from Prévôt de Marchands Le Féron that she return half the guardsmen to their quarters and remove from the vicinity of Paris the four hundred cavalrymen whom Meilleraye had recently stationed in the Bois de Boulogne.




FIGURE 12. Barricade at the porte Saint-Antoine, Paris, August 27, 1648. This engraving is based on a contemporary print, the earliest depiction of a barricade of which I am aware, now held by the Bibliothèque nationale. The setting is the customs gateway separating the city proper from the faubourg Saint-Antoine. Note the chains, barrels, and *gabions*. Bordier and Charton 1860, 2: 225.

Just days after the dismantling of the barricades, the regent invited Prévôt de

Marchands Le Féron, the aldermen (*échevins*), and the colonels and captains of the bourgeois militia to the Palais-Royal. Her stated purpose was to thank them for their “loyal service” to the king during the recent riots. She also used the occasion to reassure the people that, contrary to a rumor then in wide circulation, there was absolutely no thought of removing the king from Paris.⁴⁵

This was a commitment that the strong-willed queen would keep for less than a fortnight. With the political situation still at impasse, the prospect of effectively being held hostage by the populace was intolerable to her. On September 12, citing her son’s need for a “change of air” while the Palais-Royal was being cleaned, the queen removed the court to Rueil. This step had been advised by Mazarin, probably in the hope that the triumphant return of Grand Condé’s army, then en route from Flanders, would decisively tip the balance of power. But though the Condé’s contempt for the *parlement* had only increased in the wake of the recent insurrection, his reluctance to subordinate himself to the cardinal was stronger still. Without the cooperation of the commander-in-chief of the army, no plan to force the capital to submit could succeed, and the court was obliged to compromise. The royal family returned to Paris at the end of October, and the regent agreed to the registration of reforms worked out by representatives of the royal courts. Direct taxes were to be reduced by 20 percent, and the crown agreed not to use *lettres de cachet* against magistrates or create new judicial or financial offices for a period of four years.

But once again, royal concessions were neither sincere nor lasting. With the *parlement* continuing to meet on nonjudicial matters, the queen resolved to effect a second strategic withdrawal from the capital. On January 5, after celebrating Twelfth Night with the traditional “king’s cake,” the royal family went to bed. At two in the morning, the king and queen mother were awakened and rushed in secrecy to a waiting coach, in which they stole out of the city accompanied by a small escort of notables. This clandestine departure must have made a powerful impression on the ten-year-old king. His retinue’s unexpected midwinter arrival at the empty and unheated castle at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, where he was obliged to sleep on a bed of straw, combined discomfort with humiliation, conditions of the body and spirit that lay outside his customary experience. Raised in the belief that the universe revolved around him, the future Sun King’s ambivalence toward Paris had its roots in the events of those troubled days.⁴⁶

The furtive flight of the royal family enraged Parisians.⁴⁷ Convinced that a military confrontation was now inevitable, the *parlement* set about raising an army of some 15,000 soldiers to defend the capital against attack or siege. The

great aristocratic warriors began choosing sides in the impending conflict. Initially, the Grand Condé, the victor of Lens, headed up the regent's forces, while Turenne, Armand de Bourbon, prince de Conti (Condé's brother), and the ducs de la Rochefoucauld, Elbeuf, and Beaufort all entered the lists on the side of the *parlements*. Within the year, however, a new dynamic, driven by the exigencies of the warring armies and princely rivalries, had taken over, reshaping these coalitions and redefining the objectives of the civil war.⁴⁸ The first phase of the conflict, the Fronde parlementaire, had ended.

THE DYNAMICS OF BARRICADE CONSTRUCTION IN 1648

What most impressed eyewitnesses about the barricades of the Fronde was how swiftly they were erected in neighborhoods all over the city. The simultaneity of their appearance was, in fact, cited as *prima facie* evidence of a high degree of coordination among the insurgents, though contemporary sources have consistently failed to support this. On the contrary, in virtually every incident of the period, the leaders of the crowd remain completely anonymous, though there must have been one or more individuals who seized the initiative in the attack on Comminges's carriage or the chase after Chancellor Séguier along the quai des Grands Augustins.⁴⁹ Whatever authority they may momentarily have exercised never extended beyond the immediate situation.

The explanation was self-evident to Queen Mother Anne of Austria's lady-in-waiting Françoise de Motteville: "Of so many ill-intentioned people, not one wished to declare himself the leader of the *canaille* in revolt."⁵⁰ Her disdainful judgment was no doubt a correct characterization of the attitude of French aristocrats, who took no active part in this initial mobilization. But the urban middle class seems to have had no such scruples about associating with the rabble. Olivier d'Ormesson, another eager observer, was struck by the way that residents took to barricade construction "with such alacrity and industry that those who have been in the army say that soldiers could not have done as good a job." Divine intervention was the best explanation he could come up with for the way Parisians were able to coordinate their actions with so little forewarning: "I think that God was directing the thoughts of the entire people. It is a marvel that in the absence of any leader or any plan worked out in advance, the bourgeois everywhere in Paris had the same idea for retrieving M. Broussel."⁵¹

The absence of clear leadership was also the excuse that Premier Président Molé offered when the queen mother demanded that he end the unrest in the streets, for who could tame the unruly spirits of an aroused populace?⁵² Several

additional eyewitnesses testify that the erection of barricades was undertaken spontaneously by the people, who had neither leaders nor any well-defined plan of action.⁵³ All of these comments underscore what contemporary observers found most remarkable about the Second Day of the Barricades: the apparent contradiction between its vast scope and apparent coherence on the one hand, and its utter lack of overall direction on the other.

Historians have, of course, sought to pinpoint the animating spirit of the Fronde parlementaire in various quarters. Broussel is most frequently mentioned, but he became the focus of the August uprising only as a victim of government persecution. His arrest may have furnished the populace with a suitable rallying point, but there can be no pretense that he actively assumed the role of insurrectionary leader—one for which he was not only poorly suited but unavailable, since he remained under detention during the entire revolt.

Alternatively, it might be argued that the *parlement* as a whole, or at least its individual leaders, supplied the impetus for the insurgency. It had, after all, taken over responsibilities once shared between the municipal administration (which had surrendered much of its independence to the monarchical state since the time of Etienne Marcel) and the Estates General (which had not been convened for more than a generation). It was, moreover, particularly well positioned to mobilize resistance in the capital, Mousnier observes, because colonels of the bourgeois militia “were nearly always members of the royal courts.”⁵⁴ But though it may have prepared the ground for the seeds of rebellion through its stubborn opposition to the maneuvers of the Royal Council, the *parlement* remained an essentially deliberative body. Content, for reasons of its own, to see the spread of the initial street demonstrations, its members never identified with the popular movement. Their mistrust of the common people was warmly reciprocated by many Parisians, as the confrontation in the rue Saint-Honoré made apparent. Molé, already suspect because he was a royal appointee, defined his role not as the people’s advocate but as mediator between them and the government.⁵⁵ He and his colleagues were little inclined to ally themselves with bands of rude insurgents. And though members of the Parisian crowd might express their own opposition to the government by crying “Vive le Parlement!” it is doubtful that they would have welcomed an attempt by the magistrates to seize control of the popular movement.⁵⁶

Still, there is one candidate—or perhaps I should say self-nominee—for the role of instigator of the 1648 rebellion. Paul de Gondi, coadjutor of Paris, was a controversial figure, notorious for his overweening ambition and consistently

portrayed by his contemporaries as a master of intrigue.⁵⁷ Gondi's own memoirs recount how, sometime after midnight on August 26, he sent for Maître des comptes Miron, the militia colonel in the Saint-Germain de l'Auxerrois quarter, from whom he secured a promise to assemble and arm the forces under that officer's command as soon as Gondi gave the signal. Gondi then ordered another of his confederates to stand by in the rue Saint-Honoré, ready to seize the guard post at the Barrière des Sergens and build a barricade for use against the guards stationed in the Palais-Royal.⁵⁸ Do these revelations establish that Gondi was the counterpart of Mayenne or Charles II de Cossé in 1588?

In fact, in spite of all the circumstantial detail that he artfully inserted into his narrative, there is good reason to doubt that Gondi qualifies as the leader of the 1648 revolt. We must first keep in mind that this version of events is based almost entirely on two primary sources—one written by Gondi himself and the other by Guy Joly, his close associate.⁵⁹ Neither offers much in the way of practical details on how the conspiracy was carried out. Neither specifies the mechanism that would have allowed Gondi's directives to be transmitted to insurgents spread across a still peacefully sleeping city between 1 A.M. on the morning of August 27, when Gondi and Miron are reported to have met, and 6 A.M. when protests resumed and barricade construction began. Indeed, in the absence of an apparatus like the one that the Paris Sixteen had provided in 1588 or the sort of private army at the disposal of the duc de Guise, it appears that no one, least of all Gondi, had the means to exercise effective control over the events of August 1648.⁶⁰

THE POWER OF REPERTOIRE

Yet barricades undeniably did spread throughout the city, for contemporary observers left no doubt that every quarter was involved. Though the figures seem exaggerated, some sources claim that more than 100,000 men were under arms, and that the number of barricades constructed reached as high as 1,260.⁶¹ Even if we discount these lofty estimates, what seems clearly established is that for three days running, all normal business was halted and freedom of movement within the city curtailed. How, then, are we to reconcile the state of near paralysis that overtook the capital of France with the apparent lack of effective leadership?

Here is where well-defined routines of urban protest, once widely assimilated by the general population, could make all the difference. A local uprising in a city well versed in the art of insurrection might even dispense with the need for a tightly integrated command structure to the extent that participants acted

according to a well-defined set of roles and expectations. This body of shared knowledge explains how barricades could appear almost simultaneously throughout the city, even though most groups of insurgents remained isolated within their separate neighborhoods. The lack of leadership might, it is true, severely handicap efforts to develop a strategic plan of action or impede the emergence of an effective provisional authority, such as the one that Guise and the Sixteen swiftly organized in 1588. But a well-practiced repertoire of contention could, under the right circumstances, be sufficient to mobilize a discontented populace interested in restoring the status quo ante, as with the move to force the release of Broussel and the withdrawal of troop reinforcements from Paris in 1648.

In this respect, heightened barricade consciousness was crucial. The reappearance of this tactic on a large scale and its ability to blanket the city so quickly and completely reflected Parisians' awareness of the precedent of 1588 and the handful of smaller incidents since that time, a point frequently made by contemporary chroniclers. When the struggle for political power caused the military presence in the capital to be increased in 1648, much as it had been in 1588, Prévôt de Marchands Le Féron asked the queen to order the recently arrived soldiers removed, "lest shops be closed and barricades built."⁶² Members of the queen's inner circle "involuntarily recalled the barricades of 1588," even as they struggled, in the heat of this fresh confrontation, to maintain a falsely optimistic outlook.⁶³ Madame de Motteville herself might claim that she could have "died of astonishment" when told that Paris was covered with barricades, for her impression was that such things only happened in tales from the time of Henri III, but her comment betrays an uneasy knowledge of the capital's history and its potential to breed unrest.⁶⁴

Demonstrating barricade consciousness among the common people who, unlike the elite, generally remained mute, is a challenging task. The evidence that has survived typically comes to us more indirectly, as with Joly's presumption that "the barricades constructed under Henri III must have served as a lesson" for the insurgents of 1648.⁶⁵ Occasionally, we are reminded by concrete actions that the memory of the events surrounding the First Day of the Barricades was still alive, as with Gondi's report of an officer in the militia wearing a gorget bearing the painted likeness of the monk who had assassinated Henri III in 1589 inscribed "Saint Jacques Clément."⁶⁶ Of course, popular memories were, for the most part, transmitted by word of mouth rather than formal learning or written records. Keep in mind that the events of 1588 had taken place just sixty years earlier and were thus within the reach of living

memory. New generations of Parisians had heard their parents' and grandparents' stories and formed a mental image of the city's aspect when it rallied behind the cause of the duc de Guise. Along with this came an understanding of how barricades were constructed and what they could accomplish. This folk knowledge—what I call the lore of the barricade—was the underpinning for a routine of collective action rooted in an oral tradition.

This flexible template for barricade combat was a precious resource that allowed the insurgents of 1648 to overcome the absence of careful planning or universally recognized leaders and—in the span of a few hours and largely without instruction or supervision—immobilize the greatest metropolis on the Continent. The Second Day of the Barricades, even more clearly than the First, showed that the common people possessed a capacity for large-scale mobilization and a genius for improvisation that long predated their supposed emergence from the shadows and onto the historical stage at the time of the 1789 Revolution.

THE GEOGRAPHICAL BASIS OF THE FRONDE PARLEMENTAIRE

The barricades of 1648, like those of 1588, began as an act of neighborhood defense. This essentially communal response took hold in nearly every quarter of the city, yet virtually all of the critical events took place along a narrow geographical corridor that had been vividly outlined on the morning of August 26 by a double row of uniformed soldiers. Though they were there to guard the route the royal party would follow on its way to the mass of celebration in Notre-Dame, they also starkly outlined the main axes of power, running between the procession's points of origination and termination. At one end stood the Palais-Royal, where the king and queen mother resided, and alongside which Mazarin also lived. At the other was the Ile de la Cité, where, in addition to the great cathedral, the Palais de Justice, seat of the Paris *parlement*, was situated. The royal cortège, the abduction of Broussel, Meilleraye's initial sortie, Séguier's abortive mission and hectic flight, and the procession of *parlementaires* all followed roughly this same trajectory, consisting of a main segment that ran east-west along the rue Saint-Honoré and a shorter north-south leg leading via the Pont-Neuf or pont Saint-Michel to the island at the center of Paris.⁶⁷

It was along this same route that the rebels concentrated their barricades. Their first concern was naturally to inhibit the free circulation of royal troops

through the inner city. Soon, however, they extended their reach along the quays of the Seine, confining the king's soldiers to a few strong points in proximity to guard posts along the main thoroughfares, and finally to the immediate vicinity of the Palais-Royal itself. The way the barricades were positioned gave insurgents a much more subtle command over the urban space they inhabited than is often recognized. We have seen that in the early hours of August 27, Chancellor Seguier, dispatched by the queen regent to deliver a reprimand to the *parlement*, encountered structures that blocked his way, forcing him to make a detour and eventually to abandon his coach. Yet on the same morning, Coadjutor Gondy, whom the people considered sympathetic to their cause, had no difficulty traveling along essentially the same trajectory between the archbishop's residence (also on the Ile de la Cité) and the regent's palace.

The procession that members of the *parlement* made to the Palais-Royal at the height of the unrest is an even clearer example of the ability to discriminate that barricades placed in the hands of crowd members. As long as the robed *parlementaires* followed a path that the barricade defenders approved of—westward to present their petition to the queen—the rebels eased their passage through every obstacle. But when they tried to retrace their steps without having first secured Broussel's freedom, they were brought to a sudden standstill. Only after returning to the palace to carry out their mission to the insurgents' satisfaction were they permitted to proceed across the barricaded city to their assembly chambers. Indeed, even after the crisis appeared to be resolved, the crowd refused to let two royal coaches pass, relenting only when told they were being sent to retrieve the prisoners (and not until signed orders for Broussel's release could be produced).⁶⁸ What these examples make clear is that the barricade, for all its effectiveness in restricting the displacement of troops about the city, could also display a *selective permeability* that allowed the civilian population to assert its mastery over the urban environment in a fairly nuanced manner.⁶⁹

Descimon has pointed to a different sort of polarity, also geographical in origin, that governed the unfolding of events in Paris.⁷⁰ At several levels, Parisians' response was driven by the fear of strangers—*l'étranger*. The French term conflates two English meanings—foreigner and outsider—both of which were relevant to the political dynamic of 1648. Popular distrust of foreigners was aimed at the very highest reaches of the social hierarchy and applied specifically to Anne of Austria (who was actually a member of the Spanish branch of the House of Habsburg) and Mazarin (who, though he had been a naturalized French citizen since 1639, was of Italian origin.) It most definitely embraced the

primary instrument of their authority in the capital, the Swiss Guard (Gardes-suisses). More surprising to a modern reader, however, the term applied in only somewhat lesser degree to the other Royal Guard (sometimes referred to as the Gardes-françaises), who, though of French nationality, were not native to the city. As in 1588, and based on even more recent experience of marauding mercenary armies, Parisians lived in fear of what the introduction of so many “foreign” soldiers could mean for their lives and property, to say nothing of their prerogatives as residents of a free city.

But Parisians’ fears were also aroused by another category of “outsiders,” most of whom were actually inhabitants of the capital. Those who recorded the history of this period (for the most part members of the aristocracy or the propertied middle class) made numerous references to the presence in Paris of vagrants (*vagabonds*), the homeless (*gens sans aveu*), and the rabble (*la canaille*). In doing so, they raised the specter of the riots and looting that could be expected to occur if public order suddenly broke down. Maître d’Hôtel du Roi Jean Vallier, in fact, asserts that Parisians built barricades not in a spirit of rebellion against the king, “but to save themselves from the insolence and fury of the many rogues and reprobates who were only waiting for the chance to pillage the houses of the rich and to take revenge on their personal enemies.”⁷¹ Their alarm may not have been entirely without foundation, but municipal registers indicate that no deaths and only one casualty could be attributed to the depredations of such lawless elements.⁷² As Françoise de Motteville remarked, “Never has a disorder been so orderly, for an insurrection as vast and impetuous as this one might be expected to cause more harm than this one actually did.”⁷³

Thus, those who manned the barricades of 1648, much like their counterparts in 1588, were motivated by what might be called as a “logic of alterity”—distrust and suspicion directed not only toward alien elites and the “foreign” troops that did their bidding but also against the Parisian underclass. Eyewitness accounts rarely provide a systematic overview of participants but leave the impression that only the crowds that first reacted to Broussel’s abduction on the Ile de la Cité had a plebeian flavor. They comprised boatmen, porters, beggars and vagabonds, in addition to many artisans. By the time that full-scale mobilization began the next morning, members of the bourgeois militia were in the ascendant.⁷⁴ From that point forward, control over the insurrection remained firmly in the hands of the middle class, which relied on barricades to avert the dangers both of random acts of violence on the part of lawless social elements and of the more systematic use of coercion by royal troops bent on imposing the government’s will by force.

EPILOGUE TO THE SECOND DAY OF THE BARRICADES

One further instance of barricade construction comes to light in histories of the Fronde, but what little we learn of it comes to us only through accounts of a non-barricade event. On July 2, 1652, a battle took place between armies commanded by the two most brilliant generals of the age. The soldiers of the king, led by Turenne, clashed beneath the walls of Paris with the army of the princely Fronde, commanded by Condé. In the last days of June, royal troops appeared to have the rebels cornered just west of the capital. Under an agreement worked out between the crown and city officials, Paris had pledged to maintain a strict neutrality by admitting neither camp within its walls. Condé, outnumbered two to one and at risk of being outflanked, undertook a forced march during the night of July 1 to 2. His last hope was to lead his army to the relative safety of the spit of land lying between the Seine and the Marne rivers at their point of confluence near Charenton, east of Paris. He succeeded in skirting the city to the north but, as he turned southward, was overtaken and attacked in the faubourg Saint-Antoine. There, Condé's desperate soldiers miraculously happened across a set of "barricades" behind which they took cover. La Rochefoucauld, who was gravely wounded in that day's combat, marveled at the lucky accident that this discovery took place at the single spot in Condé's entire line of march where his soldiers had a chance of avoiding defeat.⁷⁵ Thanks to the fortuitous presence of these structures, the rebels were able to stave off Turenne's artillery and cavalry attacks for a precious few hours. This gave the duchesse de Montpensier enough time to persuade her father (the duc d'Orléans) and the municipal authorities to break their promise to the king by opening the city's gates and allowing what remained of Condé's beleaguered army to enter the city.⁷⁶

Although the inconclusive engagement between these two great armies would not qualify as a barricade event as defined here (on grounds that it was a battle between professional military forces), the *frondeurs'* appropriation of those discarded structures clearly points in the direction of an earlier episode that *does* fit our definition. Three contemporary sources stipulate that the heaps of rubble that saved Condé's army from annihilation were the remnants of improvised barriers raised by local residents to protect themselves against skirmishers and plunderers accompanying the mercenary army of the duc de Lorraine.⁷⁷ Unfortunately, this tells us only that an additional barricade event occurred sometime in May or possibly June 1652.

For the remainder of the seventeenth century—indeed, for well over a

hundred years to follow—no other barricade event has come to light. This lengthy pause in the application of the technique begs for an explanation, one that appears to revolve around variations in the strength of the state. Certainly, the unrest that accompanied the Fronde must in part be understood as a consequence of the weakening of the French monarchy that had been apparent for some time. The free circulation of *Mazarinades*—songs, poems, and pamphlets attacking the cardinal and the King’s Council that were produced by the score—was evidence both of the low esteem in which the French people held their government and of that government’s impotence in trying to stem the flow of criticism and protest. Indeed, state ministers were unable to put a stop to the campaign of innuendo and ridicule, which even targeted “Mme Anne” (the disrespectful sobriquet that *frondeurs* used to refer to the regent, Anne of Austria).

It is also evident that the uprisings associated with the Fronde were themselves responsible for the further deterioration in the legitimacy of the state noted by contemporaries. Madame de Motteville argues persuasively that the effect of the monarchy’s inability to establish its domination, both at home and abroad, was as immediate as it was damaging. Even the Spaniards, recently defeated in battle and forced to sue for peace, were emboldened by their sense of the regent’s vulnerability to funnel resources to French factions that, for their own reasons, were prepared to challenge the state’s authority. Anne of Austria foresaw that the country’s enemies would take heart from the events of August 27, 1648, and was convinced that the spectacle of “a chancellor of France, without respect in Paris, whom the people had tried to murder in the streets while the king was present in the city, was a sure sign that the power of the prince was in suspense and the love of his subjects for their sovereign apparently extinguished.”⁷⁸ Still, the paralysis of the French state would prove to be relatively short-lived. With the death of Mazarin and the beginning of Louis XIV’s personal rule in 1661, the power of the monarchy would not only be restored but enhanced.

The direct result of this resurgence of absolutist control was a tapering off of full-scale urban insurrections in general and of barricade events in particular over the remainder of the seventeenth century. René Pillorget has studied the incidence of insurrections between 1596 and 1715. He uncovered a total of 532 events in this 120-year span, or what amounts to 4.4 events per year on average. However, those events were rather unevenly distributed among the six chronological intervals into which he divided the period covered by his research. The six years from the start of 1648 to the end of 1653 (corresponding to the

Fronde and its aftermath) witnessed the highest level of insurgent activity, with an average of eleven events per year. The fifty-five years of Louis XIV's personal rule produced the lowest average of just two events per year.⁷⁹ The results reported by Yves-Marie Bercé, who studied peasant revolts in the southwest of France during the seventeenth century, are consistent with this conclusion. He found that a tripling of the tax burden and an increase in the incidence of agricultural crisis over the last thirty years of the Sun King's reign resulted in only sporadic rural violence.⁸⁰

Jean Nicolas has compiled the most complete and meticulous survey of popular movements during the period in question, documenting a total of 8,528 incidents of protest activity, large and small, between 1661 and 1789. A majority involved some form of resistance to tax collection (3,336 cases) or reactions to subsistence crises like food riots or attacks on grain shipments (1,497 events in all.) This should be sufficient in itself to show that a decline in barricade events must not be confused with an overall reduction in contentious behavior. Indeed, the extension of the state's authority actually made many types of protest, including clashes with police and royal troops, more frequent. However, even the growth in the number of revolts against judicial or military authorities (an additional 1,212 cases) seems not to have given rise to the construction of barricades.⁸¹

So while the extension of the state's authority may actually have provided the occasion for many types of protest events to become even more frequent, it seems not to have led to the sort of insurrectionary episode that involved the building of barricades. Unlike the 1588 and 1648 peaks of urban insurrectionary activity, which corresponded to distinct moments of weakness, even crisis, for the French monarchy, what followed was a long period in which the stable exercise of state power caused a shift in the nature of collective action. Once Louis XIV took the reins of government in his own firm hands, barricades went into eclipse, returning only when the faltering rule of Louis XVI created the opportunity for the tactic to flourish anew. In short, the proliferation of barricade events required a combination of facilitating conditions among which the most common were: costly wars that strained an inefficient or corrupt fiscal system to the breaking point and often undermined the government's legitimacy, especially when they resulted in military defeat; subsistence crises that demonstrated the monarchy's inability to provide for its subjects' most basic needs; and a regency or a challenge from a credible rival who was able to cast doubt on the king's ability to provide strong leadership.

By 1648, the nation, exhausted by decades of war and the demands of a

rapacious government, faced just such a crisis of legitimacy, compounded by “the presence of a child king, a Spanish queen who was held in contempt, and a foreign minister who was thoroughly detested.”⁸² These were the elements that provided the driving force behind the Fronde parlementaire and its construction of hundreds of barricades. For lack of leadership and clearly defined objectives, the insurrection of August 1648 served only to plunge French society into successive waves of civil war, princely rivalries, and bitter factionalism.

But the Fronde was nonetheless a critical turning point in French history. Two days after the battle of the faubourg Saint-Antoine in 1652, Condé’s forces alienated residents of the capital, who had given them sanctuary, by killing several prominent Parisians in the process of putting down a public assembly organized to lobby for peace.⁸³ The resulting reaction against the arrogance and authoritarianism of the princes quickly escalated. It became clear that France, fed up with domestic strife and anarchy, would welcome the prospect of dependable government, which even rebellious Parisians had reluctantly concluded only the king could provide. The tide had turned against the forces of disintegration.

France did not immediately emerge from its troubled condition. Louis XIV’s minority had officially ended in 1651 when he turned thirteen, but Mazarin continued to direct the affairs of the French state until his death, when Louis XIV assumed direct control over the conduct of government. The king’s European ambitions kept the royal armies almost constantly at war, while the construction of the magnificent palace at Versailles exacerbated the country’s ongoing financial difficulties. But the cult of royalty that Louis the Great actively encouraged, along with the enhanced administrative and political effectiveness for which his brilliant reforming minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert laid the groundwork, prevented major schisms or large-scale rebellions from taking hold. The centralization and consolidation of the power of the monarchy took place largely at the expense of the traditional aristocracy and with the active collaboration of non-noble administrators, whom Louis XIV freely recruited and promoted. Gradually, the power of the central state began to gain the ascendancy.

I have noted that once the Fronde had passed, no barricades appeared in France for nearly a century and a half. The monarchy succeeded so well in displacing armed conflict from the territory of France to its borders or to the territory of its adversaries, in fact, that for cities like Paris, the threat of foreign armies seemed increasingly remote. One sure measure of the enhanced sense of security that the capital enjoyed can be found in Colbert’s projects to demolish many of the gates and walls that had protected the city for centuries.⁸⁴ At about

the same time, the chains that had previously assured the safety of urban neighborhoods fell into disuse and were eventually removed, as Paris developed a new self-image as the most enlightened and open city on the Continent.

But barricade consciousness never disappeared completely. Time would show that the seeds of rebellion lay dormant, not dead. Before examining the conditions in which they managed first to germinate and then to thrive once more, eventually spreading far beyond the borders of France, we need to form a picture of the incidence of barricade events over their entire history and more particularly during the long nineteenth century, the period to which the remainder of this study is devoted.

The Long-Term Incidence of Barricade Events and the Lost Barricades of the French Revolution

The curious thing is that barricades suddenly resurfaced in the neighborhood of the Hôtel de Ville on November 19, 1827, after disappearing from the Parisian scene for nearly two centuries: indeed, they never figure in the imagery of the Great French Revolution.

GEORGES DUVEAU, 1848

Barricade events are inherently rare. My effort to document all instances of barricade construction over a span of more than three centuries has turned up just 155 such incidents.¹ That total could be viewed as either understating or overstating the actual number of barricade events. On the one hand, I have no illusions that I have managed to uncover every instance of barricade building that took place from the time of the tactic's origination until the end of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, even this simple tally could be seen as overstating the frequency of the barricade phenomenon, since many of the cases enumerated, rather than being free-standing, occurred directly in the wake of some large-scale and highly visible "initiator" event. Thus, when the silk workers of Lyon rebelled in April 1834, they inspired smaller "spin-off" incidents of barricade construction in Saint-Etienne, Chalon-sur-Saône, and Vienne that one can confidently assume would never have taken place had the Lyonnais *canuts* not taken the lead.²

An even more striking illustration of the problem is provided by the eleven barricade events that occurred in December 1851 in reaction to Louis-

Napoléon's overthrow of the Second French Republic. The initial insurrectionary response in the capital on December 3 was followed over the next six days by ten minor collisions in outlying locations, all of which involved barricades. The database ([appendix A](#)) lists them all as separate incidents, but, allowing for delays in the transmission of news from Paris to the provinces, they might legitimately be viewed as part of a single constellation of barricade events. The interrelatedness of specific cases will be a crucial consideration in the effort to sort out the complex process of barricade diffusion in 1848 (the central focus of [chapter 6](#)), but for now, identifying meaningful patterns in the distribution of barricade events requires that we first form a comprehensive picture of the entire period under investigation.


THE INCIDENCE OF BARRICADE EVENTS IN TIME AND SPACE

The relative scarcity of barricade events is brought home by this observation: I have been unable to authenticate the appearance of even a single barricade in 288 of the 332 years covered by my data. Graph 1 not only illustrates that barricade construction was confined to a comparatively small number of “eventful” years but also demonstrates that a large proportion of the 44 active years were tightly clustered into distinct peaks of insurrectionary ferment.


Let us momentarily narrow our focus to France, the obvious candidate for single-case analysis, since an outright majority of all events—92 of 155, or 59 percent—occurred there. Because French barricade use was even more tightly concentrated into comparatively brief bursts of civil unrest, and because they can be directly related to country-specific political developments, these surges now become more readily interpretable. Graph 2 displays the temporal distribution of all French events in my database. These define several vertical spikes over which I have superimposed shaded bands representing the six crucial moments in the history of the period when popular upheaval posed a realistic threat of imminent regime change. They correspond to the crises associated with the Holy League and the Fronde, with which we are already familiar; the French revolutions of 1789, 1830, and 1848; and the Paris Commune of 1871. Together, these twenty-six years of heightened insurrectionary activity account for nearly two-thirds of all French barricade events recorded over more than three centuries.³

Graph 2 may provide a bird's-eye view of this type of insurrectionary activity, but its graphic display also has the potential to prove misleading. In it, the 1588 and 1648 peaks are no more prominent than other, lesser sixteenth- and


seventeenth-century skirmishes and are dwarfed in comparison to the many outbreaks that occurred during the long nineteenth century, when the French turned to barricade building with increasing frequency. Yet, as the previous two chapters have shown, when one allows for the growth in size of French society, the First and Second Days of the Barricades not only stand out in their respective periods, but were equivalent in scale and historical significance to the great revolutionary eruptions of the modern era. The difficulty is that graph 2 is based on simply counting up the number of events that took place in each given year. It therefore assigns equal weight to short-lived disorders undertaken by a few dozen adventurers without genuine support in the population at large and to a massive insurrection that mobilized an entire city, inflicted thousands of casualties, and succeeded in overthrowing a venerable political regime. It makes no distinction between the many minor incidents in which only a single barricade was built and major cataclysms in which they numbered in the thousands.



GRAPH 1. Number of European barricade events, 1550–1900.



GRAPH 2. Number of French barricade events, 1550–1900.



GRAPH 3. Magnitude of French barricade events, 1550–1900.

To better reflect such differences in “magnitude,” I have calculated a score for each barricade event that makes it easier to compare their relative importance over the centuries. It is based on the number of insurgents participating, the number of insurgents who died, and, above all, the number of barricades constructed.⁴ [Graph 3](#) displays the sum of these imputed magnitudes for all barricade events that occurred in a given year. Weighting individual cases in this way restores a sense of proportion to the data. The events of 1588 become somewhat more (and those of 1851, for example, somewhat less) prominent than in the preceding graph, and the year 1848 takes its rightful place as the all-time pinnacle of barricade mobilization in France.

THE REVIVAL OF THE BARRICADE IN THE MODERN ERA

The distribution of barricade events in France reinforces a point made at the end of [chapter 3](#): not a single French incident has come to light between 1653 and 1789, a period corresponding to the strengthening of the state that began under the rule of Louis XIV. But just as the work of Nicolas reminds us that it would be wrong to equate the lack of barricades with a lack of protest, their absence should not be taken to mean that they had vanished from public memory and awareness. Though there may have been little opportunity for the common people to put to use the practical skills acquired in earlier times, this temporary restraint did not deceive the most perceptive observers. Marquis René-Louis d’Argenson, one of the Sun King’s ministers, was anything but reassured by his survey of French politics fifteen years after the crown had passed to the Louis XV. He offered this prescient assessment of the prospect of unrest in the French capital:

The king does not pay enough attention to the security of Paris, which is often crucially important to his authority. We have seen what barricades can do. This is an invention that has flourished since the time of the duc de Guise, that has been used since, and that Parisians are now quite familiar with. They will use them again at the first opportunity, for this very powerful mode of resistance transforms the streets of Paris into formidable strongholds.⁵

Argenson’s fears were not realized in his lifetime. The weakened monarchy somehow managed to skirt disaster despite France’s defeat in the Seven Years’ War and the massive state indebtedness that resulted from that effort. It was only after the ill-starred Louis XVI ascended the throne that Argenson’s dire

prophecy was to be fulfilled.

THE BARRICADE IN 1789

In considering the role of barricades in the French Revolution, the most controversial statement I can make is to assert that any were constructed at all. They play no part in the standard account of the overthrow of the monarchy or of the various stages of the early First Republic. Indeed, a number of historians have categorically declared that there were none, and that it was not until 1827 that the French renewed their erstwhile practice. Such an assertion, should it have come from a scholar specializing in the waning years of the Bourbon Restoration, might readily be explained away, for eyewitnesses to the construction of the 1827 barricades who had no personal experience of earlier barricade events sometimes jumped to the conclusion that they were witnessing a revival of some ancient ritual. Charles de Rémusat, for example, writing in his memoirs, seemed to assume that one had to go back 175 years to find a precedent: “Because there were a few barricades in the streets, we heard that name, forgotten since the League and the Fronde, being spoken once again.”⁶ Rémusat was hardly alone. Many otherwise trustworthy nineteenth-century sources committed the same error. After an extensive review of barricade use in the early-modern period, the *Grande encyclopédie* of 1887 asserted that after the Paris events of July 1652, no barricades were built until the Paris insurrection of 1827.⁷

Even those with a broad acquaintance with nineteenth-century French history have often been afflicted by the same myopia. For example, Stewart Edwards, author of several volumes on the Paris Commune, asserts that “there had been no street barricades during the first Revolution.” And Georges Weill in his review of republican politics over the course of the nineteenth century declares that barricades were raised in 1827 “for the first time since the Fronde.”⁸

Edgar Newman—who flatly states that 1827 “was the first time since the Fronde, more than a century and a half before, that barricades had appeared in the city”—is more helpful than the preceding authors, because he was careful to reference the source for his assertion.⁹ It is none other than Ernest Labrousse (1895–1988), whose stature as a historian of revolutionary movements in France was such that the confusion of those who followed his false lead seems entirely understandable.¹⁰

But the most surprising lapse of all, in my view, is the unequivocal statement

that Georges Duveau (1903–1958) made on the subject and that I have used as the epigraph to this chapter. Although the history of the French Revolution was not his area of specialization, Duveau was the first (and, until quite recently, virtually the only) historian to have singled out the barricade as a subject worthy of in-depth examination. His expert testimony on this score appears to have led a number of subsequent writers similarly astray.¹¹

Thus, denying the existence of barricades in the French Revolution might be said to place the historian in distinguished company. This does not, however, make that position any more defensible. Nor can one assume that the barricades of the French Revolution have been overlooked because they appeared only in relatively obscure and insignificant incidents, for they first turned up in the most celebrated *journée* of them all. On the morning of July 14, 1789, responding to a series of reports (all of them unfounded) that royal troops were firing on unarmed citizens in various quarters of the city, the Assemblée générale des électeurs de Paris dispatched couriers to the faubourgs Saint-Antoine and Saint-Denis with orders to “sound the alarm everywhere, unpave the streets, dig ditches, build barricades—in short, oppose the entry of troops using any and all obstacles that zeal and patriotism were capable of inventing and setting in place.”¹²

At the very least, the Electors’ order demonstrates that barricade consciousness persisted among French revolutionaries of that day, even if it fails to provide concrete assurance that any barricades were actually built. For that we must turn to other sources. The future King Louis-Philippe, duc de Chartres, the son of the duc d’Orléans (1747–93; aka Philippe Egalité), was in Paris on July 14, 1789. In his memoirs, he recalled that crowds had seized the customs barriers at the entrances to the city without great difficulty, and “All the approaches were barricaded off and guards placed at the gates.”¹³ Indirect corroboration is provided by the memoirs of Lucy de la Tour du Pin. On July 14, after returning from Versailles to Berny, where she was the guest of Mme de Montesson, she was informed by the concierge that a massacre had taken place at the Bastille and that her hostess was not present because “leaving the city is impossible. The gates are barricaded and guarded by the French guards who have joined the people’s rebellion.”¹⁴

Elector de Leutre was in a position to provide testimony of a more direct sort, for he was dispatched to the district adjoining the Bois de Boulogne during the night of July 14–15 to investigate reports that had reached the Hôtel de Ville claiming that 15,000 soldiers were on the march in that vicinity. He found no soldiers, but he did encounter “men, women, and children in the process of

unpaving the streets and preparing all possible means of repulsing or stopping the enemy.”¹⁵ An anonymous contemporary account cited in Jules Flammermont’s introduction to Louis Pitra’s memoirs related that “all streets were barricaded by trenches; all courtyards had their paving stones pried up; all windows were open; all citizens—women, old men, children—were on watch in expectation of the enemy’s arrival, an enormous supply of stones and all kinds of implements at their sides to use to overwhelm the soldiers if they should appear in the city.”¹⁶ Claude-Pierre Maillot, deputy for the Third Estate from the town of Toul, offered his personal observations in a letter to his constituents back home, intended to keep them informed of what was taking place at the meeting of the Estates General in Versailles: “The streets along the river were carved up with trenches at intervals and paving stones were piled up behind carts that had been linked together.”¹⁷ Maillot never actually calls these structures “barricades,” but others did, and his description leaves little room for doubt about what they were. The *Journal général de l’Europe* is more forthcoming, declaring that on July 15, “The people created even more fortifications than on the previous day, barricading bridges and the principal streets, placing cannon in all the avenues, and doubling patrols the following night and day.”¹⁸

In brief, evidence that barricades were built on July 14–15, 1789, seems incontrovertible. They were described in detail by eyewitness observers and so labeled by contemporary commentators. Though overshadowed by the events surrounding the storming of the Bastille, it is entirely fitting that they should have been present at this opening act of the modern era.

BARRICADES AT THE TIME OF THE FLIGHT TO VARENNES

The royal family’s escape from Paris in June 1791 was originally planned as a lightning dash for the border with the Austrian Netherlands (though Louis XVI consistently disavowed any intention of leaving French territory). It was only thanks to the convoy’s somewhat leisurely progress and to the timely and determined intervention of Jean-Baptiste Drouet, manager of the postal stables in Sainte-Menehould, that the king’s party was detained at Varennes.¹⁹ During the critical hours of the night of June 21–22, as the local authorities struggled with the decision to force the king to return to Paris, residents frantically prepared to repel any rescue effort mounted by the royal troops who were known to be circulating in the vicinity. They rang the tocsin and sent out couriers, summoning as many as 4,000 rural inhabitants to their aid; they mustered local National Guard units and did their best to assemble suitable arms; and they used

logs, bundles of firewood, and wagons to build barricades in the streets and at the main entrances to the town.

At 1 A.M., a column of light cavalry, commanded by Baron François de Goguelat and Duc Claude de Choiseul, forced its way over a barricade at the south entrance to town. These soldiers, who spoke only German, were able to overcome the resistance of the national guardsmen defending the barricade, but soon thereafter yielded to the fraternization efforts of the civilian population, both male and female.

With the help of thousands of enthusiastic new recruits and under the direction of a former army officer, more barricades were constructed around the perimeter of the town and at the bridge across the River Aire on the main road north toward Montmédy. It was at the latter site that another column of light cavalry was stopped short soon after daybreak by the patriotic forces arrayed behind the barricade.

These tactics—and the king's indecision—bought the patriots enough time for two emissaries from Paris to arrive and take charge of the situation. Fearing the arrival of a large military force under the command of General Bouillé, they hurriedly made arrangements for the king to be escorted back to Paris, accompanied on the first leg of his journey by thousands of local national guards. Even as this ragtag column set out, Bouillé's forces appeared above the town, too late to attempt a desperate rescue without endangering the lives of the royal family. Louis would enter the capital as the effective prisoner of the Revolution, and in little more than a year the monarchy would be overthrown and the king would be executed. Though his capture at Varennes involved a minimum of bloodshed, the barricades erected by hastily organized insurgents had once again demonstrated their efficacy in a confrontation that proved to be a pivotal moment in the unfolding of the French Revolution.

BARRICADES IN 1795

The *journées* of 4 Prairial and 13 Vendémiaire occurred in yet another period of crisis, as a weakened National Convention was challenged in quick succession by forces on both the Left and the Right. The *sansculottes* and the *muscadins* each turned to barricades as part of their efforts to overthrow the post-Thermidorian order but, against all odds, the Convention managed to weather these dual attacks and survive long enough to give birth to its successor, the Directory.²⁰

The Journée of 4 Prairial, Year III

Immediately following the overthrow and execution of Robespierre and his close associates, the power of the sansculottes seemed broken. It was only in response to the continual erosion of the political and social gains achieved in the first two years of republican rule—particularly the lifting of price controls and the widespread inflation and misery that undercut the economic position of the urban masses—that popular forces rallied, organizing protests in the capital that demanded an increased supply of bread and the restoration of the radical Constitution of 1793. Advocates of “direct democracy”—the unmediated and often violent intervention of the Parisian crowd—were prepared to take on the recently purged National Convention, whose claim to legitimacy was based on the alternative principle of “electoral democracy.” On 1 Prairial, armed demonstrators invaded the Convention chambers, intimidating the moderate majority and killing one of its members, the Deputy Jean Féraud. In one of those grisly rituals of the revolutionary period, Féraud’s head was severed from his body, impaled on a pike, and paraded in triumph through the assembly hall. The fate of the Convention hung in the balance, as all of Paris waited to see which side would send its opponents to the guillotine.²¹

The moderates quickly regrouped. The Committee of Public Safety transmitted an urgent call to the provinces for troops to march immediately to the capital, hoping to exploit this opportunity to deal a mortal blow to the remnants of the radical Mountain, compromised in the attempted coup. On 2 Prairial, as many as 20,000 national guards from the eastern suburbs had surrounded the Tuileries and trained their cannon on the seat of the government, but the Convention soon mobilized units from inner-city *sections* that remained loyal. Despite an initial numerical advantage, the rebels—lacking in both leadership and organization—failed to seize the initiative, even when many of the cannoneers defending the Assembly passed over to their side.²² In a move designed to erode support for the insurrection and play for time, legislators passed a decree promising to deal swiftly with the subsistence crisis and consider reestablishing the constitution of 1793. This apparent capitulation was enough to persuade the insurgents to withdraw peacefully for the night.

The Convention was soon to be reminded, however, that it no longer exercised uncontested control over the streets of the capital. On 3 Prairial, the locksmith Jean Tinel, implicated in the murder of Féraud, was being escorted by gendarmes to his execution when a band of rebels attacked the convoy, managing to free the prisoner and spirit him off to safety in the faubourg Antoine.²³ But the balance of forces was rapidly shifting. Troops from the

provinces (including 3,000 cavalrymen) had begun to stream into the capital, and militia units, mainly from the bourgeois districts of the city center, were openly declaring for the Convention.²⁴ By the evening of May 23, 1795, moderate representatives, now with a force of 25,000 well-armed men at their disposal, had regained their composure and resolved that they would end the tyranny of the Paris mob forever. They organized an expedition into the faubourg Antoine, where the revolt was centered, to arrest Féraud's assassins and disarm the rebels.

At daybreak on the morning of 4 Prairial, 1,200 men under the command of the Irish-born revolutionary General Charles Edward Jennings de Kilmaine were dispatched into the narrow streets of that working-class district.²⁵ This force comprised two hundred dragoons; small detachments from the most reliable bourgeois *sections*; and a battalion of *muscadins*, volunteers from better-off districts of the city. Kilmaine's immediate objective was to detain specific individuals, but his plan depended on the 1,500 to 2,000 reinforcements he had been told he could expect to join him shortly. This combined force would then serve as an advance guard for the newly assembled army with which the Convention proposed to pacify the three mutinous *sections* later in the day.²⁶

At first, Kilmaine's column made rapid progress. At that early hour, few residents were stirring, and it was able to cross virtually the entire faubourg from west to east, arriving at the house in which two members of the Convention alleged to have been complicit in the assassination of Féraud were thought to be hiding. A search of the premises proved fruitless, however, as were the patrols that Kilmaine dispatched to his rear in the hope of making contact with the promised reinforcements.²⁷ Even more disturbing, he learned, after linking up with local officials at the headquarters of the Quinze-Vingts *section*, that insurgents had been busy constructing barricades to obstruct his avenue of retreat.²⁸

The most prudent course might have been to slip out one of the eastern gates of the faubourg and return to the city via a circuitous route, but Kilmaine—still expecting the arrival of reinforcements at any moment—proceeded instead to retrace the passage through hostile territory his troops had just made. After resuming his march, this time to the west, he soon came up against a barricade in the rue de la Roquette. It was guarded by “a multitude of armed men” and an even larger number of women—whom he referred to as “furies” or “shrews”—shouting curses at his men.²⁹ He and the two commissioners from the Quinze-Vingts employed a combination of rational arguments and threats, but were able to gain passage through the barrier only after his troops began to prepare their

cannon for firing.

In short order, they came up against a second barricade in the rue Charonne. Fifteen minutes of negotiations had nearly succeeded in obtaining the insurgents' agreement to let them pass when relations took a sudden turn for the worse. As Costaz described the scene, "People on all sides were shouting, 'Lower your bayonets!' A rare few [members of our battalion] were weak enough to comply. One madman, who had hoisted himself up on a cart, let forth the same cry and reached out his hand to grasp mine. I gave him a stern look and made ready to cock my gun. He turned pale and withdrew his hand."³⁰ The reason for this contretemps was that soldiers at the rear of Kilmaine's column had taken the initiative of capturing the cannon of the insurgent Montreuil *section*. This attempt to deprive the rebels of their most formidable weapons prompted them to take positions at the windows of adjoining buildings from which they would have had an insurmountable advantage over troops already trapped between two barricades. Recognizing this danger, and on the face-saving pretext that his men had neither the horses nor the harness necessary to remove heavy field pieces, the General gave the order to surrender the captured guns, a concession that bought them passage through the second barricade.

The column soon came up against a third imposing structure that stood between them and, not far beyond, the wide boulevard that would restore their freedom of movement. The crowd surrounding it was more determined than the previous two, but Kilmaine was now confident that he could, if necessary, blast his way to safety. He read the summons to disperse and gave the insurgents three-minutes to clear the way. At the sight of the cannoneers making ready their guns, this last group of insurgents yielded. Kilmaine's men were forced to pass single-file through a narrow opening in the barricade, but only moments later came across the 300 dragoons and four cannon that constituted the reduced column of reinforcements sent out to meet them. The combined force quickly exited the faubourg Antoine. It was just 10 A.M.

These troops soon took part in a much larger operation, beginning at four o'clock that afternoon, aimed at forcing insurgents to surrender their cannon and end all armed resistance. Should they fail to do so, Kilmaine informed residents manning the enormous barricade at the district's entrance, "the faubourg would be reduced to powder, and they would search in vain on the following day to find where it had stood."³¹ The rebels naturally found the terms of this ultimatum harsh but, outnumbered, outgunned, and at risk of having their bread supplies cut off, they had little choice. Kilmaine ordered the barricades dismantled, and forces loyal to the Convention quickly occupied this hostile

territory. Over the next few days, systematic confiscation of all firearms took place throughout the faubourg Antoine. The Convention had at last succeeded in breaking the back of sansculotte resistance, and with hardly a shot fired.³²

13–14 Vendémiaire, Year IV

Within months, however, the barricade made one more appearance in the streets of Paris. This time, the challenge to the Convention came from a different quarter. With France menaced by an invading émigré army and most of the working-class neighborhoods of the city disarmed, the moderates running the government had less to fear from the radical Left than from the nascent royalist faction seeking the overthrow of the Republic. The authorities decided to brave controversy by organizing three “patriot battalions” led by rehabilitated Jacobin officers and consisting in part of republicans recently released from prison. Decrying this “return to the Terror,” the more conservative Paris districts—in particular, the Lepelletier, Théâtre-Français, Unité, Fontaine-Grenelle, and Bon-Conseil *sections*—attempted to integrate their National Guard units into a combined force under the command of General Auguste Danican with the announced intention of attacking the Convention. Although at a distinct disadvantage in terms of arms and military discipline, the royalists hoped to exploit their clear numerical superiority.

The National Convention initially struggled in its efforts to mount an effective defense. In preliminary skirmishes on 11 and 12 Vendémiaire, General Jacques-François de Menou seemed more inclined to negotiate with the forces of reaction than to repress them. Aghast at this lack of resolution, the Assembly promptly relieved him of his command in favor of Paul Barras, the man credited with ensuring victory on 9 Thermidor. Barras, in turn, delegated responsibility for field operations to a still obscure general named Napoléon Bonaparte, whom he had befriended. This former artillery corporal had the foresight, early on the morning of 13 Vendémiaire, to send a detachment under Joachim Murat to secure the cannon being held under light guard at the Sablons depot and bring them back to the capital. Bonaparte personally oversaw their deployment in and around the rue Saint-Honoré.

Thunderclouds unleashed heavy rains on the capital during the night of 13 to 14 Vendémiaire (October 5–6, 1795). This impeded rebels’ attempts to fraternize with troops loyal to the Convention. In desperation, insurgents began constructing barricades during the night and again the next morning, but the threat of cannon and ebbing popular support made their position precarious.³³ Barras reported that one barricade located at the Barrière des Sergens had to be

taken at the point of bayonets, and that he was obliged to order his men to direct their fire at those who were dislodging paving stones from the streets.³⁴ But it was volleys from the field guns that Bonaparte had carefully positioned near the intersections of the rue de Beaune and the quai Voltaire that inflicted the most crippling losses on royalist forces. This famous “whiff of grapeshot” has been credited with the insurgents’ decisive defeat. By the time the districts near the Panthéon and the Théâtre-Français were pacified on the 14th, the only sign of the fierce fighting that had taken place were “the remains of a few barricades.”³⁵ With the insurgent Paris *sections* disarmed, the authority of the post-Thermidorian Convention was at last secure.

Another contemporaneous account noted that the barricades attempted at the Barrière des Sergens were in “precisely the same location where residents of Paris established the first barricades during the famous war of the Fronde.”³⁶ The remark is significant, because it speaks to the issue of whether eyewitnesses to the turmoil of the great Revolution possessed an awareness of the historical precedents for this revived technique. As a barricade event, 13 Vendémiaire stood out in at least two respects. For one, it remains unique among all the cases collected in my database in that it involved barricades built by royalists for use against a republican government. Of more lasting import to the history of the barricade in France, it also marked a departure in terms of counterrevolutionary tactics. Bonaparte’s unhesitating use of cannon against barricades built by civilian insurgents would thenceforth become standard practice on the part of generals sent to repress the successive insurrections to which the nineteenth century would give rise.³⁷ The barricade had entered a new phase in its evolution in which the willingness to employ artillery would forever change the terms of civil conflict.

BARRICADES AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

Although sporadic reference to the appearance of barricades in these individual events can be found in specialist sources, nowhere has the recurrent character of the tactic in the revolutionary period been recognized. It should perhaps come as no surprise that the use of barricades in key events like the storming of the Bastille, the flight of the king, or the 1795 uprisings has passed unnoticed, given that few such structures were built, and that they played, at best, an ancillary role. It was, moreover, that much easier to overlook their presence because the obvious points of comparison were the massive outbursts of 1830 and 1848, when the construction of barricades in the thousands was directly responsible for

the overthrow of the regimes in power in a matter of mere days.

But there are at least three reasons why the barricades of this period merit our attention. The first is to correct a historical inaccuracy. The insurrection of November 1827 has so consistently been hailed as the moment of the barricade's revival that this misapprehension risks being taken for established fact. That event may well have served as an apprenticeship for what Alan Spitzer has called "the French generation of 1820," and there may be considerable justice in viewing it as a dress rehearsal for the July Days of 1830.³⁸ But it was, nonetheless, a failed insurrection, of relatively minor consequence in itself, in which a total of just seven barricades were built.³⁹ By comparison, the barricades of the French Revolution can boast of having been both more numerous and associated with events of far greater historical significance.

A second reason for giving extended consideration to the barricades of 1789, 1791, and 1795 is to help reshape our understanding of the long-term patterns that govern such incidents and, by extension, of how repertoires of contention evolve. We have now been able to more correctly assign the moment of the barricade's resurrection to that period of intense revolutionary ferment that marked the inauguration of the modern era. [Graphs 2](#) and [3](#) have already called attention to the close correspondence between major turning points in the evolution of the barricade and the cyclical peaks of collective action in France as a whole. A full discussion of the reasons underlying this distribution must, however, be reserved for the concluding chapter of this work, after we have had a chance to examine the important developments that took place during the "long nineteenth century," the classic era of the barricade.

Finally, correcting the record concerning barricade events in 1789–95 has been a necessary preliminary to tackling the subject of the barricade's diffusion beyond the borders of France. An almost single-minded focus on French events in the revolutionary period has allowed me to gloss over an even more surprising but crucial fact, which serves as the point of departure for the chapter to follow. There we will learn that the initial reappearance of the barricade after a hiatus of nearly a century and a half actually occurred some two years prior to the storming of the Bastille, and not in France but in Belgium.

Barricades in Belgium, 1787-1830

The people's alarm instantly became general. They immediately began tearing up the pavement in several streets and notably on the square before the Hôtel de Ville. The merchants closed their shops, and men and women transported paving stones to their attics so that they could crush any troops that came near their houses. . . . Fearing that they would be surrounded, some 1,200 militia volunteers had rallied, taken up positions in close formation on the Grande-Place, and blocked the adjoining streets with chains.

FRENCH CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES YVES HIRSINGER
ON THE 1787 BARRICADES IN BRUSSELS

On September 20, 1787, residents of Brussels rose in protest against the reforming zeal of their ruler, Joseph II of Austria, building barricades and obliging the local garrison to make a forced withdrawal from their city. This blow to the pride of imperial forces was merely the opening salvo in the Belgian people's arduous forty-year struggle to cast off the yoke of foreign domination and regain their national independence.

It is impossible to say with utter certainty where or when barricades first appeared outside their country of origin. I can only attest to the fact that by the time they reappeared in Paris on July 14, 1789, after a hiatus of more than 150 years, they had already sprung up in the neighboring capitals of Brussels and Geneva.¹ Thus, barricades first spread to regions immediately adjacent to French territory and to societies with which France had close linguistic, cultural, economic, and political ties. Furthermore, diffusion occurred in a period when profound social changes had begun to overwhelm the adaptive capacity of

traditional institutions. The same forces that produced the eighteenth-century anti-colonial revolts in America and the Netherlands and helped spawn the French Revolution also made the Belgian provinces (and, to a lesser extent, the French-speaking cantons of the Swiss confederation) fertile ground for social upheaval. It was in this context that the barricade, a tactic previously employed only within the confines of France, first spread.

THE BRABANT REVOLUTION

In the 1780s, Brussels was the seat of government for the whole of the Austrian Southern Netherlands. The region known as Brabant had experienced several centuries of foreign dominion. In the fourteenth century, much of this territory fell within the sphere of influence of England, which, through its domination of the textile market, exercised effective economic and political control over districts nominally ruled by the duke of Brabant. The prospect, in 1356, of the duke's title and possessions passing into foreign hands brought the local population to a state of extreme agitation that was only relieved with the granting of a special charter known as the *Joyeuse Entrée* (Joyous Entry), which not only guaranteed certain individual liberties but also granted the province a set of privileges and immunities that amounted in most respects to self-rule.²

The provisions of this charter—in effect, a written constitution—were gradually extended to the neighboring provinces and became the cornerstone of the social contract between the Belgian people and its long succession of foreign rulers. By the start of the sixteenth century, this region had passed into the hands of the Spanish branch of the House of Habsburg. In 1556, the less populous Protestant region to the north began a revolt against Spanish rule that eventually led to independence for the United Provinces (or what we know today as Holland). The staunchly Catholic southern region continued under Spanish rule until 1713, when the treaty of Utrecht transferred sovereignty to the Austrian Habsburgs. These territories, corresponding roughly to present-day Belgium, resisted assimilation by their more powerful partner, managing to retain the privileged status guaranteed by their ancient charter.

Thanks to their preeminence in textile production, the Austrian Netherlands became one of the richest regions in Europe in the eighteenth century; and thanks to the attentive but respectful management of local affairs by Empress Maria Theresa, her forty-year reign was something of a golden age. In return for this period of peace and unprecedented prosperity, her Belgian subjects rewarded her with their sincere devotion. Regrettably, this relationship would

take an emphatic turn for the worse with the accession of her son, Joseph II, in 1780.

Reforms from on High

For those more familiar with the history of the French Revolution, the situation in Brabant presents a series of apparent parallels that conceal more fundamental divergences. In France, the efforts of a well-meaning but ineffectual king to introduce reforms over the objections of the aristocracy and clergy, created the opportunity for a new National Assembly to seize the political initiative. By harnessing the passions of the urban crowd (and occasionally the peasantry) to ideas derived from the *philosophes*, they set in motion a process that would ultimately bring down the Old Regime.

In the Austrian Netherlands, on the contrary, a headstrong emperor ordained fundamental reforms—many of them rationalist, liberal, or, within the understanding of that time, even democratic. Joseph II was both an avid proponent of Enlightenment ideas and a complete autocrat. Taking Rousseau to heart, his aim seems to have been to force his recalcitrant Belgian subjects to be free. Unfortunately, he began with only a superficial knowledge of their customs or character.³ Mere months after assuming power, he promulgated an Edict of Tolerance, guaranteeing religious freedom to Protestants and Jews. This was soon followed by measures intended to assure those groups civic equality, curtail the influence of the papacy, and make local bishops more dependent on the state. These moves aroused considerable resentment among members of the clergy and the Catholic majority, feelings that were compounded when, in 1783, he replaced episcopal seminaries with the state-supervised training of priests.

The Second and Third Estates were no less upset when he went on to propose abolishing guild privileges, standardizing the system of higher learning (at the expense of the venerable University of Louvain), and unilaterally reducing the *corvée* obligations of peasants. But it was his attempt, on the first day of the new year in 1787, to carry out a wholesale reform of the country's judicial and administrative system that ignited a genuine firestorm.⁴

These progressive reforms obviously anticipated the French Revolution's emphasis on secularization, the elimination of privilege, economic rationalization, and political centralization. But Joseph's edicts, however benignly motivated, seriously misjudged the essential conservatism of Belgian society and flagrantly violated the oath he had sworn to respect existing institutional arrangements by obtaining the consent of the provincial estates before making any changes. Taken together, these measures constituted a

“virtual coup d’état,” which residents instantly rejected.⁵ A flood of pamphlets virulently critical of the emperor began to circulate. The Conseil de Brabant refused to cooperate by registering or publishing the new decrees. The provincial Estates pointed out the impossible contradiction that lay at the heart of Joseph’s plan: he derived his authority as duke of Brabant from the *Joyeuse Entrée*, a document whose fundamental provisions he now proposed systematically to subvert. The Estates commissioned Henri van der Noot, a Brussels lawyer, to formulate its objections. The crux of its legal case was Article 59, which absolved Belgians of any obligation to obey Joseph II once he had violated his constitutional oath. They forwarded the list of nine grievances contained in Van der Noot’s memorandum to the emperor, putting the latter on notice that they would withhold approval of any additional tax levies until the impasse had been resolved.

Joseph II may have seen himself as championing a liberal cause, but he had done so as an authoritarian ruler. By proceeding without consultation and contravening long-established political norms, he had precipitated a constitutional crisis the implications of which he was very slow to recognize. Though his reforms had mainly targeted the privileges of the First and Second Estates, those groups found a willing ally in the Third Estate, which insisted on blocking the approval of taxes until satisfaction had been received on every one of their demands.⁶ In the meantime, it was assumed, the Estates themselves would take over the authority Joseph had relinquished through his illegal acts.

The intransigence of the Brabant Estates was more than matched by Joseph’s own. When a delegation summoned to the imperial capital outlined Belgian objections and requested the rescission of the offending decrees, he could barely repress his fury and soon sent them packing. When his governors-general tried to calm the roiled waters by suspending all edicts that violated the terms of the *Joyeuse Entrée*, the emperor repudiated their action and had them recalled to Vienna.⁷ In their place, he dispatched an interim military governor, Count Murray, whose first task was to regain control over the “bourgeois” or Civic Guard. Its ranks had been swollen by volunteers Van der Noot had actively recruited as the kernel of an emerging patriot army. Joseph warned Murray that at the first shot fired by insurgents, he would order a massive redeployment of troops from Austria’s German provinces to Belgium, committing “my last man and my last cent, if need be” to the rebels’ defeat.⁸ In reality, the Austrian Empire was already overextended. Embroiled in a costly war with the Ottoman Turks, Joseph II was in dire need of tax revenues and incapable of diverting a substantial armed force to pacify his wayward Belgian provinces.

Instead he issued yet another imperial decree—again published without the required approval of the Conseil d'état—banning the Civic Guard. The armed volunteers, most wearing tricolor cockades, refused to comply and continued to police the streets of Brussels.⁹ In theory, Murray had at his disposal 22,000 soldiers, but the loyalty of the units that had been recruited locally was uncertain. Clashes between the minority of Austrian soldiers and the volunteers of the bourgeois militia were becoming more frequent.¹⁰ Van der Noot belatedly recognized the potential for a violent outcome. On September 19, he made a futile attempt to head off the looming confrontation by asking members of the Civic Guard to turn in their cockades as a symbolic gesture of submission. His renewed efforts on September 20 achieved partial success, but too late to stop an Austrian assault on a church where many patriots had gathered for the funeral of one of their fellow guardsmen. Imperial soldiers detained volunteers, seized their weapons, and in some cases tore off their uniforms or insignia.

The response was immediate and to all appearances entirely spontaneous. Volunteers sounded the alarm and rushed to the square that fronted the Brussels city hall. They began by stretching chains across the streets that emptied onto the square. They then pried up paving stones and “built barricades at every entrance to the Grand’ Place.” What followed was a five-hour battle during which up to fifteen Austrian soldiers were killed and a lesser number of Belgian volunteers wounded.¹¹ Fighting ended only after a delegation of notables assured Murray that if he withdrew his troops, the volunteers would lay down their arms, thus fulfilling the last of the emperor’s conditions for the repeal of the detested edicts. These conciliatory gestures succeeded in bringing about a suspension of hostilities. The very next day, Murray announced, in the emperor’s name, that the *Joyeuse Entrée* would be respected in its entirety and that the Civic Guard could continue to exist. With the help of their barricades, residents of Brussels appeared to have won major concessions from their imperial master.

From Resistance to Revolution

What to Murray seemed a humane resolution of the conflict was viewed by Joseph II as a craven capitulation. The emperor lost no time in recalling his overly complaisant governor-general and replacing him with Count Trauttmansdorf-Weinsburg. He also appointed a new military commander, who would no longer be subject to the authority of the civilian governor-general. General Richard d’Alton had already earned a reputation for the brutality of his conduct toward insurgent populations while serving the emperor in the Hungarian provinces. Within a day of his arrival in Brussels, his new repressive

policies were responsible for an incident in which Austrian soldiers, confronting an angry crowd, shot and killed several unarmed protestors. Count d'Alton's only response to the public furor was to praise the fortitude of his troops, causing the emperor to remark with pleasure that he had at last found a commander willing to act with the rigor that the circumstances called for.

This remorseless attitude did have an immediate effect. The Conseil d'état agreed to publish three decrees issued in December that it had previously vowed to resist. Moreover, the docile First and Second Estates quickly agreed to the spring 1788 tax levy. Only the Third Estate, in an uproar over the emperor's efforts to bring the university in Louvain to heel, initially held firm by exercising its veto, but its political isolation soon undermined its resolve. Pressed from all sides to compromise, it finally relented.

With tax revenues secure, the Austrians could now target the leaders of the Third Estate, hoping to end resistance once and for all. Warrants were issued for the arrest of four key figures. The comtesse d'Yves, Madame Jeanne de Bellem, a tireless publicist for the Belgian cause, was jailed, and Van der Noot was driven into exile in London. But even in the absence of these and other principals, the Third Estate remained a thorn in Joseph's side. When the fall tax subsidy came up for discussion in November 1788, the approval of the first two estates was again met with a veto by the third. This time the emperor opted for open confrontation, declaring that if his tax subsidy were denied, he would no longer consider himself bound by the oaths he had sworn at the time of his inauguration. His transfer of additional troops to the capital in January 1789 signaled that he was prepared to impose his will by force. Under the circumstances, the Third Estate of Brabant, which had been supported only by its counterpart in Hainault province, was once again forced to approve the payment of taxes.

Joseph II resolved to capitalize on this favorable turn of fortune by aggressively going on the offensive. In characteristic fashion, he settled on a strategy that seemed designed to consolidate all opposition forces against him. He began by alienating the First Estate, whose acquiescence had been so important in his recent triumphs, by commanding bishops to send all students to the new General Seminary he had established in Louvain. He then sought to dilute the influence of meddlesome members of the Third Estate by increasing representation to include every village in the province. The Conseil de Brabant refused to publish this reform on the usual grounds that it violated the sacred constitution.¹² In response, Trauttmansdorff assembled the provincial Estates and demanded that they agree to a permanent tax levy (thus exempting the

government from having to obtain biannual approval) and to reforms of the Third Estate, the courts, and the Conseil de Brabant that would have ensured their political impotence. When the Third Estate flatly refused, soldiers surrounded the Hôtel de Ville, holding the delegates prisoner while a proclamation from the emperor was distributed, unilaterally declaring all provincial privileges annulled and the *Joyeuse Entrée* revoked.

This stroke may have given Joseph exclusive control over the reins of government, but with the Brabant Estates disbanded, many of their leaders in exile, and lawful protest prohibited, an underground movement now thrived. Van der Noot, patriarch of its conservative wing, set himself up in Breda, just across the border in the United Provinces, where he was soon joined by other opposition figures. The goal of the conservatives was to undo the emperor's reforms, restore the integrity of traditional institutions (above all, the provincial Estates), and revert to the status quo ante (allowing for the possibility that this would take place under the tutelage of a different foreign protector). Their strategy was to enlist the military assistance of one or more of the states of the Triple Alliance (England, Prussia, and the Netherlands) in driving out the Austrians. As head of the so-called Breda Committee, Van de Noot spent the summer months of 1789 vainly trying to obtain a commitment for the necessary troops.

Meanwhile, in Brussels, a new secret society calling itself Pro Aris et Focis (usually loosely translated as “For Hearth and Home”) was founded. This organization, whose animating spirit was another Brabançon lawyer, Jan François Vonck, represented the liberal wing of the patriotic movement. Members generally subscribed to the ideas of the French Enlightenment and might have looked favorably on the substance of many of Joseph II's reforms had they not been imposed at the whim of a tyrant. These “Vonckists” were more moderate than the leftists of the French Revolution—in part because the provinces already possessed centuries of experience in what amounted to constitutional self-government—but they had no hesitation about emulating the examples of the United States and the Protestant Netherlands—or, much more recently, neighboring France—by mobilizing popular forces in an effort to regain lost privileges or win their independence.¹³ They focused their efforts on encouraging desertions from the Austrian ranks, procuring arms and ammunition, and enlisting and training a volunteer army. Their policy of self-reliance set them at odds with the Breda leaders, but Pro Aris et Focis had done such an effective job of concealing their activities from the authorities that most grassroots patriots were unaware of the differences that separated them from the

“Van der Nootists.”

In the end, Vonck’s most critical contribution was to identify and recruit Jean André van der Mersch as commander of the patriot forces. This career officer had served the king of France with great distinction during the Seven Years’ War before accepting a commission in the Austrian army in 1778. Disillusioned by his lack of advancement, he had retired with the rank of colonel in the expectation that his military career was over, but he now accepted Vonck’s offer with alacrity.¹⁴ Within two weeks, he was drilling volunteers at a safe location in the principality of Liège, beyond Alton’s reach.

Austrian authorities initiated a crackdown in response to a stepped-up pamphlet campaign in September 1789. With the help of a paid informant, they managed to arrest a few leaders of Pro Aris et Focis. Vonck and the others still at liberty retreated across the border to Breda, where they entered into an uneasy alliance with the Van der Nootists. The hope was to mount a formidable challenge to Austrian hegemony by combining the complementary approaches of the two groups: a foreign-backed invasion and a series of local uprisings. By early October, however, Van der Noot had received a flat refusal even from Prussia, the most favorably disposed of his potential allies, and the patriots were forced to rely on their own resources.

Driven together by forces beyond their control, the two camps formed a revolutionary committee that issued a Belgian Declaration of Independence on October 24. On that same day, Van der Mersch led his band of 2,800 untried recruits across the border into the duchy of Brabant. Well acquainted with the limitations of the forces under his command, he was determined to avoid any encounter with the Austrians in open country, an eventuality that would have resulted in the obliteration of the rebel army in its first engagement.¹⁵ Instead, he moved from one town to the next, eventually seeking refuge in Turnhout, where he was gratified to find local residents and villagers from the surrounding countryside rallying to his cause. Dinne’s contemporaneous account emphasizes the role of the town’s inhabitants in digging up paving stones and using their own household furniture to tie these loose materials together into solid fortifications.¹⁶

An Austrian column under the command of Major-General Schroeder approached Turnhout early on the morning of October 27. This commander made the fateful decision not to wait for the arrival of two additional columns that Alton had dispatched to the area. According to Schroeder’s own report, the town’s defenders had built barricades made of trees at the entrance gate and piled up paving stones to block the main access points. As his soldiers advanced,

snipers fired from the windows of adjacent buildings, and residents, mainly women, hurled paving stones from the rooftops on the hapless Austrians. Progress was slow and casualties were heavy. At the end of five hours of fighting, the Austrians gave way in a disorderly retreat, abandoning to the insurgents the five cannon they had brought with them and suffering casualties that included 110 dead and 60 wounded.¹⁷ The insurgents sustained losses only half as great. In brief, a ragtag army of irregulars, whose commander had conceded in advance that his men were no match for trained troops in a pitched battle, had, by joining forces with civilian insurgents and adopting the barricade as their principal tactic, succeeded in inflicting a stinging defeat on the vaunted troops of the Austrian emperor.

Van der Mersch might reasonably have expected this stunning victory to boost the morale of his volunteers and elicit an outpouring of support among the populace. But, as he now led his column south towards Brussels, he was passing through territory on which the Austrians had recently focused a campaign of sharp repression. The response of the intimidated rural population to the patriot army was therefore subdued. Van der Mersch—realizing that he could not count on local inhabitants to supply provisions, logistical support, or new recruits—decided not to run the risk of crossing paths with the enemy on unfavorable terrain. He abruptly reversed direction and retired across the border to the Breda sanctuary to consider his options.

The drubbing the Austrians had endured at Turnhout caused a furor in the Belgian provinces and beyond. Censorship prevented local newspapers from publishing the story, but an Amsterdam gazette circulated an account of the battle, and smuggled copies quickly made the rounds of Brussels taverns.¹⁸ In Mons, the local patriot association printed up a pamphlet that embellished upon the incident in Turnhout. According to the Belgian historian Suzanne Tassier, people fought to get their hands on a copy, and even Austrian officers read it with interest.¹⁹ The fact that this barricade event was so well publicized in Mons is significant because, within a mere matter of weeks, that city would be the scene of its own insurrection, complete with barricades.

That further development was the result of Van der Mersch's decision to pursue a new offensive in Flanders, where he believed inhabitants were more favorably disposed. Overruling the objections of the Van der Noot faction, he dispatched about 1,000 men to Ghent with the captured cannon in tow.²⁰ Their arrival on November 13 caused that city to rise en masse. The insurgents were able to force the garrison to retreat to their barracks and the citadel. Count d'Arberg, the Austrian commander, received substantial reinforcements and

appeared to be in a position to take the offensive, but when he carried out his threat to bombard the city with incendiary shells, the population became so infuriated that patriotic forces mounted an all-out attack. On November 16, they surrounded the Saint-Pierre barracks and obliged the troops within to surrender. Realizing that his situation was hopeless, Arberg abandoned the citadel and evacuated the city under cover of night. Within days, the towns of Bruges, Ostend, Ypres, Courtai, and Nieuport followed Ghent's example, and within a week the whole of Flanders had been liberated. Only now did the emperor adopt a conciliatory tone and reverse course by closing the General Seminary, revoking his political reforms, and issuing a general amnesty for those who had taken part in the various uprisings. The people ignored his appeals for calm.

Unable to restrain themselves from meddling in military affairs, civilian members of Van der Noot's revolutionary committee now authorized an expedition led by two French adventurers, which came to a sudden and disastrous end in its first encounter with Austrian troops at Dinant in Namur Province. This fiasco did, however, produce an opportunity that the insurgents were quick to exploit. The Austrian colonel, fearing a follow-up attack on the town of Namur, sent an urgent request to his counterpart in Mons, asking for immediate reinforcements. The commander there proceeded to pull his entire complement of soldiers from Mons on November 21. This was a colossal blunder, for no sooner had they left than the insurgent banner was unfurled. Residents were quickly joined by a contingent of Van der Mersch's volunteers. Together, these forces managed to prevent the garrison from reentering their city by adopting the tactics that had earlier succeeded in Turnhout: "As the Austrian troops advanced to meet the patriot army in Mons, battalions of villagers ripped paving stones from the streets, building barricades from which they stoned the approaching Austrian army. Together, the patriot army and the villagers again routed the Austrians."²¹

Inspired by insurgent victories in Flanders and Hainault, the Brabant revolution now culminated in a full-scale revolt, which began in Brussels on December 11, 1789.²² There, residents captured the city's gates and drove the Austrians from their neighborhoods. The troops' ability to respond effectively was crippled by a soaring rate of desertion. Forced to give ground, they were soon confined to the upper districts of the city center. When General d'Alton received word on the morning of December 12 that two entire companies had defected, he began preparations for a complete withdrawal. The first group to attempt to leave included Trauttmansdorff and other high officials, but when they arrived in the suburb of Ixelles, they found their route barricaded and the

local population determined not to let them pass. D'Alton personally led the attack that captured and cleared that obstacle, but by the time he rejoined the main force in central Brussels, it had already begun a hasty evacuation that resulted in the abandonment of much of its matériel, as well as all government records.

Thus, in a mere six weeks, the Belgian people appeared to have accomplished the impossible. The imperial army, led by Joseph II's hand-picked general, had been driven out of the capital of the Austrian Netherlands. A series of urban insurrections had liberated the provinces of Flanders, Hainault, and Brabant and forced the Austrians to take refuge in Luxembourg. With their territory now completely purged of foreign troops, Belgians soon proclaimed their independence.

Polasky has pointed out that "All the Belgian victories had been won with guerrilla tactics within town walls. The Belgian army had relied on the villagers, their paving stones, their barricades, and their knowledge of the city's by-ways."²³ Much like the French, the Belgians had learned that this style of urban warfare was a potent weapon, capable of overcoming the inherent advantage that normally accrued to trained troops when they were allowed to choose the field and method of battle. This lesson would not be lost, though it was forty years before it could be used to permanently secure nationhood for the Belgian people.

*The Protracted Contest among Austrian,
French, and Dutch Influences*

Van der Mersch's tactical brilliance and the élan of the civilian population had produced miraculous results. Unfortunately, as bright as Belgian prospects appeared at the end of 1789, independence proved short-lived. The combination of Van der Noot's incompetence as a leader and deep divisions between the principal political factions eviscerated the nationalist movement and led to a virtual civil war. The unexpected death of Joseph II actually ended up strengthening the Empire's bid to reconquer its lost provinces, for he was succeeded by his brother Leopold II, a more astute judge of both political and military affairs. The Austrian army began its invasion at the end of November 1790 and triumphantly entered Brussels less than two weeks later. Within a year of having declared their autonomy, Belgians found themselves again an appendage of the Austrian empire. Time would show that their travails had only just begun.

The Austrian restoration proved to be just as ephemeral as Belgians' first taste of independence. Leopold II died in March 1792, passing the crown to his

son Francis II, the last Holy Roman Emperor. Soon thereafter, France declared war on Austria and the French Legislative Assembly issued its famous declaration of *la patrie en danger*. Following the fall of the monarchy in August, the newly instituted French Republic, in a burst of proselytizing zeal, offered its help to Belgian patriots in driving out the Austrians for a second time. Before the end of that year, the French victory at Jemappes allowed General Charles Dumouriez's troops to occupy the Belgian provinces.²⁴

The French were initially welcomed as liberators on the strength of Dumouriez's pledge to support the formation of an autonomous Belgian republic. Unfortunately, the newly formed National Convention refused to honor those promises, even though it had earlier, in an outpouring of republican idealism, formally renounced wars of foreign conquest. When therefore, in the spring of 1793, Dumouriez was soundly defeated by the Austrians at the battle of Neer-winden, the Belgians expressed few regrets over the departure of French troops.

The second Austrian restoration proved equally short-lived. The French victory at Fleurus in June 1794 drove the emperor's soldiers from the Belgian provinces for good. This time, however, France was not content merely to occupy this strategic territory. In October 1795, without making any effort to consult the wishes of those affected, the post-Thermidorian Convention laid claim to the French nation's "natural boundaries" by annexing the former Austrian Netherlands (plus the province of Liège) as departments of France.

Overnight, the newest citizens of the First Republic became subject to the Constitution of the Year III, which imposed all the reforms once proposed by Joseph II and more! Attacks on privilege, policies of state centralization, and an anticlerical campaign were all carried forward further and faster than the Austrian emperor had dared imagine. Flemish-speaking areas took particular offense at the requirement that they use French to conduct official business, and even French-speakers resented the fact that for the first time in centuries, non-Belgians occupied many positions of authority. The heavy toll of the revolutionary wars in which France engaged throughout this period led to the introduction of mass conscription, which prompted an unsuccessful rebellion of Belgian peasants in 1798.

French rule, which cut the Belgian provinces off from most of their former trading partners, initially devastated the local economy. This improved somewhat under Napoléon's personal reign, as Belgian textiles and farm goods now gained privileged access to the French market. But the lack of political liberty and the cost in lives of defending France's burgeoning empire fed

Belgians' smoldering resentment. It was therefore natural that they welcomed the arrival of allied armies beginning in 1813, anticipating a peace settlement that would at last recognize their right to self-determination.

The organizers of the 1815 Congress of Vienna dashed those hopes by sacrificing Belgian independence to the perceived need to contain French expansionism. The Belgian provinces were attached to the Netherlands with the thought that together they would be better able to resist foreign encroachment. Except for a minority of Flemish nationalists, this was a deeply disappointing outcome for the Belgian people. This time, it was the establishment of Dutch as the official language that grated on the majority of French-speakers, and conflicts over economic issues were a constant irritant. The contrast in religious values and general culture between the Protestant (mainly Calvinist) north and the Catholic south proved impossible to reconcile. A joint constitution—the “Fundamental Law”—was implemented despite its rejection by referendum in the Belgian provinces. Though capitals were maintained in both the Hague and Brussels, this legal framework accorded the same representation in the Estates General to the Dutch population of two million as to the roughly three and a half million Belgians. Under William of Orange—now King William I—Belgians prospered economically but chafed politically.

Dissatisfaction simmered barely beneath the surface but had little impact until 1828, when the liberal and Catholic wings of the opposition movement joined forces. A petition drive advocating the administrative separation of the Dutch and Belgian provinces gave impetus to a resurgence of nationalist sentiment. Those feelings were further enflamed by the government's prosecution and banishment of journalists like Louis de Potter and Jean-François Tielemans. As Belgians mobilized, they reclaimed the symbols as well as the political objectives of the Brabant revolution. By 1830, the red, yellow, and black banners that had flown over the liberated cities of Brabant, Flanders, and Hainault during the 1787 to 1789 rebellion reappeared. Soon, Belgians would also revert to the crucial insurrectionary tactic—the construction of barricades—that had served them so well in that earlier conflict. This time, however, they were taking their cue from the French, who had set the stage with an orgy of barricade construction such as the world has never witnessed, before or since.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830

I do not propose to review the events of the 1830 revolution in detail. The literature on the subject is vast, and interested readers should have no difficulty

identifying authors far better qualified than I to place those events in their proper context.²⁵ My aim here is simply to assess the historical role and significance of barricades in the so-called *Trois Glorieuses*, the “three glorious days”—July 27, 28, and 29, 1830—that overthrew Charles X and installed Louis-Philippe on the throne under the title, revived from the Revolution of 1789, “King of the French.”

The July revolution was the first modern event comparable to the great Paris insurrections of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in terms of the prominence of barricades. The latter’s role in the events of 1789 to 1795 had been secondary, and the uprisings of 1814 and 1827 had been of limited historical significance. In 1830, on the contrary, barricades were the most striking and memorable aspect of a revolution that mobilized the entire population of the French capital and brought an end to the Bourbon Restoration. According to the best informed sources, no fewer than 4,000 barricades were built during the July Days, by far the highest total ever recorded in a single event.²⁶ This equates to one barricade for every 200 men, women, and children living in a city of roughly three-quarters of a million inhabitants. It had been nearly 200 years since a civil conflict had produced this level of participation, with residents of nearly every block in nearly every neighborhood in the city collaborating on their own barricade. The result was an insurgency that possessed a character at once highly localized and highly generalized.

The fact that these structures were the defining feature of the July Days explains why that conflict yielded the richest collection of contemporary barricade maps ever produced, some drawn in loving detail, using color-coded symbols to indicate the positions taken by specific military units and bands of insurgents, as well as the emplacement of each cannon and barricade. In some districts, barricades were built so close together that one wonders whom they were intended to defend against and how they were meant to function (questions that will be deferred to [chapter 7](#)). The distribution of barricades, as described in contemporary accounts as well as in these graphic representations, can be used to show how the July uprising developed over time and the leading role played by districts of known socioeconomic composition like the working-class faubourg Saint-Antoine. Above all, the ubiquity of barricades by the end of the fighting gives us some measure of how thoroughly Charles X had alienated the residents of the capital and how enthusiastically they responded to the prospect of ending his rule. The sheer disparity in numbers is what enabled insurgents, astutely exploiting a technique revived from an earlier era, to overwhelm the forces representing the regime in power.

Maréchal Auguste Wiesel de Marmont, created duke of Ragusa by Napoléon, had the task of quelling the initial disturbances thrust upon him without warning. He quickly learned that no special military preparations had been made by Charles X or the ministers responsible for the four ordinances that precipitated the revolt. Though at first he followed the standard practice of dispatching small patrols to attack and dismantle barricades wherever they appeared, he soon realized that the 15,000 royal guards and troops of the line at his disposal were inadequate. To prevent their being attacked and disarmed—and, first and foremost, to put a stop to the scattered desertions among his soldiers that began to be reported as early as the morning of July 28—he revised his tactics and allowed only large columns to make forays into the city.²⁷

Though the army had already used ordnance to put down civil unrest, the attempt to repress the 1830 insurrection broke new ground by employing artillery on a much larger scale than in 1795 or 1827 and making its deployment against barricades a standard part of military doctrine. Insurgents naturally responded in kind, introducing new forms of barricade construction aimed at neutralizing the effectiveness of cannon fire and cavalry charges, innovations that will be more closely examined in [chapter 7](#).

Fighting remained desultory through the evening of July 27. The seizure or destruction of the presses used to publish newspapers in defiance of the new regulations prompted reactions on the part of belligerent Parisians that are by now familiar as the preliminaries to full-blown insurrection: shops closed, crowds formed, coats of arms and other symbols of royal authority were defaced, the tocsin rang, and by nightfall street lamps were broken throughout the affected areas. When gendarmes tried to clear the square in front of the Palais-Royal—the Paris home of the ducs d’Orléans and, since 1789, a perennial breeding ground for revolutionary agitation—rioters greeted them with a hail of stones. The troops responded with a volley of rifle fire, striking down the nascent rebellion’s first victims. Their lifeless bodies were soon being paraded through the streets as evidence of the regime’s careless disregard for residents’ lives. After making a first attempt at fraternization with army units, the insurgents dispersed for the night around 10 P.M.

The gravity of the situation became evident to Marmont when the rebels demonstrated their staying power by appearing in greater numbers on the morning of July 28 and renewing barricade construction on a larger scale. Marmont’s words and deeds immediately assumed more ominous overtones. In a written communication to Charles X reminiscent of the duc de La Rochefoucauld’s famous exchange with Louis XVI, he averred, “This is no

longer a riot, this is a revolution.”²⁸ He declared martial law and arranged for four additional batteries of artillery to be brought into the city by that evening. But even when the rebels were driven to seek temporary shelter by a salvo of grapeshot, they soon reappeared in some new location. Meanwhile, troops found that their mobility was being severely restricted by “barricade after barricade” blocking their line of march. Worse still, more of these structures were erected behind them as they advanced, cutting off their avenue of retreat and leaving them vulnerable to the deadly sniper fire coming from adjoining buildings. Barricades continued to multiply and spread, soon engulfing the western and northern sectors of the capital. Insurgents now redoubled their fraternization efforts and, by late morning, defections reached a level that threatened to splinter the ranks of regular army units.

The historian David Pinkney’s description of the fighting in the rue Saint-Antoine on that pivotal day gives a lively sense of the confusion that reigned:

The insurgents chose for their barricade the point where the street narrowed just to the west of its junction with the Rue du Jouy. When [General] Saint-Chalman’s column left the place de la Bastille, its drums rolling, armed men gathered in overlooking houses and in nearby streets; others collected stones and other projectiles at windows and on rooftops. They allowed the infantry leading the column to break through the barricade unopposed and to continue on toward the Hôtel de Ville, but as the cavalry, slowed by the debris in the street, moved through, the people opened fire and rained paving stones, roof tiles, and pieces of furniture on the exposed men in the streets. The column hastily withdrew. The cavalry made a second attempt to pass but was again forced back. With the street again clear people swarmed out of the houses, and, spurred by their first success, built seven new barricades in about 1000 feet of the rue Saint-Antoine between the rue du Jouy and the Church of Saint-Paul.

In a subsequent incident in that same rue du Jouy, insurgents managed to strike down the three officers leading a column of infantrymen of the 1st Guard Regiment, two by rifle fire and one with a paving stone, and very nearly succeeded in winning over the now leaderless troops. Only the rapid deployment of artillery prevented a demoralizing mass defection.²⁹

This style of combat at close quarters resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. According to compensation records, 496 insurgents died and 849 were wounded. The corresponding numbers among defenders of the regime were 150 and 580 respectively, with a considerable number also reported missing. The bulk of the casualties were sustained on July 28, the fiercest day of fighting. Insurgents, apprehensive about what the next day would bring, did their best to consolidate their positions during the night, building barricades “in almost every street in the city.” What they did not know was that Marmont’s forces were on the point of disintegration. Deprived of supplies of food and ammunition,

completely drained and profoundly disheartened, they were all but incapable of carrying on the fight. Marmont, unable to blunt Charles's ill-founded confidence, finally had to suspend offensive operations on July 29 and take up defensive positions around the Louvre and along the Champs-Élysées to the Etoile, the only parts of Paris that royal forces still controlled. Soon, even this precarious toehold was placed in jeopardy, as desertions, which had been individual on July 28, now began to involve whole units of the army and even to affect the Royal Guard. When the 5th and 53rd Regiments of the Line, holding a key position at the place Vendôme, went over to the insurrection on the morning of July 29, Marmont was obliged to abandon the Louvre itself. News of this further disaster at last persuaded Charles to announce the formation of a new ministry, the withdrawal of the hated ordinances, and the convening of the recently elected Chamber of Deputies. But all this came too late, as the spontaneously reconstituted National Guard had already assumed responsibility for policing the capital—with the seventy-two-year-old Lafayette reprising his 1789 role as its commander—under a five-member Municipal Commission acting as an informally constituted provisional government.³⁰

No one could have predicted the rapidity with which events unfolded in 1830. The overthrow of the king, which in 1789 had taken three years, was accomplished in just three days in 1830. This drastic time compression was possible only because the Great Revolution had refined the issues and set the stage for its sequel. Even the choice of Louis-Philippe to succeed Charles X was a legacy of that earlier period. Among the new king's crucial qualifications were the fact that he could boast of having fought under the tricolor flag (and, unlike so many other members of the aristocracy, of never having taken up arms against his native country). The vocal minority of militant republicans among those who fought on the July barricades might claim that their revolution had been stolen from them, but their real enemy was the memory of the Terror and the excesses that had accompanied republican government in the 1790s.

The July Days were momentous because they confirmed the view that the Revolution begun in 1789 was not yet over. Instead, its promise needed to be redeemed and its gains reaffirmed through a further insurrectionary contest pitting the French people against a resurgence of Bourbon absolutism. The editors of the Orleanist newspaper *Le National* had developed the thesis that all good revolutions needed two tries to achieve the definitive triumph of moderate and stable government. Adolphe Thiers and François-Auguste Mignet, both of whom had written histories of the 1789 Revolution, were fond of invoking the example of England's Glorious Revolution of 1688 (as distinct from the bloody

and protracted English Civil War of 1640) and of pointing out that the outcome had been a constitutional monarchy.

As for the barricade itself, the revolution of 1830 bestowed upon it an almost legendary status, a burnished and much embellished version of the reputation it retained from its two spectacular appearances in the early modern period. Once again, the barricade and all that it signified became central to popular political awareness. Suddenly, allusions to barricades seemed to spring up everywhere.

Though the technical means of mass production of images had not yet been perfected, representations of barricades achieved wide circulation. Deferring for the moment a discussion of the manifestations in high culture for which Delacroix and his peers were responsible in 1830 and the years that followed, we might simply stipulate that engravings and popular lithographs of barricade combat had an enormous impact both in France and beyond. Language also reflected the new heights to which barricade consciousness had risen. When the initial impasse created by the abdication of Charles X was resolved with the accession of Louis-Philippe, he was instantly dubbed “king of the barricades” as a way of underscoring the revolutionary origins of the new regime. In common parlance, people began to qualify an individual’s political views and values by specifying “on which side of the barricade he stands.” Indeed, a reference to the barricade could be used as a shorthand way of denoting the phenomenon of revolution itself. More important, the victory of July 1830 engendered a set of deeply held beliefs that, though not self-evidently true, nonetheless persisted through the classic era of the barricade. These included the notion that, while the people united might never be defeated, barricades remained the indispensable instrument of their victory. In short, in many ways the July Days set the pattern that major French insurrections would follow for the remainder of the nineteenth century. But it was not just in their country of origination that the Paris barricades of 1830 proved influential. Within mere months, France’s Belgian neighbors would use the technique of barricade construction to establish, once and for all, their right to national independence.

THE BELGIAN REVOLUTION OF 1830

Preliminary Skirmishes

Reports that a new revolution had broken out in France electrified the Belgian people in late July 1830. A common language and the constant flow of migratory workers between Brussels and Paris—just 180 miles apart—fostered the close connection between the two societies. Many Brussels residents, including a

number of French political exiles, regularly read the Paris newspapers. They now scanned the daily news for any clue as to the political and economic implications of the change of regime. The possibility that France would seek to propagate its revolutionary principles abroad, as the Jacobins had done in the 1790s, was met with hope in some quarters and trepidation in others.³¹

Following Charles X's flight and the formation of a relatively liberal French government, Belgian nationalists had no difficulty persuading themselves that an insurrection in Brussels would enjoy immediate support in Paris. In reality, the new Orléanist government was paralyzed by the fear that the least hint of revolutionary fervor would raise the specter of French imperialism and provoke a military response from allied powers at a time when the army inherited from the previous regime was too disorganized and overcommitted to fight effectively. Over the next month, Louis-Philippe's ministers therefore did all they could to dampen Belgian expectations.³²

But the diplomatic situation was the furthest thing from the minds of those who attended the performance in Brussels on the evening of August 25, 1830, of the French composer Daniel-François Auber's opera *La muette de Portici* (The Mute Girl of Portici), whose subject is an uprising in seventeenth-century Naples.³³ The opera, premiered in Paris in 1828, had been revived there immediately after the *Trois Glorieuses*, and a duet from it highlighting the theme of national liberation, "Sacred Love of the Fatherland," had been adopted as a revolutionary anthem. It did not fail to evoke a rhapsodic response from the Brussels audience, which proceeded to carry its exuberance out into the streets. Late that evening, the city experienced a first round of rioting. Crowds roamed freely, attacking the houses of prominent Dutch officials and causing considerable property damage before troops arrived to disperse them. But the temperate response of the Dutch authorities failed to contain the disruption for long. Roving bands soon re-formed and, just as in the Parisian events they seemed to mimic, tried to obliterate the coat of arms of the House of Orange or the word "royal" wherever they found them publicly displayed. Participants seized guns and powder from the shops of arms merchants and used them to threaten—and, in a couple of instances, even to disarm—isolated patrols of Dutch soldiers, going so far as to warn gendarmes, "Stay neutral and we'll do you no harm!" Soon they were breaking street lamps and felling trees to build the first barricades.³⁴

Rioting continued for two days. Delirious patriots joined in singing "La Parisienne," an air then popular in French republican circles. A red flag was flown by a column of insurgents on its way to plunder the headquarters of the

provincial government. After workers attacked factories where power machinery had recently been introduced, property-owning residents, recognizing the grave threat that these disorders presented, formed an urban militia.³⁵ Since they lacked uniforms, they adopted as an identifying sign the red, yellow, and black colors employed by the volunteers of the Brabant revolution forty years earlier. Eight hundred of them guarded the city on the night of August 26 and attempted the next day to interpose themselves between the crowd and royal soldiers. They even managed to disarm some of the unruly elements prowling through the city by buying back the arms they carried. By the evening of August 27, this Civic Guard was in effective control of Brussels.³⁶

On August 28, the Dutch King, William I of Nassau, ordered troops withdrawn from the city and called for a meeting of the Estates General to begin on September 13. What his Belgian subjects did not know was that, in a private communication sent to his cousin, Frederick William III, he had made a simultaneous request for Prussian military support in case the forces at his immediate disposal proved insufficient to put down the unrest.³⁷

Though the king's apparent concessions had briefly restored Brussels to a state of relative calm, this did not last. On the final day of August, word spread that a Dutch army was approaching the city, and residents of all classes took up arms and once again set about digging up streets, cutting down trees, and constructing barricades.³⁸ The alarm proved premature. The force in question turned out to be nothing more than Crown Prince William and his retinue. The prince entered the city peacefully enough on September 1 and made his way to the palace without incident, though the pavement had been torn up in places, and at one point he had to clamber across a barricade.³⁹ Residents were somewhat mollified when Dutch troops, under the command of the king's younger son, Prince Frederick, moved a certain distance away from the capital. On September 3, having completed his reconnaissance and assessed the state of popular sentiment, Prince William left for the Hague to consult with his father.

In the meantime, other Belgian cities had begun rallying to the cause of "separation," sending columns of volunteers and cases of arms to Brussels.⁴⁰ The contingents that set out from Liège on September 3 and 4 were particularly welcome, for that city was then, as it remains today, a center of European arms manufacture, and its residents did not arrive empty-handed.⁴¹ Charles Rogier, who would emerge as the overall leader of the movement, organized one such band, whose members left Liège singing the "Marseillaise." The combined Liégeois forces made a triumphal entry into Brussels on September 7.

Anticipation of the upcoming meeting of the Estates General was somewhat muted in view of the fact that the constitution assigned half the votes to representatives of the much smaller Dutch population. The king was also quick to point out that the Estates' deliberations could result only in *proposals* for modifications to the Fundamental Law, and that actual changes would require the consent of the allied nations that had signed the Treaty of Paris as guarantors of the existing arrangement. Behind the scenes, William I was trying to get those same European powers to commit the troops necessary to uphold the treaty provisions unmodified. Russia was receptive to that view, but with the outbreak of a rebellion in Poland, the tsar was soon distracted by a crisis much closer to his own borders. King Frederick William of Prussia was sympathetic to his cousin's plight, but wary of becoming involved in a war with France. In the end, what tipped the scales was England's decision not to become involved unless it was necessary to counter direct French engagement in the conflict. The implied threat appears to have been sufficient, given Louis-Philippe's desire to avoid any action that might serve as a pretext for allied intervention. The Belgians were therefore left to work out their destiny without outside help or interference.

This situation hardly offered much encouragement for patriotic forces, especially the Liègeois, who increasingly rejected the goal of "separation," a form of coexistence with the Dutch on more equal terms, in favor of outright Belgian independence. The lines of authority in Brussels seemed hopelessly confused. Neither the Estates General nor the Regency Council, institutions tied to the status quo, seemed likely to advance the rebels' cause. The general staff of the Brussels militia and the Comité de sûreté publique (Committee of Public Security), established on September 11, played a useful role in coordinating the major political groups, but both of these bodies remained committed to change by legal means alone. Indeed, the call for separation they jointly issued on September 15 was so moderate in tone that it infuriated radicals to the point of demanding that a provisional government be formed to replace the existing authorities.

Lacking as yet the popular support necessary to carry out their program, the advocates of independence instead formed, on September 16, the Réunion centrale, in imitation of a Paris political society. (Informally, it was sometimes referred to as the "Jacobin Club.") Its membership, drawn from the vanguard of the nationalist movement, included provincials and foreigners as well as residents of Brussels who favored a revolutionary solution. Under the energetic leadership of Rogier, it proposed the democratization of the militia and the formation of an independent Belgian army. On September 18, this association

called for the construction of barricades throughout the city and decided that if the Comité de sûreté refused to issue the order, that it would do so on its own authority. On the following day, the call for a provisional government was renewed and the names of three specific individuals advanced, though no such body actually took shape until after the battle for control of the capital had begun.⁴² Collisions between bourgeois militia units and the Brussels crowd, ending in an exchange of gunfire and several casualties, led to the transfer of 1,500 rifles into the hands of the popular forces that now controlled the streets of Brussels. On the evening of September 20, the Réunion centrale issued a proclamation urging all Belgians to take up arms against Holland.

William I had already made the decision to march against Brussels on September 17, instructing his son Frederick to recapture the city and expel the “foreign bands” occupying it.⁴³ On September 21, the first Dutch soldiers were sighted in the outskirts of the capital. The tocsin was sounded and the people began building barricades in scattered locations. With an attack presumed to be imminent, the Réunion centrale seized control of the city, even though it had only a few hundred armed men it could count on. On the following day, as Dutch dragoons appeared in the vicinity of the porte de Schaerbeek, the *générale*, or general call to arms, summoned members of the militia to assemble at the main gates of the city. With the help of the men, women, and children of Brussels, militia members now set about erecting barricades in a frenzied rush.⁴⁴ In the initial skirmishes, units of the Civic Guard sustained disquieting losses. On the afternoon of September 22, Prince Frederick issued a harsh and uncompromising decree, again blaming “foreigners” for the unrest.⁴⁵ Outnumbered, outgunned, and lacking stable organization, Belgian patriots appeared to have such poor prospects of success that, even as Brussels was preparing to repel a full-scale assault, virtually the entire rebel leadership—members of the Comité de sûreté, the high command of the urban militia, and even the revolutionaries of the Réunion centrale—deserted the city.

The Battle for Brussels

The Dutch attack began very early on the morning of September 23. Over the next several days, the people of Brussels, with the aid of their provincial and foreign allies, performed the miracle of turning back a professional army easily four times larger than the number of armed rebels. The casualty rate among those fighting for Belgian independence was horrendous, with as many as one-fourth of all insurgents dying in combat.⁴⁶ This willingness to endure heavy losses, along with the effective use of street-fighting tactics—most visibly, the

construction of barricades—goes a long way toward explaining a victory that not even the most committed leaders of the nationalist movement appear to have believed in.



FIGURE 13. The reception of the Dutch troops in the rue de Flandre, Brussels, September 1830. As in France, the insurgents have used barrels, paving stones, planks, and beams to build their barricade. Van Neck 1905, 43.

The Dutch strategy was to overwhelm resistance with four simultaneous military charges. Two feinting incursions at the Flanders and Laeken gates, located at the lower end of the city, each involved 800 or 900 men. A more serious thrust by 2,500 men was aimed at the Louvain gate. The main assault was made on the Schaerbeek gate by a force of some 4,700 men.⁴⁷ In every one of these locations, the royal army encountered insurgents heavily entrenched behind massive barricades.

At the porte de Flandre, troops were at first welcomed by a group of bourgeois who voluntarily began dismantling their barricade and offered the soldiers beer. However, once the troops advanced as far as the marché aux Porcs, they were greeted in an entirely different manner. After parleying for several minutes, General van Balveren, whose orders instructed him only to make a show of force in the hope of diverting insurgent resources from the other sites of

combat, decided to withdraw. At this point, militia members fired into the mass of retreating soldiers, prompting an immediate riposte from the troops. This exchange was the signal for residents in adjoining buildings to begin hurling paving stones, wood, scrap metal, furniture, pots, bottles, boiling water, hot lime, and even a burning stove, down on the heads of their attackers.⁴⁸ In streets encumbered with barricades that denied them freedom of movement, the infantrymen succumbed to panic. In the ensuing rout, dozens of Dutch soldiers lost their lives.

A similar outcome was achieved at the porte de Laeken. It was there that the Dutch first used cannon fire to batter a Belgian barricade, built in the classic fashion from trees, vehicles, planks, “and an enormous quantity of paving stones.”⁴⁹ But after initially making satisfactory progress, Dutch forces soon had to seek cover against the murderous fire coming from the houses that adjoined the city gate. After sustaining heavy casualties, this force, whose purpose was also diversionary, withdrew to a defensive position just outside the city.

The attack on the porte de Louvain was more successful, at least in its early stages. After breaking through the iron gate, Major General Post’s troops split into two columns. The larger one quickly reached and secured the porte de Namur. The smaller one was stymied when it came up against a barricade in the rue Notre-Dame-aux-Neiges and soon rejoined the rest of the battalion. The advance of this combined force was then halted by sharpshooters posted at the windows of houses along the boulevard de Waterloo and the two cannon the insurgents were able to bring into play.

Still, the outcome of the struggle for control of the capital largely hinged upon the progress of the nearly 5,000 men sent against the porte de Schaerbeek under the command of Major General Schuerman. Confident of an easy victory, they had begun their approach at 6 A.M. under cover of an artillery bombardment. When they found the gate heavily defended, two cannon were used to force a passage and to attack the substantial barricades the insurgents had built to guard this key access to the city’s high ground.⁵⁰ Amid the acrid smell of powder and the incessant tolling of the tocsin, royal troops made their way along the main boulevards to the rue Royale, where a detachment of grenadiers cleared two more troublesome barricades. By 9:30 the Dutch army had planted the orange flag in the Parc Royal and occupied the two adjoining palaces. General Schuerman had accomplished his immediate objective at the cost of roughly one hundred casualties. But the decision to consolidate his soldiers’ position rather than following up on their success by seizing the adjoining square, still lightly held by the insurgents, would prove fatal. One hour later, the rebel position had

been reinforced, pinning down the soldiers in the park. The artillery duel that ensued never resulted in a decisive advantage to either side. Despite some ebb and flow in the morale of the two camps during the first few hours of fighting, no significant change in positions took place over the next four days.

The insurgents' style of combat was well adapted to their circumstances and resources. Women, children, and old men played a crucial role by carrying paving stones up to the rooftops and heaving them down on the soldiers with deadly effect.⁵¹ As long as the sun shone, the fighting was unremitting; but after defending their barricades with remarkable determination all day, insurgents abruptly abandoned them at nightfall. Most returned home to reassure family, eat a nourishing meal, and sleep in a comfortable bed. A good many stopped off at the neighborhood café to share the day's experiences. These hours of respite were also put to practical use by those who made up cartridges or searched for powder.⁵² By 6 A.M. the next morning, insurgents had again taken their places behind the barricades, and combat resumed.



FIGURE 14. Volunteers defend the Hôtel de Belle-Vue in Brussels, September 1830. It is difficult to discern differences in outward form or method of deployment between this barricade, constructed in the later stages of the fighting in Brussels, and those built by Parisian insurgents during the July Days. Van

Neck 1905, 80.

The second day of the insurrection witnessed a small but discernible shift in the general tide of battle. Juan van Halen, a Spaniard of Belgian origin, was named commander of insurgent forces in Brussels in recognition of his military experience and his exemplary role in the early fighting.⁵³ The first rebel reinforcements arrived from the provinces that evening. By the following day, this early trickle had turned into a torrent. Encouraged by these developments, local residents who had held back as long as the patriot cause seemed hopeless, now joined the fray. For the Dutch army, on the contrary, there was no relief in sight. Units suffered mounting casualties from sniper fire and occasional artillery exchanges, while the logistical situation steadily deteriorated. Although Prince Frederick had opened cease-fire negotiations, the insurgents, now sensing a shift in the balance of forces, were disinclined to compromise.

By Sunday, September 26, the spirits of the insurgents were further buoyed by expressions of support from every one of the Belgian provinces, as well as by the arrival of fresh waves of patriots. On the opposite side of the barricades, the army's spiraling losses first undermined morale and then gave rise to outright dissension. A fourth day of military stalemate had made it obvious to Prince Frederick that the only hope of victory lay in a general bombardment of the city, an expedient that would render a future reconciliation between the king and his rebellious subjects all but impossible. In the end, he was deprived of that option, even as a last resort or a bargaining chip, when the minority of Belgians within the army's officer corps gave notice that they would refuse to take part in the destruction of their country's capital city.⁵⁴ The rank and file were similarly divided along lines of national origin. The military high command had done its best to assign predominantly Dutch regiments to put down the insurrection in Brussels but was unable to avoid deploying units of mixed nationality, particularly in the all-important cavalry corps.⁵⁵ The desertion rate among Belgian soldiers, whose loyalty in the early fighting had been commendable, continued to rise at a disconcerting pace. Retreat became the sole means of preventing the total disintegration of the royal army.

The withdrawal of Dutch forces took place in the middle of the night of September 26 to 27. Infantry units were accompanied by eighty wagons carrying the wounded and the bodies of some of the dead. The cavalry covered the hooves of their horses to muffle the noise of their departure. The next morning, insurgents were first surprised, then overjoyed to learn the enemy had decamped.

Their jubilation at having accomplished the impossible was capped on the 28th by the return of several prominent leaders, most notably de Potter, from their exile in France.

The liberation of Brussels had been effected against all odds and thanks to techniques the insurgents extrapolated from the Brabant revolution as well as the July Days in Paris. The special strategic importance of a dozen specific Brussels barricades explains why their location and defense was described in extravagant detail by contemporary sources, but this narrow focus has tended to obscure the fact that scores more were built.⁵⁶ Belgians' revival of this tactic had denied William's forces, vastly superior in both numbers and armament, control over the city and dealt them a staggering defeat.

Prince Frederick promptly withdrew to the countryside. Though his clear intention was to concentrate on cutting lines of communications between Brussels and other Belgian cities and limit the spread of disaffection, he was already too late. The astonishing victory in Brussels caused Belgians everywhere to take up the cause of national independence. Within days, the uprising had been generalized throughout the Belgian provinces. Louvain, fifteen miles east, rose up and chased its garrison from the city. When that retreating army sought refuge in Tirlemont (Tienen) on September 23, residents refused them entry by barricading the city's gates.⁵⁷ The next day, Liège, which had provided much of the impetus for the insurgents' success in Brussels, experienced its own flurry of barricade construction. The appearance of soldiers in the city was at first thought to signify a Dutch attack. Though these forays turned out to represent nothing more than scattered marauders sent out from the citadel to scavenge for food, the Liègeois, once mobilized, proceeded to lay siege to the fortress, beginning on September 27. Efforts to relieve the troops trapped there were thwarted when the inhabitants of nearby Sainte-Walburge denied passage to the Dutch relief column by building barricades.⁵⁸ When news of the successful Brussels insurrection reached Ghent on September 28, residents resolved to drive out their own local garrison of 2,000 royal soldiers. Two days of barricade fighting forced the Dutch to retreat to the citadel; the arrival of the Belgo-Parisian Legion a couple of weeks later, which seemed to portend a direct assault on the fortress, was the final blow: the military had no choice but to capitulate.⁵⁹

The royal army, harried by insurgents at every turn, found itself faced with imminent internal collapse. Unlike the units that had been specially selected for use against Brussels, garrisons in other towns and in the principal fortresses included substantial contingents of Belgian soldiers, now fully awakened to the nationalist struggle. Their presence "broke the homogeneity and resistance of the

army.”⁶⁰ With the rate of desertion soaring, all Dutch military units had to be withdrawn from Belgian soil without delay. Though William I for years maintained the hollow pretense that this outcome was not definitive, the provisional government wasted no time in proclaiming Belgian independence and convoking a National Congress to oversee the creation of a new state.

RELATIONAL VERSUS CULTURAL DIFFUSION IN THE BELGIAN PROVINCES

The occurrence, between 1787 and 1789, of multiple barricade events in the Belgian provinces poses the question of how repertoires of collective action diffuse—or, perhaps more accurately, whether in the case of the barricade routine specifically, the Belgian events represent a process of diffusion or were simply the result of independent invention, whether that occurred in the late eighteenth century or earlier. What concepts and what evidence can be brought to bear in deciding such a question?

Everett Rogers’s classic work *Diffusion of Inventions* highlights the role of relational ties. He uses the term “channels” to refer to the chains of human contact that allow novel ideas or behaviors to pass from initiators to subsequent adopters through everyday, face-to-face social interactions that bind the parties into a rudimentary social system. Rogers’s main point is that scientific innovations, like all other forms of learning and social influence, typically follow channels defined by preexisting lines of interpersonal communication. In brief, diffusion is a function of network ties. Rogers goes on to propose the principle of “homophily”—the degree to which interacting individuals possess common attributes—to explain why the transfer of ideas is most likely to occur among those who share similar outlooks or experiences.⁶¹

However, relational transmission has a more difficult time explaining forms of diffusion where direct personal contact among initiators and emulators is limited or nonexistent. David Strang and John W. Meyer have investigated cases where, for example, the spread of strategies of economic development to far-flung corners of the globe could not be adequately accounted for either as the result of autonomous invention on the part of experts and politicians working in isolation or as a consequence of relational ties among key actors, most of whom, it was easy to demonstrate, never came into direct contact. Strang and Meyer directed attention instead to processes of nonrelational or cultural transmission that often supplement or substitute for unmediated personal interaction. The point is that cultural transmission, though it may be reinforced by relational ties,

regularly occurs even in the absence of such contact when the parties share common reservoirs of meaning, operate in similar institutional environments, and rely upon the same sources of information. Freed from the necessity of direct individual interchange, nonrelational or cultural transmission has the potential to vastly increase the speed and scope of the diffusion process and often exerts a powerful homogenizing influence on the nature of what is transmitted.⁶²

In the realm of social movement theory, Doug McAdam and Dieter Rucht have built upon and adapted these insights to the specific problem of tactical innovations, here exemplified by the spread of barricades.⁶³ For them, there are three critical considerations in attempting to establish a link between initiators and emulators. One is the existence of common elements in the objectives, ideologies, or styles of protest adopted by the groups concerned. Another is the ability to identify mechanisms that might plausibly account for the passage of those shared elements from one set of actors to another, whether the channels in question are relational or cultural. In addition, one needs to demonstrate that the observed temporal lags are consistent with the hypothesized mode of transmission.

In the Belgian case, it is possible to show that both relational and cultural diffusion played some role in the spread of the barricade, though the lack of source materials dealing with pivotal events, particularly during the crucial period from 1787 to 1789, limits our ability to draw inferences that are more than conjectural.⁶⁴ We do know, for example, that as far back as the 1770s, a period of great turmoil in France, the *Gazette des Pays-Bas* gave detailed coverage to the French monarchy's dispute with the French *parlements* and to the widespread unrest occasioned by the "flour wars" during the final, troubled years of Louis XV's reign.⁶⁵ In the decade leading to the outbreak of the French Revolution, Belgians were enthralled by the spectacle of the so-called Revolt of the Nobles in France, which showed that even the king of the most powerful nation on the Continent could be humbled by his subjects' refusal to bend to his will. And quite clearly, Belgians' reaction to Joseph's administrative coup of June 16, 1789, was sharpened by the arrival on the previous day of news that the French Third Estate had declared itself a National Assembly, effectively usurping a portion of Louis XVI's legislative authority.⁶⁶ Just one month later, Belgians reveled in an account of the storming of the Bastille that included mention of the use of barricades.⁶⁷

Austrian officials were well aware that a wind of revolution was sweeping

across the border from France, but they remained powerless to prevent Belgians from breathing deeply of its intoxicating aroma. In secret correspondence, the emperor's minister plenipotentiary, Trauttmansdorff, reported that "people await and receive the news from France with an incredible avidity" and "were speaking aloud about following the example of the French." Brussels was swamped with handbills that read simply "Here as in Paris!" The gravity of the situation could hardly have escaped Joseph II's attention, since Alton, his hand-picked general, had already written him on July 6 that "France, so near to us, furnishes at this moment an example of authority being successfully attacked and of an entire army that is forgetting its duty."⁶⁸ The Vonckist party, one of the two major factions that directed the successful effort to drive the Austrian army out of the Belgian provinces in 1789, was self-avowedly pro-French. Its leader dispatched an envoy to the French National Assembly after Brussels newspapers reported how that body had dismantled the feudal system during the late-night session of August 4, 1789. This emissary's primary mission was to learn what response was to be expected from the National Assembly should a major insurrection occur in the Austrian Netherlands.⁶⁹ All of this suggests that developments in France exerted at least an indirect influence on the progress of the Brabant revolution.

In short, there is ample evidence that political developments in Brussels and Paris were mutually reinforcing, even if we retain no record of actual movements of money, arms, or men. But the Belgian revolution of 1830 presents a far more promising context in which to study the diffusion process. Contemporary public opinion certainly considered the connection between the two great revolutionary events of that year to be self-evident. Barricades went up in Brussels less than a month after reappearing in Paris, and neither participants nor observers considered the timing mere coincidence. Eyewitnesses cited as evidence Belgians' readiness to borrow highly visible French symbols. Thus, on August 26, 1830, the first full day of insurrectionary activity in Brussels, the blue, white, and red French flag flew above the Hôtel de Ville for several hours before being replaced by the Brabant tricolor, a passing of the torch that was eloquent in its symbolism. Throughout the initial week of unrest, residents were reported to have spontaneously broken into choruses of the "Marseillaise" to mark their patriotic fervor. Demonstrators in the streets of Brussels raised cries of "Vive la liberté! Vive de Potter! Vive Napoléon!" and the general public seemed ready to welcome even the most implausible reports, like the mid-September rumor that 40,000 French national guards were preparing to march to the aid of Brussels.⁷⁰

The appropriation of French symbols, though widespread, was never altogether uncritical. When residents of Liège set up a shadow government, they briefly considered calling it the Committee of Public Safety (Comité de salut publique) but decided that this name “sounded bad due to its associations” with the Jacobin Terror.⁷¹ They had no qualms, however, about calling the new revolutionary association they set up in September the Réunion centrale, in conscious imitation of French militants who had recently founded the club of the same name in Paris. Moreover, the inner circle of that organization, though based in Brussels, included not only Belgian provincials (notably its leader, the Liégeois Charles Rogier) but also a number of French nationals (among them, Pierre Chazal, Ernest Grégoire, Charles Niellon, Charles Culhat, and Anne-François Mellinet, all of whom distinguished themselves in combat on behalf of Belgian independence).⁷²

In Paris, meantime, the expatriate Belgian community was in a state of frenetic activity. Even after the transfer to Dutch rule in 1815, the migratory current of Belgians flocking to the French capital had continued unabated. Despite the diminutive size and population of the Belgian provinces, natives of that region almost certainly represented the single largest contingent of foreign residents in Paris.⁷³ A tiny but highly influential subgroup consisted of political activists seeking refuge from William I’s efforts to repress the independence movement. Among the most recent arrivals were Louis de Potter and François Tielemans. Though they had applied for asylum immediately after being banished in the summer of 1830, Charles X’s prime minister Jules-Armand de Polignac flatly rejected their request. It was only with the change of French regimes in late July that access to French territory was granted by the new government, and not until August 24 that de Potter and Tielemans, like their compatriots Adolph Bartels and P. Nève, arrived in Paris.⁷⁴

Over the next few weeks, de Potter, the most widely recognized representative of the Belgian nationalist movement in France, was showered with offers of assistance. He was made the guest of honor at political banquets and met with Lafayette, who not only endorsed the concept of Belgian independence but gave his personal guarantee to a loan of 12,000 francs from his political ally, the banker Lafitte. De Potter’s role was key not only because of his visibility and moral force but also because he had maintained close ties with the “pro-French” faction back in Brussels from whom he now earnestly sought instructions.⁷⁵

As for the thousands of ordinary Belgian workers who resided in the French

capital, their enthusiasm was, by late August, boundless. Many had been witnesses to if not participants in the *Trois Glorieuses*. The French nobleman Ponté-coulant would later claim that he led his Parisian sharpshooters to Brussels after being “besieged on all sides by the ardent solicitations of young men who, like myself, had fought in the streets of Paris.”⁷⁶ Patriotic Belgians, intent on applying the lessons learned during the July Days to the challenge facing their own country, found sympathetic Parisians eager to help.

The largest political organizations in Paris—the *Amis du peuple* and *Aide-toi, le ciel t’aidera*—began signing up volunteers, both Belgian and French, and promised to provide weapons for the struggle to win separation from the Netherlands.⁷⁷ When news of the outbreak of rioting in Brussels arrived, workers who frequented the *Café Belge*, located at 22 rue Grenelle Saint-Honoré in Paris, formed the *Bureau central*, a political club that held stormy discussions of the latest developments back home. This drew a vehement reaction from the Dutch ambassador. On September 23, he wrote to his superior in the Hague, Foreign Minister van Soelen, urging him to call Louis-Philippe’s attention to this recruitment effort in the hope that the French government would put an immediate stop to all such activities.⁷⁸ Dutch fears have to be understood in light of newspaper reports like the one that appeared on September 30 telling of 300 Belgians who paraded through various quarters of the French capital, waving a Brabançon flag, singing “*La Parisienne*,” and being acclaimed by local residents to cries of “*Vivent les Belges!*”⁷⁹ In the few weeks that had elapsed since hostilities erupted in Brussels, at least a half dozen columns of volunteers had been organized, armed, and dispatched to Belgium.⁸⁰

THE AMBIGUOUS CHARACTER OF FRANCO-BELGIAN INTERACTIONS

Thus, a combination of relational and cultural connections appear to have facilitated the diffusion of barricades from France to Belgium over the period extending from 1787 to 1830. Unfortunately, the more closely we examine the evidence, the less conclusive it appears. The most obvious stumbling block regarding the first Belgian barricades is the fact that they appeared in Brussels a year and a half *before* Parisians dusted off this venerable tactic for use on July 14, 1789. As the French journalist Linguet would point out to Trauttmansdorff, “it was the Belgians who had given the French the example of popular resistance in the first place.”⁸¹ The timing of the 1830 events plainly suggests that Belgians were influenced by the French example, but few of the presumed links turn out

to have been terribly efficacious. For example, the Dutch ambassador almost immediately retracted the protest he had filed with the French government concerning attempts to recruit Parisian volunteers to come to the aid of the Belgian revolution. His reason was simple. After more detailed inquiries, he no longer considered the “collection of blunderers” headquartered at the Café Belge to be of real consequence.⁸² As for de Potter, the linchpin of the Paris-Brussels connection, his activities never really achieved any concrete result. His arrival in the French capital on August 24, literally on the eve of the first Brussels barricades, came too late to have had any practical impact on those events. He spent the next three weeks fending off unsolicited offers from prospective freedom fighters, while vainly awaiting orders from those heading up the movement back in Belgium. In frustration, he left Paris on September 18 for a meeting with Gendebien in Lille, but it was not until the 28th, the day *after* Dutch troops had withdrawn, that he finally set foot in Brussels. None of his activities can be shown to have been of any consequence to the outcome of that struggle. As for the much-touted volunteer legions, they were all small, and de facto independence was achieved so quickly that not one of them arrived in time to have the slightest influence on the barricade fighting.⁸³

I have, in fact, been unable to document a single instance in which relational ties directly linked the French and Belgian barricades of 1830. Though ties of a more diffuse nature abounded, they do not always provide satisfying proof of a direct relationship. As Demoulin emphasized, Brussels insurgents may have adopted the French flag and national anthem as *generic* emblems of revolt, but this could not be taken to signify direct French involvement in their struggles, much less a desire on the part of the local population to be reabsorbed by France.⁸⁴ In the end, the most substantive connection between the two revolutions may have been the simple fact that the change of regimes in France deprived the Dutch of the support they might have expected from Charles X’s ultraconservative government, while leaving open the possibility—or so Belgian patriots persisted in believing—that Louis-Philippe, the “king of the barricades,” would intervene on their behalf.

Lacking the level of detail we might hope for, particularly regarding the 1787 events, the Belgian case allows us to draw only general conclusions. It suggests that geographical proximity—and more particularly a common border served by efficient modes of transport over hospitable terrain—translated into an ease of access that increased social interchange between the two capitals. At the same time, a set of cultural affinities rooted in part in a common language and many common values favored the movement of ideas across the porous boundary

separating the two societies. The history of the Belgian provinces, specifically the experience of political integration, enhanced the sense of connection, since as erstwhile departments of France, they possessed direct knowledge of that country's laws and institutions. The combination of frequent interpersonal contact, a substantial current of cross-migration, and a shared cultural context created multiple channels with the potential to facilitate the adoption of the barricade as an insurrectionary technique.

It seems especially fitting that Belgians were the first to build barricades outside France, since that act closed a circle dating back to Etienne Marcel's borrowing of the custom of stretching the chains from fourteenth-century Flemish towns.⁸⁵ Chains were still in use in the 1780s in Ghent and Brussels as well as Paris, testimony to the longevity that such innovations sometimes achieve. The irony is that, in contrast to the spread of the practice of using chains more than 600 years ago, we know so little about the precise mechanism of transmission that brought the barricade to the Belgian provinces in 1787 just over two hundred years ago. A mere four Belgian barricade events in the crucial 1787–1789 period, all thinly documented, are insufficient to establish in a definitive way whether that local adaptation represented a process of diffusion or a case of independent invention. The more ample record of the Belgian revolution argues strongly (without quite pinning down) that the appearance of barricades in Brussels in 1830 was a direct consequence of events in Paris a month earlier. However, if our goal is to understand the dynamic of the diffusion process more fully, we need to turn to the richly documented events of the year 1848, responsible for the most rapid and comprehensive spread of barricade construction ever witnessed.

The Barricade Conquers Europe, 1848

France's influence over the fortunes of the world had never been raised so high or pushed so far. Europe can recognize that fact without regret—can even applaud it effusively—because this influence was not imposed by force of arms, nor through diplomatic guile, nor through the oppression of conquest. It was simply the result of an enthusiastic sense of affinity on the part of other peoples. A ray of hope illuminated everyone's awareness. All those who were moaning in the darkness turned their eyes toward France. Our flag became the colors of redemption, our popular songs the hymns of liberty for the world.

LOUIS GARNIER-PAGÈS, *HISTOIRE DE LA RÉVOLUTION DE 1848*

In late February 1848, Louis-Philippe, who had been brought to power by one popular insurrection, was dethroned by another. The time lapse between the first protests and the king's abdication—barely forty-eight hours—was even briefer than it had been in 1830. Yet, if we step back from these individual insurrectionary episodes and compare the succession of forms of government in the first half of the nineteenth century with what it had been under the Great Revolution, we might almost say that the pace at which events unfolded was quite deliberate. After all, beginning in 1789, the French had passed from a divine-right to a constitutional monarchy and then to a republic in the span of little more than three years. In contrast, they took roughly ten times as long to recapitulate those same three stages of political development following the 1815 Restoration.¹

This is not meant to imply that those who rebelled in 1848 were consciously

aware of working through some grand historical pattern until they got it right. They were simply reacting to pressing political and economic concerns which happened to bear a strong similarity to those that had helped precipitate the 1789 and 1830 revolutions. Beginning in 1845, harvest failures, initially in potatoes, then in wheat, had thrown first the rural and then the urban segments of French society into chaos. In Paris and other big cities, a precipitous rise in the price of bread placed intolerable pressure on the family budgets of ordinary workers, even as a sharp decline in the demand for industrial goods caused a disastrous spike in unemployment. Just as in 1830, dislocations in agricultural production resulted in a crisis in the industrial economy that persisted even after grain harvests started to improve in the fall of 1847. The lack of jobs and deteriorating wages were reason enough for the gnawing sense of discontent that gripped the urban masses, but this sharp economic downturn also coincided with a national political mobilization, highlighted by the famous banquet campaign that brought conflicts over electoral reform simultaneously to a head.

So much has been written regarding the revolution of 1848 that there seems little point in my undertaking an extensive analysis here. Still, an understanding of the diffusion process that took place in that year of turmoil requires that I attempt a rapid review of the critical role that barricades played not only in the February Days but in the other great Parisian insurrection that occurred just four months later.² Since 1830, barricades had appeared on several occasions in Paris, so residents were well schooled in this technique of insurrection. A number of such structures had already been erected during the earliest protests against the government of Prime Minister François Guizot (1847–48), but combat took a more serious turn late in the day on February 23, after the king dismissed the ministry, a crowd gathered to celebrate this political victory, and a tense confrontation between these demonstrators and royal troops ended with an unprovoked fusillade that killed more than fifty civilians. It was this tragic outcome—the so-called massacre in the boulevard des Capucines—that triggered a full-fledged insurrection and doomed the Orléanist monarchy. Militants paraded the bodies of victims through the streets, much as they had done in 1830. By the morning of February 24, Paris was united in opposition to the regime, and some 1,500 barricades had been built.

When the extent of defections in the ranks of the Paris militia became apparent, Louis-Philippe himself seemed to fall prey to the very myths that had taken hold in the general population in 1830. The reappearance of barricades and desertions in the National Guard he had once taken pride in restoring caused him to lose heart and refuse, despite the recommendations of his closest advisors, to

put up a stiff fight.³ Preferring to avoid further bloodshed in what he considered a futile cause, the first and last Orléanist king of France wrote out his two-sentence abdication and immediately departed for England.

The experience of 1830 also explains the vehemence with which the insurgent population of Paris now insisted that the provisional government declare the Second French Republic and immediately begin instituting a series of sweeping reforms. In short order, this body affirmed the freedoms of the press and association, adopted universal manhood suffrage, shortened the workday in the capital, ended abuses of the subcontracting system, created a “Workers’ Commission,” definitively abolished slavery in French colonies, opened the ranks of the Paris National Guard to all adult men, and declared that all citizens would thenceforth enjoy “the right to work.” But of all the provisional government’s innovations, the most consequential of all for the political future of the Second Republic was the creation of two new institutions, a body of troops called the Garde mobile (Mobile Guard) and the Ateliers nationaux (National Workshops), each directly connected to the barricades of February and June 1848.⁴

The new government’s most fundamental problem in the wake of the February insurrection was how to restore order in the capital. Far from solving the economic crisis, the revolution completely undermined the confidence of business and financial circles and soon exacerbated the already elevated rate of unemployment, which shot up as high as 50 percent in many skilled trades. Desperate workers, many of them with arms in hand, now controlled the streets of Paris. The police force that had served the Orléanist regime was utterly discredited, and most of its members had fled to the countryside. The army was still reeling from the humiliation of having whole units go over to the insurgent cause. It was hardly a factor in any case, since one of the provisional government’s first concessions to the Parisian crowd had been to order all units to leave the capital and to promise they would not return. That left the National Guard which, as in 1830, had assumed a pivotal role in the fighting and had since taken on temporary duties patrolling the city. But this was a true citizens’ militia, whose members served part-time and without pay. Their family and job responsibilities prevented them from fulfilling the role of a permanent police force.

To fill the void created by the change of regime, the provisional government came up with an ingenious but risky strategy. Making a virtue of necessity, it targeted Parisians who had fought on the February barricades and actively recruited them to serve in the newly formed Garde mobile. Unlike the army, this

corps consisted of local recruits, mainly drawn from the youngest cohort of unemployed artisans. Unlike the National Guard, its members served full-time, lived in barracks, and were commanded by officers of the regular army on detached duty. These raw recruits were provided room and board and paid what, at a time when jobs were scarce, amounted to a premium wage for military service. The provisional government (and the executive commission that succeeded it) carefully cultivated the members of this hybrid force in order to ensure its unswerving loyalty to the moderate Republic that had provided them with a measure of security in troubled times.

But while the Garde mobile thus managed to get some 15,000 potentially turbulent young men off the streets of the capital and attach them to the new regime, this barely reduced the magnitude of the problem the government faced. With so large a share of the city's population out of work, the risk of unrest was constant and the need for a solution urgent. Although the right to work had originally been no more than an abstract concept, a plan soon evolved to create the Ateliers nationaux. The name of this organization evoked associations to precedents as disparate as the *ateliers de secours* set up after the 1830 revolution for much the same reasons, the *ateliers de charité* of the Catholic Church, and the *ateliers sociaux* envisaged by the socialist theoretician Louis Blanc. Leadership was to be provided thanks to the entrepreneurial spirit of students and alumni of the Ecole centrale, who constituted the organization's "officer corps." The intention was to enroll perhaps 10,000 or 12,000 unemployed Parisians and assign them to public works projects in return for a subsistence wage. However, by the month of May, the rolls had grown to more than 100,000, far exceeding the number that those in charge could possibly place in any form of useful, much less gainful, employment. The promise of the right to work had spawned a huge make-work operation whose members idled away their days playing cards or engaging in political discussion on the Champ de Mars. Meanwhile, the cost of maintaining this mass of indolent workers steadily mounted.

When the recently democratized electorate went to the polls in late April, it returned a moderate to conservative Legislative Assembly, which lost no time in subjecting the National Workshops to critical scrutiny. The June insurrection was a direct response to the Assembly's decision effectively to disband the Workshops, thus revoking one of the fundamental gains that the Paris working class had fought to achieve following the February revolution. It was, in fact, Louis Pujol, a lieutenant in the National Workshops, who fixed a rendezvous for insurgents to meet the next morning, June 23, to recommence the building of

barricades. Of the more than 400 structures that were built over the next two days, often under the leadership of army veterans or officers of one of the National Guard legions that sided with the insurrection, a number were adorned with the banners of units of the National Workshops.

Though the revolt may have mobilized as many as 50,000 residents and held sway over nearly half the city's surface area at its peak, it ultimately proved to be a calamitous failure. General Eugène Cavaignac, granted nearly dictatorial powers, withheld his troops until the insurrection had taken shape and then committed them in force, making full use of artillery and cavalry units to overcome the advantage the insurgents hoped to gain by building barricades. What turned the tide in favor of the repression was the Garde mobile, that special product of the February barricades, whose members surprised observers on both sides of the conflict with the enthusiasm they displayed in spearheading the defense of the moderate Republic.

Two novel developments that can be ascribed to the June insurrection were a change in the strategy of deployment against civilian insurrections, aimed at denying the rebels access to small troop formations whom they could hope to win over in early contact; and a highly successful demonstration that, under the right conditions, it was possible to recruit barricade fighters, train them as a combat force, and retain their loyalty in a subsequent popular insurrection. Indeed, the Garde mobile was widely credited with having played the decisive role in determining the outcome of the June conflict. But what is often overlooked is that, until mid-May, the government's efforts to co-opt the members of the National Workshops had been nearly as successful, thanks to the very same measures that had proved effective with the Garde mobile: (1) addressing the practical grievances of the rank and file, mainly by offering them a secure source of livelihood; (2) providing leadership in the form of a cadre of reliable officers; and (3) insulating members, however imperfectly, from radical influences in the general population. It was only once the Legislative Assembly disrupted these arrangements by removing the organization's director, threatening to force members to enlist in the army or be banished to the provinces, and revealing its plan to do away with the National Workshops altogether that the membership's loyalties shifted, the command structure disintegrated, and the isolation of the rank and file was brought to an end.

Both the February and June insurrections were crucial events in the history of French contention, which explains the intensive analysis that has been devoted to them. However, in the present context, their significance stems not from their role in a national drama but from their combined impact on Europeans'

awareness of the barricade. The February Days were just the opening salvo in a barrage of revolutionary events that staggered governments all across the Continent, and the use of barricades was one of the elements visibly linking these uprisings together. As the insurrectionary fever reached epidemic proportions, societies with no prior experience of revolutionary upheaval began emulating the French, not simply in their idealistic pronouncements and programmatic goals, but even in their preference for specific tactics and symbols, chief among them the barricade. The initial surge of liberal sentiments emanating from Paris thanks to its February revolution would give way to an altogether more somber wave of reaction following the defeat of the June insurrection, annulling hard-won reforms and placing their advocates on the defensive. These later struggles were also fought across dividing lines defined by barricades, even if, once the revolutionary momentum had been dissipated, the tactic was rarely able to make headway against the reinvigorated police and military forces insurgents now confronted. The flourishing of barricade use, however brief, in so many new locations where they had never previously appeared presents us with the opportunity to study the diffusion process in greater detail and with the advantage of a comparative perspective that was not possible using the Belgium example alone. Our inquiry begins by asking how barricades began to spread in 1848 and what mechanisms and agencies aided this proliferation.

REVOLUTIONS OF THE YEAR 1848 OUTSIDE FRANCE

In the history of European protest, the year 1848 remains without parallel for the sheer scope of the revolutionary unrest it engendered. Among the few locations left essentially untouched by the chaos that engulfed the Continent, England and Russia stood at opposite poles, both geographically and institutionally. In the former, a mildly permissive political context convinced the Chartists that reform was a more promising and pragmatic alternative than revolution. In the latter, the willingness of the tsar's autocratic regime to use the state's coercive power without restraint forestalled radical action on any appreciable scale.

Between these two extremes, all manner of traditional political regimes faced some form of revolutionary challenge. Having breathed in the hope-filled atmosphere of what Mazzini called "the springtime of the peoples," Europeans became convinced that a new era had dawned. For a few astonishing months, it seemed that the established order would either accommodate their demands or be swept away. So sudden and powerful a spike in revolutionary mobilization

was without precedent, whether measured by the number of insurgent movements, their concentration in time, or the ease with which they spread across so vast a territory. In most cases, the barricade assumed a central role in these revolutionary mobilizations.

The common thread among these movements was the aspiration for national self-determination, although that goal was capable of manifesting itself in apparently contradictory forms, as shown by the contrast between the drive to unify the Italian or German states on the one hand, and the efforts of Hungarians or Czechs to separate from the Austrian empire on the other. But such differences are tangential to the history of the barricade, and I shall therefore make no attempt to survey the full extent of political and social change that occurred in 1848, much less to retrace the subsequent course of the nationalist, constitutionalist, or republican currents that were unleashed in such spectacular fashion. My initial goal is simply to take stock of the rash of insurrectionary events that occurred during the spring of that year and consider whether or not they constituted a more or less coherent sequence that can be understood as part of a process of diffusion. It should then be possible to look for patterns in the spread of barricade techniques and try to identify the elusive “vectors”—or what amount to chains of human agency—that helped propagate the spirit of rebellion across the Continent.

The Initial Dissemination of Revolution in 1848

The convergence of so many insurgent movements in the span of a few short months has been enough to convince most observers that the uprisings of 1848 should be treated as a unitary phenomenon. Despite its intuitive appeal, this assumption rests on shaky logical grounds and, in itself, contributes little to an understanding of how these events were interrelated. For if timing were the only pertinent consideration in charting the course of a diffusion process, then historians should properly trace the outbreak of the revolutionary upsurge of 1848, not to Paris, as has been their nearly universal practice, but to Palermo. After all, on January 12, 1848, that city experienced a popular uprising, complete with barricades, that led to a series of reforms and the eventual abdication of Ferdinand II as ruler of the kingdom of Naples and Sicily. In reality, of course, temporal precedence is not always a sure guide to causal significance, especially as there is little to indicate that the insurgents who poured into the streets of Paris just six weeks later consciously had the Palermo rebellion in mind—or, indeed, were even aware of its occurrence.⁵

The opposite case—that the Paris uprising was an important contributory

factor in the outbreak of most subsequent insurrections—is far easier to make, as long as we confine ourselves to the early stages of the general European mobilization, where it is possible to single out the direct and unmediated impact of the February Days. The simplest way to demonstrate the existence and begin to disentangle the sequence of such cross-linkages is by reconstructing how the rest of the Continent reacted upon first learning of the February revolution.

Given historical precedents, the outbreak of a new insurrection in Paris was certain to cause a sensation among Europeans, regardless of political leaning, ensuring that the news would circulate at breakneck speed. But unlike present-day electronic media, which have all but annihilated lags in transmission based on distance, the methods of dissemination available in 1848 imposed a more deliberate and uneven pace. With the exception of a few locales where railroad or steamship service was already established, even the most earthshaking reports still required that the message be conveyed physically, typically by mail coach or horse-mounted courier.⁶ Because distance was the main determinant of time of transmission, one might imagine a map representing the spread of news taking the form of a series of concentric circles encompassing all points at one, two, three, or more days' travel from Paris.⁷

This way of likening the diffusion process to sound waves radiating outwards at a constant speed from a common point of origin is an obvious oversimplification. For one thing, it ignores topography, since it obviously took longer for a messenger to travel an equal distance in mountainous terrain like that which separates Paris from Bern than to cross the essentially flat expanse that lies between Paris and Brussels. Just as important, time of transmission varied sharply with the quality and carrying capacity of roads or the presence or absence of internal rail lines—both of which were correlated with levels of economic and political interchange in normal times.

If a diagrammatic rendering of the progress of diffusion could take such factors into account by plotting the time of transmission to thousands of locations, large and small, its concentric circles would be transformed into a nested set of many-pointed stars, the apexes of which would be situated along major thoroughfares. The farther one ventured from these well-traveled roads, the shorter the distance that news could cover from its point of origin in a given length of time. Though it can be no more than suggestive, [map 4](#) attempts to show how initial reports of the February revolution spread in 1848. The number in parentheses accompanying the name of each city on the map indicates the delay in receiving the news to the nearest day.⁸



MAP 4. First reports of the French revolution of February 1848 (days of delay).

The Belgian Provinces

Residents of London were the first outside France to hear of the success of the new insurrection in Paris. The world's most up-to-date communications link made use of a rail connection from Paris to Boulogne, a special steamer across the Channel, and an electric telegraph recently installed between Dover and London, which delivered the news to the nerve center of the British empire between 4 and 5 P.M. on February 25, 1848.⁹

At nearly the same moment, residents of Brussels—the foreign capital closest to Paris and the only one then linked to it by a direct rail line—were receiving similar reports. Aware since the previous evening that a great struggle was being waged in the French capital, Belgians now learned its outcome, the declaration of the Second Republic.¹⁰ When this news was published in daily newspapers on the morning of February 26, it caused a brief run on local banks and a tightening of credit. Panic-prone elites were not the only ones who foresaw the prospect that Belgium might imitate France. Victor Considérant, in that country on a lecture tour, immediately wrote to his friend Charles Rogier—leader of the 1830

revolution and, by then, Belgian minister of the interior—urging him to persuade King Leopold I to abdicate the throne largely on the strength of the following prediction: “As soon as the French newspapers arrive, inundating Belgium with heroic accounts of the miracle that the people of Paris have just accomplished, an indescribable enthusiasm is going to take possession of the population.”¹¹

Considerant’s initial exaltation was shared by the Brussels Democratic Association (which listed as one of its vice presidents a temporary Brussels resident named Karl Marx.) But the demonstrations organized by that group, though well attended, never progressed beyond peaceful gatherings at which participants shouted republican slogans and then tamely yielded before the troops’ orders to disperse. Contrary to the expectations of Considerant and a still obscure journalistic commentator named Friedrich Engels, the political crisis quickly passed, leaving Belgium, for most of that eventful summer of 1848, “a peaceful island in the heart of a surging sea.”¹²

One small event that diverged from this pattern is worth remarking, if only because it took place in a city whose history had already been entwined with that of the barricade for hundreds of years. Ghent became a center of popular agitation on March 28, when a gathering of workers began to erect a barricade near the town’s railroad station by overturning a vehicle and dragging a beam into the roadway. These efforts were abandoned as soon as soldiers arrived, though unrest sporadically reappeared in the city over the next few days, claiming the lives of two demonstrators. It may seem curious that this flare-up should have taken place in late March, well after the initial reaction to the February Days had died down, but its timing is explained by demonstrators’ expectation that an expedition of Belgian workers from Paris, to be discussed in greater detail below, was about to cross the French border and “liberate” their country.

Still, in the context of the general turbulence of European politics in that period, it is the relative absence of insurrectionary activity in Belgium proper—the country that shared the closest geographical, political, and cultural ties with France—that seems noteworthy. The obvious explanation is that most Belgians felt they had already had their revolution nearly two decades earlier. Moreover, the elections of the preceding summer had returned a liberal government, headed by Rogier, whose role in the 1830 events has already been noted. The makeup of the ruling political coalition and the recent introduction of legislation aimed at poor relief and a broadening of suffrage rights explain why Belgium, which was pursuing a path of domestic political reform not unlike England’s, was left largely unscathed by the revolutionary surge of 1848.¹³ As the newly appointed

French ambassador to Brussels remarked in a report to Lamartine, Belgians already possessed most of the liberties that their neighbors hoped to secure by revolutionary means.¹⁴

A few other northern European peoples—notably the Dutch, Swedes, and Danes—were caught up by the progressive spirit engendered by the February revolution and used the occasion to demand constitutions or enact programs of political reform. But despite an attempt in Denmark to form a provisional government, none of these countries experienced a loss of life, much less an actual change of regime.

The German States

The German border states reacted swiftly to the news from Paris. A late-February entry from the diary of one Mannheim resident, Colonel Louis Blaison, makes it clear how closely events were being tracked: “The impression here is indescribable. All day long, everyone rushes after information. A new bulletin, with new details, appears every couple of hours.”¹⁵ Beginning on February 27, demonstrations, sometimes accompanied by riots, took place in Mannheim, Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, Darmstadt, Mainz, Hanau, Leipzig, Cologne, Wiesbaden, Heidelberg, Frankfurt, Dusseldorf, Donaueschingen, and Hanover.¹⁶ The historian Rudolph Stadelmann leaves no doubt as to the direct connection that existed between the recent fall of the monarchy in France and the chain of events unleashed in the southern German states: “After February 24, the day when the throne of Louis-Philippe was publicly burned in Paris on the Bastille Place, the German governments were overwhelmed by an irresistible wave. . . . Without the dramatic events in Paris and without the flight of the French king, certainly at this moment there would have been no revolutionary psychosis, no March ministries, and no national assembly in Germany.”¹⁷ Opinion appears to have been fairly evenly divided between those who hoped that a new Paris revolution would inspire Germans to emulate their neighbors and those who, remembering the legacy of 1789, lived in fear that it would bring another French invasion.¹⁸

Of course, the region bordering the Rhine included territories that had been annexed under the First Republic and Napoléonic empire, a nearly twenty-year period during which French institutions and political values had the opportunity to take root. It therefore came as no great surprise that the first outbreak of revolutionary activity on Prussian-controlled territory took place in Cologne, where the “Marseillaise” was played in honor of the news that Louis-Philippe had fled.¹⁹ In Baden, one of a mere handful of sites that would follow the French example by adopting a republican form of government in 1848, “big popular

meetings took place as soon as the news from Paris arrived.”²⁰ At one such assembly in Neustadt, when the speaker began his address with the word “Gentlemen,” his audience corrected him by shouting back, “Citizens!”²¹

To Munich went the distinction of being the first city to respond to the February revolution by erecting barricades of its own. Bavarian politics had already been thrown into an uproar in January and February after King Ludwig I’s infatuation with his mistress, the Irish actress known as Lola Montez, called into question his fitness to rule. Still, it was not until word of the Paris insurrection arrived that crowds poured into the streets. By March 4, they turned to barricades as a way of underscoring their insistent demand that the king vacate the throne. The government hastened to grant freedom of the press and make other liberal concessions, but these were not enough to stem the tide of protest, and Ludwig was soon forced to abdicate in favor of his son.²²

Though Berlin lay substantially further east, routes of communication between the French and Prussian capitals were well established, and residents learned of Louis-Philippe’s overthrow with only a slightly greater lag. Rumors began to circulate on Sunday February 27, but, because of a holiday weekend, it was not until the following day that they were confirmed in the press.²³ A government dispatch of that same date declared that “it is impossible to describe the amazement, the terror, the confusion aroused here by the latest reports from Paris crowding on each other almost hourly.”²⁴ The reaction among well-to-do Berliners can be judged by the sharp drop in local stock market prices that immediately ensued.²⁵ The historian Priscilla Robertson calls the news “the catalytic agent that precipitated revolution in Prussia,” citing the testimony of Paul Boerner, a university student in Berlin, who was so excited at the prospects he saw suddenly opening up before his country that he had to walk for hours in the cold in order to calm his spirit.²⁶ He spent subsequent evenings in a café listening to newspaper accounts being read aloud. By March 5, protests in which workers and foreigners figured prominently had already given rise to sporadic rioting.²⁷

However promising these beginnings may have appeared to critics of the regime, it is unlikely they would have led to open insurrection without unintentional help from the military. Berliners gathered in the Tiergarten on March 13, demanding, among other reforms, the creation of a ministry of labor of the sort that the provisional government in Paris had refused to grant Louis Blanc.²⁸ Their demonstration soon turned into a confrontation with troops, who used the flats of their swords to disperse members of the crowd. It was in the

course of this collision that the initial barricade was erected in the Grünstrasse.²⁹ Reports on March 14 and 15 that Vienna was also in a state of revolt prompted further clashes between the people and the cavalry, accompanied by the spread of barricade construction and the first fatalities. On March 16, fighting redoubled in Berlin and spread to Posen and Silesia, thanks to the hardened attitude of the army and the arrival of news from Vienna that Metternich had resigned.



FIGURE 15. The Frankfurt insurrection of September 1848. After the German National Assembly in Frankfurt am Main voted on September 15, 1848, to accept the treaty Prussia had signed with Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein, a three-day uprising began in the city. *Journées illustrées de la révolution* (1848–49), 333.

By midday on March 18, King Frederick William IV, aghast at mounting civilian casualties and demoralized by the Austrian regime's apparent surrender, hastily promised a new constitution, a free press, and the reconvening of the

Diet. These conciliatory gestures caused a huge crowd to gather to celebrate the people's victory. In an effort to manage the volatile situation, General von Prittwitz, who had just been appointed governor of Berlin, attempted to clear the square. As his soldiers used drawn sabers to force the demonstrators to give ground, shots were fired by an unknown assailant, and the altercation quickly escalated. Berliners proceeded to build a prodigious number of new barricades. Despite the fierceness of the fighting, the army appeared on the point of overcoming resistance when the king suddenly decided on March 19, against the recommendation of his military advisors, to withdraw all troops from the capital. Following Frederick William's capitulation, the crowd—"perhaps remembering stories of Paris"³⁰—marked its victory by the symbolic humiliation of the king and queen, who were obliged to pay homage to a procession of biers carrying the bodies of those who had fallen during the fighting.

While no subsequent German event rivaled Berlin's March insurrection in scale, the remainder of the year brought a scattering of smaller uprisings, complete with barricades, in locations as widespread as Freiburg, Mannheim, Cologne, and Frankfurt. (See [fig. 15](#).) Most bore the marks of French influence. At the end of March, for instance, both the "Marseillaise" and tricolor cockades were much in evidence on the barricades constructed in Saarlouis until Prussian troops arrived to suppress that uprising.³¹ Both the Trier disturbances of early May and the Berlin confrontation of mid-June produced barricades, from which red flags briefly flew. The spirit of revolutions past continued to animate France's neighbors to the east, particularly in regions that had experienced French rule under Napoléon.

Ireland

News of the February Days reached Dublin at a moment when Ireland was still haunted by the specter of mass starvation and wracked by political crisis. Accounts of the Paris events brought the "intoxication of hope" which an editorial in *The Nation* expressed in exuberant terms: "Ireland's opportunity—thank God, and France—has come at last!"³² The overthrow of the Orléanist monarchy was taken as a demonstration of the efficacy of insurrectionary methods, and Irish nationalists, naturally drawn to a rhetoric of popular sovereignty, readily imagined how such tactics could be turned to their advantage. The English authorities appear to have been following a parallel line of thought. Prime Minister Lord John Russell expressed the fear that "there would perhaps be an attempt in Dublin to imitate the barricades of Paris. . . . The Irish are not the French, but they have a flair for imitation." The prospect was of

sufficient concern to the duke of Wellington to prompt him to prepare a memorandum on the problem of dealing with barricade warfare in an urban setting.³³

Fears that the February revolution would provide encouragement to the Irish were well founded. William Smith O'Brien, leader of one wing of the Young Ireland movement, believed that the revolution in France had fundamentally altered the chances of a successful challenge to English domination and that this improvement in outlook would help overcome the factionalism from which the movement had long suffered.³⁴ His hope was that France would provide assistance and protection—or, at the very least, moral and political support—for an Irish rising. O'Brien immediately declared himself ready to head a deputation to Paris to congratulate the new provisional government and seek its backing for the cause of Irish self-rule.³⁵ The group that crossed the channel on March 22 was sadly disappointed by Lamartine's response.³⁶ English diplomatic pressure had proved highly effective, and O'Brien returned home with little to show for his efforts but verbal pledges of solidarity from Alexandre Ledru-Rollin and Louis Blanc.³⁷ However, he left behind in Paris two of his young colleagues, Richard O'Gorman and Eugene O'Reilly, with a specific charge to "learn, in that great school of popular warfare, the prompt discipline of new levies, and the rough-and-ready organization of insurgent forces." In this case, the link with subsequent barricade events seems incontrovertible, since late July produced two such incidents in Ireland, in the second of which O'Gorman was himself a participant.³⁸ But the failure of the original Irish deputation's mission took some of the luster from the French example, and there seems to have been no repetition of this experiment with barricade construction anywhere else in the British Isles in 1848.

The Austrian Empire

Events in Vienna proceeded along a similar but independent path from those in Berlin. Though it took longer for word of the February Days to reach the Austrian capital, the effect was much the same: "On February 29, the first news of the Paris revolution was published in Vienna. . . . The news electrified the Viennese."³⁹ The bond market promptly lost 30 percent of its value, and people seeking to convert their assets into gold and silver precipitated a run on local banks. Those thirsting for political intelligence gathered in Viennese coffeehouses, where the latest reports from France were read and discussed. By March 2, it was confirmed that a new French Republic had been proclaimed, and distorted accounts of the events in the west German states also began to

circulate.⁴⁰ In Pressburg, where the Hungarian Diet was then in session, Lajos Kossuth, upon hearing that the French had overthrown the Orléanist monarchy, delivered an inflammatory speech calling for the revamping of the Austrian empire. Within two weeks, it had been translated and was making the rounds in liberal circles in Vienna.⁴¹ The seeming flood of revolutionary tidings roused the normally placid Viennese to abrupt political action. Calls were issued for the abolition of stamp and sales taxes and an end to censorship.⁴²

These developments reached a critical stage at the March 13 meeting of the Estates of Lower Austria. The assembly hall was inundated by several thousand students and workers pressing for a series of reforms. This invasion of the chamber degenerated into running skirmishes between soldiers and protestors, in which forty-five were killed. Here too, the parading of the bodies of the dead—the well-documented routine used by the French in both 1830 and 1848—helped rouse support, and soon barricades were being constructed in the narrow streets of the Old Town. By late afternoon, the military had succeeded in clearing away most of these obstacles, but the populace was unrepentant. The mayor asked the Civic Guard to assume responsibility for policing the city, while the government sought to appease the people's anger by approving the formation of an "Academic Legion" of armed students. Just as these concessions seemed to be restoring a measure of calm, the new political equilibrium was shattered by the stunning news that Chancellor Metternich had tendered his resignation. The response in the streets of the capital was instant jubilation. In the suburbs, rejoicing soon gave way to mob action, and by the next morning, 40,000 weapons had been taken from the arsenal. This caused the middle class, originally supportive of the protests, to waver. Before the day had ended, the government announced an end to press censorship and the establishment of a National Guard that would assure respect for law and order.

Encouraged by the gains already realized, radicals revised their goals to include the granting of a constitution and the creation of a representative assembly. Emperor Ferdinand rode briefly through his capital in an attempt to reassure the population and mitigate the negative reaction to his appointment of the autocratic Field Marshal Prince Alfred Windischgrätz as commander of military forces in Vienna. But it was only with the reading, on March 15, of a proclamation listing a variety of reforms, including the promise of a constitution, that the dark clouds of civil conflict seemed to lift. In the span of just three days, the repressive character of the Habsburg empire and the "Metternich system" had been all but obliterated in the face of popular resistance.

This March revolution in Austria would have been unthinkable without the

changed sense of political realities that attended the fall of the Louis-Philippe's regime. "The first intelligence of the new revolutionary movement in France came upon Vienna like a thunder-bolt from a clear sky, and caused a shock which vibrated through every nerve of her political system. . . . In the most public manner the people of Vienna sympathized with the revolutionists of Paris, loudly complaining of their own oppressions."⁴³ News of upheaval in the German and Italian states and the uproar that accompanied the meeting of the Hungarian Diet at Pressburg were additional contributory factors, though they too could be seen as consequences of the February Days. Thus, directly and indirectly, the jolt provided by events in France is what impelled residents of the Austrian capital to act upon their own smoldering discontents. Having borrowed some of the demands advanced by Parisian insurgents, the Viennese apparently found it natural to try out French tactics as well. Following up on their initial experiment with barricades in March, they discovered that the threat represented by the construction of perhaps 200 more such structures in May was enough to cause the government to give way before the insurgents' demands. This success explains why barricades would again be a centerpiece of the much larger and bloodier outburst in October, resulting in casualties that numbered in the thousands.

The Viennese example was soon being imitated in other corners of Austria's far-ranging empire. Budapest was the next imperial capital to which the barricade spread. Reports of the February revolution arrived there in the first days of March.⁴⁴ While Kossuth was mesmerizing the Diet, a new crop of young and previously unknown leaders were assuming control over the radical movement back home in Budapest. Students like the twenty-five-year-old Sándor Petöfi—like Lamartine, a poet—were brought to sudden prominence. Described as "fascinated with French republican theory," he certainly never hesitated to steal pages from the script used by Paris leftists. For example, within weeks of learning of the February Days, Petöfi and his friends from the Café Pilvax in Pest "were preparing a grand reform banquet, on the French model."⁴⁵ With the overwhelming support of the populace, Hungarian militants were able to force civilian and military authorities to make sweeping concessions, including the formation of a citizens' militia and the creation of a new executive body that the radicals unabashedly labeled the "Committee of Public Safety." As one participant recalled, the influence of France was all-pervasive: "We were all Frenchmen. We read only Lamartine, Michelet, Louis Blanc, Sue, Victor Hugo, and Béranger. . . . In Peröfi's [*sic*] case, the adoration of the French was a real cult. His room was filled with valuable engravings of the men of the '89

revolution which he had brought from Paris. They represented Robespierre, St. Just, Marat and Madame Roland.”⁴⁶

Having adopted France as the model for their own country’s intellectual and political development, the youthful leaders of the Budapest uprising of March 15 unhesitatingly opted for barricades as a way of asserting control over the city. With local Austrian military commanders reeling from reports of what was taking place back in the imperial capital, the Diet used the occasion to move its seat to Budapest and constitute a Hungarian national government largely independent of Austrian oversight.

Venice was next. By February 29, it had learned of the fall of the July Monarchy in France, but it was only the March Days in Vienna that created the political opportunity for Venetians to proclaim the restoration of the Republic of Saint Mark.⁴⁷ Rumors of upheaval in the Austrian capital had reached the city on March 16 and were confirmed the following day when a passenger on the postal steamer (coincidentally a French businessman) added details concerning Metternich’s resignation and flight.⁴⁸ This provided sufficient encouragement for the crowd formed on the Piazza San Marco to undertake the liberation from jail of Daniele Manin and Nicolo Tommaseo, leaders of the local patriotic movement. Two days later, when troops cleared another raucous gathering from the square, insurgent Venetians took up positions on rooftops and behind barricades. Manin, capitalizing on a mutiny among Italian workers in the city’s arsenal, succeeded in capturing its store of rifles. In the face of an armed citizenry and massive defections of Italian soldiers serving in imperial army units, Austrian officials quickly yielded. A civic guard was established to maintain order in the city, and a new government formed including, following the pattern set in Paris, a workers’ representative.⁴⁹ Thus began the 1848 period’s longest-running experiment with republicanism outside France.


Public sentiment in Milan had already been roiled by news of earlier events in Palermo, Naples, and especially Paris, but it was the initial report on March 17 recounting the outbursts in Vienna and Metternich’s fall that set in motion the demonstrations leading to the “five glorious days” of barricade fighting in that city.⁵⁰ Austrian troops under the command of Prince Radetzky were soon placed on the defensive and had to retreat to the citadel. Faced with dwindling provisions and mounting casualties—to say nothing of 2,000 barricades fiercely defended by mostly working-class insurgents and the gradual mobilization of the rest of Lombardy—the Austrian army evacuated Milan during the night of March 22–23 to seek the relative safety of Lodi where it hoped to regroup and

mount a counterstrike.

In Prague, events developed along somewhat different lines and with a considerably greater time lag. The overthrow of Louis-Philippe had been reported as early as February 29, resulting in widespread effervescence in that city. The most visible consequence was a public meeting called for March 11 at which a reform petition was to be put forward. The poster announcing this assembly began with the following declaration: “Citizens of the Capital City! The Parisian events have awakened all Europe from her slumber. Germany is preparing for a struggle and is arming her burghers. Citizens of Prague, our own country is watching you. Shake off your lethargy and proclaim that truth which now stands revealed. From this day you must participate actively in affairs of state.”⁵¹ Students and workers responded enthusiastically to this summons, but the rest of society gave no sign of overt rebellion even when news of the March uprising in Vienna arrived. It took Windischgrätz’s tactless efforts to establish strict military control over the city—and a second wave of barricade fighting in Vienna in late May—to spark a series of protest rallies in Prague.⁵² A June 12 confrontation between soldiers and marchers led to six days of combat and the erection of 400 barricades, primarily in the Old Town, many of them constructed with the help of individuals who had been present in Vienna for the May 25 events.⁵³

PATTERNS OF INITIAL DIFFUSION

By almost any measure, 1848 marked the all-time peak on a chart of revolutionary mobilization in Europe. Limiting consideration to just the period from January to mid-June of that year—before the picture became hopelessly complicated by interaction effects among the many insurgent movements and by the arrival of the reactionary turn that followed the June Days in Paris—it is possible to delineate the main channels of barricade diffusion diagrammatically. [Map 5](#) shows cities where major barricade events took place during that six-month time span and uses arrows of differing weight to represent the paths of primary and secondary transmission.



MAP 5. The spread of barricades in 1848 (with date of first occurrence).

A dashed line has been drawn between Palermo and Paris because, although the appearance of barricades in Sicily was widely reported in French newspapers, I have been unable to uncover any evidence that participants in the February revolution had the Sicilian events in mind when they undertook their challenge to the Orléanist monarchy. A much heavier, solid line leads from Paris through the Rhineland and Baden, before terminating in Munich, the first location in the western German states where insurgents engaged in actual barricade combat. Similar but longer lines of primary transmission link Paris to Vienna and Berlin.⁵⁴ Lighter lines, denoting secondary transmission, radiate outward from Vienna to Budapest, Kraków, Venice, Milan, and Prague. In reality, the sequence of events was a good deal more complex than this map suggests, as barricades continued to spread to towns in Belgium in March; Baden in April; the Rhineland and the kingdom of Naples in May. By the time that sequence had played out, Vienna and Berlin were already experiencing their second round of barricade events, making it extremely difficult to make sense of the lines of diffusion beyond the simple observation that by June 1848, the revolutionary wave had reached a stage of critical mass in which mobilizations

appeared, however briefly, to have achieved a self-sustaining character.⁵⁵

INTERACTIONS AMONG THE 1848 REVOLUTIONS

Having established the basic sequence of barricade events in the spring of 1848, we are ready to undertake the more demanding task of specifying the mechanisms that facilitated the spread of this insurrectionary technique. The question of timing is an important starting point in sorting out the relationship between a given pair of events, but it becomes an uncertain guide when, as in 1848, so many insurrections break out in rapid succession. In cases where an uprising in some distant capital erupted soon after news of the February revolution arrived, it is tempting to infer a direct connection, even if observers familiar with the local context insist that the unrest in Paris merely provided a pretext for preexisting tensions to flare. But just as often, days or weeks might intervene, during which, one might plausibly argue, developments elsewhere in Europe were liable to exert a more determinative influence than the French example.

In trying to determine how the barricade traveled from its country of origin to the many sites where it was newly adopted in that year of revolution, it is therefore crucial to pay close attention to any evidence that participants were themselves aware that such a connection existed. Occasionally, they provided an explicit sign—for example, by issuing statements that self-consciously tied their actions to those of Parisian revolutionaries. More commonly, they promulgated decrees, issued demands, or adopted slogans that revealed their debt to the French revolutionary idiom. Most often, they simply adapted to their own purposes symbols associated with previous revolutionary episodes. Thus, insurgents in Vienna debated the merits of “the right to work” and created their own “Garde mobile,” while in Solingen, the red flag was appropriated as the emblem of the rebel cause.⁵⁶

The historian Robert Lougée regards the planting of a liberty tree in one Würtembergian town as atypical of German styles of protest, but it was this very inconsistency that made such borrowings from the French revolutionary tradition so glaringly obvious.⁵⁷ An anecdote from the March Days in Berlin underscores how random catchphrases, devoid of specific content but incongruously uttered in French, could command a hearing from an excited mass of insurgents:



FIGURE 16. Naples, May 15, 1848. A dispute over the exercise of constitutional powers erupted into street fighting that produced nearly eighty barricades and as many as 2,000 casualties. Bertolini 1897, 393.

The later much celebrated journeyman locksmith and barricade fighter Gustav Hesse, who stood among the fighters like a monument in a blue blouse with an iron bar in his hands, was only able to gain attention and some obedience among the raging crowd, when, leaning on his staff, he stepped to the edge of the barricade and harangued his fellow citizens with magic French words like “Citoyens! Liberté!” and a few other unintelligible fragments borrowed from the Parisian revolutionary vocabulary.⁵⁸

In Baden, a breeding ground for republican agitation, those who appealed to the

archduke for the immediate abolition of all feudal privileges made a point of addressing him as “Citizen Leopold Zähringen.”⁵⁹

One sign of cross-fertilization among the many Continental movements of 1848 was the remarkable consistency of the reform programs they published. Most called for the adoption of a written constitution guaranteeing the rule of law and the establishment of representative or “responsible” governments (i.e., a parliament or assembly) tied in some fashion to the will of the people. They usually included the guarantee of certain civil liberties, ranging from the nearly ubiquitous demand for freedoms of the press and association to the inauguration or enlargement of suffrage rights, to more situation-specific concerns like the abolition of serfdom and feudal dues, the institution of a jury system, or the emancipation of gypsies and Jews. Practical measures generally included the creation of a civilian militia, a guarantee of free primary education, and some form of poor relief or social welfare provisions.⁶⁰

In the articulation of some of these demands, the French influence was unmistakable. After an earlier call by Berlin militants for a ministry of labor went unheeded, they persuaded the government to set up public works projects that were the Prussian equivalent of the National Workshops in Paris.⁶¹ Circourt, the diplomatic envoy of the Second French Republic, patronizingly observed that Berlin insurgents displayed a singular lack of originality in how they conducted their revolution. Later historians have hardly been less disparaging in their assessments. Stadelmann, for example, notes that “even French observers agreed snidely how much the [German] movement of 1848 had borrowed in its speech and its symbols, its ideals and its arguments from the already somewhat dusty memory of 1789 and the example of the Paris February revolution.”⁶² This comment was followed by a list of specific items borrowed from the French, the very first of which referred to the use of barricades.

MECHANISMS OF DIFFUSION

Reflecting on the July 1830 barricades, Charles de Rémusat (1797-1875) expressed his belief that “the common people, who do not read history, have no need of memories to improvise what instinct and necessity suggest to them.”⁶³ It may be true that the man in the street rarely had occasion to consult learned historical treatises, but the French people took exceptional pride in their collective past and tended to rely on more populist sources to nourish their lively awareness of the insurrectionary triumphs of previous generations. More to the point—and what Rémusat fails to mention—Parisians had had their memories

refreshed less than three years previously, when participants in the substantial insurrection of November 1827 had constructed several sturdy barricades. The proof that such memories remained alive came directly from members of the crowd who, on the first day of the July revolution, shouted, “Let’s do as we did in 1827 in the rue Saint-Denis, let’s build some barricades.”⁶⁴ The “instinct and necessity” to which Rémusat refers might be sufficient to enable a desperate population to cobble together the physical means of self-defense, but what interests us here is the persistence of elaborate insurrectional routines, which, against any reasonable expectation, ordinary people were able to reproduce in considerable detail over centuries, even when much time had elapsed between successive episodes. That capacity calls for a more satisfying explanation.

Tocqueville might initially seem guilty of the same faulty reasoning as Rémusat if we look only at the passage in which he invokes Parisians’ “instinct for disorder” as a way of accounting for their penchant for constructing barricades. But he goes on to describe a particular form of political *culture*—a “taste” for insurrection, born of the “experience of past revolutions”—that had long set the residents of the French capital apart.⁶⁵ If, by 1848, that experience had been assimilated by France’s neighbors, we might ask how Europeans of so many different nationalities acquired the often elaborate knowledge of the French revolutionary tradition that their words and deeds self-confidently revealed.

French pride in a national heritage that included past revolutionary exploits was a key driving force behind this process of dissemination, and 1847 was a critical year, for it witnessed the initial publication of three major histories of the French Revolution. Louis Blanc and Jules Michelet achieved immense success, but the reception of their offerings was soon eclipsed by the appearance of Lamartine’s *Histoire des Girondins*, which argued that the work begun by the 1789 and 1830 revolutions remained unfinished, not just in France but all across Europe.⁶⁶

On a more humble level, popular histories of France had long provided a more accessible way of celebrating the nation’s past glories. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, such works typically assigned great prominence to the First and Second Days of the Barricades. Louis-Pierre Anquetil’s *L’esprit de la Ligue*, highlighting the Parisian insurrection of 1588, was published in 1767, for example, and several new editions of it appeared in subsequent years both before and after the 1789 Revolution. Even more influential was the same author’s *Histoire de France*, initially published a year before his death in 1806 and destined to become a standard among popular

history texts. Its lengthy press run was made possible by a series of later editors who extended Anquetil's narrative, which had originally ended with the execution of Louis XVI. Beginning in the late 1830s, these updated versions often incorporated nineteenth-century engravings illustrating key turning points, including the great barricade events of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁶⁷ Thus, knowledge of the barricade tradition was being conveyed to a broad domestic audience in both words and pictures from the time of the French Revolution forward.

As a result, one might almost assume that any reasonably well informed or politically aware adult living in the middle of the nineteenth century would have been reasonably familiar with the essential techniques of barricade construction. That proposition is supported by the following anecdote: in April 1848, workers in Rouen rebelled when the results of the legislative elections did not turn out as they had hoped. Their revolt was decisively put down, and a number of arrestees were brought before the departmental court of assizes. Among those prosecuted was a man named Cavelier, whom several witnesses placed at the scene of fighting, not only carrying materials for barricade construction and helping to overturn a carriage but also encouraging others to join him and even issuing orders to those taking part. Cavelier defended himself by claiming variously that the witnesses were lying, that his right arm was crippled (making it impossible for him to have been the individual in question), and that he had participated only after being forced to do so by the true insurgents. When a witness named Romain Bénard accused him of carrying a plank under his arm and inciting others to build barricades, Cavelier replied as follows: "The witness is mistaken. Despite all this talk of barricades, I don't even know how they are built." To this the presiding judge promptly responded, "Defendant, you are an assistant in a bookshop. . . . You have a certain amount of education. . . . You must know how barricades are built."⁶⁸

This presumption prevailed despite the fact that instructional texts on how to assemble a barricade remained quite rare.⁶⁹ Literary and artistic representations almost surely had a much greater impact on the spread of barricade consciousness than formal treatises or practical manuals. Louis Vitet's immensely popular drama, *Les barricades*, is an early example. Its far-reaching influence within France would later be replicated on a European scale by the historical novels of Hugo and Flaubert.⁷⁰ These works shaped the memory of the barricade scenes of the 1830s and 1840s much as Eugène Delacroix's monumental tableau *Le 28 Juillet: La Liberté guidant le peuple* (1830; commonly known in English as *Liberty Leading the People*) or such later works

as Jean-Louis Meissonier's *La Barricade* and Adolphe Leleux's *Le mot d'ordre* (*The Password*), both painted in 1849, would in the visual arts.⁷¹



FIGURE 17. Print portraying the Paris events of February 22 and 23, 1848, for German-speakers. The uprisings in Italy were the subject of a similar color lithograph in the same series. © Historisches Museum Frankfurt, inventory no. 43597, and reproduced here with its kind permission. Photograph by Horst Ziegenfusz.

We should not assume that such messages could only be transmitted through great works of art or that the intended audience was limited to a cultured elite. Delacroix's tableau may have been purchased by Louis-Philippe (and quickly consigned to storage), but it was almost immediately made available to the public in the form of engravings, which circulated widely.⁷² Thus, in much the same way that works of historical scholarship by a Guizot or Lamartine inspired the sort of popular histories previously discussed, the *grands tableaux* of the masters gave rise to a brisk trade in *images d'Epinal* (inexpensive but colorful prints of little sophistication, often sold door-to-door), and *estampes* (commercial engravings usually purchased through booksellers). Prints such as the one displayed as [figure 17](#) were in circulation within weeks of the February

Days and often sold in large numbers.⁷³ These pictorial representations constituted an alternative path toward barricade awareness, open even to the illiterate, for though they often bore foreign-language captions, their message really needed no translation and tended to cross borders far more readily than the printed word.



FIGURE 18. Sequence from Rudolphe Töpffer's *Histoire d'Albert*. Panel 1, the singing of the “Marseillaise”: “Qu’un sang impur abreuve nos sillons!” (“Let impure blood water our furrows!”). Panel 2: “Issue Number 80 [of the fictional newspaper that Töpffer’s protagonist, Albert, has founded] implores the authorities to grant the people’s just demands.” Panel 3: “Issue Number 90 implores the people to remain calm, as the authorities won’t be able to deny the people’s just demands much longer.” Panel 4: “However, inasmuch as the people have begun to understand one another and to make themselves understood, citizens are soon shooting at one another, the Constitution has been overthrown, the town is in mourning, and business is ruined.” Töpffer [1845] 1901, folio 39.

Indeed, still more populist methods of transmission made a special contribution to the spread of barricade consciousness. The Genevan Rodolphe Töpffer (1799–1846), often credited with the invention of the comic strip, used this innovative form of story-telling to comment satirically on the suddenly fashionable tendency to build barricades (see [fig. 18](#)). Significantly, in the first

frame of the sequence in [figure 18](#), Genevans are shown enthusiastically singing the “Marseillaise.”⁷⁴ In the last, the common people are seen building the inevitable barricade. The association between French symbols (here the revolutionary anthem), political innovations (especially the freedom of the press), and insurrectionary practices (the construction of barricades), is succinctly drawn.

The state itself often assisted in the process of disseminating barricade awareness. The provisional government of France published images celebrating the popular victory in the February Days and the declaration of a new republic. Though it was careful not to antagonize other European powers by aggressively promoting revolutionary principles, as the First Republic had done, it would naturally have been pleased had any of its neighbors followed its example. To that end, representations of highlights from the February revolution like the one shown in [figure 19](#) sometimes bore captions in the language of a nation thought to be favorably inclined (here Spanish).



FIGURE 19. The taking of the Château d’Eau (place du Palais-Royal) in Paris in 1848. Bibliothèque nationale, Département des estampes, P 31438. Note the legend in Spanish. Similar images publicizing the Paris events circulated widely in Europe. *Le Men* 1998, 32, 189, calls attention to a print of barricade combat

in Prague in June 1848 with legends in Czech, German, Hungarian, and Italian—four of the principal languages of the Austrian empire.

Of course, the most likely method of acquiring knowledge of barricades among the militants who actually ended up building and defending such structures was from face-to-face contacts in relatively intimate settings. The autobiographical accounts of nineteenth-century activists indicate that they often received their political socialization in the course of casual workplace conversations, from discussions prompted by the reading aloud of newspapers in their local café, or by learning the popular *chansons* that celebrated the memory of past revolutions.⁷⁵ This process was inseparable from the activities of daily life and, as the historian Axel Körner has suggested, involved the masses as well as elites, and members of both genders: “For example, only in exceptional cases were women members of secret societies, but they heard political songs in the local Goguette, and spoke about what they had heard to relatives, neighbors or other women at their workplace. They brought up their children with certain political ideas and with a collective memory of 1789, 1830 or the riots of the ‘Canuts’ in Lyon.”⁷⁶

That final allusion to the silk-workers’ revolts of the 1830s invites mention of the Caussidière family by way of illustration. Its patriarch, a force in radical politics in Lyon, had never hesitated to draw his children into the revolutionary struggle. His oldest son had been killed in the 1834 insurrection, a conflict in which his daughters also joined him in constructing barricades, activities for which he was subsequently prosecuted and imprisoned. But it was his son Marc, also a combatant in 1834, who would go on to become one of the principal activists of the revolution of February 1848.⁷⁷ The involvement of members of the Caussidière clan can be documented in detail only because of its prominence in the clandestine movements of the period, but it shows how significant familial ties could be and provides a glimpse of how the flame of political passion was passed from one generation to the next. Such intergenerational linkages were crucially important, at least to judge by earlier research I conducted using the compensation records generated by the February revolution, which showed that a surprising number of participants in that Paris uprising had fathers, brothers, or other close relatives who had taken part in previous insurrections.⁷⁸

While familial relations, workplace contacts, and leisure-time pursuits may have been pivotal for many militants, most Europeans were first exposed to the concept of the barricade in more impersonal ways. It is important to recognize

that the diffusion of the barricade over such a vast territory was greatly facilitated by the fact that Paris was a hub of the book trade and the recognized center of intellectual and artistic life on the Continent. Images of barricades, which might or might not be accompanied by lengthy foreign-language captions explaining their mode of use and conveying their significance, circulated widely.

Engravings depicting the revolutionary struggles in France often underwent subtle modification to make them suitable for publication in other countries. For example, a classic representation of a worker standing on a barricade that appeared in the February 24 issue of the Paris weekly *L'Illustration* found its way into the March 25 edition of the *Leipziger Illustrierte Zeitung*, relabeled “Sketch from the Paris Barricades.” It was later used as a template for a full-sized lithograph issued in Frankfurt and simply titled “Eine Barricade.” The first and last of these images were identical in nearly all respects but one: the stripes of the flag that waved in the background of the original ran vertically (as in the French tricolor); the Frankfurt version redrew them to run horizontally (as with the black, red, and gold bands of the recently adopted German banner). With such minor changes in captions or ideographic details, what began as a representation of the Paris insurrection could be detached from its geographical point of origin and have its content universalized, rendering the concept of the barricade more readily transmissible.⁷⁹

Images had gained much greater currency through the 1840s, thanks largely to the perfection of techniques for mass reproduction of wood engravings and the consequent rise of the illustrated press. Although publications like *Le Charivari* and its English imitator *Punch* had been in circulation since 1832 and 1841 respectively, their primary objective was satirical rather than journalistic and their political content was rarely time-sensitive in nature. Coverage of current events became a primary focus only with the launching of illustrated weekly news magazines. Here it was the English who, with the founding of *The Illustrated London News* in 1842, assumed the lead over *L'Illustration* in Paris (1843), *Die Illustrierte Zeitung* in Leipzig (1843), and *Il Mondo illustrato* in Turin (1847).

The success of these new periodicals depended on their ability to deliver, with minimal delay, stories that lent themselves to being told in pictures as well as words. The February revolution was the first great political convulsion to be chronicled via this novel medium. The *Illustrated London News* secured an early competitive advantage by retaining a team of French “special artists,” working in the field. Their sketches were rushed across the Channel to England, where they were traced onto wood and engraved by the French caricaturist, Paul Gavarni,

who had fled to London several months earlier to avoid imprisonment for debt.⁸⁰ These elaborate arrangements paid handsome dividends. The double issue published in the first week of March was a sensation. Thanks to generous pictorial coverage of events in France and elsewhere on the Continent, the paper doubled its circulation over a three-month period. Indeed, the publisher was at times unable to keep up with demand and on one occasion was “pelted with flour and other harmless missiles because the London ‘trade’ could not get their supply soon enough.” This success spawned a twelve-page special supplement at the beginning of July that reported on the revolutions that were by then breaking out all across the Continent.⁸¹

Yet even these impressive gains in circulation understate the influence that barricade images exerted through their international distribution. Keep in mind that the bulk of the contents of illustrated weeklies still consisted of text published in English, French, German, or Italian, leaving them largely immune from cross-border competition. The editorial staff of the *Illustrated London News* quickly recognized that in the contest with their true rivals—the domestic daily newspapers—they could derive a significant advantage by sharing illustrations of current events with their peers. This explains why, for example, the representation of a barricade in the rue Saint-Martin, reproduced as [figure 3](#) (see page 13), which first appeared in the *Illustrated London News*, was published exactly one week later by the *Illustrirte Zeitung* in Leipzig with a German caption.⁸² Indeed, a comparison of the English weekly’s pages with those of *L’Illustration* for all of 1848 shows that the two reprinted many identical images, notably those depicting political events in France. The degree of overlap between the French publication and its Italian counterpart, *Il Mondo illustrato* was, if anything, greater still.⁸³ Thus, the development of an illustrated press was a Europe-wide phenomenon, which gave barricade images an international flavor in both in their production and dissemination

AGENTS OF DIFFUSION

Of course, books and periodicals merely increased awareness of barricades without providing any guarantee that the technique would be adopted locally.⁸⁴ Still, the tactic’s spread in 1848 was so spectacular that contemporary observers often likened it to an epidemic or explained it as a product of “imitation.” But the comparison to a contagion begs the question of what “carrier strains” or “vectors” were responsible for the propagation of the presumed “infection,” and even imitation implies a set of actors who consciously or unconsciously pattern

their behavior after role models they deem worthy of emulation.

On reflection, it seems more useful to conceptualize barricade construction as a routine of collective action whose diffusion is subject to the same processes that apply to any other form of culturally transmitted innovation. This suggests that we should focus our attention on crucial chains of human agency that can help us to understand why so many Europeans who had been quite content to ignore this technique of insurrection over the preceding two and a half centuries abruptly embraced it in 1848.

As one might anticipate, those responsible for implanting barricades in new locations sometimes turned out to be individuals whose military training or professional skills were directly relevant in the building of such structures. Army veterans frequently assumed command over insurgent outposts, and contemporary records occasionally document cases such as those of the professor of mathematics who “superintended the fortifications” in Milan and the state architect, Gottfried Semper, who “advised on the building of barricades” during the 1849 insurrection in Dresden.⁸⁵ However, in most instances, the lead was taken by ordinary people who possessed no special occupational or educational qualifications beyond an awareness of the power of the barricade.

This is not, of course, to say that barricade builders were simply a random sample of the general population. A great many of them fell into one of three categories that equipped them to serve as a bridge between established centers of barricade consciousness like Paris and other European locations that lacked prior experience with this insurrectionary tactic, but remained open to its potential. Students, political refugees, and itinerant workers share the spotlight in the remainder of this chapter, as we try to sort out the role each group played in spreading practical knowledge of insurrectionary tactics.

Students

By virtue of their youthful impetuosity, their relentless optimism about the prospects for social change, and their relative lack of constraining social responsibilities, students have long been viewed as especially susceptible to political mobilization in any setting where they are present in significant numbers. Whether the positions they adopt are perceived as liberal or conservative, students are notorious for their propensity to be stirred into action. This remained as true in 1848 as it had been at the time of the first great Parisian barricade event in 1588.⁸⁶ During the February Days, for example, the Latin Quarter fairly bristled with barricades built and defended by those enrolled in

Parisian universities.⁸⁷ The student presence was an equally noteworthy aspect of the insurrections in Munich, Vienna, Milan, Budapest, Prague, and Berlin, every one of which involved the construction of barricades.⁸⁸ The activities of Romanian, Austrian, and Czech students can be used to illustrate the distinctive contribution this social category made to the dissemination of revolutionary culture.

Romanians in Paris. Paris enjoyed a well-deserved reputation as a center of learning, and the children of European elites were sent there to acquire the polish and erudition that would distinguish them from their peers. But the very cosmopolitanism that made the French capital so attractive all but guaranteed that these aspiring leaders would also be exposed to modern political ideologies at odds with the traditional values that predominated in their countries of origin. Given the frequency with which insurrections occurred in the French capital during the 1830s and 1840s, there was also an excellent chance that foreign students would gain firsthand knowledge of the forms of contention that had been perfected in Paris over the previous two hundred years. For foreign students, the pivotal role played by their French classmates in many of these uprisings aroused their admiration and envy.⁸⁹ In short, their years of study in Paris gave these visitors an intellectual appreciation for the political trends of the times; a practical acquaintance with insurgent tactics that had been thoroughly tested in France; and an expectation that when they assumed leadership positions back home, they would have the opportunity—even the responsibility—to apply what they had learned, both in and outside the university, to the task of modernizing their own societies.

Romania, a small and relatively closed society that lacked its own university system, relied especially heavily on French institutions of higher learning to educate the sons of its elite. Among the nobility of Walachia and Moldavia, the country's two provinces, French was nearly as important a language as Romanian itself.⁹⁰ This undoubtedly eased the transition for the sons of aristocratic *boyars* who, while studying in Paris in the 1840s, wrote for French journals and newspapers, founded a Society of Romanian Students (with none other than Alphonse de Lamartine as its sponsor and honorary president), established a Romanian–French reading room near the Sorbonne, and in a few cases became disciples of French utopian thinkers like Henri Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, Louis Blanc, and Victor Considerant.⁹¹

When the February revolution broke out, this coterie of Romanian students followed events with keen interest. Some even made common cause with French

insurgents, distinguishing themselves so well on the Paris barricades that the new revolutionary mayor organized a ceremony to express the city's gratitude. Indeed, the tricolor flag that was to become the symbol of the struggle for Romanian unification was created when some of those same students needed a banner to march under, having organized a gathering at which foreign residents of Paris could convey their congratulations to officials of the recently constituted French Republic.⁹²

Fired by the French example, a handful of these combatants returned to Romania to join local republicans, some of whom were themselves members of earlier cohorts of students who had resided in France while completing their studies. If the reverberations of the February revolution were so quickly felt in this far frontier, it was largely due to this university connection. "Paris played an important role in the crystallization of the program and of the methods of struggle of these Romanians," Dan Berindei writes.⁹³ The reform movement ignited in the Moldavian capital of Iași by the arrival of news from Paris relied on the organizational and leadership skills of these graduates of French institutions. A meeting on March 27 attracted several hundred participants and led to the drafting of a long list of demands for political reform. But the movement remained poorly organized and isolated from the peasant masses, and when the first fighting broke out, Prince Mihail Sturdza "easily dealt with the feeble attempts to erect barricades." The Moldavian uprising was eradicated almost before it began.⁹⁴

In Bucharest, the capital of Walachia, young men, some recently arrived from France, put together a reform campaign that eventually led to the abdication of the ruling prince and the establishment of a de facto republic. Though able to navigate the treacherous currents of Turkish and Russian political intrigue for only a few months before their revolution fell victim to foreign military intervention, the leaders of this movement were likewise recruited from a select group whose most important credentials as revolutionaries derived from their Paris connections.⁹⁵ The considerable debt that these, the furthest eastward of all the revolts of 1848, owed to French inspiration led the historian John C. Campbell to call the Romanian uprisings "the imported revolution" and to underscore the central role played by current or former matriculants of Parisian universities.⁹⁶

The March and May Days in Vienna. With regard to institutions of higher learning, Austria presented an almost total contrast with Romania. Vienna boasted a vibrant university of its own, with an enrollment of some 2,000

students. Far from needing to look elsewhere, Austrians were actually prohibited from studying abroad. “Foreign” students (as opposed to those who might not be Austrians but were imperial subjects) were discouraged from enrolling at the University of Vienna, but the fact that the empire was a blend of so many national and ethnic traditions doomed to failure all efforts to segregate Austrian youth from outside influence. Students from other parts of the empire were particularly well represented in the school of medicine, and this was thought to account for the distinctly liberal tone that prevailed there. An oft-cited indicator of their progressive attitude was the concerted effort university students made, even prior to 1848, to reach out to the working population of the capital for political support.

When news of the Paris revolution reached Vienna, students were the first to respond. Adopting the convention of the First French Republic, they began addressing one another with the familiar *du*. They drafted a petition calling for an end to censorship and to restrictions on what courses could be taught at the university. When these modest demands remained unmet by March 13, the date of a scheduled meeting of the Estates of Lower Austria, they decided to make their case directly to the provincial representatives of the empire. The crowd that assembled in the courtyard of the Landhaus listened with emotion to a reading of Kossuth’s stirring March 2 speech before the Hungarian Diet. At its conclusion, the reform program was amended to include the granting of a constitution and the dismissal of Chancellor Metternich. When troops were ordered to disperse the crowd, a *mêlée* ensued in which dozens of demonstrators, many of them students, were killed.⁹⁷ In reaction, barricades sprouted in the streets of Vienna for the first time in that city’s history. Among those who participated in the March uprising were a number of Czech students living in Vienna while pursuing their studies (see [fig. 20](#)). This group included Vojtěch Náprstek, a twenty-two-year-old law student, and his close associate Václav Tieftrunk, both of whom were active in Slavic politics in Vienna and maintained close ties with radicals back in Prague.⁹⁸

The capital reacted swiftly to the deaths of unarmed protestors, as well as to the news that continued to pour in from abroad. With the backing of local residents, the students now insisted that they be armed and that their “Academic Legion” be assigned responsibility for maintaining order in the city as part of a civilian National Guard. The government’s capitulation to these demands, coming just as Metternich tendered his resignation, produced a euphoric reaction in the capital. Though Emperor Ferdinand I ordered the formation of a more liberal ministry, this was no longer enough. The loose coalition between students

and workers continued to wield considerable influence over state policy through mid-May, at which time it forced the government to convoke a constituent assembly to be elected by universal suffrage.



FIGURE 20. A university barricade in Vienna, May 26, 1848. Note the mix of students, workers, and guardsmen, as well as a prominently featured female figure. Tietze 1925, 123.

The victories achieved in the initial Vienna uprising emboldened the student movement, which sought to expand its sphere of influence. It obliged the Austrian authorities to reverse a long-standing policy by allowing delegates from

Vienna to attend an all-German university congress in Eisenach. The Austrian students' ostentatious uniforms and the stories they told of the triumphant role they had played in the March Days made them the center of attention at that gathering. Delegates from the University of Vienna even organized a ceremonial exchange of flags with their French, Hungarian, Polish, Croat, Slovene, and Serb counterparts.⁹⁹

The March insurrection would prove to be just the first of three barricade events to rock the Austrian capital in the span of several months. A renewed outbreak in late May revolved partly around the government's attempt to close the university and dissolve the Academic Legion, so it was to be expected that students, along with other national guards, were well represented among barricade fighters. During the third insurrection, which broke out in October, most of the barricades were again built by students and workers. Moreover, it was through the university connection that echoes of these events soon began to resound in the farthest corners of the empire.

Prague in June 1848. The example set by Viennese students was quickly copied elsewhere. Prague had experienced its own "peaceful revolution" in mid-March, at which time local students had sent a letter to their counterparts in Vienna extending congratulations for all they had done to promote the cause of liberty.¹⁰⁰ Though Czech students would later come to look upon the objectives and attitudes of their peers in the imperial capital with some ambivalence, the solidarity between the two groups held strong through the beginning of June. This was particularly evident in the May events in Vienna, when one of the most celebrated of the structures that forced the authorities to back down before the popular will, the massive "Austro-International Barricade" in the Stephansplatz (fig. 21), was built and defended by resident Czech students.¹⁰¹

Back in Prague, however, it took mere days for simmering tensions to come to a boil with the reappointment of the autocratic Windischgrätz as commander of imperial forces in Bohemia.¹⁰² He lost no time in tightening the army's grip on the city, in total disregard for inhabitants' growing sense of unease. The general's provocations may have caused the situation to veer sharply in the direction of confrontation, but there was just one community prepared to take up the challenge, and it was clear where it looked for its inspiration: "No group was more conspicuous and more determined in its reactions than the university students, and with some oversimplification it may be said that the ensuing conflict reduced itself to one between the students (and intellectuals) and the military. From the middle of March, they had maintained contact with the

students in Vienna, and had been influenced by their actions.”¹⁰³ Indeed, the timing of the mobilization in Prague was determined by the arrival of Moravian and other Czech students, fresh from their latest victories in the Austrian capital. This group included the “Vienna-trained” Karel Sladkovsky, who quickly became the movement’s most visible leader after organizing rallies on May 27 and 29 at which he called for Windischgrätz’s removal and the handing over of 2,000 rifles and an artillery battery to the students.¹⁰⁴



FIGURE 21. The Austro-International barricade, Vienna, May 1848. Smets 1876, 1: 281. The presence on the barricades of many nationalities—in particular,

Slavs—was widely celebrated at the time of the May insurrection in Vienna, though interethnic tensions followed.

At his subsequent interrogation, Maximilian Maux, one of the most incendiary of the student activists, explained the leaders' thinking with disarming candor: "we assumed that we could achieve what the students of Vienna had achieved, and that we must do as they had done earlier."¹⁰⁵ Among the tactics appropriated from the Viennese uprisings was the construction of barricades. The university contingent had begun its preparations for armed conflict in the first week of June, but when Windischgrätz's rejection of the students' demands was announced on June 11, "there was a surge of excitement, and for the first time the word 'barricades' rang through the hall."¹⁰⁶ Václav Tieftrunk, eager to apply the skills he had recently mastered in Vienna, "urged that barricades be set up and offered to teach the Prague students the techniques." His friend Vojta Náprstek recorded in his journal that on June 12, he helped set up barricades in both the Old and New Towns.¹⁰⁷ Meanwhile, A. Bradka, a militant in the Polytechnic wing of the student organization Slavia, led his peers in the construction of a fortified barricade that withstood the most intense combat of the uprising.¹⁰⁸

But the students had underestimated the effectiveness of Austrian troops and the iron will of their commander. Though fighting continued for six days, there were already calls from within the insurgent camp on June 14 to dismantle the barricades. Windischgrätz, who did not hesitate to order an artillery bombardment of Prague, had crushed the last vestiges of resistance by June 16. A delegation of students had been dispatched to Vienna in the vain hope of persuading the government to soften the repression already under way back home. The Prague insurrection gave the Habsburg empire its first real victory after so many reverses on the Italian peninsula and in central Europe. Though it has generally been overshadowed by the June Days that broke out in Paris less than two weeks later, it deserves recognition, along with capitulation of Kraków in late April and the suppression of the mid-May unrest in Naples, as an early sign that the tide of revolutionary affairs was turning and that counterrevolutionary forces would soon go back on the offensive.

Yet despite these shifts in momentum, the role of university students throughout the spring of 1848 remained essential. They were a crucial link in the chain of events that carried revolutionary upheaval outward from its recognized center in Paris to distant sites like Vienna, Prague, Budapest, and Iași. Though

students' efforts to pass on their expertise in barricade building gave one unmistakable sign of their active engagement, this group was by no means the only channel for communicating such knowledge. Another, to which even students had to defer when it came to familiarity with traditions of revolutionary action and direct experience of insurrectionary struggle, consisted of the refugees who had gathered in Paris in the years preceding the February revolution, awaiting the opportunity to liberate their native lands.

Political Exiles

The French capital had long been a magnet for those forced to leave their homelands behind because of their political beliefs. Twentieth-century historians were quick to label the Paris of the 1840s “the revolutionary capital of Europe” or, in a less heroic vein, the “Mecca of the malcontents.”¹⁰⁹ Poles, Germans, and Italians were especially well represented among exiled revolutionaries living there. Indeed, in some cases, these exile communities could actually be larger than the opposition movements in their native countries.¹¹⁰ Though they represented just 3 percent of the total foreign population resident in France, most were concentrated in Paris, where, according to Louis Garnier-Pagès, “foreign refugees” numbered between 15,000 and 20,000 in the years leading up to the 1848 revolution.¹¹¹ They would thus have constituted a sizable community unto themselves. But exiles typically lacked alternative means of support and had to accept whatever form of employment presented itself. As a result, they blended in with the much larger mass of itinerant artisans attracted to the French capital for purely economic reasons. In what follows, I single out a few individuals whose lives are documented so well that they can stand in for the welter of more anonymous Poles, Russians, German, Italians, and other foreign nationals who had settled in Paris until political developments made it practical for them to return home.¹¹²

Since the end of the eighteenth century, England had offered asylum to a steady stream of Continental émigrés, especially expelled monarchists and members of the elite (including, most recently, Louis-Philippe and his family); but France had long been the preferred destination for displaced republicans and other varieties of liberal democrats. In the decades that preceded the 1848 revolution, Paris not only produced its home-grown crop of career revolutionaries (the generation of Blanqui, Barbès, and Sobrier in particular) but also played host to a procession of foreigners who had been banished from their homelands or chose exile of their own volition.¹¹³ Heine, Marx, Mazzini, and Herzen rank among the best known displaced radicals in the French capital, but a

throng of more obscure figures were attracted by its cosmopolitanism, its generally tolerant attitude toward the presence of foreign nationals, and the fact that large and thriving expatriate communities were already well established there.

This is clearest of all in the case of the Poles. After their failed revolution of 1831, a mass emigration brought so many members of the defunct Polish Diet to Paris that a majority favored reconstituting a “Diet in exile” in the French capital. Though never implemented, the idea was revived in 1846, after the abortive Polish revolt, and again in 1848 when enthusiasm for the liberation of Poland soared. During the 1840s, Poles residing in Paris numbered in the thousands, most of whom were recipients of some form of subsidy from the French government.¹¹⁴ Many of these guests fought heroically on the February barricades, confident that a change of government in France would favor their own political aspirations.¹¹⁵ In the end, they were unable to convince the new French Republic to intervene on their behalf and never succeeded in fomenting their own Polish revolution, but these refugees exerted considerable influence over the course of other nations’ political affairs in 1848.¹¹⁶

The Poles’ reputation for military prowess created opportunities for figures like exiled General Ludwik Mieroslawski. He is best remembered for his involvement in the Baden uprising of May 1849, when the revolutionaries invited him to take command of the defense of their city against Prussian forces. But to trace backwards the path that led him there is to obtain a thumbnail sketch of how the train of revolutionary events advanced in this tumultuous period. The Baden insurgents had to send for Mieroslawski in Paris, where he was recovering from wounds sustained a month earlier, while fighting against the Bourbons in Sicily. He had ended up there only after failing in his efforts to forge Polish émigré volunteers from Paris and Brussels into a fighting force capable of carrying out his plan for an uprising in the city of Poznan, then capital of the Prussian Grand Duchy of Posen, in the spring of 1848. It was these very refugees, in turn, who had been responsible for Mieroslawski’s release from a Berlin prison following the March Days of 1848, during which, according to Stadelmann’s account of those clashes, “Polish directors, recognizable by dashing shakos and other parts of uniforms, served as experts in street riots.”¹¹⁷

Polish residents of Paris were thought to be among the most highly organized of expatriates, thanks in part to the existence of a Polish Legion.¹¹⁸ It had been set up by Adam Mickiewicz, who lived in the French capital through the beginning of 1848. His departure for Rome had an only momentarily disruptive

effect, and the Legion proved highly successful at recruiting Polish émigrés for an expedition aimed at liberating their native land. At the end of March, Parisians gave a column of outward-bound volunteers a lively send-off (fig. 22).¹¹⁹

Though the Polish community was united in its desire for national liberation, the appearance of solidarity actually concealed a drove of opposing factions. The main division was between the patriotic camp, which sought to deliver Poland from Russian domination with few, if any, changes to the local political or social system, and another, more democratic splinter, which also wished to abolish the privileged status of the landed gentry, whom they considered no less oppressive than the Russians just because they happened to be Poles themselves.




FIGURE 22. Parisians giving Polish revolutionaries a warm send-off, March 30, 1848. Lithograph by Jules Arnout and Victor Adam, reproduced from Dayot [1897] n.d., 2: 23.

Pan-Slavism, which advocated a loose confederation of self-determining

Slavic peoples emerged as a third alternative. Its most colorful champion in this period was not a Pole at all but the Russian Mikhail Bakunin, whose travels in 1848 were like a flight of a bee, pollinating one fertile site ripe for insurrectionary activity after another. Bakunin had arrived in Paris in 1844 and developed ties among émigré radicals (including Karl Marx and Georg Herwegh), as well as with French socialists and republicans (like Proudhon, Blanc, and Godefroy Cavaignac). In late 1847, he was expelled from France at the insistence of the Russian ambassador for having delivered a fiery speech in favor of an alliance of Polish and Russian democrats against the government of Tsar Nicholas I. The outbreak of the February Days thus found him in Brussels; but upon hearing the first reports of fighting he resolved to return to Paris at all costs. He borrowed a passport and arrived on February 26, too late to participate in the actual combat, but in time to experience the “ecstatic atmosphere of revolution” firsthand. His most vivid impression was of how, “on every street, almost everywhere, barricades had been piled up like mountains, reaching the rooftops.”¹²⁰ He immediately fell in with the new Montagnard police force being organized by his friend Marc Caussidière (lodging for a week in one of its barracks) and participated in a stream of club meetings, marches, and demonstrations.

But Bakunin soon grew impatient with the Paris scene, convinced that the center of revolutionary activity had already moved east. He was acquainted with members of the provisional government, including Blanc and Ledru-Rollin, but it was to Ferdinand Flocon that he took his plan to travel to the Prussian Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznan), which bordered on Russian Poland, to help kindle a Polish rebellion against the tsar. Surprisingly, Flocon granted Bakunin’s request for 2,000 francs to finance this journey, probably because it was a cheap way of distancing a potentially troublesome influence from the capital. Caussidière supplied not one but two passports—the first in the Russian’s own name and a second that established a false identity to help him avoid arrest where his presence was unwelcome. Bakunin also carried letters of introduction to German democrats, having agreed to function as a courier for Herwegh, who needed to communicate secret instructions to collaborators back home.

Thus equipped, Bakunin set out on an itinerary that would take him in early April to Frankfurt, where the German *Vorparlament* was in session. He next made the acquaintance of the principal leaders of the Baden uprising as he traveled through that region, briefly stopping in Mannheim. His stay in Berlin was cut short by his arrest and expulsion, but by the beginning of May, he had established himself in Breslau (now Wroclaw in Poland), where he spent nearly

a month in a largely futile effort to cultivate contacts among the exiled Poles who were gathering there in anticipation of the Poznan uprising.

By early June, the failure of the revolts in Baden and Poznan and the reverses suffered by the Parisian radicals in the *journée* of May 15 had convinced Bakunin that the flood of revolution was already receding. He pinned his remaining hopes on the Slav Congress that had recently convened in Prague. He made a point of routing his journey there through the town of Dresden, where he stayed long enough to strike up a personal relationship with the leaders of the Saxon democratic party, with whom he would collaborate during the insurrection of May 1849.¹²¹

This list does not include all the stops that Bakunin made during this roughly three-month period, but every town that *has* been mentioned would end up as the site of a barricade event. Not all of those outbreaks were major and most did not occur while Bakunin was on the scene, but with an almost unerring sense of where the insurrectionary possibilities lay, he managed to home in on those cities where insurrection was in the air during 1848-49. My point is not that Bakunin was personally responsible for the transmission of barricades to these locations all by himself, but rather that a larger category of militants, of which he was broadly representative, was able, in the new circumstances created by the February Days, to circulate freely in areas known to harbor a core of activists with revolutionary ambitions.

These qualifications aside, Bakunin's direct role in barricade events is well documented in at least two instances. The first was the Prague insurrection of early June 1848. It happened to overlap with the Slav Congress that had brought the Russian militant to the Bohemian capital but whose parliamentary wrangling he eagerly abandoned as soon as serious street fighting broke out. His subsequent account of those heady days in Prague emphasized the energetic efforts he initially made to *dissuade* the leaders from undertaking a revolt, on grounds that it could only play into Windischgrätz's hands. Of course, this did not stop him from joining in "as a volunteer" once the uprising was under way.¹²² He describes how he "went from one barricade to another carrying a gun," offering advice to the students and other participants. Contemporary third-party reports placed him in the insurgents' headquarters on June 15 in the company of the student leader Josef Frič, "with whom he was poring over a map of the city."¹²³

Bakunin's participation in the Dresden uprising is even better substantiated, thanks to accounts by Richard Wagner, Stephan Born, Friedrich von Waldersee,

and others.¹²⁴ According to his own version of events, Bakunin and three radicals whom he recruited on the spot served as a sort of advisory board to the newly declared provisional government (in exchange for a promise of support for the Slavic revolt they hoped to foment in Bohemia should the Dresden action prove successful). This group acted as a general staff, sharing its military counsel with the government, “which carried out all our demands unquestioningly.” Even as the insurgents’ situation turned hopeless, Bakunin joined the rebel leader Otto Heubner in a tour of the barricades. He took particular pride in having remained at his post even after his Polish allies and much of the German leadership had fled, noting that “several times I brought together the commanders of the barricades, tried to restore order and collect forces for offensive actions.”¹²⁵ It was, in short, his participation in the events of 1848-49 that justified Bakunin’s reputation as the quintessential revolutionary adventurer of his generation.

All Roads Lead from Paris. A number of other political refugees whose peregrinations brought them through the French capital in 1848 deserve mention for their roles as preachers of the revolutionary gospel and agents, at least indirectly, of the diffusion of the barricade. Joseph Mazzini made Paris his base of operations, and it was from there that he set out in April to assume command of the rebellion against Austrian rule in Milan. Many of his followers in the Young Italy movement acquired their firsthand knowledge of insurrectionary techniques as eyewitnesses to the February events.¹²⁶ In the months that followed, Paris remained a highly effective recruiting and staging ground for the “Italian Legions” organized to help chase Austrian troops from Venice, Vicenza, and the Piedmont.¹²⁷

Although the history of the German Legion will largely be deferred to the next section, its originator, the poet Georg Herwegh, could also serve as prototype for the category under discussion. Like that other German poet in exile, Heine, he had chosen Paris as his place of refuge and was therefore present at the overthrow of Louis-Philippe. He immediately seized the opportunity provided by the change of regime to organize the “German Democratic Legion,” recruited from the substantial community of German workers living there. This loosely organized body made its fleeting and hapless appearance on the historical stage in April after it crossed the French border into Baden. Members’ hopes of providing support to the republican revolt that had been declared by Friedrich Hecker and Gustav von Struve were quickly dashed by their defeat in a battle against Badenese and Hessian troops near Dossenbach. According to

Stadelmann, Herwegh's vision of the German revolution was "clearly derived from the Paris experiences, which defined the revolution without hesitation as *coup d'état*," a model that many German radicals were at best ambivalent about applying to their own society.¹²⁸

The list of wayfaring militants could be extended almost at will, but even this mere handful of examples suggests how pervasive revolutionary consciousness had become and begs the question of what systematic forces (beside their strongly held political convictions) helped propel them into this role. The historian B. F. Porschnev has astutely observed that as early as the seventeenth century, the spread of unrest seems to have been unwittingly facilitated "by the judicial practice of exiling active participants following an uprising."¹²⁹ If revolution had reached epidemic proportions by the middle of the nineteenth century, it was due in part to the actions of European governments that had helped concentrate the most radical representatives of local political opposition movements in foreign capitals where they could come into mutual contact, sharpen their ideas, and incubate their projects of rebellion in a highly supportive environment. By the mid nineteenth century, the tendency for political refugees to congregate in Paris greatly intensified this cross-fertilization among national causes and offered ample opportunity for foreign visitors to school themselves in the art of insurrection. And yet, as important as these communities of expatriates assuredly were, it is doubtful whether their activism would have had such far-reaching consequences had it not been for the presence of a much larger mass of their compatriots who had come to Paris as simple workers and had their outlooks changed by their exposure to French insurrectionary politics.

Foreign Workers Resident in Paris

The personal odyssey of Stephan Born further illustrates the difficulty of drawing a clear line of demarcation between militants and workers. As a young printer, Born originally set out on a *Wanderjahr* that took him through Belgium, Switzerland, and some parts of France, before arriving in Paris at the end of 1846. There he crossed paths with Friedrich Engels, associated with other members of the League of the Just, and underwent a political awakening. By the end of 1847, he had migrated to Brussels, where he briefly worked as a typesetter for Karl Marx's newspaper. He was still living in the Belgian capital when he first learned of the outbreak of the February revolution.¹³⁰ Acting on his intuition, he had, within weeks, set out for Berlin, arriving just barely too late to assist with the barricades of March 18. In this new setting, he began organizing a workers' party and founded a newspaper that was a mainstay of the radical

movement until its suppression later that year. Born then traveled to Leipzig, where he established a workers' club and went on to play an important part in the radical revolt ignited in May 1849 by news of the uprising in nearby Dresden.

Thus, it was Born's journeyman's tour that brought him to Paris, his occupational networks that acquainted him with progressive ideas, and his identification with the working class that led him to act in solidarity with the 1848 insurgents. Yet these earlier associations merely provided the occasion for him to develop a political awareness that ultimately transcended his status as worker. Though he continued to ply his trade through 1848, he had been transformed. Notwithstanding the personal distance he always managed to maintain from Blanc, Marx, and the other socialist luminaries with whom he associated, he had become a militant first and a printer only incidentally.¹³¹

In the case of a well-documented activist like Born, it would be daunting enough to try to determine just when he made this transition. When it comes to ordinary individuals for whom the crucial years were spent in relative obscurity, there is rarely any basis for distinguishing between the artisan of unformed political views and the fully committed revolutionary. Though foreign workers were usually attracted to Paris more by its employment opportunities than by the freedom of expression for which that city was famous, it was not uncommon for those who started out with little sense of political conviction to undergo a radical transformation as Born did. The acquisition of a liberal and even nationalist viewpoint was often helped along by the tendency of foreign workers, much like their French provincial counterparts, to gravitate toward furnished lodgings (*maisons garnies*) whose residents were from the same region of origin. There the recent arrival found himself in a dormitory-style setting where he was likely to encounter friendly faces and familiar accents. He could count on his compatriots to show him the ropes and provide assistance in securing employment. The sense of community among such men, living at close quarters and yet at such a great distance from their native land, could be intense. This was an environment in which new values and attitudes had the potential to spread quickly. The same intensity and openness to new outlooks may explain why many ended up enrolling in volunteer legions that aimed at delivering their homelands, using both ideas and techniques they had absorbed while living in France.

A picture of the émigré community in Paris as it existed in the spring of 1848 must be pieced together from many sources. The first French census was conducted only in 1851. It showed that about 1 percent of that country's

residents—some 380,000 individuals—were citizens or subjects of other nations. As one might guess, the countries of origin that contributed most to this total tended to be those bordering on France.¹³² As might also seem entirely natural, the bulk of these immigrants took up residence in the region of France closest to their native land.¹³³

The great exception to this pattern of dispersion among the French provinces was the Seine *département*, where in 1851 more than 62,000 immigrants had converged. In Paris proper, the 53,000 foreigners enumerated in the census constituted 5 percent of the city's inhabitants, and, because there were so few females among them, an even higher proportion of the adult male population. These figures may constitute a starting point for understanding the flow of migrants, but, as we shall see, this or any static estimate presents a highly misleading picture of the total number who had come and gone during the three years that separated the 1848 revolution from the first count of the French population. A dramatic demographic change had taken place in the intervening period, thanks in part to the great midcentury crisis, which had devastated the French economy and drastically curtailed job opportunities beginning in 1847. That crisis was soon compounded by the revolution it helped precipitate, for the turmoil of the spring of 1848 not only exacerbated France's economic collapse but also inspired (or forced) many foreign workers to return to their native lands.

Anyone who studies this period is indebted to the work of the late Jacques Grandjonc for sorting out the complex picture of foreign immigration around the time of the February revolution.¹³⁴ According to his reworking of the available evidence, the number of foreign nationals living in all of France peaked in 1847 at 850,000, more than double what it would be a scant four years later. The corresponding figure for Paris in that same year was 180,000, nearly three times the level to which it had fallen by 1851.¹³⁵ Even more striking is his estimate that in the twenty-year period that extended from the revolution of 1830 to the overthrow of the Second Republic, some five million foreigners passed through France on stays of highly variable length. Of these, at least three million—or roughly 60 percent—were workers.

Some idea of how sharply the number of foreigners plummeted following the revolution is provided by the following statistic: at the start of 1848, Paris housed anywhere from 60,000 to 85,000 residents of German nationality alone.¹³⁶ That number equaled or exceeded the total of all foreigners who remained in the city just three years later. [Table 1](#), which shows the breakdown by nationality in December 1846 (the latest date prior to the February revolution

for which Grandjonc provides systematic data) and in the 1851 census (by which time both the size and the composition of the foreign community had been substantially altered).

TABLE 1 Foreigners resident in Paris, by nationality, 1846-1851

<i>Nationality</i>	December 31, 1846		1851 Census	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
German, Austrian	59,334	35.2	13,584	26.6
English, Scots, Irish	35,192	20.9	5,781	11.3
Belgian, Dutch	24,882	14.8	12,156	23.8
Italian, Savoyard	24,360	14.5	9,562	18.7
Swiss	15,760	9.3	6,030	11.8
Spanish	4,550	2.7	1,321	2.6
Polish	4,000	2.4	2,600	5.1
Portuguese	500	0.3		
Total	168,578	100.1	51,034	99.9

See Grandjonc 1975, 234. Similar data for 1851 can also be derived from Bertillon 1895, 14. Discrepancies among sources (and even the difference between these figures and Grandjonc's own estimate of the overall number of foreigners, cited earlier) are presumably due to differences in the classification systems and in rules for handling incomplete information concerning the nationality of some individuals.

The reasons for this mass exodus have already been mentioned, but it is worth providing some pertinent details. The midcentury economic downturn conformed to the pattern of a classic "old-style crisis," in that it began in the agricultural sector but quickly proceeded to devastate industrial production in France's major cities.¹³⁷ But unlike the crises of 1830-31 or 1836-37, which merely slowed the pace of in-migration, the one that began in 1846 actually reversed the direction of labor flows. Even before the February Days, many foreign workers decided to return home in the hope that familiar surroundings and family ties might make it easier to subsist. Those who initially stayed on because the employment situation in other European cities was as bad or worse than in Paris, soon found that the revolution was making their position

untenable. Unrest in the French capital sapped what confidence remained in financial circles, leading to further cutbacks in production, cutthroat competition, falling wages, and unprecedented levels of urban unemployment. In Paris, as in other French cities, the protests of native-born workers over the lack of jobs often led to the mistreatment of foreigners, ranging from petty harassment to threats of violence.¹³⁸ The new regime, painfully aware that its political survival depended on its ability to provide relief to a desperate working class, declared the “right to work” and created the National Workshops and Paris Garde mobile. However, none of these measures provided any benefit to foreigners. The sole form of assistance the latter were eligible to receive—one that was both politically expedient and cost-effective from the government’s point of view—was the daily allowance of 50 centimes plus transportation expenses payable to those who agreed to repatriation.¹³⁹ By reducing the number of non-French residents, this stratagem eliminated not just a source of job competition for domestic workers but also a wellspring for political agitation in the capital.

Hard times may have provided the “push” that drove many foreigners from French territory, but just as important in this era of revolutionary change was the “pull” exerted on workers by the prospect of liberating their homelands from autocratic governments or foreign domination. Contemporary observers estimated that foreign nationals who had fought on the February barricades numbered in the thousands, and their experiences left many of these men with an irrepressible enthusiasm for social reform and a newfound conviction that their efforts could produce concrete results.¹⁴⁰ The freedoms that the provisional government had bestowed upon its own citizens were quickly exploited by foreign nationals as well. Among scores of clubs that flourished in Paris in the weeks following the change of regime were many organized by and for the non-French population. Among the most prominent were the Belgian Patriotic Society, the German Democratic Society, the German Association of Paris, the Club of German Workers, the Club of Italian Emigrés, the Democratic Iberian Club, the Swiss Society of the Grütli, and the Club of Polish Emigration.¹⁴¹

In most cases, these associations welcomed both French and foreign members and provided a setting in which political perspectives could be freely shared. The explicit goals of such organizations were to plan for the anticipated liberation of the expatriates’ native lands; to lobby the French government to provide moral, economic, and even military assistance; and in most cases, to recruit, equip, and train a corps of volunteers that would join in any rebellion or, should an uprising fail to materialize spontaneously, undertake an armed invasion aimed at instigating one.

The French authorities had a difficult time reconciling the contradictory reactions that these initiatives elicited, and foreigners' demands for assistance sharpened the divisions within their ranks. Radicals within the provisional government would have liked nothing better than to incite revolution abroad, both as a way of affirming their political values and as a precaution against attempts to crush France's renewed experiment with republican government. The precedent of the allied powers' invasion under the First French Republic was just as disturbing to moderates, but they drew an entirely different lesson from it. Lamartine, while rejecting the analogy to 1792, was anxious to avoid the expansionist policies that, in the name of spreading republican principles across the Continent, had driven the monarchies of Europe to form a hostile coalition and provoked the revolutionary wars that ultimately prepared the ground for Napoléon's rise to power. Of course, Lamartine also realized that stubbornly withholding all support for the aspirations of subject peoples risked alienating the most militant revolutionaries, the bulk of whom were concentrated in Paris. His attempt to resolve this dilemma took the form of a carefully circumscribed foreign policy that pledged France's undying devotion to democratic values, while forswearing any active intervention in the affairs of her neighbors. He did a masterful job of managing this delicate balancing act, but, as we shall see, his colleagues in the new government were not always as scrupulous in respecting his carefully crafted compromise.

Foreign workers remained all but oblivious to such fine distinctions. Radical members of the expatriate community, who vociferously advocated the violent overthrow of the regimes in power in their home states and expected support from the French government, found an immediate following. To give the reader some idea of the paths down which these enterprises led, we shall look very briefly at a few noteworthy examples.

Italians, Savoyards, and Germans. The Italian case is somewhat anomalous, since the French government, whether because it felt bound by promises previously made or because it wished to extend its sphere of political influence, committed itself to intercede if the "independence" of the Italian peninsula were threatened. It did not hesitate to sell arms and munitions to the Venetian and Milanese insurgents—a concession it denied to others—and in April, it even went so far as to organize an "Army of the Alps" in case direct intervention should prove necessary.¹⁴² But at the same time, the Second Republic refused to arm Italian patriots operating on French soil and stuck to its promise not to send its own troops into action unless it first received an invitation from leaders of the

movements struggling against the reimposition of Austrian rule.

This did not prevent some 400 members of the Italian Legion, which Giacomo Antonini had set up in Paris immediately following the February Days, from marching off in support of their rebellious countrymen (fig. 23) and fighting alongside Manin and Tommaseo at Vincenza in May 1848.¹⁴³ But though barricades were plentiful in both Venice and Milan, Italians' use of this tactic preceded the arrival of the volunteers from Paris and cannot be directly ascribed to the influence of these returning workers.

The demand advanced by two thousand Savoyards living in Paris was even more disconcerting. They petitioned the provisional government to annex their homeland outright, an action that would have restored the status it had enjoyed between 1792 and 1815, when this territory constituted the French *départements* of Mont-Blanc and Leman. Not wishing to alienate Charles Albert, king of Sardinia-Piedmont, to whom the territory had been ceded after the Hundred Days, Lamartine equivocated, willing only to repeat assurances that, should the independence of Italy be compromised, France would come to its rescue.¹⁴⁴ In defiance of efforts by the French government and the local *commissaire* to dissuade them, volunteers gathered in Lyon before crossing into Savoy on April 2. Of 1,500 men, just 100 were armed with rifles, but the mere rumor of their approach was enough to cause the Piedmontese authorities to flee.




FIGURE 23. The departure of Italians from Paris to join the struggle for the liberation of their homeland. *Journées illustrées de la révolution* (1848-49), 102.

One day later, the volunteers entered Chambéry like a conquering army. They occupied public buildings, proclaimed the republic, and arrogated to themselves positions formerly occupied by the king's representatives. Their attitude fueled resentment among local elites, who used the tocsin to summon an ill-assorted assemblage of town-dwellers and their peasant allies. Armed with nothing more than hunting rifles, these succeeded in chasing out the invaders after barely an hour of fighting. That evening, Piedmontese officials, now accompanied by 3,000 soldiers, were emboldened to return and found the local population happy to have them back.

The story of the German Democratic Legion, which began recruiting in Paris within weeks of the change of regime in France, followed a similar trajectory. An unknown but substantial number of foreigners, including many Germans, had taken part in the February revolution. They now considered themselves "barricade victors," entitled to the gratitude of the new government, and specifically to its help in emancipating their homelands.¹⁴⁵ In the initial outpouring of fraternal good feelings, requests for food and logistical support

were welcomed, and expatriates were even allowed to conduct military exercises on the Champ de Mars.¹⁴⁶ Despite the vaguely encouraging pronouncements of Adolphe Crémieux, and Flocon's willingness to advance a few thousand francs of his personal funds, the provisional government managed to avoid making any official commitment.

It was, however, soon struggling to maintain its distance.¹⁴⁷ It pointedly turned down Herwegh's request for arms, though it did vote a credit of 60,000 francs to pay for tickets home for all his followers, calculating that their presence in Paris represented a more serious danger than the mischief (and diplomatic complications) associated with their return to Germany.¹⁴⁸ When the French authorities learned of plans to dispatch five "battalions" from Paris on a staggered schedule, beginning at the end of March, they were alarmed. Herwegh's intention was to reassemble his forces near the border before crossing the Rhine to join forces with the Badenese rebellion led by Friedrich Hecker and Gustav Struve.¹⁴⁹ Hecker was almost as upset as Lamartine at the thought of a revolt in Baden receiving assistance from a "French" army.¹⁵⁰ He rejected the German Legion's offer of support, the only source of outside assistance available to him, even though that helped ensure the decisive defeat of the Baden patriots on April 20. That did not stop Herwegh from making his incursion across the border with 600 to 700 volunteers on April 23. Their lack of discipline as much as their lack of arms left them easy prey when, four days later, they encountered a company of soldiers from Württemberg. The Legion was soundly defeated in its first serious military engagement near Dossenbach, leaving those not killed or captured to straggle across the Swiss border in search of sanctuary.¹⁵¹

Fiasco in Flanders. Of all the military initiatives undertaken by foreign workers in 1848, the most notorious was undoubtedly the Belgian Legion, thanks to the disastrous engagement that brought it to a sudden end at the aptly named Flemish town of Risquons-Tout ("Let's Risk Everything"). Though their native land would prove highly resistant to the lure of revolutionary action, Belgian workers living in Paris had been quick to form a Patriotic Society dedicated to the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic.¹⁵² It organized demonstrations in the French capital and called for volunteers to help topple their own king, Louis-Philippe's son-in-law, Leopold I.

However wary of these intrigues, the moderate majority in the provisional government was delighted to facilitate the departure of more jobless workers

from French soil. In addition to the usual allowances for food and travel expenses, it arranged, in the case of the Belgians, for special trains to transport them back home.¹⁵³ But Paris radicals, including Prefect of Police Marc Caussidière, nurtured a quite different ambition. A successful invasion by a mixed force of Belgian and French republicans, they appear to have reasoned, could simultaneously install a sympathetic republican government in Brussels and discredit the policies of Lamartine and his moderate supporters within the French provisional government. Working through Charles Delescluze, the Republic's appointed *commissaire* in the Nord *département*, and with the acquiescence of Ledru-Rollin, Caussidière concocted a plan to divert a shipment of 1,500 rifles (supposedly destined for local National Guard units) into the hands of the members of the Belgian Legion just before they crossed the border into Flanders.¹⁵⁴

Unfortunately for these conspirators, the Belgian Legion was riven by factions. As a result, its volunteers left Paris in four separate columns over a two-day period. No one had forewarned Delescluze that the first complement would be arriving by train in Valenciennes on March 25. Thinking these passengers were simply unemployed workers returning to their homeland, the *commissaire* arranged for their train to be taken straight through to Quiévrain, in Belgian territory, without making the customary stop just before the border that members of the Legion had counted upon. Once arrived, they were greeted by police and troops who, finding arms and political propaganda in their baggage, proceeded to send the French citizens back where they had come from and to place the others under arrest.

Over the next day and a half, at least 1,200 more men congregated at staging areas near Séclin, just shy of the Belgian border. They were accompanied and in part commanded by French republicans and students from the Ecole Polytechnique.¹⁵⁵ Delescluze found himself under intense pressure to carry out the plan to arm these volunteers. Lacking clear instructions from Ledru-Rollin, he finally relented. As the members of the Legion proceeded eastward, they (by prearrangement) fell upon five wagonloads of rifles and ammunition. Thus armed, they crossed into Belgian territory on March 28.

The Belgian government had been kept well informed of these developments by its diplomats in Paris and its spies in the French border provinces. Its regional military commander had forces more than equal in numbers to the volunteers and far better trained, equipped, and organized. They intercepted the invaders near Risquons-Tout and, after a pitched battle that lasted no more than two hours, put them to rout, chasing back across the border all but sixty prisoners,

seventeen dead, and twenty-six wounded.¹⁵⁶

THE BARRICADE TRADITION TAKES FIRM ROOT OUTSIDE FRANCE

The adventure that culminated in the fighting at Risquons-Tout may have been an unmitigated disaster when judged in terms of the insurgents' avowed goals, but an event that was its by-product revealed an important truth about how barricade construction came to be incorporated into the repertoires of contention of other European peoples. This incident took place in Ghent, a city that crops up several times in the history of the barricade, and which, in 1848, was once again experimenting with this technique of popular insurrection.

The first reports of the February Days stirred the working-class population of Ghent to organize rallies on February 28 and 29. When these failed to elicit a sympathetic response from nearby towns, the initial mobilization quickly subsided.¹⁵⁷ But militant republicans appear to have remained undeterred, if we are to judge by their efforts over the month that followed to coordinate their activities with expatriate Belgians living in Paris. The first such episodes resulted from a false alarm that sparked a series of minor uprisings in Ghent and a handful of other locations on March 13. The timing was significant, because this agitation coincided with the date *originally* set for the arrival on Belgian soil of the legion of volunteers whose exploits were chronicled in the previous section. Unfortunately, when internal disputes among leaders in the French capital caused the postponement of the planned invasion, no one bothered to inform their supporters back home.

Even this could not dishearten the Belgian patriots, for immediately following the actual departures of the volunteer columns from Paris on March 24 and 25, a series of large demonstrations broke out in Luxembourg and various Belgian provinces. The most noteworthy of these events occurred in Ghent, beginning on March 28 and lasting until April 1. Workers gathered at the railroad station to await the arrival of a trainload of republicans from Paris, unaware that the volunteers, who had in fact disembarked in France and crossed into Belgium on foot, had already been soundly defeated by the royal army within miles of the border. Insurgents in Ghent, led by the local branch of the Association démocratique, twice seized control of a public square, where they began digging up paving stones in the face of heavy repression by police and troops. In the end, they managed to construct the semblance of a barricade near the town's train depot.¹⁵⁸ Although it might seem hardly worthy of note—the barricade itself was

short-lived and casualties were limited to two dead among about 1,000 demonstrators—this incident is nonetheless instructive. It showed that members of the Belgian Legion in Paris and their supporters at home were clearly in contact, even if the consistency and accuracy of their communications left much to be desired. But it also underscored that the presence and supervision of individuals who had taken a direct hand in the overthrow of Louis-Philippe were superfluous, at least in a place like Ghent, which already had an established history of barricade use. Well versed in the requisite tactics, local revolutionaries were quite capable of raising barricades and exploiting the potential of an insurrectionary situation without need of any external intervention.

Admittedly, most European cities that witnessed barricade combat in 1848 had nothing like the prior experience that Ghent possessed; but, for the most part, they did not need it either. Literally hundreds of thousands of artisans from virtually all the nations of the Continent had spent from one to several years in France over the previous two decades as part of the journeyman's tour.¹⁵⁹ They had thus acquired a familiarity with political doctrines as well as techniques of protest that they carried back to their native lands. This is why the legions of foreign workers recruited in Paris in the spring of 1848 who may never have literally helped transplant the barricade to some new locale are nonetheless essential to understanding the diffusion process. They represented the much larger group of workers who had previously experienced the radicalizing influence of a stay in the capital of revolution. Their role in 1848 may have been superfluous, but only because those who had preceded them in making a Paris sojourn had already sown the seeds of barricade consciousness on this new and fertile ground.

CONCLUSIONS

The wave of revolutionism in 1848 was formidable, but it was neither universal nor particularly long-lasting. England (the world's most highly industrialized country) along with Russia (England's semi-feudal antithesis) shared with a relative handful of smaller nations the distinction of having skirted the storms that engulfed so much of the Continent. The irony is that in this most troubled year of the nineteenth century, the Orléanist monarchy in France was the only European regime to be irrevocably overthrown.¹⁶⁰

But while the radical reforms of the period seldom proved enduring, revolutionary ideals did manage to redefine the terms of political struggle, and the use of barricades gives us a visible and widely reported index of their

progress. Students, exiles, and itinerant workers were the groups primarily responsible for the proliferation of this technique during the first several months of the revolutionary upsurge. Students' ease of mobilization combined with their propensity to move across national boundaries and even to organize themselves on an international basis made them an effective vector of diffusion.

Political exiles who had settled in France enjoyed an extraordinary freedom of action, and this was nowhere more evident than in Paris, both before and especially after the February revolution. Their efforts to mobilize expatriate communities were often spectacularly successful, and they took full advantage of the diminished capacity of governments, thrown into disarray by the events of that spring, to restrict their movements. These were ideal conditions for the spread of the revolutionary creed and its associated lessons concerning the efficacy of barricade combat.

Considered as agents of diffusion, itinerant workers may not have been quite the equal of students in their embrace of novel causes, or of political exiles in their eagerness to fly off to new theaters of insurrectionary action, but they joined political receptivity and geographical mobility with the strength of large numbers. The February barricades were responsible for bringing them out,¹⁶¹ but their apprenticeship in the art of barricade construction had begun much earlier. In Paris alone, the *journées* of 1827, 1830, 1832, 1834, and 1839 helped them refine their skills and perfect their role as bearers of the knowledge necessary to conduct a popular insurrection.

What these three channels of diffusion possessed in common was a set of characteristics highly favorable to political mobilization. Many lived somewhat apart, in self-enclosed, often all-male settings, relieved of many familial or parental responsibilities. To a degree, this relative isolation, often reinforced by differences of language and culture, freed them to assume the risks of radical activism. Their enclave-like existence also made for an exceptionally dense set of intra-group relations, capable of generating an extraordinarily strong sense of community. Moreover, they often had at their disposal a relatively rich set of organizational resources, which included preexisting associational ties—from casual centers of sociability like the Café Belge to more formal contexts like university classes, library reading rooms, and political clubs—that enhanced the potential for coordinated action.

These predispositional elements were reinforced by the daily interactions that took place in dormitories, boardinghouses, and mutual aid societies and that blossomed into new forms of political association during the springtime of the peoples. Governments had even done their part, by, for example, welcoming (in

the case of France, even subsidizing) political refugees they approved of, while sending the domestic militants they sought to repress into exile in the company of like-minded outcasts from other nations. Even the policy pursued by the governments of France and other countries of repatriating foreign workers to relieve the crisis of unemployment had the unintended consequence of furthering this process of intermingling.

The spread of barricade consciousness, previously all but exclusive to France, was just one by-product of the internationalization of the revolutionary movement. The tactic's introduction in European locations where its use had hitherto been unknown allowed it not just to expand its dominion but to remake itself completely. The year 1848 marked a turning point in two important respects: first, the barricade became a recognized component of a pan-European repertoire of collective action; and, second, the barricade acquired a *symbolic* significance that increasingly superseded and displaced the pragmatic quality that had earlier defined its essence. The next chapter attempts to understand these changes and the reasons for the barricade's persistence both before and after this shift occurred.

The Functions of the Barricade

One must never forget that the barricade, though a material element in any insurrectionary situation, plays above all a moral role. Instead of functioning as fortresses do in a time of war—as physical obstacles—barricades have served in every revolution simply as a way of halting the movement of troops, thus placing them in contact with the people.

LEON TROTSKY

At first glance, it might appear that the function of barricades is straightforward and self-evident: they serve to protect those who build and defend them. A closer examination reveals, however, that barricades can have many purposes other than the provision of physical cover and that the diversity of their functions goes some ways toward explaining why insurgents have turned to them so consistently. We have already observed barricades being used to challenge the legitimacy of the regime in power, delimit the lines of cleavage in society, and define the identity of insurgent groups. It should also be apparent that insurgents construct barricades in an attempt to influence the behavior of a variety of other groups including governmental authorities, social control forces (police and soldiers, for the most part), the general public, and even, on occasion, a disinterested audience of international observers. This chapter explores the many less obvious purposes that barricades can fulfill, stressing throughout how this tactic, far from remaining static and unchanging, has evolved over time in response to constantly shifting military, political, and cultural exigencies. For the sake of convenience, I have grouped the functions of barricades into three broad rubrics—practical, social, and symbolic—even though the boundaries among these categories are rarely hard and fast and any given barricade is likely to serve multiple objectives.

THE PRACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE BARRICADE

The manifest functions of the barricade—in other words, those that insurgents more or less consciously intend such structures to perform—are mainly pragmatic in nature. The rebels' overall aim is to mitigate or overcome the disadvantages that irregular forces inevitably face in any confrontation with better-trained, better-equipped, and better-organized troops. This asymmetry of power between the two sides in a civil conflict often creates the appearance that barricades are essentially defensive. In reality, barricades can just as readily serve an offensive purpose (especially when used as a means of asserting the moral ascendancy of the insurgents' cause), and they have been instrumental on many occasions in assuring the defeat of militarily superior forces. Our initial goal is therefore to summarize the practical functions of barricades without prejudging the question of their strategic potential.

To Provide Protective Cover

The barricade's role as a refuge from attack presumably requires little elaboration. At least through the end of the nineteenth century, this simple physical barrier presented a formidable obstacle to assaults by foot soldiers. It was even better suited to counteracting the effectiveness of mounted troops, which might otherwise be employed with devastating results against urban crowds. And though only the most robust barricades could withstand the destructive force of cannon fire for long, a sturdily crafted example could often slow the progress of an artillery barrage enough to allow the rebels to beat an orderly retreat. This was an eventuality for which insurgents often prepared in advance by using pickaxes to open passages through the walls of adjacent buildings. Because, unlike soldiers, they wore no uniforms, they could hope to blend in with the noncombatant population as long as the struggle on the barricades, even when unsuccessful, gave them time to effect a well-ordered withdrawal.¹

The protective aura that barricades possessed had a psychological dimension that could be no less important. Maxime du Camp, who was equally unsympathetic to the June Days of 1848 and to the Paris Commune, remarked that in both conflicts, barricades increased the willingness of insurgent forces to fight by providing the reassurance that there existed a haven behind which they could retreat if driven back from their forward positions.² His conclusion, far from being the fanciful speculation of a political commentator, was based on personal experience as a combatant in the June insurrection (on the side of order, to be sure) and is backed up by the testimony of no less an authority than Louis

Rossel (1844-71), who briefly served as the Commune's delegate at war. At his trial, Rossel acknowledged that the commission charged with building the colossal showcase barricades in the place de la Concorde and the place Vendôme had been very poorly organized; but this was of little consequence, he argued, since the true purpose of these projects had been “more to reassure the men on the ramparts than to serve as a veritable means of defense.”³

To Bar Passage and Impede Circulation

Barricades may have promised a measure of security, real or illusory, but individual insurgents were not the only ones they were intended to shield. We saw in [chapter 2](#) that from their earliest beginnings, barricades were a form of neighborhood defense, used to safeguard residents' families and property. Those who conspired against Henri III during the First Day of the Barricades turned to such structures because they feared their revolt would become a pretext for criminals and the dispossessed to stir up an orgy of riot and pillage that would devastate their communities even as it discredited their cause.⁴ Like the custom of stretching the chains (of which they were an outgrowth), Parisian barricades began as a way of marking the limits of urban neighborhoods and preventing outsiders from intruding.⁵

The result of encumbering the streets with barricades—and remember that in 1588, they could be found at thirty-yard intervals in some quarters—was to make it impossible for individuals to move freely about the city unless equipped with the secret password or a *laissez-passez* issued by the neighborhood militia.⁶ According to Poulain, the king's spy within the councils of the Paris Sixteen, an additional benefit that barricades conferred was to confine members of the nobility who might otherwise have rushed to the aid of the king, while at the same time leaving the League's own supporters free access to the Louvre and other sites where concentrations of royal forces could be attacked.⁷ The *selective permeability* of the barrier thus created has been one of the hallmarks of this tactic ever since supporters of the Catholic League seized control of Paris during the First Day of the Barricades, denying freedom of movement to the emissaries and lieutenants of Henri III, but allowing passage to Catherine de Medici when she was sent on a mission that held promise of a compromise favorable to the duc de Guise.⁸

The capacity of these barriers to make such fine distinctions remained one of the signal advantages associated with their use. In 1648, when “a flood of barricades” again washed over Paris, Anne of Austria gave orders to *dissiper la canaille* (“disperse the riffraff”). Unfortunately, her Swiss guards were

powerless to comply, having been immobilized by barricades that Parisians “had set up with their innate skills as revolutionary engineers.”⁹ Yet, when it suited their purpose, insurgents were quite prepared to grant passage. They immediately cleared the way for a delegation of the Paris *parlement* on a mission to implore the queen-regent to release Broussel and his fellow prisoners. Then, when the magistrates returned empty-handed, they were suddenly refused passage by members of the crowd for whom the liberation of their champion was the price of relaxing the stranglehold they held over the capital. President de Mesmes and his colleagues were forced to repair to the nearby Palais-Royal to engage in further deliberations. In the end, this ploy on the part of popular forces was successful. The delegation of *parlementaires* eventually hammered out a conciliatory declaration that met with the approval of Anne of Austria and thus secured an order for Broussel’s deliverance. Even then, it was not until the next morning, after the councilor’s carriage actually entered the city, that the barricade defenders agreed to dismantle those structures altogether.



FIGURE 24. The great barricade in the faubourg Montmartre. *Journées illustrées de la révolution* (1848–49), 5. Although generally associated with the narrow, winding streets of the inner city, barricades could also be effectively deployed in broad avenues or open squares, as in this example from the February Days of 1848.

Examples from the nineteenth century could be multiplied almost at will, but I shall confine myself to a single incident that dates from February 23, 1848, when the spread of protests persuaded Louis-Philippe to dismiss the Guizot government and ask Adolphe Thiers and Odilon Barrot to form a new one. These would-be ministers encountered one insuperable obstacle to their efforts to announce the change of government to insurgent Paris: the streets were clogged with barricades! Barrot, who had headed up the reform movement and been the principal promoter of the spring banquet campaign, instantly concluded that Thiers might prove a liability in any effort to win over the crowd; he therefore set off without him. But even Barrot's pleas for an end to the insurgency met with a mixed welcome. Advancing with difficulty through the congested streets, his small delegation was acclaimed by some insurgents, who began tearing down their barricades. However, others (whom Barrot referred to as "fanatics") reacted in anger to this attempt to salvage the Orléanist regime. Arriving before the porte Saint-Denis, where the Société des droits de l'homme had erected an awe-inspiring barricade that reached as high as the second story of adjoining houses, Barrot's party was met with a deathly silence. He reported that, although no one actively tried to prevent their passage, this chilly reception left the dignitaries in doubt as to whether they would be permitted to proceed to the Hôtel de Ville or, should they encounter resistance further along in their journey, once engaged upon that course, be allowed to retrace their steps. Upon reflection, the group decided to turn back then and there.

Although Barrot managed to put the best face on this setback, claiming that his principal goal had already been achieved, the inability of this newly appointed president of the King's Council to make his way through the barricaded city marked a significant turning point. As all would soon come to realize, events had proceeded beyond the point where a reshuffling of ministers could satisfy the militants. The situation inevitably deteriorated. Sporadic clashes soon gave way to fierce fighting and, within hours, the effort to form a new government was abandoned, leaving Louis-Philippe little choice but to abdicate.¹⁰

Of course, once the king had fled, members of the provisional government, chosen by acclamation of the boisterous Parisian crowd, had little difficulty making their way through the capital to the new seat of power in the Hôtel de Ville. The lesson of the February Days, as of the earlier examples, was that the physical constraints imposed by the barricade could be exploited with considerable subtlety so as to make the conduct of politics as usual all but impossible and thereby influence the course of political events.

To Isolate Social Control Forces and Disrupt Communications

From an early date, barricades were used to interdict access to rebellious neighborhoods. Insurgents may at times have sought to restrict the movements of the anarchic *hoi polloi* (whose propensity to loot and pillage was greatly feared) or their polar opposite, the vengeful aristocratic supporters of the constituted order; but nearly always, the primary targets remained police and troops. Barricades were meant to halt their movement and cut off their lines of supply; to hamper communications between barracks, armories, and storehouses; and to deprive the authorities of basic intelligence concerning the activities of the insurgents themselves. In this way, the military chain of command was severed, the army's logistical superiority compromised, and its repressive capacity diminished, all of which went some considerable way toward placing insurgents and repressors on a more equal footing.

To illustrate this effect, we can again turn to the earliest of major barricade events. In 1588, barricades were already being used to sequester platoons of the Swiss Guard from one another, leaving them dispersed and vulnerable within the capital.¹¹ “Paving stones were pried up from the streets, chains were stretched, and barricades were raised to isolate the royal troops and render them incapable of defending themselves against the musket volleys and clusters of paving stones thrown from the windows.”¹²

In some quarters, where barricades appeared on every block, troops often became hemmed in on all sides. The immediate effect was to make them easy targets for marksmen firing from adjacent buildings as well as to projectiles that included, in addition to *pavés*, pots and pans and household furniture.¹³ Officers who had initially been contemptuous of the preparations made by a civilian rabble soon found themselves trapped, their communications disrupted, and their supplies of munitions and food intercepted.¹⁴ The historian A.-J. Meindre writes that “as the insurrection gained ground and the troops became dispersed across Paris, surrounded on all sides and abandoned to themselves without orders or provisions, they fell into a state of discouragement and cried out for mercy”¹⁵

Subsequent insurrections, down through the 1800s, followed a pattern that differed only in details. The goal of immobilizing social control forces became all the more crucial once the authorities began to rely on cavalry to quell civil unrest. F.-A. Isambert, to whom we owe the most detailed account of the 1827 insurrection in Paris, asserts that early nineteenth-century barricades were aimed specifically at mounted troops, which normally moved so quickly and which civilians found so terrifying.¹⁶ Frédéric Fayot, writing about the July Days, is

even more categorical. He notes that obstructions made of paving stones, barrels, vehicles, furniture, and the trees that lined many Parisian boulevards were deliberately aimed at blocking the movements of horses (and therefore also horse-drawn artillery.)¹⁷ So effective was this tactic that when Polignac, president of the King's Council, urged his military commanders to deploy columns of soldiers throughout the capital, he was told by General Vincent that even 100,000 men would be unable to cross Paris, given the state of exaltation of the population and the defenses insurgents had built.¹⁸ Even when Major-General Marmont's soldiers succeeded in cutting their way through a series of barricades in the faubourg Saint-Antoine without apparent difficulty, the insurgents quickly repaired the damage done to their structures and were soon able to overpower and disarm the troops.¹⁹

This dynamic was by no means unique to Paris. The 1834 rebellion of Lyon silk weavers produced only a dozen or so substantial barricades in the workers' quarters of the Old Town, but General Buchet observed that as his soldiers proceeded from one to the next, they became increasingly dispersed and began taking fire from the rear.²⁰ According to J.-B. Monfalcon, this was a self-conscious strategy on the part of insurgents, intended to isolate the troops and surround them on all sides.²¹ In still larger-scale events, the sheer number of barricades created the constant risk that military units would be cut off. An advancing column might encounter slight resistance, dismantling without hindrance barricades that insurgents would quickly abandon. But as troops proceeded deeper into hostile territory, they were likely to see those structures resurrected in their wake, blocking their natural avenue of retreat and severing all contact with their central command. We have previously noted the use of this tactic during the *journée* of 4 Prairial, but Auguste Nougarede de Fayet observed that in the February Days of 1848, these same maneuvers managed to exhaust and exasperate the troops.²² General Perrot was so concerned about the morale of the units involved that he gave orders for an artillery salvo. Two cannonballs fired in the rue de l'Oseille put an instant end to resistance in that neighborhood, but the effect was strictly temporary. In the journal that he kept during that same conflict, the English ambassador, Lord Normanby, reflected on the blunders that had made the overthrow of Louis-Philippe possible. He underscored that "hardly one order ever arrived in time to all the troops crowded into Paris," and he attributed the gaps in his own narrative of events to "communications with various parts of Paris being cut off by numerous barricades."²³

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's analysis was similar. He credited the ascendancy of

the February insurgents not to the success they had in face-to-face clashes but to the overall effect their tactics had on the troops' resolve:

The demoralization of the regime and the army were responsible [for the insurgents' easy victory in the February Days]. Contrary to what people imagine, the success of an insurrection doesn't depend on real combat. It results, above all (and even uniquely) on the rapidity and generality of the movement. To have this impact, the troops need to be occupied at a few points and made to chase after the uprising from one barricade to the next, even as barricades are being raised on all sides. Then, when the initial momentum has drawn everyone in and the city is all topsy-turvy, the army reflects and hesitates.²⁴

Elan, or revolutionary momentum, can thus help counteract the superiority the military typically enjoys thanks to its mobility and firepower. But in this passage, Proudhon also hints at another dimension of barricade use, one that enters a realm where social interaction between insurgents and the general population—and perhaps most critically, between insurgents and social control forces—is as important as any exchange based on powder and lead. Without downplaying the significance of the factors already enumerated, in the next section, I shall focus on the attempt to legitimate the insurgency in the eyes of the populace and on the struggle for the loyalty of gendarmes and soldiers, factors that often prove decisive.

THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE BARRICADE

Alongside the manifest functions of barricades exist others that might be termed *latent* because they generally escape the conscious awareness of participants and analysts alike. In defining the concept of the barricade in chapter 1, I remarked that these structures create a singular *physical* space, adapted to the imperatives of armed combat. But this insurrectional setting also gives rise to a distinctive *social* space, along with a corresponding set of human relationships that can be even more pivotal in determining how civil conflicts unfold. Although the significance of this sociological dimension may pass unnoticed by most of those present, it remained the critical focal point for the most astute strategists of insurrection, from Blanqui to Lenin.

Lenin's comrade-in-arms Leon Trotsky, the twentieth century's preeminent theoretician of the barricade, may have gone too far in claiming that these structures should not even be thought of as physical barriers, but this was merely his way of underscoring the underappreciated fact that the social and not the military dimensions of barricade use were more likely to determine the outcome of a civil conflict. As he emphasized (see chapter epigraph), preoccupation with

the practical aspects of barricade combat can be a distraction from their more consequential sociological properties. The sections that follow dissect these social functions and discuss the influence they exerted on the course and outcome of specific popular insurrections.

To Mobilize the Crowd and Identify New Recruits

Of the many ways insurgents can choose to declare their intention of contesting the status quo, building a barricade is surely among the most dramatic. But while this act of defiance may ostensibly be aimed at the powers that be, its true targets are often members of the general population—in particular those sympathetic to the insurgents' cause who have not yet taken sides. The spectacle of barricade construction is well calculated to arouse their curiosity and draw them in, easing them along a path that leads to full commitment.

Caussidière provided a vivid description of the sights and sounds that abruptly jarred Parisians from their daily routines on February 23, 1848: the constant beating of the drums and ringing of the church bells; the raucous crowds gathered before the town hall; the frantic efforts of new arrivals to obtain information; the cadence of marching feet as National Guard companies traversed their home territory trying to muster the last of their members; and the verbal appeals directed at army units.²⁵ Taken together, these are all elements of the phenomenon that students of collective action have sometimes referred to as “milling,” in which customary rates of social interactions suddenly intensify even as the mix of excitement and apprehension puts everyone on high alert. In such circumstances, individuals' sense of who they are and what they are capable of becomes subject to redefinition. This openness to change, even to the point of modifying one's self-conception, is facilitated by barricades, which Charles de Freycinet, another participant in the February Days, called “places of assembly and chat.”²⁶

Sometimes, not even the tragic intervention of violent death was enough to dissipate this atmosphere of heightened sociability. In May 1839, only a few hundred Parisians actually took up arms, but a much larger number of casual onlookers were mesmerized by the confrontation. At the National Guard's first rifle volley, the barricade situated in the Marché des Innocents was abandoned by all of its defenders save the two struck dead on the spot.

But this did little to disperse the crowd that had gathered in the adjacent streets and filled the rue Saint-Honoré, the Halles, the Saint-Merri Cloister, the rues Saint-Denis and Saint-Martin, and that entire district of the capital, so densely inhabited and normally congested with street traffic. On the contrary, the rifle shots fired in the marché des Innocen[t]s only increased the crowd, due more to

people's curiosity than to any malicious intent.²⁷

Barricade combat clearly captivated these bystanders, who were prepared to risk life and limb to witness events that some may have hoped and others feared would have momentous consequences.

The sharp-eyed Englishman Percy St. John, in Paris at the time of the February revolution, aptly conveyed the heady atmosphere of the French capital in the earliest stages of unrest. Carriages were stopped, omnibuses overturned, and paving stones dug up as part of the preparations for barricade construction, a task that was periodically interrupted by cavalry charges and soldiers' efforts to right the vehicles and repair the pavement. Yet the appearance of troops, far from causing people to flee, merely made them more inquisitive and rebellious. The crowd grew denser by the minute.²⁸

For militants, the physical assembly of such a throng was an opportunity not to be missed. Barricades had always been active sites of political proselytizing, and those engaged in barricade-building never hesitated to launch appeals to the uncommitted in any form they thought might work. Countess Eléonore de Boigne, whose Paris apartment looked directly across at the spot where a barricade in the rue du faubourg Saint-Honoré was erected in July 1830, relates one intriguing example. From this vantage point, she observed an individual arrive and briefly occupy himself with readjusting paving stones that had been disturbed by passersby. Soon, however, he broke into full-throated song—"in a very beautiful voice and with extremely clear pronunciation"—offering five couplets in honor of Napoléon II.²⁹ Her description of the scene outside her window communicated both how barricades served as points of assembly and how they generated a sense of unity and anticipation:

This place had become a center. Neighbors gathered around the twenty-five or thirty men on guard. The latter did not budge from their post until they were relieved by their replacements, headed by a student from the Ecole Polytechnique, and only after twenty-eight hours on duty, during which time folks from the neighborhood had made a point of bringing them food and drink. . . . The drama played out upon this tiny stage was being repeated at the fork in every road throughout the city and gives a fairly accurate idea of the general situation.³⁰

Thus, a barricade site drew not just would-be insurgents but also those still straddling the fence (and even the merely curious), for this was where they could make contact with their peers, hear the latest reports, and observe the state of preparations. Part public information booth, part recruitment station, this tiny node of insurrectionary activity invited them all to take part in innocuous preliminaries such as listening to speeches, singing songs, and signing petitions.

For the most receptive among them, helping to build a barricade was one modest further step in the direction of declaring their loyalties and throwing in their lot with the insurgents. This was a process that gave concrete meaning to the colloquial expression “deciding on which side of the barricade one stands.”

To Claim Turf, Challenge Legitimacy, and Build Solidarity

In its earliest stages, a developing insurrection might appear to be ruled by an irreducible spontaneity, as participants milled about, sharing not just the scanty information that each possessed but also their sense of uncertainty and anxiety, thus fueling the process of rumor propagation. The fluidity of this situation would, however, rapidly give way to more routinized behaviors, among which the construction of barricades was one especially striking example. The ritualized character of many of the actions undertaken and the consistency with which they reappeared in successive insurrections remind us that we are dealing with components of a well-established repertoire of contention.

There existed a sequence of standard behaviors, many of them built around unmistakable aural and visual cues, that signaled that a barricade event was potentially in the offing. The tocsin—the loud, continuous ringing of church bells to declare a state of emergency—reached every corner of the city, alerting inhabitants that normal business should be suspended. Crowds soon circulated through the streets, loudly calling journeymen out of their workshops. Apprehensive merchants closed their shop doors, adding to the crush. If night had fallen and a clash with troops seemed imminent, insurgents might begin smashing street lamps in order to create a protective cover of darkness for their activities.³¹ Amid these harbingers of unrest, drummers were dispatched, sounding the call that would muster local National Guard units, while knots of fascinated bystanders gathered on street corners to speculate as to which side the militia would take in the impending conflict.

Militants soon set off on errands of a more pragmatic nature, above all the search for weapons. The arms dealer Lepage, located in the vicinity of the Palais-Royal since the early eighteenth century, somehow survived being pillaged in one Parisian uprising after another (see [fig. 25](#)). Insurgents who made off with the available stock of rifles and side arms occasionally took the time to draw up “requisition orders” or to pen handwritten notes promising to return the weapons once the battle had been won. Others foraged door-to-door in search of firearms, using a system of chalk symbols to mark residences that had already been searched in vain or that had willingly turned over their guns and ammunition.




FIGURE 25. The premises of the Paris gunsmiths Lepage frères being pillaged by insurgents in 1830. This print dates from the revolution of July 1830, but Lepage frères suffered such attacks several times over the course of the nineteenth century. Insurgents can be seen divvying up their plunder in the left foreground, while at the right they begin the construction of a barricade. Blanc [1830–40] 1882, 97.

In the expectation that barricade building would soon begin, insurgents went in search of levers and crowbars to pry up paving stones, and carts and wheelbarrows in case they needed to be transported to the site of construction. Their comrades scavenged for beams and wrought-iron railings, useful in binding loose materials together to make a solid, sedentary mass. Still others set out to commandeer wheeled vehicles of every variety. St. John mentions witnessing insurgents' seizure of two omnibuses, two small carriages, a wagon carrying stones and gravel, a brewer's dray, and a hackney cab on February 22, 1848.³² On that very same afternoon, Count Louis Molé, crossing the Champs-Élysées on his way home after having failed in his efforts to form a new ministry, made a narrow escape from barricade builders who tried to seize his coach.³³ Heinrich Heine was not so lucky. On the following day, he was stranded in Paris when the

carriage he had engaged to take him to the rue de l'Oursine was overturned to form a barricade.³⁴

The impressment of vehicles was a refinement of technique that gave rise to a fascinating set of secondary rituals. Reports from several nineteenth-century uprisings call attention to the deferential, even chivalrous, attitude of the rebels who demanded the surrender of private carriages. They wasted no time freeing the horses by removing the harness or simply cutting the traces, but they were generally respectful in their treatment of any occupants. Nougarière de Fayet, for example, notes the “remarkable politeness” with which they requested that passengers descend and, if women were present, the exaggerated courtesy they displayed, often offering assistance in negotiating the debris-strewn site of barricade construction.³⁵ Only then would they turn back to the empty conveyance and proceed without fanfare to heave it on top of the growing pile.³⁶

The highly conventionalized character of these and other behaviors associated with barricade construction alerts us to the possibility that they had a significance that cannot be explained solely on the basis of practical utility. Irrespective of the setting in which they occur, rituals are used to mark the transition between two distinct statuses.³⁷ In the conditions that obtain during barricade events, such ceremonial activities served to separate the state of everyday political existence, with its presumption of stasis or continuity, which most of us take to be “normal,” from the insurrectionary situation, which, even in the context of nineteenth-century Paris, remained exceptional and was perceived to hold both the potential for sudden violence and the promise of meaningful change. In other words, the construction of barricades was an act that invited people to question the presumption of normalcy, including the legitimacy usually enjoyed by a duly constituted government, and to contest the authorities’ right to use repressive measures to maintain their power. When used effectively, the barricade helped create the state that Trotsky called “dual sovereignty,” in which competing visions of how society should be governed openly struggled for supremacy.

Of course, the building of barricades amounted to an attack on the regime’s legitimacy in a far more immediate and threatening manner as well. The very appearance of such structures in an urban setting challenged the state’s most fundamental prerogative: the monopoly it claimed over the use of force within its territory. Barricades were an effective mechanism for announcing insurgents’ defiant intention of overthrowing the government. For as long as they remained standing, they cast doubt on the regime’s ability to preserve order and therefore, by extension, on its fitness to rule. In the process, they inevitably affected the

lives of ordinary citizens, recasting their activities, outlook, and attitudes.

Barricades increased the difficulty of navigating the urban landscape to the point of severely dislocating habitual patterns of sociability. The hazards of moving about slowed commerce to a crawl and caused many workshops to close their doors, releasing those who usually toiled within from the constraints of their daily work schedule and flooding the streets with potential new recruits. The exhilaration of the novel situation into which they had suddenly been thrust rendered these individuals psychologically as well as physically more available. Those who readily joined in barricade construction were presented with a series of concrete actions requiring reciprocity and coordination with others. Indeed, contemporary images of the construction process are especially revealing of the form and function of barricades, as well as of the social relations they engendered (see, e.g., [fig. 26](#)).³⁸ These shared activities helped them to make an instant transition from strangers to comrades-in-arms, fostering a sense of mutual identification that was reinforced by their shared sense of risk and the knowledge that their own fate might depend on the resoluteness and commitment of those with whom they toiled. Undertaking the simplest tasks of barricade construction gave them a chance to try on the persona of insurgent and, at the same time, assess the trustworthiness of their peers.



FIGURE 26. Barricade construction in Paris, July 28, 1830. Dayot [1897] n.d.), pt. 1, 33.

To Gauge Public Sentiment and the Probability of Success

But it was not just the sentiments of those already taking part that mattered. The public's receptiveness to the prospect of an insurrection was a critical consideration, on which barricade construction could also shed light. A particularly striking and well documented mechanism for gauging the eagerness of the general population involved the barricade's use as what I like to call an "insurrectionary toll booth." The practice involved refusing passage to persons who had not declared allegiance to the uprising until they had made a labor contribution to the construction process. The assistance demanded might be token or substantial, depending on the circumstances. Failure to comply was likely to result in recriminations, threats, or physical mistreatment. Tocqueville, in his *Recollections*, evoked the experience of his friend and colleague Claude de Corcelle at the start of the June Days:

Being impatient to gather information about the state of the town as quickly as possible, Corcelle and I decided to separate; he went one way and I the other; his excursion nearly turned out badly for him. He told me afterwards that, having first passed several half-constructed barricades without obstruction, he was halted at the last one; the workers building it, seeing a fine gentleman in a black suit with clean white linen quietly walking around the dirty streets by the Hôtel de Ville and stopping in front of them with a placid air of curiosity, decided to make some use of this suspicious onlooker. They asked him in the name of fraternity to help them in their work. Corcelle was as brave as Caesar, but in the circumstances he rightly thought it best to yield without a fuss. So there he was levering up the pavement and putting the stones one on top of another as tidily as he could. His natural clumsiness and his wandering thoughts luckily came to his aid, and he was soon dismissed as a useless laborer.³⁹

The conscription of a well-dressed, aristocratic member of the National Assembly may have been an exceptional case, but efforts to compel ordinary citizens to help with the physical labor of barricade building as the price of passage were notorious (see [fig. 27](#)).⁴⁰

By 1871, supporters of the Paris Commune had refined the procedure and made its observance nearly universal. A correspondent for the London *Times* explained that a barricade near the Buttes-Chaumont was able to spring up so quickly "by reason of the rule that is enforced that every passer must place a stone."⁴¹ On March 18, the agent in charge of the telegraph office in the La Villette district cited the problems his employees were having in moving about the city as a justification for a decision to suspend the delivery of messages:

“The postman just returned from delivering three telegrams to Belleville. He was able to get through only with the greatest difficulty. There were barricades in every street. He was obliged to carry paving stones before being allowed to pass and even then, they wanted to stop him and make him take up a rifle.”⁴²



FIGURE 27. *Fédérés* oblige passers-by to bring paving stones for barricades, Paris, 1871. Balathier-Bragelonne 1872, 593.

Thanks to Agricol Perdiguier, we have a terse verbatim record of another such exchange. It took place on May 21, 1871, at the start of the *Semaine Sanglante*, when the worker-author, then sixty-five years of age, was importuned at a site of barricade construction.⁴³ Three times he was asked to carry a paving stone or to fill a sack with earth, and three times he refused, going so far as to ask whether the sentry who had stopped him would have him sent to prison for saying no. The national guardsman thought it over, weakly replied with a simple “No, I guess not,” and allowed Perdiguier to be on his way.

It is tempting to dismiss this custom as a clumsy but pragmatic method for enlisting many hands to make light work of the onerous task of barricade construction. Louis Rossel, whose skepticism toward the Commune’s reliance on barricades we have already encountered, actually considered it “harmful and inefficient” to coerce casual bystanders into contributing in this way.⁴⁴ The persistence of this grassroots practice in the face of grave misgivings on the part of the Commune’s chief strategist is reason enough to ask whether it performed an important latent function, having little to do with military efficiency. Indeed,

in light of the abject failure of the Barricade Commission's experiment with the new monumental style of state-organized barricades, it might be argued that the blind faith that leaders of the Commune placed in the superiority of military planning over spontaneity was completely misplaced, causing them to overlook the critical social functions of the barricade.⁴⁵

Fortunately, the illustrative cases cited here offer valuable clues to the less obvious functions that barricades fulfill. When Tocqueville's friend Corcelle decided that it was the better part of valor to accede to the February insurgents' demands that he assist them, he presumably made a quick mental calculation of his odds of extracting himself from the situation unscathed should he choose to refuse. But, far more important to the decision whether to proceed with a potentially deadly firefight, the insurgents were making a simultaneous appraisal of the influence that their numbers and level of commitment were having on the behavior of even so unlikely a recruit as Corcelle. The process of barricade construction afforded insurgents repeated opportunities to observe the impact that their appeals had on all segments of the population, ranging from those favorably disposed to those frankly hostile to their goals, but focusing mainly on those wavering in between. In nineteenth-century France, in the absence of opinion polls (or even a well-elaborated system of party politics), this amounted to a direct canvass of public sentiment, from which insurgents derived invaluable intelligence concerning the likelihood of succeeding in the enterprise upon which they were about to embark.

How valid was the information thus obtained? In the case of Perdiguier's refusal to comply when accosted by insurgents in May 1871, we know that it was perfectly indicative of his personal stance toward the Commune. Though he had been a staunch supporter of the Second Republic and quite active in municipal affairs during the siege of Paris, he became an outspoken critic of the Commune's continued resistance to the Versailles government. Perdiguier's reaction at the Barrière du Trône would not in itself have had an appreciable effect upon the insurgents with whom he interacted, but it did constitute a hint worthy of being integrated into insurgents' ongoing calculations of their chances of success.⁴⁶ Indeed, had the barricade builders of May 12, 1839, or June 13, 1849, paid more attention to the indifference of the public to their early mobilization efforts, they might have avoided those costly defeats.

Even more important than individual reactions were the responses of organized entities like political clubs and neighborhood associations. For example, on 4 Prairial, 1795, militants in the rebellious faubourg Saint-Antoine gratefully received assistance with barricade construction from the nearby

Section de l'Indivisibilité, and their joint efforts were enough to intimidate the lone column led by General Kilmaine.⁴⁷ But this proved to be the only form of outside support the insurgents received, and it soon became apparent that the prognosis for a direct challenge to the authority of the National Convention was poor. When, therefore, a larger military force began to assemble at entry points around the circumference of the faubourg with the clear intention of disarming its population, resistance quickly crumbled.⁴⁸ The construction of the first three barricades had, in a sense, done its job by revealing the tepid response of the general population and the hopelessness of the insurgent cause.

Details on how this process of calibrating the relative strength of the two camps was managed are typically lacking. Participants in failed uprisings remained silent for obvious reasons, while even in triumph, insurgents displayed a natural reluctance to acknowledge that they had ever been less than fully committed or confident of victory. But we do gain occasional insights into how carefully participants weighed the probabilities on which their lives depended. For example, in 1839, as Auguste Blanqui and Armand Barbès assembled the members of the clandestine Société des saisons for a preliminary assault on the Lepage frères weapons shop, some of the more hesitant members demanded that their leaders redeem a previous pledge to make known the name of the important political personages who were backing the revolt before they were asked to begin building barricades. It fell to Blanqui's lieutenant, Martin Bernard, to respond to their request. He offered a few vague references, barren of details, regarding public figures whose names appeared on a proclamation that had been printed up for distribution by the insurgents. As he returned to his place in the ranks, Bernard surely realized that his performance had hardly satisfied his comrades' curiosity, but his situation was delicate, for he knew what they did not: that the only signatures that had not been forged were those of Blanqui, Barbès, and himself. The warier members of the group, dissatisfied with the assurances offered, promptly deserted. Those who did not share their caution went on to take part in one of the most spectacularly unsuccessful revolts of the period.⁴⁹

The June 1832 insurrection in Paris with which this book began offers a further glimpse of the convoluted calculus on which the decision to proceed often depended. When a council of republican notables gathered at the editorial offices of *Le National*, Armand Carrel remained the sole dissenter from the consensus that conditions for an uprising were ripe. He had just crossed Paris on horseback and was discouraged by what he had observed. When he asked insurgents in the street whether they had a regiment on their side, the answers

they blurted out were, to his mind at least, anything but confidence-inspiring. “We have them all,” boasted one of his interlocutors; to which Carrel replied, “That’s too many. I just want one!”⁵⁰ But when he recounted this exchange to a meeting of republican leaders, their revolutionary zeal prevented them from heeding his call for caution.

A variant of Carrel’s dilemma cropped up in the same group’s dealings with Maréchal Bertrand Clausel. Though Carrel himself refused to take part in what he deemed a futile enterprise, he reluctantly agreed to meet with this veteran of the armies of the First Republic to try to convince him to throw his support behind the uprising. The exchange that took place between Clausel and the members of a follow-up delegation amounted to the elite equivalent of the same calculation in which barricade builders throughout the city were then engaged. Clausel hesitated to commit to joining the conspirators unless they could provide assurances of the participation of at least one regiment. To this, a spokesman for the insurgent leaders offered only this curt reply: “Pardon me, Sir, but if, as we speak, we had a regiment under our orders, we wouldn’t need you!”⁵¹

Of course, the decision whether or not to take part in a budding rebellion—especially once it had reached the stage of active barricade construction—was rarely arrived at in isolation. The court-martial records of those arrested in June 1848 provided an occasional look at the lively back-and-forth surrounding the question of whether or not to take that fateful step. The case of Ferdinand-Ambroise Jacquinet, a captain in the 8th Legion of the Parisian National Guard, is particularly instructive. He was accused of having commanded a barricade in the faubourg Saint-Antoine, that familiar hotbed of sedition. Several witnesses actually testified that Jacquinet had vigorously opposed the idea of barricading the rue de Charenton; but when his opinion was ignored by the men in his company (and he himself was called a coward and threatened with physical harm), he relented rather than break ranks with his men.⁵²

To be sure, the building of barricades was not always an irrevocable act. These structures were sometimes erected even though insurgents had no firm intention of holding them if they were attacked. Indeed, the rebels’ willingness to abandon their creations at the first appearance of troops suggests that their testing function could sometimes be more important than their role in military defense. One source even intimates that this became a deliberate strategy in May 1839.⁵³ Even during the February Days, an insurrection that carried the day more easily and quickly than any other, initial attempts to raise barricades were tentative. Nougarede de Fayet told how the same men who had overturned vehicles in order to block the streets could then be seen helping to right them

alongside soldiers whose good will they were anxious to retain.⁵⁴

In brief, barricade construction needs to be thought of as a process of give-and-take among multiple parties. Achieving tactical advantage was one critical objective of the contending parties, but at the same time, information was being exchanged, attitudes shaped, consequences assessed, commitments made, and sides taken. All this occurred in an unsettled atmosphere whose indeterminacy may have best been captured by the author whose name is most closely associated with barricades. As Victor Hugo wrote: “There are accepted insurrections which we call revolutions, and there are rejected revolutions which we call uprisings. An insurrection when it breaks out is an idea which submits itself to trial by the people. If the people turns down their thumbs, then the idea is dead fruit, the insurrection has failed.”⁵⁵ Hugo might have added that barricades gave insurgents a highly efficacious means of obtaining an early read on the verdict of the people. They created a space that fostered social interactions—among the rebels themselves, to be sure, but also between them and the public, the social control forces, and even those in power—and thus allowed these various parties to gauge the costs and benefits of progressing to the stage of outright hostilities.

To Foster an Appropriate Level of Insurgent Organization

For barricades, as for any component of a well-established repertoire, a mixture of spontaneity and structure is the rule. This did not prevent commentators throughout the nineteenth century from hotly debating the role that organization should play in barricade events. Among those who advocated increased discipline and rationalization, Auguste Blanqui spoke from the greatest depth of practical experience. Looking back on decades of personal involvement in popular uprisings, he concluded that all had suffered from a debilitating lack of overall command structure and the virtual absence of coordination among isolated sites of combat. From his pragmatic perspective, “The army has just two great advantages over the people: the Chassepot rifle and organization. The latter especially is immense, irresistible.”⁵⁶

We are already familiar with the concurring opinion of Rossel, whose military training no doubt accounted for the grave misgivings he expressed regarding the improvised actions of irregular forces. Yet it was none other than Rossel’s successor as the Commune’s delegate at war who most vigorously advanced the case for “revolutionary war.” By this, Charles Delescluze meant reliance on the spontaneous and unorganized initiative of the people. In a proclamation issued on May 22, 1871, a day after the Versailles forces began

their final assault on the capital, he framed the issue in these terms: “Enough of militarism! No more staff officers braided and gilded on every seam! Make way for the people, for the fighters with bare arms! . . . The people know nothing of clever maneuvers. But when they have rifles in their hands and cobblestones under their feet, they have no fear of all the strategists of the monarchical school.”⁵⁷ And, if one were to judge solely on the basis of the disastrous performance of the ready-made edifices of the Commune’s Commission of Barricades, Delescluze’s point might seem well taken.

But it was not just strategists and theoreticians of civil unrest who weighed into this controversy. Eyewitness observers throughout the classic era of the barricade repeatedly clashed over the extent to which barricade events had—or should have—an organized character. Some saw clear evidence of coordination and planning in insurgents’ adoption of the very same tactics, their use of passwords, the speed with which barricades spread, or the fact that outbreaks occurred nearly simultaneously in disparate locations. Others, conversely, emphasized the shortage of arms and ammunition, the purely defensive posture adopted by strictly local mobilizations, and the near-total lack of widely recognized leaders as proof that advance preparation had been minimal or nonexistent.⁵⁸

It may seem entirely natural that such discrepant opinions have been expressed about the general category of barricade events, which includes some highly orchestrated affairs (like the Catholic League’s 1588 rebellion or the Société des saisons’ attempted coup of 1839) alongside others (like the 4th of Prairial, 1795, or the Parisian response to the coup of December 2, 1851) that were precipitated by events over which insurgents had no control and only after their leaders had been jailed or driven underground. It may therefore be useful to examine instances where observers arrived at contradictory assessments of one and the same event.

Jean-Baptiste Monfalcon saw proof that the 1834 uprising in Lyon constituted a carefully prearranged conspiracy in the fact that barricade construction began in all the affected streets at precisely the same hour.⁵⁹ Evidence given in subsequent courts martial appeared to corroborate his contention that insurgents were working from a comprehensive plan.⁶⁰ But this did not deter the twentieth-century historian Sébastien Charléty, who had a more complete documentary base at his disposal, from concluding, on the contrary, that the battle was, “without plan, without order” and that “the insurgents were virtually without leaders.”⁶¹ Similarly, many of those who lived through the June Days of 1848

remarked upon the considerable number of insurgents who fought in their National Guard uniforms or on barricades draped with the banners of specific National Workshops' companies, taking this as proof that the uprising had been deliberately contrived by those organizations. Others saw no credible evidence of coordination or structure and pointed out that most leftist leaders had been detained since shortly after the debacle of May 15. Norbert Truquin, who, though just fifteen at the time, helped build the June barricades, fell into this second group. His firsthand observations convinced him that the insurgents "had no leaders; everyone fought according to his whim."⁶²

The extreme example of such divergent views involved not just a single event but one and the same observer. In her narrative of the July Days of 1830, Eléonore de Boigne initially equated the insurgents' adoption of consistent tactics with the existence of an overarching organization. As she put it, they were "too general not to be prearranged." Yet, when she got a much closer look at the proceedings—thanks to a barricade that was constructed just outside the window of her apartment—she changed her opinion dramatically, declaring, "I did not see any chief supervising activities; everything seemed to be completely spontaneous"⁶³

Why is it that observers' conclusions were so often at odds? One reason is that in the typical insurrectionary situation, the stakes were high, information was incomplete, and the outcome inevitably remained in doubt. Under these circumstances, people's perceptions were especially likely to be colored by the hopes and fears that the conflict elicited in them. Once the issue had been decided, uncertainty gave way to a new dynamic that was acutely analyzed by Heinrich Heine, who remarked, in connection with the June 1832 uprising in Paris, on how the degree of organization of the insurrection remained a matter of debate. The authorities tended to exaggerate—and insurgents and their sympathizers simultaneously tended to downplay—the degree to which a well-hatched conspiracy existed. In the one case, the goal was to magnify the threat, entitling the victors to greater credit and helping to justify the repression that swiftly followed. In the other, the aim was to minimize the scope and seriousness of the rebellion and make it look entirely spontaneous in the hope of diffusing responsibility and allowing those apprehended to escape judicial penalties.⁶⁴ Despite these differences in perspective, we can briefly explore how the question of organization impinged on the use of barricades.

The Emergence of a Division of Labor. Because barricade events almost never involved a stark choice between organization and spontaneity but rather

incorporated a measure of each, a corresponding ambiguity surrounded the question of the division of labor among participants. Jean-Claude Caron has rightly pointed out that barricades had the capacity temporarily to erase distinctions of age, gender, and class in the name of solidarity.⁶⁵ This facility, most evident in the initial stages of mobilization, was, moreover, integral to the barricade's power to transgress boundaries and catalyze change. But as an insurrectionary situation progressed from incipient protest to lethal conflict, the confusion that initially reigned behind the barricade gradually gave way to an informal hierarchical order—one that mirrored, however imperfectly, arrangements in society at large. The logic of the barricade began to restructure the social as well as the physical space that the insurgents sought to control.

To understand how the barricade reconfigured that social space, we need to look beyond the myths created by iconic representations of barricade combat. In his writings on the July Days of 1830, David Pinkney reminds us how misleading it could be to base our image of the revolutionary crowd on a literal reading of a work like Delacroix's *La Liberté guidant le peuple*.⁶⁶ The three principal figures that the artist placed atop a barricade—a classically draped female bearing the tricolor flag, flanked on one side by a boy brandishing pistols and on the other by a properly attired *bourgeois*, clutching his rifle—are idiographic elements used to portray the vulnerability, innocence, and unity of the people, and therefore the justice of their resort to revolution as a means of overthrowing their ruler. As for the “common folk”—a different and more restrictive definition of “the people”—they too are visible in the painting, but only as the fallen bodies over which the central trio lead the charge, or as the mass seen indistinctly following behind.⁶⁷

As Michael Marrinan has pointed out, contemporary artists were often influenced more by the folklore of the July revolution than by a concern for accurate historical depiction: “In these works, women and children, top-hatted bourgeois gentlemen and shirt-sleeved laborers, Napoleonic veterans and students of the Ecole Polytechnique fight side by side to defend the embodiment of their collective resistance: the barricade.”⁶⁸ These observations call seriously into question whether artistic representations of barricade events can be relied upon for an accurate portrayal of what happened without confirmation from other types of sources.⁶⁹



FIGURE 28. Building a barricade. Leighton 1871, 27.

Despite the distortions that such representations potentially introduce, can they at least be useful in suggesting the diversity of those who fought on the barricades and the roles they played? Certainly, when it comes to age, the factual record shows that participants ranged from the very young to the very old. Hugo's *gamin* Gavroche had many real-life counterparts among the insurgents of the nineteenth century, and observers of an event like the June Days at times marveled at their number.⁷⁰ Yet, despite abundant anecdotal testimony (including all the attention lavished on the relatively modest contingents of students who fought in 1830 and 1848),⁷¹ systematic data—mainly casualty lists and compensation records—show that the proportion of adolescents who fought

and died on the barricades was quite small.⁷² To judge by contemporary representations (e.g., figs. 26 and 28, or, for that matter, [fig. 4](#), on page 15), they, like women, might have been a mainstay of the effort to *build* many a barricade; but once the fighting began, they were more likely to be relegated to support roles.⁷³ Quite apart from any moral scruples that older insurgents may have felt, this was a practical necessity, since weapons were usually in such short supply in the rebel ranks that those available ended up being allocated to more experienced (or at least more mature) individuals. Youths were instead used as couriers or assigned such tasks as pouring lead into bullet molds, preparing wadding for cartridges, and reloading rifles ([fig. 29](#)).⁷⁴ When, however, an insurgent was struck down by enemy fire, his rifle and his place on the barricade would, more likely than not, be taken by one of these adolescents.⁷⁵




FIGURE 29. Behind the barricade. *Illustrated London News*, March 18, 1848, 182. Drawn by Paul Gavarni.

As for the very old, they too were present, though their numbers were

probably less significant than the influence they frequently exercised over other insurgents. The most prominent representatives of the elder generation were professional revolutionaries like Blanqui and Barbès, who continued to mount the barricades in middle age and well beyond. They were frequently joined by journalists and political figures like Marc Caussidière, Ferdinand Flocon, Alexandre Ledru-Rollin, and Armand Marrast, who, though by no means old men in 1848, were already considered elder statesmen of the republican cause, on the basis of their prior insurrectionary involvements—a role that most continued to embrace in the years that followed. Delescluze, whose part in the drama of 1848 was considered in the preceding chapter, could be viewed as representative of this group. Just twenty-one when he began his insurrectionary career during the July Days, he died on the barricades of the Commune at the age of sixty-two.⁷⁶ And behind each of these recognizable figures stood a larger cohort of obscure individuals of advanced years, whose experience and convictions placed in leadership roles.⁷⁷ A comparison of arrest and compensation records for the crucial period between 1827 and 1871 shows that militants in charge of barricade sites were often entrusted with that authority on the basis of revolutionary credentials earned in one or more previous uprisings.⁷⁸

Women too fought on the barricades, though, just as in the case of adolescents, it was more common for them to be consigned to what were seen as traditional roles as canteen workers (feeding and provisioning combatants) or nurses (staffing first-aid stations that cared for the wounded).⁷⁹ The artist Paul Gavarni has offered us a more representative scene of barricade combat than Delacroix, for his depiction of women, tending the wounded from positions barely out of the line of fire, is backed up by numerous firsthand accounts (fig. 29).⁸⁰ An anonymous fourteen-year-old participant in the 1832 insurrection described how women were engaged in fraying strips of linen while old men and children made cartridges.⁸¹ Women were also posted as look-outs or asked to serve as messengers, since they enjoyed a presumption of innocence and therefore a freedom of movement that was often denied to male members of the working class, who were immediately suspect in the eyes of the authorities.⁸² Dramatic images of women rallying insurgents on barricades are, however, not lacking (fig. 30).

In reality, women's roles in barricade events extended well beyond ancillary activities virtually from the earliest instances of barricade combat. In both the First and Second Days of the Barricades, they not only helped dig up the streets but carried dislodged paving stones to the upper stories of adjoining buildings

where, from windows and rooftops, they used them, along with everything from furniture to pots of boiling water, to bombard the king's soldiers.⁸³ We have already seen that this tradition was kept alive during the Brussels revolution of 1830, when women and children rained down paving stones on Dutch troops with deadly effect. And although frequently cast in the role of helpless victims—as when the lifeless bodies of women shot down during peaceful demonstrations in both 1830 and 1848 were paraded through the streets of Paris to help rouse the people's thirst for vengeance—there is ample evidence of their having served as active combatants and even leaders.



FIGURE 30. Women on the barricade near the porte Saint-Denis, June 1848.
Illustrated London News, July 1, 1848, 426.

As early as 1648, the wife of a *parlementaire* is said to have ordered the beating of the drums and given the signal to begin building barricades in the quartier Saint-Jacques.⁸⁴ A contemporary collection of primary sources on the 1830 revolution not only mentions the part played by women and children in barricade construction but describes an incident in which women attacked a column of the Swiss Guard.⁸⁵ Indeed, the first image to depict a female barricade

combatant of which I am aware is a watercolor, painted by Louis-Philippe's son François, celebrating a "barricade heroine" being carried in triumph in the aftermath of the July revolution.⁸⁶ Perhaps the most celebrated image of this type portrayed an "Amazon" poised atop a Prague barricade in June 1848, holding a musket and dressed in a traditional Slavic costume.⁸⁷

Still, female combatants remained the exception, and those that took part in fighting did so as individuals, at least through the middle of the nineteenth century. Though anecdotal information abounds, the best systematic sources confirm that in the aggregate, the presence of women among those arrested in the wake of nineteenth-century insurrections ranged from 1 to 4 percent.⁸⁸ The all-female legion known as the Vésuviennes, founded soon after the fall of the Orléanist monarchy, may have demanded that the provisional government provide its members with arms and a role in the defense of the Republic, but I have been unable to find any evidence that their demand was met or that they actually took part in the June Days on either side.⁸⁹

Thus, it was not until the "bloody week" of May 1871 that organized female detachments assumed a prominent role in combat. Through associations such as the Union des femmes and several local vigilance committees, Louise Michel, Nathalie le Mel, Elisabeth Dmitrieff, and others were able to coordinate the participation of women in constructing and defending barricades.⁹⁰ Indeed, female combatants, who sometimes fought in National Guard uniform, were frequently said to be more uncompromising advocates of the insurgent cause than their male counterparts.⁹¹ Though there is abundant testimony concerning women's active participation in this epic battle, the conditions of civil war—and, more particularly, the summary executions conducted by the Versailles forces after the fighting had ended—make it especially difficult to specify the extent of their involvement with precision.⁹² All that we can reasonably conclude is that female deaths in the struggle numbered in the hundreds (and possibly the thousands); and that if we include, along with combatants, those who cared for the wounded, helped erect barricades, or merely provided more passive forms of support and encouragement to the insurrection, as many as ten thousand women may have taken part in some way.⁹³

As for the question of class, the pattern is similar: on the one hand, a good deal of anecdotal information, some of it contradictory, indicating the wide range of social strata represented on the barricades. On the other hand, systematic data from the major events of 1830 and 1848 suggest a clear working-class preponderance in the aggregate. Thus, in providing circumstantial

detail concerning the Parisian insurrection of 1832, Heine allowed himself the bold assertion that the lower classes were less well represented than had generally been assumed and that the insurgent ranks were filled mainly with the likes of students, artists, and journalists.⁹⁴ While it is conceivable that intellectuals and members of the middle classes may have been overrepresented in a highly circumscribed event like the one in question, the records that have survived from the large-scale insurrections of 1830 and 1848 clearly show that the distribution of participants' occupations rather closely mirrored those of the general population. In mid-nineteenth-century Paris, this meant that the great majority of participants were skilled artisans, a generalization that is, at this point, far too well grounded in empirical research to need elaboration here.

Still, it makes perfect sense that particular occupational specialties would be of special utility in connection with barricade construction. An official report on the Parisian insurrection of 1827 contended that "no individual belonging to the respectable class [*la classe honnête*] of the population participated in the construction of barricades," attributing the structures built in the rue Saint-Martin instead to "men dressed in masons' work clothes."⁹⁵ The autobiography of Martin Nadaud, the most publicly recognizable mason of his generation, suggests a different picture from the one painted by Heine.⁹⁶ In the very same insurrection of June 1832, Nadaud and his co-worker Luquet could be found in the thick of barricade construction in the rue Saint-Martin. Indeed, Luquet was arrested and briefly detained. Nadaud, by way of explaining the resurgence of Parisian secret societies after the 1832 defeat, relates how he, Luquet and two other masons from the Creuse were warmly applauded at a meeting of the Société des droits de l'homme when they announced that in the event of a future insurrection, they knew where to find crowbars, hammers, and planks with which to build barricades.

Nadaud was hardly an isolated case. The most formidable of the barricades raised during the Rouen insurrection of April 1848 was supervised by a plaster worker named Groult;⁹⁷ and the memoirs of Martial Senisse intimate that it was no mere chance that he, a mason, was appointed to assist Gaillard *père*, a shoemaker, on the Commune's Barricade Commission.⁹⁸ In each case, the man's practical experience uniquely equipped him for the task at hand.

Of course, it was not the manual trades alone that could qualify an individual for special responsibilities on the barricades. Any doctor, nurse, or medical student associated with the insurgent cause was likely to end up in the *ambulances* offering help to the wounded.⁹⁹ Eléonore de Boigne attributed the

authority enjoyed by the students of the Ecole Polytechnique in 1830 in part to the usefulness of their training as military engineers when it came to the construction of barricades. The advantages of other occupational specializations may have been less immediately obvious. Richard Wagner recounts how Gottfried Semper, designer of the Dresden opera house, turned up in the uniform of a rifleman, ready to do his part in that city's 1849 insurrection. He was so appalled at the "highly faulty" manner in which the initial barricades had been built that, at Wagner's urging, he addressed his criticisms and suggestions to the military commission in charge of insurgent fortifications, which quickly put his expertise to good use. Paul Martine cites the example of a colleague named Dianoux, also an architect, whose skills qualified him to oversee the rapid construction of barricades in the place Péreire in May 1871.¹⁰⁰

More commonly, however, the special contributions of nonworkers on the barricades were primarily political or organizational in nature. In the absence of formal political parties, it was newspapers that often provided coherence to opposition movements. The printing press enabled key leaders of the French Revolution to wield influence over the insurrectionary crowd, most clearly perhaps through the association of Desmoulins and Danton with the *Vieux Cordelier*, Marat with the *Ami du Peuple*, and Hébert with the *Père Duchesne*. Though it remained unusual to see such figures actually shouldering a rifle, the tradition of direct participation was carried on by the likes of Auguste Fabre in 1830, Marc Caussidière in 1848, Alexandre Ledru-Rollin in 1849, and Henri Rochefort in 1870, all of whom were journalists as well as instigators of barricade events.¹⁰¹

Both before the era of mass-circulation newspapers and later—notably in periods when press censorship was especially severe—political organizations, whether open or clandestine, fulfilled much the same function. In its facilitating role, if not in its substantive political outlook, the Catholic League of 1588 was the distant precursor of the Société des droits de l'homme in 1832 and 1834, and of its successor, the Société des saisons, in 1839. From the ranks of such groups rose the likes of Cossé-Brissac, Raspail, and Blanqui, men whose names are forever linked to the history of the barricade. Less well known but often just as effective were individuals who briefly emerged from obscurity to assume temporary leadership over an insurgent movement. Such a figure was Louis Pujol, a cadre in the Parisian National Workshops, who gave a stirring speech on the eve of the June Days that hardened the attitude of the crowd and set the rendezvous for insurgents to gather the next morning, rifles in hand, to build barricades and engage government forces in armed struggle. Similarly, much of

the credit for the success of both the July 1830 and February 1848 revolutions should arguably go to the mostly anonymous National Guard commanders who brought their units over to the insurgents.

The deference shown to men with military training was a special case of the more general regard that barricade combatants displayed for those with relevant skills and experience. Insurgents turned instinctively to veterans, even when the latter's expertise had little to do with barricade construction or street warfare. So it is not surprising to find a man named Jamod, who commanded the barricades in the quarter where he resided in 1830, being identified primarily as a "former soldier" and only incidentally by his civilian trade (ironworker).¹⁰² Fernand Rude, in his account of the 1831 silkworkers' uprising in Lyon, took note of the major role played by veterans of Napoléon's armies, who were more battle-hardened than the then-active troops sent against them. By drawing upon these "Rhône volunteers" for its cadres, that insurrection reaped the immediate advantage of tried-and-true leadership. Just as opportunistic were participants in the Paris revolt of 1832 who accepted a recent defector from the regular army's 62nd regiment, one Vigouroux, as commander of their last-ditch stand at the Eglise Saint-Merri.¹⁰³

The same pattern persisted in 1848. An anonymous observer of the February Days identified the two men issuing orders at the massive barricade in the faubourg Montmartre as noncommissioned officers who had served in Algeria.¹⁰⁴ Transcripts of the courts martial held after the June Days included examples like Paul Saintard, who had been a member of the *montagnards*, or republican guards, organized by Caussidière following the February revolution but was caught up in a swirl of events leading to his June arrest as a *chef de barricade* in the Jardin des Plantes quarter.¹⁰⁵ In fact, regard for military qualifications was often a more important credential for leadership roles than nationality. In 1848, the reputation of Poles as experts in insurrectionary combat helped win them positions of responsibility in German as well as French uprisings. And in May 1871, *Le National* reported that a former officer in Garibaldi's army of liberation had been chosen to oversee the construction of barricades near the place de la Guillotière in Lyon.¹⁰⁶

As the historian Charles Schmidt observes of the June Days, "Each barricade had its impromptu organizer."¹⁰⁷ Those thrust into positions of authority were assigned a variety or more or less grandiose titles by their peers (or assumed them on their own.) Caussidière spoke of summoning "a few *chefs de barricades*" to give them instructions during the February revolution.¹⁰⁸ Charles

Leland, Heine's American translator, did not hesitate to call himself "a captain of barricades" or to refer to those who helped him pry up paving stones in that same insurrection as "my followers."¹⁰⁹ A hat maker named Hibruit—another former republican guard, it would appear—was tried in absentia for his role in the June Days based largely on written appeals addressed to other insurgents in which he affected the title of *commandant* of the barricades in his neighborhood.¹¹⁰

In short, despite the sometimes facile assumption that anarchy and chaos reigned behind the barricades, the surviving records of nineteenth-century insurrections demonstrate that a semblance of order more or less quickly emerged. This included a simple division of labor and the germ of a command structure that granted authority on the basis of many of the same criteria used to structure everyday social life: age, gender, class, experience, and qualifications or merit (as those concepts were understood in the anomalous circumstances of an insurrectionary situation). But in the life-or-death struggle that could be expected to follow the construction of barricades, this might not be enough. In order to succeed, insurgents' most essential task was to neutralize or turn to their own advantage the terrible destructive power arrayed against them.

To Fraternize with Soldiers and Police

Insurrectionary situations are characterized by a fundamental asymmetry, one that militates against the insurgent cause, but that barricades are well suited to help rectify. Supremacy in armament and equipment, complemented by the discipline and hierarchical coordination that are the hallmarks of military organization, normally confer upon government troops an insuperable advantage over irregular forces, however highly motivated. This disparity has, of course, been widely remarked upon, and the conditions under which insurgents can overcome this handicap have been endlessly debated. In *Les misérables*, Victor Hugo observes that "these battles of one against one hundred must always end in the crushing of the rebels unless the spirit of revolution, spontaneously arising, casts its flaming sword in the balance."¹¹¹ While essentially correct, Hugo's formulation seems imprecise or misleading in its estimation of what determines the outcome of such a struggle. On the one hand, insurgents do not always find themselves outnumbered, while numerical superiority is by no means indispensable to the forces of order, which rely for victory on their tactical preeminence.¹¹² On the other hand, when an insurrection does succeed, it is rarely because the populace, unaided, has been able to defeat the army in head-to-head combat.

Trotsky, who spoke from ample personal experience, described the crucial dynamic in far more pragmatic terms: “There is no doubt that the fate of every revolution at a certain point is decided by a break in the disposition of the army. Against a numerous, disciplined, well-armed, and ably led military force, unarmed or almost unarmed masses of the people cannot possibly gain a victory.”¹¹³ This is the same conclusion reached by Katherine Chorley in *Armies and the Art of Revolution*, the work that has most systematically examined the conditions governing the outcome of civil conflicts. For her, too, the simple rule of thumb is that no popular insurrection can succeed against the energetic opposition of trained troops whose esprit de corps remains intact.¹¹⁴

Yet, as the history of nineteenth-century France makes clear, some insurrections *did* succeed despite the inherent difficulties they confronted. Based on a varied sample of mainly European revolutionary events, Chorley has analyzed the circumstances in which insurgents were occasionally able to overcome the odds against them. All relate to the coherence and loyalty of the armed forces charged with repressing the unrest. Division within the officer corps constitutes the first and most crucial consideration since, in well-integrated units, officers command the obedience of their soldiers and generally side with the regime from which their authority derives.¹¹⁵ If, however, the officer corps wavers, then the common soldiers’ conditions of service become the critical determinants of whether the rank and file are likely to defect, especially where ordinary soldiers’ tour of duty is short and their practical grievances have been allowed to fester without effective remedial action.

Unfortunately for insurgents, they are rarely in a position to exert any meaningful influence over the preconditions of disaffection among the troops. As a result, the success or failure of an insurrection is more commonly decided by the last of the issues that Chorley identifies: the degree to which ordinary soldiers can be isolated from contact with the general population and therefore from attempts to sway their loyalties. An insurrectionary situation thus amounts to a desperate struggle between opposing camps to control access to the rank and file and secure their allegiance. The tactics at the disposal of army commanders range from persuasion to coercion. Their initial recourse is to appeal to soldiers’ sense of duty and patriotism as a way of shoring up morale. When necessary, they may also offer practical incentives like hazard pay, the promise of supplemental leaves, and rewards like the “liquor and sausages” to which Marx, in *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, attributed the loyalty of Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte’s troops in 1851.¹¹⁶ Still, the most reliable expedient of all is simply to confine the troops to their barracks whenever civil unrest threatens and rely on

military sanctions to enforce a strict separation between soldiers and the population they are expected to keep in check.¹¹⁷

The goal of insurgents was, of course, to break down that isolation, communicate directly with the troops, and sap their willingness to fight by putting a human face on the insurrection and its goals. To this end, militants would march through the city streets, particularly those where barracks were located, singing traditional airs, chanting slogans, and shouting out appeals like “Vive la Ligne!”—Long live the Army of the Line!—in the hope of melting the resolve of regular army units. This, however, was far less effective than the sort of personal interaction that barricades made possible. Whenever troops came up against one of these structures, whether on routine patrol or because they had been ordered to attack some outpost of insurrection, the initial encounter almost invariably produced a moment when, though actual fighting had not yet begun, the two sides confronted one another at close quarters (see, e.g., [fig. 2](#), on [page 11](#)).

The ensuing exchanges might be fleeting but were typically impassioned. In a scene depicted in a number of nineteenth-century images, insurgents at a barricade, their shirts torn open to bare their chests, defiantly challenge the troops: “Shoot then! If you dare!” ([fig. 31](#)).¹¹⁸ Such a confrontation could lead to either of two unthinkable outcomes: the individual issuing the challenge might instantly be shot dead by soldiers not so different in age or social origin from himself; or, more rarely, military discipline might disintegrate because, in spite of all their training, the troops refused to fire. Whatever the denouement, such encounters occurred only because the construction of a barricade had brought the parties face to face, unleashing powerful social forces that neither side fully comprehended or controlled.

Truquin recounts an incident from the February Days that showed how the protagonists in such engagements sometimes found ways of conveying their sentiments with considerable subtlety even when few words were exchanged. Troops, arriving in the rue de l’Echaudé, where insurgents were actively preparing barricades, were greeted with cries of “Long live reform!” and “Long live the Army of the Line!” The soldiers, who had drawn up in formation just twenty-five yards in front of the principal barricade, proceeded to fire a volley into the air as a way of signaling their nonaggressive intent. The insurgents immediately responded in kind. Thunderous but harmless exchanges of gunfire, all aimed toward the sky, continued for fifteen minutes before the troops withdrew to further acclamations by the insurgents. The unique, contested social space created by the barricade had facilitated a form of interchange that, in this

instance at least, ended without bloodshed, a conclusion in which every member of both camps had a vital interest. In the event, this incident provided an accurate portent of how the insurrection would play out over the next twenty-four hours.¹¹⁹



FIGURE 31. “Shoot, then! If you dare!” A scene from the 1848 revolution, based on an etching by Denis-Auguste Raffet, reproduced in Dayot [1897] n.d., 2: 30.

The ultimate goal for insurgents was, of course, that genuine commingling of forces known as *fraternization*, for they assumed, with some justice, that face-to-face contact and a frank sharing of perspectives would forge an indissoluble bond capable of overcoming any initial antagonism. They thus grasped intuitively that such exchanges offered their best—perhaps their only—chance of prevailing. Even a handful of defections among army units had the potential to break the back of the repression by causing military commanders to reassess the reliability of their troops and withdraw forces to prevent the spread of disaffection, thus shifting the momentum of the struggle. Savvy insurgents almost invariably directed their first entreaties to the National Guard, which, by virtue of being a citizens’ militia, could never be completely insulated from

contact with the people. The Guard was the natural bridge between the army and the civilian population, for members' loyalties always hung in the balance. For leaders on both sides, the political orientation of this corps was considered the most reliable predictor of the outcome of civil conflict. The watchword of experienced observers of nineteenth-century unrest became "As goes the National Guard, so goes the insurrection."

Henri Rochefort (who, two decades later, would play a key role in the barricade events of the late Second Empire) has provided us with a glimpse of how this process of intermingling operated during the February Days and of the assumptions, however naïve, that insurgents made about its efficacy.¹²⁰ Though he and his schoolmates treated much of this interlude as a lark that allowed them to escape the boredom of the classroom, there were sobering moments as well. Rochefort recounted how, as a member of a crowd of loiterers stationed on a sidewalk in the place du Panthéon, he was slow to recognize the implications of the arrival of a regiment of infantrymen that had taken up positions on the opposite side of the broad rue Soufflot:

I was in the front row, completely exposed, and I affected a tone full of indifference to ask one of the men who was distributing arms to our group: "Are those soldiers going to attack us?"

"Of course not," he responded. "Those are friends. They have fraternized. Just yell 'Long live the Army of the Line!'"

So we began shouting at the top of our lungs, "Long live the Army of the Line!" and all the more enthusiastically since, had they not fraternized, the adventure would doubtless have ended with a bloodbath that would have been terrible for our side, none of whom knew how to shoulder a rifle.¹²¹

Such amicable exchanges between opposing forces might take place at the moment of first contact or even during lulls in the fighting. And whenever practical, it proved particularly effective for insurgents to be accompanied by women and children. Because they were seen as peace-loving and especially vulnerable, their presence cast the uprising in a softened light and perhaps called to the soldiers' minds the families they had left at home. Eugène Pelletan relates how, during the February Days: "In the market quarter, women threw themselves into the ranks, hugged soldiers, offered them food, and cried out to them: 'My children, don't fire on our sons, our fathers, our husbands.'" ¹²²

Victorine Brocher, perhaps describing that very same scene, tells how, even as market women were taking advantage of a break in the February hostilities to launch their appeals, workers and soldiers traded good-natured barbs. Her comments underscore the special moderating role played by those whose age or gender made them seem less threatening: "[Insurgents] gaily continued to put up

their barricades, right before the eyes of the soldiers, singing all the while. A few Parisian *gamins* laughingly called out to the officers: ‘Hey, don’t shoot without at least warning us! Yell “Look out!” first.’ Even the officers laughed at that.”¹²³ This sort of good-natured repartee, so striking in the midst of a mortal conflict, could have a marked leavening effect, possible only because barricades were not just a site of combat but also a locus for social interaction.

The insurgents were not the only ones who recognized how damaging an impact on soldierly morale the presence of women and children could have. After the fall of Paris in 1871, General d’Aurelles de Paladine testified that the mingling of women and children among army soldiers was directly responsible for two regiments refusing to obey orders.¹²⁴ Indeed, military commanders were sometimes prepared to advocate draconian measures aimed at protecting their troops from this pernicious influence. Maréchal Bugeaud, who had firsthand knowledge of the disastrous effect fraternization had produced in 1848, circulated the following directive to his subordinates when he assumed command over the Lyon garrison at the start of the following year:

Troops must never let themselves be approached by a column of rioters or by women and children. The infantry’s hesitation to fire can compromise it and cause it to be disarmed. The rioters must be ordered to stop at a distance of two hundred yards, and if they don’t obey, firing should begin immediately. Women and children carry out the killing of officers; they are the avant-garde of the enemy and must be treated as such. . . . Under no circumstances should anyone enter into communication or parley with the rioters; the commanding general alone has that right.¹²⁵

Of course, with or without their commanders’ permission, officers in the field often had no choice but to engage insurgents in conversation when barricades literally stood in the way of carrying out their mission. In the Paris revolt of June 1832, an infantry sergeant sought to gain passage for his detachment by promising the defenders of a barricade in the rue Aubry-le-Boucher that his soldiers would not fire. The insurgent leader rejected this request, vowing that the troops would be allowed to pass only after laying down their arms—and seizing the opportunity to urge the entire unit to cross over instead to the cause of the people. Sensing his soldiers’ reluctance to fight, the officer ordered an immediate withdrawal, a move that was greeted with cries of “Long live the Army of the Line!” from the ranks of the rebels. He may have been aware of other recent incidents in which detachments had displayed a singular lack of enthusiasm for battle, or he may simply have shared the perspective of one captain who responded to a similar situation just blocks away by scribbling this note to his battalion commander: “Sir, I beg you to accept my resignation . . . and to permit me to return home. Allow me to assure you of my obedience when

we make war with foreigners.”¹²⁶

In brief, what I have tried to show with this scattering of examples is how barricades helped insurgents to surmount the inherent difficulties to which Chorley and others have pointed. The activities surrounding their construction and defense generated or reinforced bonds of solidarity among the partisans of revolt; facilitated the search for new recruits; allowed an internal division of labor to emerge; identified effective leaders; and fostered a level of organization that irregular forces would otherwise have been unlikely to attain. They also helped participants gauge the extent of support or resistance among the general population, as well as the level of resolve within the army or police. In sum, barricades permitted insurgents to mobilize the crucial resources—material, social, and moral—without which they were destined to fail.

We earlier saw how barricades interrupted the field communications of military units and cut them off from the overarching command structure, thus depriving them of an essential benefit of military organization. Yet, even more important was the ability of barricades to break through the isolation of ordinary soldiers from the general population. Once fraternization had been initiated, the rebels could contest the government’s view of the world before the only audience that truly mattered: the troops summoned to defend the social order that the insurgents sought to overthrow.

Barricades made possible this challenge to the government’s legitimacy because they defined a social space in which insurgents, most of whom had never previously met, came together with a powerful sense of common purpose. They marked a break with everyday experience and private preoccupations. The sudden rise of these massive structures epitomized the way that the collective will could easily accomplish what individuals could never hope to bring about. By offering up an alternative frame of reference in which what had seemed impossible all at once appeared attainable, they helped generate an irresistible sense of exaltation and transcendence. And yet, as momentous as its sociological implications may be, the barricade’s significance in the history of contention cannot be appreciated without also attending to its cultural dimension.

PRACTICAL VERSUS SYMBOLIC FUNCTIONS OF THE BARRICADE

“Rebellion in the old style, the street fight with barricade, which up to 1848 gave everywhere the final decision, was to a considerable extent obsolete [after the June Days],” Friedrich Engels observes in his 1895 introduction to Karl Marx’s

The Class Struggles in France.¹²⁷ He then goes on to point out, correctly, that it had *always* been exceptional for insurgents to defeat military forces and that, in those rare instances where they did prove victorious, success depended on “making the troops yield to moral influences.” Still, his essential premise concerning the decline in the effectiveness of the barricade needs to be critically examined and refined. This section therefore begins with a review of the remarkable results that barricades have at times achieved—both before and after the target period that Engels had in mind—preliminary to arriving at an assessment of how they have developed over time. Only against this background can we appreciate one of the most striking anomalies in the history of the barricade: that, even as its practical utility diminished, its use, far from coming to an end, appeared, on the contrary, to flourish.

On the Efficacy of Barricades

For the period covered by this study, and as measured by their magnitude and outcome, the four best-known successful instances of barricade use—1588, 1648, 1830, and February 1848—all took place in France. Still, it is possible to cite many other events where the technique produced remarkable results, albeit on a smaller scale or in a losing cause. During the 1830 revolution in Brussels, for example, one barricade in the marché aux Porcs stymied the advance of the Dutch army despite the latter’s clear superiority in both numbers and firepower. According to C. J. Mackintosh, a few dozen Belgians held out against 800 infantrymen and 300 cavalrymen, who also had four cannon at their disposal.¹²⁸ The troops’ inability to turn their artillery to account and their consequent defeat could perhaps be attributed to a lack of familiarity with this novel style of urban warfare, which subjected them to a hail of paving stones and scrap metal thrown down from windows and rooftops by “noncombatants.” But that excuse could hardly explain the difficulties that the French army, well acquainted with barricade tactics, encountered in Lyon in 1831. Units dispatched to quell the November silk workers’ rebellion were “halted at every turn by barricades against which even artillery proved powerless.”¹²⁹ Their experience demonstrated that, under favorable circumstances, these structures could stand up against even the most formidable weaponry at the military’s disposal.

A year later, in the Paris insurrection of June 1832, a barricade in the rue Aubry-le-Boucher managed to resist a barrage from two cannon and multiple onslaughts by infantry. We have seen that Armand Carrel, one of the foremost leaders of the republican Left, had expressed his skepticism about the utility of barricades, claiming that the people’s victory in 1830 had been a fluke. His

arguments did nothing to shake the conviction of the actual combatants that, in the hands of a tight-knit band of conspirators, the technique would all but ensure victory. The resilience of the barricade they constructed was due, in no small part, to the fact that it was protected by the flanking fire of snipers posted at the windows of adjacent buildings. Though the attackers were eventually able to use an encircling movement to take the barricade from behind, their repeated failure to overcome it by frontal assault was seen as proof of the tactic's continued efficacy.¹³⁰

Engels might be expected to object that these examples all date from the heyday of the barricade in the first half of the nineteenth century, when the effectiveness of the technique was still intact. As for the similar incidents recorded during the insurrections of the middle years of the nineteenth century—compare, for instance, Hugo's description of one June 1848 barricade, "defended by eighty men against ten thousand [that] held out for three days"—Engels would no doubt have dismissed them as literary hyperbole or ascribed insurgents' success to the fact that counterinsurrectionary tactics had not yet been perfected.¹³¹

Yet, as late as the time of the Paris Commune, observers continued to pay tribute to the effectiveness of the barricade, sometimes in terms that might seem, at first glance, grossly exaggerated. Maxime du Camp, generally no friend to insurgent causes, remarked upon an 1871 barricade in the rue de Chateaudun where five defenders stymied the advance of troops for an entire day. He mentioned another where a single individual, equipped with six rifles, fooled a squadron of soldiers into believing that his barricade, located at an intersection of the boulevard des Capucines, was so heavily defended that they wasted several hours trying to reduce it with an artillery barrage. When his ammunition eventually ran out, this lone insurgent quietly slipped away. It was only after a bystander informed the skeptical attackers that the barricade had in fact been abandoned that it was finally seized.¹³² P.-O. Lissagaray, every bit as fervent a partisan of the Commune as du Camp was a detractor, took note of a barricade manned by 100 insurgents that held out for two crucial hours, slowing the progress of the Versailles forces despite the deployment of two regiments of troops and concentrated artillery fire.¹³³

Technical Adaptations

While it would be possible to multiply, almost at will, the number of anecdotes purporting to demonstrate the tactical advantages that the barricade could, well into the 1800s, confer upon insurgent forces, it would also be misleading.

Despite the prodigious results achieved in special circumstances and a couple of resounding victories in large-scale uprisings, the reality was that the barricade's utility steadily diminished, from a strictly military perspective, as the century wore on. The introduction of the railroad and telegraph in the 1840s may have accelerated the steep decline in the fortunes of insurrectionary initiatives, virtually none of which succeeded in the second half of the nineteenth century, but changes in the military equation had already made their influence felt as early as 1830.

The most obvious of those changes involved the army's willingness to employ artillery to put down domestic uprisings. With rare exceptions, these weapons had previously been reserved for use in foreign wars.¹³⁴ That restraint had clearly been lifted by the time of the July revolution in Paris, during which Charles X's commanders showed little compunction about obliterating barricades with their cannon. Though this proved to be of little avail, it seems to have opened the floodgates, for the use of artillery against barricades became standard practice from that time forward, both in France and abroad. A partial listing of incidents in which the authorities adopted this tactic over the next two decades includes Paris in 1832 and 1848; Lyon in 1831, 1834, and 1849; Marseille and Rouen in 1848; Geneva in 1846; Berlin, Milan, Prague, Frankfurt, and Cologne in 1848; and Rome in 1849.¹³⁵ The use of skilled sappers and the adaptation of other techniques borrowed from siege warfare meant that, as long as both the government and the army command structure remained firm, even the most substantial barricades could be reduced to rubble in relatively short order. Ironically, in the aftermath of the June Days, plans were made to equip army units with shields (*boucliers*) termed "mobile barricades" or "counterbarricades" (fig. 32).¹³⁶




FIGURE 32. Artist's conception of a mobile barricade in 1848. *L'Illustration* n.d. [1848–49], 259; text 263.

Of course, insurgents were just as inventive in coming up with counter-measures aimed at blunting the army's superior firepower. These included, for example, the use of multiple barricades, sometimes separated by only fifty or a hundred yards, at the side of which narrow passages were left open. This arrangement allowed the defenders of a forward position to quickly retreat behind a second line of defense once concentrated cannon fire made their initial position untenable.¹³⁷ In some cases, insurgents anticipated the effects of artillery barrages by building their barricades in the shape of a V, the point of which was aimed squarely at the position from which the cannonade was expected to originate. The force of the cannonballs thus caused the prow of the

barricade to collapse back upon itself, absorbing the blow, compressing the materials from which the barricade was made even more tightly, and preserving the structure's integrity. We have previously noted that insurgents frequently sought out the iron grill-work that enclosed public parks, adorned outdoor monuments, or embellished the balconies of residential buildings, using it to consolidate the heaps of paving stones in which it was embedded. The rebels also learned that the most formidable barricades were those firmly tied into adjoining buildings, allowing them to add structural strength even as they exploited the opportunity to establish covering fire from overlooking windows.

Still, for all the ingenuity that insurgents displayed in making these adjustments, most astute observers had concluded that the usefulness of the barricade had seriously waned by the time of the Paris Commune. Rossel and Gaillard, whose opinions as leaders of the revolt against the government carried considerable weight, certainly had little faith in the military effectiveness of improvised barricades. As for Blanqui—who, even at his advanced age, would doubtless have been in the thick of the fighting had he not, with characteristically bad timing, been arrested just a week before the insurrection that established the Paris Commune—he had become convinced of the inadequacies of traditional barricades much earlier in the century. He argued that extraordinary popular élan had largely been responsible for the triumph of the revolution of 1830 (fig. 33), and that the February revolution had succeeded in 1848 only because of Louis-Philippe's passivity. Blanqui considered the June Days a more revealing test, and like most of the smaller midcentury events in which he participated, that insurgency had been an unambiguous failure.¹³⁸

Engels's assessment of the barricade's efficacy actually varied a good deal over time. In the informal division of labor he and Marx had worked out, he had assumed primary responsibility for military strategy. He therefore provided frequent commentary on insurrectionary tactics. As the articles published in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* during the summer of 1848 make clear, Engels was a zealous proponent of barricade combat prior to the June Days. He even briefly served as "inspector of barricades" in the Elberfeld insurrection of May 1849.¹³⁹ His enthusiasm at this early stage in his career as a insurrectionary leader might seem exaggerated, given the mixed results achieved by the barricade events of that period. The pessimistic view he later developed—as expressed in the passage cited at the beginning of this section, written only a few months before his death—initially appeared better grounded. If ripe reflection on almost a half century of intervening history had persuaded Engels that the golden era of barricades had passed, it was for reasons that anticipated the subsequent analyses

of Trotsky and Chorley.¹⁴⁰



FIGURE 33. Combat in the rue Saint-Antoine, July 1830. Blanc [1830–40] 1882, 47.



FIGURE 34. The great barricade of June 1848 at the entrance of the rue du faubourg Saint-Antoine, seen from the place de la Bastille. *Illustrated London News*, July 1, 1848, 415.

Referring specifically to Berlin, Engels mentions the “long, straight, broad streets” that urban renewal projects had introduced to European cities as one factor that had reinforced the advantage held by the armed forces.¹⁴¹ This argument had originally been made with reference to the rebuilding of Paris under the Second Empire, resulting in the replacement of the tortuous alleyways of the central districts with expansive thoroughfares. This was thought to have facilitated the rapid deployment of troops and their ability to train artillery fire on barricades from a safe distance, with devastating results. A similar controversy has swirled around the substitution of macadam for the more traditional paving stones, so much favored by barricade builders.¹⁴² However, there seems to be little warrant for the assumption that either Baron Haussmann or Napoléon III instituted this change with the *intention* of curbing Parisians’ penchant for rebellion.¹⁴³ As figure 34 shows, barricades allowed insurgents to assert control even in broad boulevards and open public squares before the great reconstruction projects of the 1850s and 1860s, and they continued to do so after. Though the widening of the main axes may have aided the troops’ mobility

and made the use of artillery more effective, the principal impact that Haussmann's *grands travaux* had on the incidence of insurrection resulted from the displacement of a large share of the rebellious working-class population from the warrens of the inner city to the faubourgs at its periphery.¹⁴⁴

STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENTS

As we have already seen, a repertoire of contention evolves through reciprocal attempts at innovation that are part of the continual tug-of-war between social control forces and insurgents. In the case of the barricade, it might be argued, nineteenth-century military authorities shared fully in helping along the evolution of the barricade. Among their most important contributions was to come up with numerous proposals for countering the threat of barricade combat, all of which could be reduced, in the final analysis, to variations on just two basic plans which were tried out with wildly inconsistent results. The first and arguably more intuitive approach was to dispatch troops to any reported hotspot at the first sign that insurgents had begun barricade construction in order to nip the incipient uprising in the bud and discourage broader mobilization. The alternative was to allow barricades to be built and the insurrection to develop to the point where distinct centers emerged. These could then be crushed with overwhelming force without ever incurring the risk that small individual detachments of troops would be cut off, demoralized, and either disarmed or won over by insurgents.

In commenting on the debate between the advocates of those strategies of repression, most observers have correctly dated the French army's definitive choice of the second approach from the June Days of 1848. They rarely acknowledge, however, that General Louis-Eugène Cavaignac's deliberate withholding of forces was actually nothing new. It had already been tried in 1827, when the authorities purposely restrained the police, allowing the uprising to gain a firm foothold while they prepared the troops necessary for a coordinated attack in massive numbers. This resulted in a convincing victory over the insurgents, though it also gave rise to accusations that high-ranking officials had actually been complicit in allowing, if not encouraging or even organizing, the disturbances.¹⁴⁵ Well-informed observers like Rémusat considered these criticisms misguided (or even cynically motivated by the opposition's desire to gain political advantage) but recognized the real damage they did to the monarchy's credibility.¹⁴⁶

This may help explain why the opposite tack was taken in 1830, and again in

February of 1848, with equally disastrous consequences. Chateaubriand characterized the strategy employed by Maréchal Auguste Wiest de Marmont during the July Days as one better suited to a force of 30,000 soldiers than the relative handful over which he actually disposed.¹⁴⁷ Though the initial strike force was never bested in actual fighting, the detachments it left behind to maintain communications with headquarters were too small and too isolated to withstand insurgents' efforts to fraternize. Similarly, in 1848, the decision to confront insurgents as soon as barricade construction began left troops dispersed over a great many sites all across the capital, where they became the immediate target of efforts to win them over.¹⁴⁸

The defection of even a small number of units often had a disproportionate and contrary impact on the two sides. Social control forces became deeply disheartened even as insurgents experienced sudden jubilation. Both reactions were completely disconnected from any material effect that such small shifts could have had on the military situation. Cavaignac was an attentive student of this dynamic, and his strategy as supreme commander during the June Days reflected an analysis consciously worked out in reaction to the mistakes of his predecessors. When members of the Assembly demanded to know why he had not prevented the construction of barricades in Paris on June 23, he gave this curt reply: "Do you think I am here to defend Parisians and their National Guard? Let them defend their city and their businesses themselves! I am not going to disperse my troops. I remember 1830 and I remember last February. If just one of my companies is disarmed, I'll blow my brains out. I refuse to live with that dishonor!"¹⁴⁹

The vehemence of this reaction could perhaps be explained by the blow to General Cavaignac's military pride that even a single incident of this kind would represent, but it seems more likely to have been motivated by the specter of the far greater disgrace of having overseen the army's defeat by shabby groups of irregulars. History had shown that demoralization and wholesale defections could be set in motion by seemingly innocent acts of fraternization, and Cavaignac had drawn the obvious conclusion from France's two nineteenth-century revolutions: barricade fighting against civilian insurgents was a highly specialized form of urban warfare that required a specially adapted response. His success during the June Days depended on acknowledging and counteracting the unique potential of this distinctive insurgent tactic.

ON THE PERSISTENCE OF BARRICADES

We have seen that the effectiveness of barricade combat has been tied to changes in repressive strategies, advances in military technology, improvements in transport and communications, and even transformations of the physical layout and demographic makeup of nineteenth-century cities. The odds of an insurgent victory, hardly encouraging during the first half of the nineteenth century, generally became more remote after 1848. From the purely pragmatic viewpoint that Engels adopted in 1895, “the spell of the barricade was broken.”¹⁵⁰ Yet miraculously, barricades did not disappear. To understand their persistence will require that we look beyond purely pragmatic considerations and consider the more abstract functions that barricades also perform.

The wonder is, after all, that barricades—unlike the food riot, the charivari (i.e., serenading the unpopular with “rough music”), and other early-modern routines of contention with which they once co-existed—did not vanish, once their utility as a tactic of physical confrontation had waned. Though the frenzy of barricade construction that occurred in 1848–49 would never be matched for sheer intensity, the technique not only outlasted the “age of revolution” but somehow managed to broaden its appeal over the course of the twentieth century, with insurgents on every inhabited continent adapting it to their own struggles. In the European context, this was achieved despite the tactic’s gradual loss of efficacy and the erosion of the legitimacy of popular direct action once the rise of political parties, the adoption of universal suffrage, and the elaboration of reformist modes of political participation gave the advocates of social change alternative avenues to pursue.¹⁵¹ The counterweight to these attenuating forces was the emergence of the barricade’s role as symbol.

It may initially seem curious that the same period that saw a sharp decline in the barricade’s military value witnessed the expansion of its figurative significance, but E. J. Hobsbawm has hinted at the reasons why the two developments should be seen as systematically rather than coincidentally related. In explaining how traditions originate, he postulated that the practical utility of an object or practice acts as a fetter or constraint which has to be relaxed or eliminated in order for the object to be appropriated for symbolic or ritual purposes. By way of example, he mentions the spurs that are a conspicuous element of the dress uniforms of British cavalry officers, noting that they acquired symbolic significance only once they had become purely ornamental, thanks to the corps’ shift from horses to mechanized vehicles as a mode of transport.¹⁵² In much the same way, as barricades began to relinquish their value as a method of combat, their resonance as symbols of an insurrectionary tradition became more profound.

Of course, the analogy goes too far if it seems to suggest that in the process, the barricade was relegated to the status of a useless relic of merely antiquarian interest, for it continued to perform a vital political and moral role. For Bronisław Baczko, the purpose of a symbol is “not just to make distinctions but also to introduce values and model conduct, both individual and collective.”¹⁵³ Symbols are a way of tapping into the “social imagination,” an amalgam of hopes, fears, memories, and expectations that together constitute a collective framework both for the interpretation of personal experience and, even more significantly, for the valorization of the past. In this view, the transformation of the barricade from a utilitarian instrument into a “collective memory” may even have enhanced its ability to mobilize individuals and given it the power to galvanize otherwise inchoate groups into concerted action.

Prototypical acts such as the defiant display of a flag or banner, the singing of the “Marseillaise,” or the planting of a liberty tree, often closely associated with barricade events, serve to illustrate the dynamics of this process. Another was the adoption of distinctive headgear—including the use of ribbons, badges, and insignia—as a way of signaling a person’s political identification. The brilliant blue and red caps worn by Etienne Marcel’s followers in the fourteenth century, much like the Phrygian bonnets of the French Revolution, may have offered the practical benefit of allowing fellow rebels to recognize one another at a distance, but their more abstract purpose was to express (and to elicit) commitment to a cause. Though their meaning could be read by contemporaries without great difficulty, such forms of dress both conveyed a message of considerable subtlety and complexity and yet retained the ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Thus, at the start of the 1789 Revolution, the tricolor cockade came to signify the movement in the capital to reform the French monarchy by marrying local colors (again, the blue and red of Paris) to the white of the Bourbon dynasty. For the revolutionaries, this new motif symbolized “the nation, united and indivisible,” a meaning it was somehow able to sustain through abrupt changes of government and counterrevolutionary challenges, from the final years of the Old Regime through the height of the Terror, to Napoléon’s empire and beyond.¹⁵⁴

The barricade itself underwent a similar evolution. It first rose to prominence as a form of neighborhood defense in the essentially local revolts of 1588 and 1648 and was long thought of as a largely Parisian idiosyncrasy. The national ramifications of the 1789 and 1830 revolutions and the gradual spread of barricade events to more and more provincial cities as the nineteenth century advanced helped to redefine them as a broadly French phenomenon. It was only with the 1848 and 1871 insurrections and their echoes abroad that the barricade

acquired an international overtone such that, from midcentury on, the mere mention or simple representation of a barricade could be used to evoke the vision (or specter) of revolutionary change for Europeans and non-Europeans alike. This progression thus involved a shift in what the barricade signified: from a physical site where political issues and outcomes were decided, it became an abstract symbol of the struggle itself.

The French historian Pierre Nora has popularized the concept of *lieux de mémoire*, places that have the capacity to summon powerful collective memories. Buildings, monuments, and battlefields are classic examples of the type of locations that help perpetuate a sense of connection to pivotal historical events. Barricades, which possess properties in common with all three, likewise exerted a powerful influence over the popular imagination. Their role in maintaining the continuity among successive insurrectionary episodes is suggested by the observation, frequently made by contemporary witnesses, that barricades would reappear in identical locations within a Paris neighborhood in one nineteenth-century uprising after another.

And even then, the transformation of the barricade from a tactic that conferred a physical advantage in a situation of armed conflict into the preeminent symbol of revolutionary struggle was not the end point in its evolution. In time it would achieve iconic status, implying a still higher level of abstraction in which memories and associations had been so tightly compacted that the mere mention of the barricade or the display of its silhouette functioned as a surrogate for the revolutionary tradition as a whole.¹⁵⁵ This recasting of the meaning of the barricade worked in the realm of political rhetoric and iconography a bit like a literary synecdoche, in which a part (the barricade) is taken to represent the whole (revolution). The image of the barricade was the nonverbal equivalent of the revolutionary slogans that laconically stated the insurgent program and perspective, such as “Bread or Lead!” or “Live Working or Die Fighting!”

This radical compression of meaning is what allows the icon to cut through a tightly knotted cluster of contested social issues. Much like the actual construction of barricades, their iconic representation helped redefine ongoing political conflict as having reached the stage where it constituted an “insurrectionary situation,” capable of resolution only through popular direct action. It thus translated a complex reality into a readily comprehended and easily communicated story. This process inevitably entailed the sort of simplification and exaggeration already noted in connection with the origin myth of the first barricades or the iconography of Delacroix’s *La Liberté guidant le*

peuple. It achieved the desired result through a mixture of selective and distorted remembering, supplemented as necessary by a bit of creative reconstruction or outright fabrication of the past.

Radical compression also made it easier to freight that message with intense emotional overtones to which insurgents, despite personal differences in outlook, responded with a minimum of reflection or hesitancy. Their concept of the barricade transcended the physical structure they had before them because it also embraced those remembered from earlier events, however widely dispersed in time or space. As diverse or even contradictory as their individual values and objectives might be, they invested the barricade with what they took to be a common meaning, thus reinforcing their sense of participating in something much larger than themselves. The iconic barricade operated as a trigger for collective memories whose very indeterminacy sustained the illusion of universality.

We can now better appreciate why barricades (like emblems and insignia, cries and slogans, songs and poems—in short, symbols and catchphrases of all kinds that involve this sort of short-circuiting to varying degrees) can perform the solidarity building and legitimating functions noted earlier. Particularly in a population that shares a strong sense of common destiny, they engender a powerful identification with those who faced the same difficult choices in the past. Along with the sights, the sounds, and the memories (personal or vicarious) that accompanied the construction process, the cry “To the barricades!” unified those caught up in an insurrectionary situation by inviting them to situate themselves within a lineage of revolutionary activity and to declare in a very literal sense on which side of the barricades they stood.¹⁵⁶ Barricades (like other elements of a society’s repertoire of collective action) served the purpose of overcoming their natural reluctance to pass from the stage of vague predisposition to a state of actual mobilization.¹⁵⁷ Specifying how they accomplished that feat is the focus of the concluding chapter of this study.

Barricades and the Culture of Revolution

Hegel says somewhere that all great historic facts and personages recur twice. He forgot to add: "Once as tragedy, and again as farce." Caussidière for Danton, Louis Blanc for Robespierre, the "Mountain" of 1848–51 for the "Mountain" of 1793–95, the Nephew for the Uncle. The identical caricature marks also the conditions under which the second edition of the eighteenth Brumaire is issued.

KARL MARX, *THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE*

The previous chapter hinted at the visibility and symbolic power that the nineteenth-century barricade derived from its association with a "revolutionary tradition." That last phrase may, at first glance, appear to have something of the quality of an oxymoron, since it joins two concepts that are commonly presumed to be polar opposites.¹ On reflection, however, it is evident that even the most radical attempts to do away with every last vestige of the former status quo must confront the need to provide a social movement organization that can coordinate supporters' activities and give structure to their collective aspirations, since without such a framework, the chances of the new order prevailing remain remote. Moreover, to the extent that these initial challenges are surmounted and the revolution triumphs, the desire to make its success lasting and meaningful logically implies an effort to reconstitute society by coming up with novel institutional forms capable of replacing the old. In the process, revolutionaries assume roles, formulate policies, and devise alternative societal arrangements that respond to the demands of the immediate situation. They may perceive these expedients as being utterly without precedent, but in reality, the problems they

are intended to address are timeless, and the “innovations” they introduce therefore inevitably share much in common with those championed by the system builders of earlier eras. Thus, even when the protagonists claim to be marking a sharp break with all that has gone before, they frequently appear to be reenacting rituals borrowed from the past.

The celebrated passage from Marx’s *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* quoted above as the epigraph to this chapter is not the only nineteenth-century reference to the recurrent quality of the behavior exhibited by revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries alike. In his *Recollections* of the events of 1848, Tocqueville also calls attention to this penchant for historical repetition:

[The February revolution] was a time when everybody’s imagination had been coloured by the crude pigments with which Lamartine daubed his *Girondins*. The men of the first revolution were still alive in everybody’s mind, their deeds and their words fresh in the memory. And everything I saw that day was plainly stamped with the imprint of such memories; the whole time I had the feeling that we had staged a play about the French Revolution, rather than that we were continuing it.²

Although the allusion to a script from which historical actors hesitated to deviate was meant to suggest how shallow and inauthentic such efforts to recapture past glories could be, Tocqueville also presents this impulse as an affirmative act of remembrance that demonstrated the power that the exploits and symbols of previous generations could exert over the minds of those who sought to emulate (or perhaps magically reproduce) their success.

Another version of this same insight—this time from the pen of the poet Heine—can actually claim precedence over those of both Tocqueville and Marx. In March 1848, in the very first of a series of reports on the February Days he published in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*, Heine broached the theme of revolution as play-acting. After decrying the mind-numbing effect that Parisians’ monotonous singing of the “Marseillaise” was having on his frazzled nerves, he adopted a breezy, ironic style—almost as if he were turning to engage his reader out loud—to express his puzzlement at the revolutionary spectacle that he had before his eyes. Speaking of the French people as of a playwright, and of the 1848 revolution as of a theatrical production, he evoked the sense of déjà vu that the recent events inspired in him in these terms:

Is the great author repeating himself? Are his creative powers faltering? Wasn’t this play, presented to us in February with such pride, the same as the one he produced eighteen years ago in Paris under the title “The July Revolution”? But one can always see a good play twice. In any case, this production is improved and enlarged, and the dénouement is new, and was received with thunderous

applause.³

Heine is the only member of this select trio whose literary predilections might be thought to explain the reliance on an analogy with the stage. So clear a convergence in language and imagery on the part of three of the most acute observers of the period—and ones whose perspectives on the events of 1848 were, in other respects, drastically different—suggests that the theme of historical recurrence is worth exploring in greater depth. But before tackling that task, it will be helpful to form an overall picture of the continuities and discontinuities in barricade use over the time period covered by this study and how the evolution of this tactic fits into the history of European contention in general.

HOW THE BARRICADE PHENOMENON RESEMBLED OTHER ROUTINES

The theme of revolution as theater brings us full circle to the notion of the repertoire of collective action with which we began this inquiry. That concept, after all, employs a metaphor that is similarly derived from the realm of drama to capture the recurring quality of the choices people make when they engage in protest. Charles Tilly's original insight can, for present purposes, be reduced to the observation that participants in such actions as urban insurrections naturally gravitate toward tried-and-true techniques even when readily available but less familiar alternatives might better suit their objectives.⁴ The crux is that a preestablished repertoire forms part of insurgents' common store of culturally transmitted knowledge and practices, which, once broadly diffused throughout a society, can be recognized and implemented on a moment's notice should the occasion for a "performance" arise. Virtually no one living in nineteenth-century France had to ask what a barricade was or what purpose it served. Elaborate explanations were therefore unnecessary, and the skills required for barricade construction were either so elementary they could be perfected on the spot or had long since been acquired by critical members of the collectivity, who could provide whatever leadership or supervision was called for.

By definition, routines exhibit an essential continuity, and the testimony of eyewitnesses clearly indicates that barricade builders of the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries regularly engaged in many of the same behaviors. Paving stones (and even, to a lesser extent, the barrels that gave these structures their name) remained staple materials of barricade construction despite three hundred years of rapid technological progress (not to mention advances in repressive

countermeasures). The French tendency to turn to this tactic whenever an insurrectionary situation seemed ripe acquired the consistency of a tropism. One indirect indication that, from the insurgent perspective, the barricade retained its essential integrity is the fact that, through the early-modern and modern eras, and irrespective of location, Europeans continued to refer to these structures as barricades long after the etymology of the term had been lost to common understanding.

Yet barricades were hardly static. It is possible to retrace their lines of physical, tactical, and even ideological development in some detail. We have seen, for example, that although the custom of stretching chains, with which they were once associated, was subsequently abandoned, the overturning of wheeled vehicles—a technique apparently new to the nineteenth century but reminiscent of the selective mobility that had first recommended the use of barrels—became ever more common. Insurgents and repressors engaged in a continual struggle to gain advantage over each other by experimenting with the introduction of promising innovations and countermeasures. Thus, the army's use of cavalry—and later, cannon fire—to quell civil unrest led rebels to deploy multiple barricades, make more studied use of adjoining buildings, and erect V-shaped barricades that could deflect cannonballs or, failing that, better absorb the shock of artillery barrages.⁵ Yet, through all of these changes, the resulting structure never became any less recognizably a barricade.

Principles of Diffusion

After being confined exclusively to France for its first two hundred years, the barricade began to spread across the Continent, a process that accelerated dramatically by the middle of the nineteenth century along lines determined in part by the principle of *propinquity*, but greatly assisted by a property that Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow have called *modularity*, which is to say, “the capacity of a form of collective action to be utilized by a variety of social actors, against a variety of targets, either alone, or in combination with other forms.”⁶ Modular routines display a facility for adaptation and diffusion that is closely tied to how well they can be communicated in a highly condensed form and still be easily grasped by others. They propagate more readily because a sequence of prescribed behaviors—for instance, prying up cobblestones, chopping down trees, scavenging materials from nearby construction sites, commandeering vehicles in the street, exacting “tolls” from passersby, and engaging in fraternization activities—constituted a well-defined and well-encapsulated pattern that groups of actors could instantly discern and transpose to new

contexts with a minimum of tinkering.

Once established, such routines could be instantly reproduced, even when decades had elapsed since their last appearance, even in the absence of the slightest overlap in personnel between successive events, and even though participants in the current episode were otherwise unknown to one another. They served as a template for revolution that enabled insurgents—with minimal discussion, debate, or direction—to coordinate their behavior and overcome in some small degree the lack of discipline and organizational continuity that was the single most critical disadvantage they faced in any collision with trained troops. In place of the military's reliance on endless drills and a clearly defined chain of command, they relied on modular routines of collective action to lower the costs of mobilization and achieve consistent results in a wide variety of settings. The early-modern barricade had already demonstrated the utility of this approach, apparent not only from the speed with which the tactic initially spread within the confines of its native France but also from the linkage between two great insurrections, implied by their being dubbed the First and Second Days of the Barricades, even though they occurred sixty years apart. The nineteenth century greatly enhanced the modularity of the barricade, thanks in part to a succession of gifted writers and artists who recognized the tactic's lyric appeal and visual *éclat*. Their efforts helped socialize a receptive public, increasingly accustomed to inexpensive images and a mass-circulation press that could be seen as the distant precursors of the visual and electronic media that have continued to reshape social movements in our own era. These trends resulted in not only an epidemic of barricade consciousness but also the vast midcentury proliferation of actual barricade events.

Propinquity is a principle familiar to any student of diffusion processes. As applied to routines of collective action, the term can sometimes be taken literally, as with the observation that the first sites outside France to fall under the spell of the barricade tended to be bordering territories like Belgium, Switzerland, or, among the German states, the Rhineland. But propinquity often needs to be understood in a more abstract sense that takes into account cultural lines of transmission and acknowledges that the countries that became "early adopters" of the tactic were also those that shared a common language and/or experience living under the political and institutional framework created by the First French Republic. We might even speak of the sort of "social propinquity" that briefly united the students of Vienna and Prague in solidarity during the early spring of 1848 on the basis of their common status as elites in training, anxious to play a special role in the regeneration of their respective societies. In

short, the notion of propinquity, as used here, is a surrogate for heightened rates of social interaction and reinforced bonds of mutual identification that explain, for example, why, when barricades spread into central and eastern Europe, it was typically capital cities like Berlin, Vienna, Prague, and Budapest that were the first in their respective regions to be affected. As seats of government, it was their nature to be outward-looking, and they already maintained regular diplomatic and cultural ties with France and an acute awareness of events in Paris, the capital of revolution. Like modularity, propinquity allows us to penetrate the seemingly chaotic nature of revolutionary uprisings, make sense of the ease with which barricades took hold in specific locations, and comprehend the diffusion of routines of collective action as a coherent and orderly process.

The Relationship between Cycles and Repertoires of Contention

Small, incremental changes are crucial to the evolution of any routine of collective action, but the rhythm of their occurrence is neither steady nor haphazard. Instead, they tend to come in concentrated bursts of innovation that coincide with fluctuations in the general level of mobilization in society. As we saw in [chapter 4](#), barricade events were rare, and they tended to cluster in a relative handful of years, corresponding to peaks of insurrectionary ferment. Recall that all ninety-two French events recorded between 1569 and 1900 were crowded into just 37 of those 332 years. Furthermore, nearly two-thirds of those French events—sixty, to be precise—fell within the 26 years that defined the six great spikes of insurrectionary activity in France that figure so prominently in the preceding pages.⁷ The alternation of short-lived but sharply accentuated peaks with prolonged troughs of inactivity is a pattern that is by no means unique to France, to the period covered by this study, or to the barricade phenomenon itself. Whether we consider the few great climaxes of global ferment like 1848 and 1968 or more commonplace swings in the incidence of unrest at the level of a region or nation-state, this kind of variability seems to be the general rule.⁸

Yet, this compression of a large number of events into a small number of years is noteworthy mainly because it draws our attention to the qualitative changes that accompany these spurts in rates of collective action. Cyclical peaks often represent critical junctures when conditions permit the introduction of innovations in the techniques of protest and accelerate the pace at which routines of contention are elaborated. The reasons for this association between heightened activity and tactical innovation are fairly well understood.⁹ To begin with, any sudden and substantial increase in the scale of protest has the potential

to challenge and even, under the right circumstances, overwhelm the state's customary ascendancy over political contenders. Police and military forces, abruptly confronted with many small fires—or perhaps a few really big ones—may have great difficulty putting them all out in a timely way. A diminished capacity to repress insurgent activity exposes the vulnerability of the constituted authorities and their associated elites and provides encouragement to challengers who might otherwise have remained quiescent. Once this dynamic takes hold, it can cause the initial surge in protest to take on a self-reinforcing character. The weighing of consequences that prospective insurgents must constantly engage in undergoes a shift as the intrinsic risks of participation appear to dwindle, even as the chances of a favorable outcome grow more promising.

A marked increase in the level of contentious behavior also changes the mix of protesters, as new groups become embroiled in contesting institutional arrangements. Political exiles, students, and itinerant workers may have taken the lead in the revolutionary movements of 1848, as we saw in [chapter 6](#), but as the scope of the European wave of protest became apparent, less politicized workers, members of the petit bourgeoisie, and even peasants joined their ranks in various locations across the Continent. They brought with them distinctive interests, values, and outlooks that changed the tenor of the events in which they participated and obliged the authorities to confront a multifaceted opposition movement advancing a confusing mix of seemingly contradictory demands.

As the field of collective action expanded to take in new constituencies, it also spread to new locations, usually progressing from core to peripheral areas. In 1848, for example, the barricade traveled from Paris to Limoges and Rouen in France, while, on an international scale, it passed from Paris to Vienna, Budapest, Milan, and Iași in Moldavia. As the diffusion process took hold, newly mobilized populations seized the opportunity to experiment with methods of protest that had proven successful elsewhere, but did so in novel cultural and practical circumstances that required that they adapt established routines to local conditions. As insurgents and social control forces struggled to gain the advantage, a series of reciprocal adjustments resulted.

These are among the reasons why peaks in intermediate-term cycles of collective action—most obviously associated, in the case of the barricade, with the key years of 1588, 1648, 1789, 1830, 1848, and 1871—tended to coincide with major departures in where and how a routine was exploited. A rapid review of these main chronological points of inflection will make explicit what earlier chapters have already suggested.

THE PRINCIPAL STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE BARRICADE

Although the tactic had already been in use for some time, barricade consciousness took firm hold among the French only in 1588. Received wisdom erroneously situated the “invention” of the barricade in that year, mainly because this was the first time that a major insurrection—one that directly implicated Paris, that most highly visible of all venues for revolutionary unrest—had made use of the technique. This misapprehension gained currency all the more readily because the First Day of the Barricades, May 12–13, 1588, was overseen by members of the military elite, including recognizable personalities like the duc de Guise and Charles II de Cossé, comte de Brissac. Yet, despite these leaders’ presumption that they would decide the spiritual and political fate of the nation, those who actually built the barricades and seized control of the capital were members of the bourgeoisie and artisan community, motivated primarily by fears that the propertyless masses would pillage their neighborhoods. With this challenge to the French monarchy’s dominion over its own capital, it was these solid citizens who placed the barricade on the conceptual map of European collective action.

The Second Day of the Barricades, August 27–28, 1648, was responsible for establishing the tactic’s repertorial character. Other barricade events had intervened, but none large enough or storied enough to fix in the popular mind the barricade’s status as the unquestioned tactic of choice to which participants would turn whenever an insurrectionary situation arose. The 1648 events were also led, however ambivalently, by notables (including leaders of the Paris *parlement*, though they often had to be goaded into action by members of the bourgeoisie), with sporadic participation and support on the part of the *menu people*. The fact that, for a second time, the king of France (along with the queen regent and the thoroughly detested Cardinal Mazarin) had been forced to flee from the capital strongly reinforced the sense of historical recurrence.

The period of the French Revolution, though not widely known for its barricades, was nevertheless a crucial stage in the evolution of the routine. In 1787, two years in advance of the fall of the Bastille, the barricade made its first appearance outside France when residents of Brussels adopted the tactic, already well established among their French neighbors. The Swiss would join the Belgians in making further use of the technique in 1789, even as the first act of the great revolutionary drama was being played out in the French capital. Although the Parisian barricades of July 14, 1789, have gone all but unnoticed, their undeniable presence in that tumultuous setting provides a thread of continuity linking the modern revolutionary tradition with its early-modern

antecedents. The part played by the municipal authorities (the Paris electors) in ordering barricade construction to begin during the initial stages of the most celebrated *journée* of the period offers a particularly strong parallel to the role played by the Paris Sixteen in 1588.

Thus, the barricade was in attendance at the birth of the sansculottes' movement and, by extension, of the tradition of popular direct action that it is said to have inaugurated. But it was also present on 4 Prairial (May 23, 1795), when the sansculottes' cause expired. Moreover, when, less than five months later, Napoléon trained his cannon on royalist insurgents on 13 Vendémiaire (October 5) to forestall their desperate efforts to build a barricade, he was also writing a new page in the annals of civil unrest in France. Thereafter, the willingness of governments to make full use of the military expedients at their disposal in order to repress their own citizens resulted in changes in how future insurrections would be conducted, including the refinement of the barricade's sociological and symbolic functions, even as its military efficacy diminished.

With the cyclical peak of 1830, both the trend toward direct political engagement on the part of ordinary working people and the continuing geographical diffusion of the barricade were confirmed. The July revolution in Paris stands as the largest barricade event ever documented—at least as measured by the number of structures that appeared in the course of that three-day insurrection, for if contemporary estimates are to be credited, some 4,000 were built in all. Those “three glorious days” were significant not only for the sheer magnitude of the conflict but also because of the phenomenon, discussed in the next section, that I call “the myth of the barricade.” But 1830 also witnessed the barricade's first use in the revolutionary overthrow of a government beyond the borders of France, enabling Belgians to wrest their independence from the Dutch. A series of fiercely contested battles in Brussels, Tirlemont, Liège, Ghent, and Sainte-Walburge was triggered less than a month after the fall of Charles X. The demonstration effect of this small nation in the making, employing barricade combat to defeat militarily superior Dutch forces, was a potent lesson absorbed by would-be insurgents everywhere on the Continent.

By 1848, the year that witnessed the greatest sustained outburst of barricade events ever recorded, this routine had won such wide acceptance as an element of urban insurrection that its reappearance at the fall of the Orléanist monarchy was a foregone conclusion. Though the unrest in Paris had actually been preceded by smaller barricade events in Switzerland and the German and Italian states between October 1846 and January 1848, the profound political

implications of a revolutionary change of government in France explain why the Paris insurrection was universally presumed to have inspired everything that followed. By the time of that conflict, the barricade had already begun to shed its strictly neighborhood focus in favor of a more cosmopolitan outlook that targeted strategic or symbolic locations across the city and accepted the need for greater coordination among dispersed centers of resistance. Above all, what the year 1848 represented in the history of the barricade was the true internationalization of the technique and its adoption as the principal icon of a revolutionary tradition that, for a brief moment, appeared to have taken hold on a continental scale.

Though many old-style barricades were hastily built and heroically defended by city residents in the waning hours of the Paris Commune, the monolithic structures built by the Commission of Barricades, often months in advance of their actual use, proved completely ineffective against the attack mounted by the Versailles government. If they merit special mention in the history of the barricade, it is for their contribution to the further mythification of the barricade and its identification with a culture of revolution. There is a certain irony in the fact that, though this last great paroxysm in France's long history of insurrectionary struggle ended in failure, its powerful grip on the revolutionary imagination allowed it to influence twentieth-century events in Russia, Germany, and around the globe.

The potential for the barricade routine—and the repertoire with which it was associated—to grow, mature, and spread was enormously enhanced during the “moments of madness” that corresponded to peaks in ongoing cycles of protest.¹⁰ At such climactic junctures, a wholesale shift in the calculus of political opportunities took place, with the potential to open the floodgates of creativity among those seeking to challenge the constituted authorities. Both insurgents and the representatives of the existing social order had to reassess the range of plausible outcomes in a situation where, suddenly, anything seemed possible. In these unusual circumstances, experimentation could occur at a breakneck pace and routines of collective action could undergo changes that were as abrupt as they were dramatic.

THE MYTH OF THE BARRICADE

These cyclical peaks of activity stand out as critical moments in the long-term evolution of the barricade, but it is also possible to discern one extended time period crucial in the development of the routine as we know it today. The middle

decades of the nineteenth century—roughly from the 1830s through the 1860s, with the individual events of 1827 and 1871 marking the extreme chronological limits—defined the classic era of the barricade. During those years, people all across Europe not only became more “barricade aware” but actually assimilated the concept of a “mythified” or “fabulized” barricade, made larger than life thanks to the efforts of artists, writers, journalists, and even scholars.

Prior to 1830, this had not been the case. Even in France, histories of the barricade events of earlier centuries had yet to capture the popular imagination, and a work like Louis Vitet’s play *Les barricades*—which, as noted in [chapter 6](#), was first published in 1826, just before the supposed “revival” of the technique in the following year—was a notable exception. The best proof is that, despite my best efforts, I have failed to unearth more than a single contemporaneous representation of the barricades of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries—or, for that matter, of any barricade event that predates the 1830 revolution.

That situation changed dramatically with the July Days. We have already had occasion to comment on the far-reaching influence that paintings and sketches of the barricade by the likes of Delacroix, Daumier, and Meissonier exerted. Their vitality inspired a host of imitations and variations that then circulated to a much broader audience as popular woodcuts or the ubiquitous cheap prints called *images d’Epinal*. As for the literary realm, Pierre Citron has offered one index of how strongly the increased visibility of the barricade made itself felt: though rare in the period preceding the Orléanist regime’s accession to power, the French word *pavé* suddenly came into vogue, to the point where poets used it in verse no fewer than forty-three times between 1830 and 1833.¹¹ Just as in the case of fine art, these initial intrusions into the elite world of letters soon had their counterpart in popular literature’s fascination with the barricade, a trend immediately reinforced by newspaper coverage of the insurrections of 1831, 1832, 1834, and 1839.

During the 1840s, the barricade’s spread to the far corners of the Continent was further prepared by historians like Guizot, Blanc, and Lamartine, even though the agents through whom most Europeans actually became acquainted with France’s revolutionary tradition were more often those who variously imitated, popularized, or criticized their writings. This decade witnessed a vast expansion of the popular press—and specifically the rise of its latest innovation, the illustrated weekly, which did so much to portray the barricade in mythic terms. Common usage of the word “barricade” as a stand-in for the very concept of revolution helped fix the association in the minds of future insurgents, for

whom the routine of barricade construction became an all-but-obligatory response whenever the scent of rebellion was in the air.

The 1850s were, in France and elsewhere, a time when the reaction that followed the revolutionary outbreaks of 1848–49 created an environment deeply inhospitable to the proponents of barricade combat. After the abject failure of the isolated protests against Louis Bonaparte’s December 1851 coup (and the severe repression that ensued), the barricade virtually disappeared for a time. Its memory was kept alive by the literary genius of figures like Hugo and Flaubert. *Les misérables* (1862) and *L’éducation sentimentale* (1869) appeared during the liberal phase of the Second Empire’s second decade. Their most compelling scenes are set behind barricades, in that crucible of social passions whose intensity was capable of purifying and ennobling the members of a living insurgent community.

Thus, novels, poetry, plays, paintings, engravings, and other forms of artistic expression were powerful instruments of the mythification of the barricade. We have observed this process at work practically from the first beginnings of the barricade phenomenon—witness the origin myths that helped elevate the 1588 insurrection in Paris into nothing less grand than “The First Day of the Barricades”—but it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the shift from the pragmatic to the symbolic barricade was consummated.

HOW BARRICADE EVENTS DIFFERED FROM OTHER ROUTINES

Though the concept of the repertoire normally emphasizes the relative stability among forms of contention at any given moment in a people’s history, it can also be examined in the context of a much more extended time frame, a sort of *longue durée* of collective action. From this perspective, the fundamental continuity in techniques of protest—and even the gradual, incremental nature of the innovations made in specific routines during cycles measured in decades or generations—recede in importance. Instead of continuity or gradational shifts, a truly long-term outlook enables us to discern the epochal, sweeping transformations during which an entire existing repertoire of contention is replaced by a wholly new set of prototypes of protest. To capture this process of comprehensive change requires that we adopt a frame of reference measured in centuries.

Tilly identifies just one such wholesale renewal, which resulted in Western societies making the shift from what he calls the eighteenth-century repertoire to its nineteenth-century equivalent. Since, however, the first began much earlier

and the second lasted much longer than those labels imply, a more useful convention might be to refer to the early-modern versus modern (or simply old-style versus new-style) forms of protest.¹² Tilly characterizes the former as parochial and patronage-based—which is to say, people were motivated to act by grievances affecting their immediate communities, and they sought to influence “local actors or the local representatives of national actors.” That might mean asking patrons or petty officials to whom protestors had direct access to intercede on their behalf in settling some nagging conflict. It might also mean, in cases where militants undertook action on their own, that they emulated the conduct or usurped the powers normally vested in local authorities. Examples might include the charivari, the draft riot, the intervillage brawl, invasions of fields and forests, armed rebellions against tax collectors, and public ceremonies involving the use of costumes, disguises, and effigies, including mock trials and executions. The classic food riot, one of the characteristic routines of the early-modern period, provides what is, no doubt, the clearest illustration. It was usually precipitated by a disturbance in the supply of grain or a fluctuation in the price of bread in some specific district. Instead of seeking to address the regional (much less national or international) causes of such dislocations, members of the crowd tried to mitigate the consequences for themselves and their neighbors by preventing grain from being shipped elsewhere, commandeering what bread they could lay their hands on and distributing it to the public, or controlling the price at which foodstuffs were sold—all actions that mimicked those that officials were expected to take in times of dearth.

This early-modern pattern contrasted with the national and autonomous style of protest that would eventually displace it. New techniques of contention focused on issues that tended to be broad in scope. They were aimed at regional authorities or even the central state (whose role in the affairs of ordinary people was steadily increasing) rather than seeking redress from local officeholders. Instead of asking patrons to intervene in their name, participants were more likely to formulate their own list of demands organized around programmatic objectives and communicated with the help of broadsheets, pamphlets, signs, banners, and the like. Instead of mimicking the conventional behavior of local officials, they devised methods of protest that, though often rooted in custom, were distinct from those employed by agents of the government. Modern forms of protest included petition marches, public assemblies, electoral rallies, demonstrations, and strikes. These and other novel techniques were soon being combined into sustained and organized challenges to the state, giving rise to a new phenomenon—the social movement—which Tilly claims was “virtually

unknown in western countries until the nineteenth century.”¹³

BARRICADES AND THE HISTORIC SHIFT BETWEEN REPERTOIRES OF CONTENTION

By drawing a sharp contrast between old and new repertoires, Tilly's writings risk creating the false impression that the break was sudden and final. In reality, differences between the two styles were sometimes muted by the fact that new forms often originated as variations on established practices. For example, the strike owes something to the much earlier convention of calling workers out of their place of employment in times of crises, even though the reason for the “turnout” might not be work-related; and the demonstration harkens back to rituals once associated with state visits, holiday parades, or the petitioning of officeholders.¹⁴ Tilly is also careful to emphasize that the transition to the modern style of protest always took place over an extended period and that its timing varied according to the national context. In England, for example, it appears to have begun as early as the 1760s, a century or more in advance of other parts of Europe.

In France, the first signs of change appeared only with the coming of the French Revolution, and the displacement of the old patterns was not complete until the 1850s. Thus, Tilly's chronology associates the crucial shift not with 1789, generally seen as the critical turning point in modern European history, but with 1848, a year that constituted a historical “hinge.” Tilly uses that term to designate a moment that changed “the whole direction in which collective action was evolving.” Though elements of the new repertoire had been making headway throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, it was only subsequent to that date that the new-style repertoire held undisputed sway. The great Revolution, by contrast, had amounted to a mere way station (a “milestone” in his terminology) rather than a watershed. In the larger scheme of things, he concluded, “a greater change in the character and direction of collective action occurred in the middle of the nineteenth century than at the end of the eighteenth.”¹⁵

That view has been challenged by William H. Sewell Jr. in an article that both praises Tilly's contributions, empirical and theoretical, to our understanding of the history of contention, and questions his “novel periodization” of collective violence in France.¹⁶ He criticizes Tilly for paying insufficient attention to the cultural dimension of historical change and to the short-term political antecedents of violent protest, and he objects that the significance of the

Revolution of 1789 in redefining the role of the state in French society had been given short shrift. According to Sewell, “The French Revolution of 1789 also saw the invention of a new and supreme category of collective violence: the popular insurrection.”¹⁷ For the next six decades, the two competing repertoires of collective action coexisted, the early-modern forms disappearing once and for all only after the Second Empire suppressed *all* forms of collective action in the 1850s.

I might be tempted to conclude that the debate between Tilly and Sewell, the two historians/sociologists from whom I have learned the most, is a mere matter of semantics. After all, they seem to be in agreement that the process of repertoire change *began* at least as early as the French Revolution; and both are willing to stipulate that the shift was not *complete* until the time of the Second French Republic. Their differences seem to come down to the primary emphasis that Sewell places on the question of origins versus Tilly’s stress on when the pivot point was passed and the predominance of the new forms definitively established. Allowing for this disparity, their portrayals of the long-term evolution of forms of collective action appear largely convergent.

But when we try to see how their ideas square with the history of the barricade, a somewhat more nuanced picture emerges. We have already remarked that the year 1848 clearly constituted the all-time climax of barricade use, whether measured by the number of events; the number of people engaged in barricade-related combat (or, for that matter, killed, wounded, or arrested as a result of their participation); the geographical territory over which the technique was adopted; or the actual number of barricades constructed. Indeed, it was precisely this extraordinary proliferation that conferred upon the barricade its status as icon of an international revolutionary tradition. Yet we have also seen that the early years of the French Revolution of 1789 can legitimately claim to have also marked a turning point in the evolution of the barricade. Though most historians have neglected its role in the Great Revolution (when they have not denied its presence outright), we have been at pains to show that it played a modest but significant part in four of the most important Parisian *journées*. Just as important, it was also in the last years of the Old Regime and the initial years of the First Republic that the barricade made its first tentative forays outside France. Comparing the part it played in the events of 1789 and 1848 raises the same distinction between the importance of new beginnings versus the importance of a climactic shift that separated the perspectives of Sewell and Tilly. It also suggests that, by their own lights, they may both be right.

Viewed from another perspective, however, both might also be considered

wrong. Despite differences over the precise timing of the transformation, both assume that the routines that made up early-modern and modern repertoires of collective action were fundamentally different and, despite a period of transition and overlap, they remained, in essence, mutually exclusive. As Tilly himself put it, “Established forms change as a result of collective learning and of changes in the supporting social structure, *but they tend to change together as a bloc*.”¹⁸ The shift from the eighteenth- to the nineteenth-century repertoire in Europe was thus thoroughgoing and comprehensive, and we should no more expect widespread grain seizures and charivaris to have persisted as forms of protest in contemporary Western societies than we would expect an inhabitant of early-modern English or French or German society to know what to make of a modern strike or a “media event.”

That observation provides some measure of the originality of the barricade, for it, virtually alone among the well-documented routines of European contention, has proved to be compatible with both old and new styles of protest. An undeniably significant element in French insurrections of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, it survived the transition to the nineteenth-century repertoire and has endured—even prospered—through the twentieth century and on into the twenty-first as well. Indeed, if we enlarge our frame of reference to take in the world as a whole, we can see that the modern barricade has assumed a privileged place, of which contemporary newspapers occasionally remind us, as an element of a global revolutionary tradition that remains very much alive today. In short, the barricade flies in the face of notions of two separate and distinct repertoires, each unique to its respective historical context.

Thus, the barricade violates some of the most sweeping generalizations that historians have come up with concerning the long-term succession in forms of collective protest. But it might also be seen as the exception that proves the rule. It survived, after all, only by undergoing a fundamental transformation of its own, and one that recapitulated the process of change leading from the old style of protest to the new. If we compare the barricade of 1848 with the barricade of 1648, we find that it had gone from being local to national, and from being patronage-based to autonomous, paralleling the changes between the larger repertoires of which it was a part. In this respect, the barricade expressed in its own way the master trends guiding the evolution of collective action in general. Paradoxically, it was the barricade’s capacity for change that allowed it to transcend the shift away from the early-modern forms, and thus persist into the contemporary era.

WHAT BARRICADES TELL US ABOUT THE CHANGING FORMS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

In the spring of 1848, Charles de Freycinet, then just nineteen years old, was completing his studies at the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris. The dramatic events that shattered the calm of the capital on February 23 happened to fall on a Wednesday, thus coinciding with the customary midweek break at this elite military academy. Students were therefore free to spend the afternoon touring the city, observing efforts to clear the streets of structures resulting from the first desultory wave of barricade building. It was only after Freycinet and his classmates had returned to their dormitories for the evening that rifle fire erupted in the boulevard des Capucines, reigniting the conflict and raising it to a whole new level of hostility. The next morning's newspapers brought initial word of the massacre of unarmed protestors before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the calls for popular vengeance, and the resumption of barricade construction. As news of renewed combat spread through the school, students streamed out of their classrooms and into the central courtyard. It was there that Freycinet, in his capacity as "quartermaster-sergeant" of his class, delivered an extemporaneous speech characterizing the situation into which he and all his colleagues had suddenly been thrust. He developed themes that, despite being couched in language chosen to appeal to his fellow *polytechniciens*, had a nearly universal resonance. He later paraphrased his thesis, writing that with "revolution in the air, the Ecole could hardly remain aloof. We were bound by our traditions. Hadn't the Ecole stood alongside the people in 1815 to defend Paris? Hadn't it fought with them in July 1830? (The name of our comrade Vaneau, killed on the barricades, had kept this glorious memory alive.) Hadn't it mingled with them at the time of the funerals of Benjamin Constant [in 1830] and of General Lamarque [in 1832]?"¹⁹

Freycinet's audience was doubtless won over to his argument long before he finished speaking. The chords he struck were, after all, familiar to anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of the insurrectionary history of France. Much like their counterparts in the student-led uprisings that would soon follow in other continental settings, these young sons of the elite appear to have assumed a leadership role out of a sense of noblesse oblige. But most members of the revolutionary crowd, even those less capable of articulating the reasons that had driven them to revolt, could appreciate his logic. For them, as for Freycinet himself, the decision to take a stand was motivated by a heartfelt commitment to carry on a tradition of direct political intervention, a burning pride in the exploits of previous generations of their peers, a desire to honor—perhaps even to

vindicate—the sacrifices of comrades who had fallen in earlier clashes, and an unwavering faith in the righteousness of the popular cause. These were the sentiments that insurgents were expressing through the simple act of building and defending barricades.

Freycinet's account also reveals how the resort to barricades was prepared by a combination of personal experience and historical memory, by the values people held in highest esteem, and by what they themselves expected or thought was expected of them. The decision to pledge their fortunes to the insurgent cause hinged not simply on a calculation of their chances of prevailing in battle but on an amorphous sense of obligation to an institution and a set of political ideals with which they identified intensely. Individuals' choices depended on the totality of the beliefs and practices, images and narratives assimilated over a lifetime of contact with an insurrectionary culture that was inescapable in France, and soon would be in the rest of Europe. The decision to build barricades was an irreducible by-product of that context, built upon the countless insignificant and informal interactions taking place around the family dinner table or in settings as diverse as street-corner encounters, student dormitories, clandestine political associations, or in the fellowship of the neighborhood wine shop.

If there is value in paying attention to these humbler forms of social interchange, it is because they shed new and unexpected light on practices that only rarely attract the attention of historians. It is also true that a focus on the actions taken rather than just the words spoken in insurrectionary situations has proved a fruitful approach, especially in the case of early-modern barricades, whose essential purpose was to provide physical protection and community defense. Gathering the neighbors, stretching the chains, and thus laying claim to a contested urban space relied primarily on casual contact and word-of-mouth transmission of information rather than formal political pronouncements, for the barricade was, from the beginning, a product of popular culture.

Still, barricade consciousness realized its full potential only in the nineteenth century, once the pragmatic uses of the tactic had largely given way before sociological and symbolic functions such as fraternization, socialization, solidarity-building, and legitimation. For, as the barricade became increasingly integrated into a revolutionary tradition, it acquired new meanings that imbued it with the power to redefine the possible. It was thus elevated to the status of a symbol that could serve as proxy for the desire to effect radical political change. The history of the barricade shows how culture, understood in the broadest sense, lies at the point of intersection between abstract representations and

concrete structures, between hidden meanings and everyday practices. It is the capacity to encompass both at once that explains the versatility, longevity, and vitality of the barricade.

APPENDIX A

Database of European Barricade Events

For a definition of what constitutes a barricade, see [chapter 1](#). For the purposes of this database, a “barricade event” is any instance of collective action involving the construction by insurgents of one or more barricades that takes place on one or more consecutive days in one or more adjacent towns.

The following inventory of barricade events has been compiled from readings and archival research as well as from helpful leads provided by generous colleagues. In geographical and chronological terms, my aim has been to embrace all of Europe from the origin of the barricade in the sixteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century, by which time the barricade had become a worldwide phenomenon (which would have greatly complicated the task of tracking its spread in a systematic fashion). Even within those limits, my confidence in the accuracy and completeness of the information presented here is uneven. It is greatest with respect to Parisian events, both because that is the history I know best and because insurrections that took place in that city inevitably attracted attention and were, as a consequence, well documented. I am far less sanguine regarding barricade events in provincial France, many more of which would undoubtedly be unearthed by a more systematic survey of regional newspapers and departmental archives than I was able to undertake. As for the rest of Europe, much less the world beyond, I am certain that numerous events have eluded me, even beyond the sixty odd ambiguous cases that I have not included in this list because the information available to me was too fragmentary or the documentation too uncertain for me to categorize them with real assurance.

In the interest of correcting the deficiencies of this database over time, I would be grateful to any reader willing to communicate to me circumstantial details, along with appropriate references, concerning barricade events I have mischaracterized or omitted.¹

A CLASSIFICATION SCHEME FOR BARRICADE EVENTS

My goal has been to devise a framework that would at once provide a shorthand description of each individual barricade event, permit comparisons to be made among different incidents, and make it possible to reconstruct the physical and temporal distribution of barricade events taken as a whole. As with any attempt to reduce a complex reality to a simple set of categories, this effort involves a degree of arbitrariness, and the result unfortunately fails to capture the idiosyncratic nature of specific events, especially when, as frequently happens, the accounts presented in historical sources are ambiguous (or, as they are all too often, flatly contradictory) regarding key details. The best I can do is to offer my rationale for the choices made in defining each of the following thirteen fields:

Field 1 (numeric, three digits): “Event Number”: A unique number assigned to each documented barricade event contained in this database.

Field 2 (numeric, four digits): “Year”: The year in which the barricade event began.

Field 3 (numeric, two digits): “Month”: The month in which the barricade event began.

Field 4 (numeric, two digits): “Day”: The day on which the barricade event began.

Field 5 (numeric, two digits): “Duration”: The duration of the barricade event in calendar days.

Field 6 (alphabetic): “Country”: The country or governmental entity in which the barricade event occurred.

Field 7 (alphabetic): “Province, *Département*, or Principality”: The second-order administrative entity in which the barricade event occurred. (The use of *départements*, though admittedly anachronistic for events that occurred prior to March 1790, is intended to facilitate the identification and comparison of the numerous instances of barricade construction in France.)

Field 8 (alphabetic): “City or Town”: The city or town in which the barricade event occurred.

Field 9 (numeric, one digit): “Number of Insurgents”:

1 = “small” (1 to 99)

2 = “medium” (100 to 999)

3 = “large” (1000–9,999)

4 = “exceptionally large” (>10 000)

Field 10 (numeric, one digit): “Number of Insurgent Dead” (or, if information is lacking, one-third the number of insurgent wounded):

- 0 = “none” (0)
- 1 = “small” (1 to 9)
- 2 = “medium” (10 to 99)
- 3 = “large” (100–999)
- 4 = “exceptionally large” (>1,000).

Field 11 (numeric, two digits): “Number of Barricades”:

- 02 = “small” (1 to 9)
- 04 = “medium” (10 to 99)
- 08 = “large” (100–999)
- 16 = “exceptionally large” (>1,000).

Field 12 (numeric, two digits): “Magnitude”: This is an ad hoc indicator of the total magnitude of each barricade event. It is equal to the simple sum of fields 9–11, and it therefore ranges in value from 3 to 24. Though ultimately quite arbitrary, my intention has been for it to reflect the extent of popular support and the deadliness of the conflict, but to give disproportionate weight to the distinctive property that made these barricade events in the first place: the number of such structures built by insurgents.

Field 13 (numeric, one digit): “Independence”:

- 0 = “dependent”
- 1 = “independent”

For certain analytic purposes, it can be useful to distinguish between an event that was dependent (in the sense that participants would have been unlikely to construct barricades were it not for some immediately prior instance of collective action that had inspired them) or independent (in the sense of constituting a free-standing and self-contained barricade event in its own right). Any such judgment tends to be problematic and is always a matter of degree, since the concept of a repertoire of collective action implies some basic level of interrelatedness among all such events. Still, I believe that this variable can be helpful in sorting out certain issues discussed in [chapter 4](#).

Fields for which no information or insufficient information was available have been coded with an X. Dozens of cases, many of them no doubt legitimate barricade events, have been left out of this database because multiple fields

could not be coded due to a lack of particulars.

In most cases, brief descriptive remarks provide basic identifying details. Bibliographic references to both primary and secondary sources (as well as, where relevant, to maps and illustrations) are intended to permit the interested reader to pursue his or her inquiries in greater depth.

BARRICADE EVENTS, 1569–1900

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
001	1569	09	20	01	France	Landes	Mont-de-Marsan	2	2	02	06	1

In 1571, Blaise de Monluc, after suffering a horribly disfiguring wound in the siege of the Huguenot town of Rabastens (see below), retired to private life and drafted his *Commentaires*. In this account of his life, he described the principal engagements in which he had participated as a commander in the Catholic army attempting to stamp out heresy by capturing or destroying strongholds of French Protestantism. Among these centers was Mont-de-Marsan. His account of the attack on this town includes mention of the inhabitants' construction, in the town's main street, of what he explicitly labels a barricade. This first written reference to a barricade event describes residents' use of barrels, filled with unspecified materials, for the purpose of plugging a gap in the wall that protected their village. No details of the number of participants on either side are included, but given the extent of the fighting, the number of insurgents can be presumed to have been no more than 1,000. Similarly, no explicit mention of the number of barricades is provided by Monluc, but the context suggests that it was small (i.e., no more than ten). Though the number of casualties is not specified, Monluc's account makes it plain that the number was at least ten.

Primary sources: Monluc 1964, 719–23.

Secondary sources: Imbs 1975, 4: 211; Robert 1985, 1: 864.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
002	1570	07	22	02	France	Hautes-Pyrénées	Rabastens-de-Bigorre	2	2	02	06	1

In 1570, Monluc (see preceding event) participated in the siege of the Protestant town of Rabastens. His forces were initially stymied by a barricade constructed by local residents, which allowed them to train a costly fire on Monluc's

soldiers, particularly those manning his two cannon. It was a musket ball fired by one of these defenders that grievously wounded Monluc, ending his military career at the age of seventy. According to Monluc's own account, he ordered captured insurgents to be put to death in retaliation for the earlier murder of several of his comrades.

Primary sources: Monluc 1964, 770–84.

Secondary sources: Imbs 1975, 4: 211; Robert 1985, 1: 864.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
003	1580	02	16	02	France	Drôme	Romans	3	0	02	05	1

The celebration of Lent in Romans, a town of 7,000 at the junction of the Isère and Presle Rivers, provided the occasion for dances and masquerades, which residents of the town's poorer districts used in 1580 not only to caricature their social betters but also to lodge a political protest against rising taxes. Bourgeois notables reacted by physically attacking those who had participated, reviving a conflict that was part religious dispute, part score-settling in response to the mounting internecine violence of the preceding year, and part class warfare. A clash between the two factions came to a head on the evening of Lundi gras ("fat Monday"), resulting in about 20 deaths. Among the victims was Jean Serve (known as Paumier or Pommier), leader of the populist rebels, among whom were counted many artisans and agricultural workers. This massacre was conducted by notables self-identified as the *gens de bien*, who were led by Laroche and Judge Antoine Guérin, author of one of two important primary sources on which knowledge of these events is based. On the following day, Mardi gras, as they tried to extend their control by capturing key gates at the extreme west end of the town, Laroche's men encountered resistance before a "few barricades" built by the followers of Paumier. The purpose of the notables' attack was to prevent Paumier's forces from joining up with the approximately 1,500 peasants from surrounding villages who were seeking to enter the city. In the end, these artisans dismantled their own barricades, fearing that, if they allowed the peasants to enter the town, the result would be general pillage. Thus, the confrontation ended without actual barricade combat, and most of the 20 to 30 estimated deaths actually occurred either on the preceding evening or as a consequence of the repression that followed.

Primary sources: Le Roy Ladurie 1979, 263, 273, 275; Roman 1877, 166–71.

Secondary sources: Le Roy Ladurie 1979, 254–77; Roman 1877, 22–28.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
004	1588	05	12	02	France	Seine	Paris	4	2	08	14	1

When Henri, duc de Guise, leader of the ultra-Catholic Holy League, appeared in Paris in defiance of King Henri III's orders in May 1588, residents turned out to express their joy at his arrival. The king's decision to bring several thousand Swiss and royal guardsmen into the capital to maintain order and forestall a coup attempt succeeded only in escalating the conflict into a full-scale insurrection. Contemporary estimates of the number of men in arms, no doubt vastly exaggerated, ranged as high as 100,000. Dozens of barricades went up, forcing the king to withdraw his troops and flee the city, leaving Guise in control. Crowds of enthusiastic participants, numbering in the hundreds, gathered in various parts of the city. Total casualties amounted to 40 to 50 deaths among the king's defenders and at least 36 among insurgents.

Primary sources: [Saint-Yon?] 1836, 327–50; “Amplification des particularités qui se passèrent à Paris” (1836), 351–63; “Histoire de la journée des barricades de Paris, mai 1588” (1836), 365–410; Aubigné 1993, 181–91; Paris, Bureau de la ville, 1902, 9: 4–159; Cheverny 1823, 106–9; Guise 1836; L’Estoile 1943, 549–62; Meindre 1855, 441–43; Palma-Cayet 1838, 33–54; Pasquier 1966, 286–301; Person 1999, 72–75; Poulain 1836, 323; Thou 1854, 323–29; Valois 1836.

Secondary sources: [Vitet?] 1827, 26–43; Anquetil 1851, 390–95; Ascoli 1971, 137–74; Barnavi 1980, 61–65; 119–28; Bordier and Charton 1860, 88–91; Brissac 1952, 103–07; Chalambert 1898, 47–91; Dulaure 1853a, 2: 376–81; 1853b, 1: 267, 282–88; Felibien 1725, 2: 1167–70; Gaulle 1839, 460–63; Girard 1670, 72–75; Larousse 1866, 2: 262–63; Mariéjol 1911, 269–78; Meindre 1855, 441–43; Ranum 1968, 34–38; Richet 1982; 1990; Robiquet 1886, 326–39; Salmon 1975, 234–43.

Images: Anquetil 1851, 393; Genouillac n.d., 2: opposite p. 92; Lurine 1844, 228; Melchior-Bonnet 1986a, 89; Musée Carnavalet 1989.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
005	1589	02	23	01	France	Rhône	Lyon	3	0	08	11	1

Lyon reacted in February 1589 to the murder of the duc and the cardinal de Guise, and the blow this dealt to the ultra-Catholic cause, by mounting a brief general uprising. The city is said to have bristled with barricades on the night of February 23. According to Antoine de Ruffi, news that barricades had been

raised in Lyon became the occasion for Marseille joining the Holy League.

Primary sources: Ruffi 1696, 1: 377.

Secondary sources: Richet 1990, 390.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
006	1591	02	21	02	France	Bouches-du-Rhône	Marseille	2	1	04	07	1

In February 1591, a dispute between pro- and anti-Savoy factions within the Holy League led to a clash in the inner-city districts of Marseille. Newly elected consuls devised a plan to drive out the supporters of the duke of Savoy and declare the city's neutrality with respect to the League's internal conflicts. Forewarned, the pro-Savoy forces rallied in the Cavaillon quarter, where they built a number of barricades. Though the use of this tactic was limited to this one district of the city, it proved crucial in launching a counteroffensive, which ultimately defeated the consuls and delivered the city to the duke of Savoy.

Primary sources: Nostradamus 1971, 898–901.

Secondary sources: Richet 1990, 390.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
007	1594	02	07	03	France	Rhône	Lyon	2	1	04	07	1

A revolt in favor of a Spanish succession in February 1594 led to the construction of barricades “in most quarters” of the city.

Secondary sources: [Gonon?] 1842, 7.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
008	1625	07	11	01	France	Gironde	Bordeaux	1	0	02	03	1

A false rumor in July 1625 that a rebel naval force under the command of the duc de Soubise was in the vicinity caused residents of Bordeaux to take up arms. Butchers in the market near the Château du Hâ constructed barricades at three street corners. The authorities soon managed to scotch the rumor, and the event remained quite small-scale.

Secondary sources: Beik 1997, 133–34.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
009	1630	02	28	01	France	Côte-d'Or	Dijon	2	1	04	07	1

The revolt of the Lanturelus (named after a popular song of the period) in February 1630 originated in the reaction to an attempt to end the province's favored tax status by replacing the local Estates with an alternative political structure that would centralize revenue collection. On February 28, a crowd in which local winegrowers were prominent rang the tocsin and took up arms. Making the rounds of the city, they proceeded to sack the houses of officials and rich notables and burn their furniture. Barricades were constructed in the quarters inhabited by winegrowers, six or eight of whom were killed in clashes with the bourgeois militia.

Secondary sources: Beik 1997, 126–33; Tilly 1986, 13–15.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
010	1635	06	15	01	France	Gironde	Bordeaux	3	3	08	14	1

Beginning in mid-May 1635, the city of Bordeaux, then part of the province of Guyenne, was the site of protests and unrest aimed at repealing an annual tax on wine retailers that had been newly imposed in August of the previous year. (Consumption taxes of this sort were generically referred to as *gabelles*, even though that term technically referred to the specific tax that had traditionally been levied on salt.) These events were a continuation of the series of popular revolts in the southwest of France collectively known as the *jacqueries des Croquants*. An insurrection broke out in the Saint-Michel district on June 15, in the course of which chains were stretched and more than a dozen barricades (called “barricados” in Cotton’s English translation of Girard’s text) were constructed by rebellious residents. Between 3,000 and 5,000 insurgents participated. A small force of roughly fifty soldiers, commanded by the duc d’Epernon, succeeded in assaulting and clearing all barricades, killing 25 to 30 insurgents in the process and sustaining a number of casualties of its own. Girard mentions that at the start of the fighting, all the city’s chains went up. He also notes that the most dangerous aspect of all was the fire directed at his troops from windows, though Yves-Marie Bercé considers stones thrown from a height as the greater peril. One source claims that a woman came very close to “braining [Epernon] with a flower-pot.” The threat of an artillery barrage helped avoid an attack against the last five barricades that would surely have added to the casualty figures.

Secondary sources: Beik 1997, 134–41; Bercé 1974b, 1: 238, 295–316; Bercé 1990, 50, 52; Girard 1670, 538–47.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
011	1635	06	17	02	France	Lot-et-Garonne	Agen	3	2	04	09	0

The uprising two days earlier in Bordeaux inspired unrest in cities further up the Garonne River in June 1635, aimed at recently instituted *gabelles*. Preliminary events failed to produce a widespread response, but on Sunday, June 17, a dispute between boatmen and those responsible for protecting local tax collectors led to a crowd confronting and murdering an archer who was on his way to join in the repression of the Bordeaux unrest. The crowd then proceeded to pillage and burn the houses of officials who refused to oppose the new taxes, resulting in a number of deaths on both sides of the conflict. Barricades soon went up “all over the city.” Twenty-six such structures were built by the defenders of city officials, and an additional but unspecified number were erected by rebels, mostly artisans, who were resisting the imposition of new taxes. Women were reported to have played an important role in the pursuit of *gabelleurs*, in the pillage of those officials’ houses, and even in throwing rocks and wielding knives. The ringing of the tocsin managed to assemble as many as 6,000 peasants from the surrounding region, but the bourgeois militia prevented them from entering the town, killing a few and dispersing the rest. The unrest continued on the following day, with several more deaths reported. In all, the crowd killed at least fifteen victims, half of whom were tax farmers or financial officers. Crowd violence mimicked the customary practices of the justice system (the dragging and mutilation of dead bodies, reprisals on the property of those executed, etc.). A roughly equal number of insurgents perished. This made the Agen uprising the most violent and most famous of the 1635 events in the southwest of France. Order was quickly restored, but only after monks and the archdeacon of Appil circulated among the barricades, and the *gens de bien* formed armed squads to aggressively police their neighborhoods. Five executions resulted from subsequent judicial pursuits.

Primary sources: Bercé 1974b, 2: 718–21.

Secondary sources: Beik 1997, 63–71; Bercé 1974b, 1: 323–37.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
012	1635	06	19	02	France	Dordogne	Périgueux	2	2	04	08	0

Word that barricades had been erected in Bordeaux arrived in Périgueux on the evening of June 17, 1635. Formerly free towns, threatened by the end of their exemption from the imposition of new duties, rose in anger. A hunt for

gabelleurs ensued, with many notables forced to flee, their houses sacked. The level of unrest escalated on June 19, especially after an aide to the mayor mistreated a protestor. As barricades went up on June 19, the aide was killed by the crowd and his body thrown down a well. Order was restored with the arrival of the intendant, and a swift repression followed. Other than two insurgent leaders who were tried and executed in the aftermath of these events, details on casualties are lacking. Most of the rebels appear to have been artisans or *gens de métier*. A substantial but unspecified number of barricades were constructed.

Primary sources: Bercé 1974b, 2: 718–21.

Secondary sources: Beik 1997, 63–71.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
013	1635	07	01	01	France	Gironde	Bordeaux	1	2	02	05	0

In the aftermath of the Bordeaux events of mid-June 1635, brewers and truck farmers in the suburb of Saint-Seurin rioted briefly, setting a few houses on fire. The duc d'Epéron quickly brought matters under control with the help of his personal guard and a hundred bourgeois volunteers. Insurgents who had barricaded themselves in and around the local church were routed with a loss of about forty lives. The entire incident lasted just four hours.

Secondary sources: Bercé 1974b, 1: 295.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
014	1637	06	01	01	France	Gers	La Sauvetat-du-Dropt	3	3	04	10	1

In 1637, faced with a renewal of the communal revolts collectively known as the *jacqueries des Croquants*, the king's lieutenant in the Perigord, the duc d'Epéron, then eighty-two years old, recalled his son, the duc de la Valette, from the war against Spain. Some 2,000 to 3,000 rebels fortified their position in the Protestant market town of La Sauvetat by building barricades. On June 1, 1637, La Valette's forces, about equal in number, began a successful assault on the town that resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. Some 200 soldiers died and a larger number were wounded. Among the insurgents, the death toll may have ranged anywhere from 800 to 1,500.

Secondary sources: Bercé 1974b, 1: 426–29.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
015	1637	06	06	01	France	Dordogne	Bergerac	3	2	02	07	0

Rebels who had managed to escape the carnage that ended the revolt in La Sauvetat conducted an assault of the town of Bergerac under the command of Antoine du Puy de la Mothe in June 1637. His forces proceeded to fortify their new position by constructing barricades, but La Mothe, skeptical of the ability of his untrained peasant army to withstand an attack by the duc de la Valette's soldiers, temporized. A new leader, a Périgueux physician named Jean Magot, soon emerged. On June 6, he succeeded in rallying about 1,000 peasants to his cause and directed them to reinforce barricades in the vicinity of the citadel in order to repel La Valette's anticipated assault. Magot was immediately struck down by the followers of La Mothe, who decided not to resist the entry of La Valette's forces into Bergerac the next day. The remaining Croquant forces rapidly dispersed. It would appear that, although the number of insurgents mobilized was large, only a limited number of barricades was constructed and the casualty total was small.

Secondary sources: Bercé 1974b, 1: 427–30.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
016	1648	08	27	03	France	Seine	Paris	4	2	16	22	1

In August 1648, on the occasion of the mass celebrating the French victory at the battle of Lens, Anne of Austria, acting on the advice of Mazarin, ordered the arrest of Pierre Broussel and other leaders of the Paris *parlement* whom she blamed for having frustrated the crown's efforts to raise revenue for the conduct of the war against Spain. Parisians responded with a general uprising, demanding the release of Broussel, whom they considered their protector. According to some contemporary estimates, as many as 1,260 barricades were constructed by insurgents. In the early fighting, somewhere between a dozen and fifty of the king's defenders were killed, most of them members of the Swiss Guard. Perhaps a score of insurgents are known to have lost their lives. *Parlement* intervened and a "compromise" was worked out, but the magnitude of the uprising and the ability of insurgents to force the crown to back down dealt a serious blow to the prestige of the monarchy and set the stage for the chaotic period of civil war known as the Princely Fronde.

Primary sources: "Relation véritable de tout ce qui s'est fait et passé aux baricades de Paris" (n.d.), 1–8; Brienne 1854, 99–100; Dubois 1865, 324–37;

Dubuisson-Aubenay 1883, 1: 50–57; C. Joly 1854, 159–61; G. Joly 1854, 7–19; Motteville 1855, 2: 144–85; Montpensier 1928, 103–8; Ormesson [Olivier] 1860, 554–71, 556–63; *Registres de l'Hôtel de Ville de Paris* (1846), 1: 10–38; Retz 1854, 3–13; 58–77; Talon 1732, 5: 132–43, 245–79; 1854, 260–71; Vallier 1902, 1: 80–101.

Secondary sources: Anquetil 1851, 515–24; Bordier and Charton 1860, 224–27; Descimon 1990, 397–422; Dulaure 1853b, 1: 374–84; Felibien 1725, 2: 1400; Larousse 1866, 2: 263–64; Lavissee 1911, 29–41; 1978, 39–42; Martin 1867, 2: 487–89; Mousnier 1949, 33–78; 1978, 248–72; *Registres de l'Hôtel de Ville de Paris* (1846), 1: 445–54; Ranum 1968, 213–17; Retz 1872, 607–20.

Images: See [figures 9-12](#), this volume; Anquetil 1851, 521, 536; Bordier and Charton 1860, 2: 225; Martin 1867, 2: 489; Melchior-Bonnet 1986b, 123.

#	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
017	1649	03	31	02	France	Gironde	Bordeaux	3	1	04	08	0

The Fronde parlementaire in Paris had created a power vacuum in provincial cities all over France. In Bordeaux, it precipitated a struggle between the regional *parlement* and the duc d'Epéron, governor of Guyenne. Members of the *parlement* sought to capitalize on this opportunity by creating a war council that would counter d'Epéron's attempts to isolate Bordeaux militarily and establish his hegemony. A collision on March 31, 1649 in which d'Epéron's soldiers fired upon a delegation of *parlementaires* became the occasion for city residents to arm themselves and build barricades. On April 1, demonstrators in the Saint-Michel quarter demanded the resignation of municipal officials. Though the rebellion continued for months, in this incident, the barricades remained no more than a couple of days.

Secondary sources: Beik 1997, 199–220-24.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
018	1649	07	23	03	France	Gironde	Bordeaux	3	1	04	08	0

The rebellion that began at the end of March continued while negotiations between the Bordeaux *parlement* and the crown proceeded at an uneven pace. D'Epéron returned to the city on July 23, 1649, to enforce a settlement that called for the members of the *parlement* to go into internal exile. To express their displeasure, residents built barricades, obliging the duke to try to enter the city by a different route. The bourgeois population refused to cooperate with the

king's representative, and two days later, armed crowds drove him from the city. Though the city remained in a state of rebellion for the remainder of 1649, there is nothing to indicate that barricades persisted beyond late July. Though a number of deaths were caused by bombardments from the Château Trompette, a military strong-hold astride the city proper, casualties in connection with the barricades appear to have been minimal.

Secondary sources: Beik 1997, 199–220–24.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
019	1652	03	21	01	France	Lot-et-Garonne	Agen	3	0	04	07	1

The Fronde was in its final phase when the prince de Condé sought refuge for his army within the walls of Agen. When a force under the command of Condé's brother, the prince de Conti, entered the city on March 21, 1652, some residents resisted the attempt to establish a garrison by erecting barricades. Condé's efforts to persuade the insurgents to dismantle their barricades failed. It was only after gunfire was exchanged that a compromise was reached, calling for troops to withdraw to the suburbs. No casualties are reported from this engagement.

Secondary sources: Beik 1997, 204–205.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
020	1652	03	29	07	France	Lot-et-Garonne	Agen	3	1	08	12	0

The approach of the royal army under the command of Harcourt revived the dispute described in the preceding account. Supporters of Conde prepared to resist the entry of the king's soldiers into their city, while a smaller group of royalists occupied the city hall. In the conflict that followed, as many as 233 barricades were built. This standoff lasted until April 2 when an unsuccessful attempt to capture the city hall and diminishing support for Conde caused him to leave the city. On April 4, Harcourt and the royal army entered the city and the barricades were taken down.

Secondary sources: Beik 1997, 205–7.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
021	1652	06	XX	1	France	Seine	Paris	2	0	04	06	1

On July 2, 1652, a battle in the faubourg Saint-Antoine pitted rebel forces under

the command of the Grand Condé against the royal army under Turenne. Paris had shut its gates, vowing to remain neutral. Condé's forces, outnumbered two to one, were pinned down in the streets just outside the city walls but managed to hold out until the gates of Paris were opened only because they made use of "barricades" they found already in place. Structures built or used by troops in a purely military engagement would not qualify as barricades under the definition adopted in this study, but the sources agree that these were artifacts left behind from an earlier event. They had been built anywhere from "a few days" to two months earlier by local residents to protect Paris from the marauding soldiers of the duc de Lorraine's army. Unfortunately, few details are provided by contemporary sources, though it appears that up to a few dozen barricades were involved. Thus, while Condé's use of these "barricades" in July would not qualify as a barricade event, their presence is evidence of an earlier barricade event during which city residents defended themselves through the use of such structures. Célestin Moreau, editor of the memoirs of the comte de Tavannes (who provides the most detailed account of this incident), places barricade construction late in the month of May, but other credible sources suggest a date early in June.

Primary sources: Brienne 1854, 142–43; Conrart 1971, 107–13; Dubuisson-Aubenay 1883, 2: 244–47; G. Joly 1854, 74–75; Montpensier 1928, 130–40; Rochefoucauld 1925, 276–87; Talon 1732, 8: 24–29; 1854, 494; Tavannes 1858, 153–65, 260–69; Turenne 1872, 157–61; Vallier 1916, 3: 303–16; York 1854, 538–43.

Secondary sources: Anquetil 1851, 548–49; Aumale 1892, 182–99; Martin 1868–85, 2: 506–7; Moote 1971, 344.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
022	1787	09	20	01	Austrian Nether- lands	Flanders	Brussels	2	1	02	05	1

Belgians reacted sharply against the reforms that Austrian Emperor Joseph II tried to impose upon them, in violation of their provinces' traditional autonomy. Resistance centered in the Estates General of Brabant and Hainault. Clashes between armed members of the bourgeois militia and Austrian soldiers frightened elite leaders of the resistance movement like Van der Noot, who remained deeply suspicious of spontaneous popular uprisings. They were, however, unable to prevent a collision when Austrian troops attacked isolated groups of volunteers for wearing tricolor cockades and moved against a funeral

procession. Around 2 P.M. on September 20, 1787, militia members sounded the alarm and rushed to the Grande-Place (la place Royale), where they stretched chains, dug up paving stones, and built barricades at all entrances to the square, even as the Estates continued to meet nearby in the Hôtel de Ville. As many as fifteen Austrian soldiers may have died; a smaller number of patriots were wounded. This constituted the first use of barricades outside France that I have been able to document.

Primary sources: Feller 1787, 5: 169–77; Hubert 1920, 285–88.

Secondary sources: Borgnet 1834, 1: 108–11; Dewez 1806, 6 205–10; Galeslott 1977, 31–35; Gérard 1842, 277–84; Henne and Wauters 1845, 2: 330–35; 1969, 4: 220; Juste 1845, 1: 153–60; Pirenne 1920, 5: 436–39; Polasky 1987, 60–63.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
023	1789	01	26	01	Switzerland	Geneva	Geneva	2	2	02	06	1

An edict raising the price of bread in Geneva published on January 26, 1789, precipitated a wave of unrest, during which bakers' shops were pillaged and grain shipments attacked. Troops responded by firing on the people, killing one and wounding another. This, however, only intensified the disorders. When local officials dispatched additional military forces, the insurgents formed and vigorously defended a sturdy barricade. They also deployed two fire pumps filled with boiling water and lye to slow down the soldiers' progress and carried paving stones to the roofs "to be thrown down upon the troops if they should force the barricades." In the ensuing fighting, the commanding army officer was killed and several of his men wounded. The unrest became so widespread that the authorities made concessions, issuing a counteredict lowering the price of bread and granting a general amnesty. Though a temporary truce was negotiated, fighting but not barricade construction continued through January 29.

It is worth noting that French forces had collaborated in a military intervention in June 1782 to help put down a similar popular insurrection that had been raging in Geneva since February 1781. However, by the start of 1789, France was too deeply embroiled in troubles of its own to become directly involved.

Secondary sources: Encyclopædia Britannica 1797, 7, pt. 2: 623; Vuilleumier 1997.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
024	1789	07	14	02	France	Seine	Paris	4	3	04	11	1

The events of July 14, 1789, in particular the storming of the Bastille, are generally well known. What is less well understood is that the construction of barricades was an integral part of the crowd's activities on this and the following day. The original impetus appears to have come from the permanent committee of the Assembly of Electors, which took over many of the responsibilities exercised by royal authorities in less turbulent times. A number of eyewitnesses recorded the existence of barricades in the course of July 14, though they provided few details about their number or location. During the night of July 14–15, in response to suspicions that royal troops would mount a counteroffensive, a still larger number of barricades was built in the principal streets as well as at bridges. In general, though their existence was overshadowed by the attack on the Bastille fortress and subsequent events at the Hôtel de Ville, it would appear that dozens of barricades were constructed over the course of two days.

In brief, despite a frustrating lack of detail, Parisians' active awareness of barricades on July 14 and the significant but secondary role they played in those events are well documented, and the presence of barricades at this watershed event of the modern era seems well established.

Primary sources: Chassin 1889, 3: 514, 539–40; Denis 1891, 547–48; Flammermont 1896, 365; *Journal général de l'Europe* 4, no. 89 (July 25, 1789): 171–74; Legg 1905, 1: 63; La Tour du Pin 1920, 81; F.-P. Orléans 1977, 44; Paris, Assemblée générale des électeurs (1790), 1: 276.

Secondary sources: Flammermont 1892, xc, clxxxv, ccxlvii; Godechot 1970, 204ff.; Tassier 1930, 116–17.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
025	1789	10	26	02	Austrian Netherlands	Flanders	Turn- hout	3	2	04	09	1

A newly recruited patriot army of 2,000 to 2,800 Belgian rebels crossed the border into Flanders from their training ground at Breda on October 24, 1789, and occupied Turnhout in hope of gaining support from the local population. E.-J. Dinne, a contemporary witness, reports that Van der Mersch, commander of the insurgent Belgian forces, ordered his irregulars and local residents to construct entrenchments and to barricade the avenues that appeared most likely to be attacked by the Austrian army. In the actual engagement, residents fired from the windows of their houses, and women threw down paving stones from

the roofs. The Austrians fled in disarray, leaving behind three of their cannon. According to General Schroeder's report, the army's losses totaled no dead, 60 wounded, and 23 missing. Insurgent casualties amounted to 87 dead or wounded.

Primary sources: Alton 1791, 175–76, 334–39; Dinne 1791, 12–17; Hubert 1924, 118.

Secondary sources: Borgnet 1834, 2: 11–18; Juste 1845, 1: 268–71; Polasky 1987, 121–22; Tassier 1930, 172–74.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
026	1789	11	22	01	Austrian Netherlands	Hainault	Mons	3	2	04	09	0

Upon hearing of the victory of a patriot army in Ghent, Van der Mersch led 2,000 newly trained troops into Hainault province. On November 21, the Austrians evacuated the town of Mons. On the afternoon of the following day, when residents heard reports that Austrian troops were on the march, they began preparations to repel any effort to reoccupy their town. In an effort to support the patriot army, villagers dug up paving stones and built barricades. Dinne makes no mention of the outcome of the engagement, but Polasky asserts: "Together, the patriot army and the villagers again routed the Austrians."

Primary sources: Dinne 1791, 51–52; Paridaens 1903–7, 189–97.

Secondary sources: Polasky 1987, 123; Tassier 1930, 177.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
027	1789	12	11	02	Austrian Netherlands	Brabant	Brussels-Ixelles	3	2	04	09	0

Following the liberation of Flanders and Hainault provinces, residents of the capital of the Austrian Netherlands succeeded in chasing the Austrian garrison from Brussels. The authorities' attempt on December 11, 1789, to round up deserters who had congregated in the city served as precipitant. Because of the high rate of desertion from the Austrian ranks—in at least two cases, entire companies defected—insurgents were able to capture several of the outer gates. General Richard d'Alton was soon obliged to withdraw his forces to the more heavily fortified areas of the upper city. On December 12, as his position continued to deteriorate, he made the decision to withdraw from Brussels. However, the first convoys that attempted to leave the city found the road through the suburb of Ixelles barricaded, mainly using trees felled by local

villagers who were prepared to prevent the Austrians' passage. D'Alton personally led a sortie that used cannon to remove the obstacles, but by the time he returned to the central districts of Brussels, he found that his army had already begun its evacuation, abandoning much of its matériel, including four cannon, as well as important government records. Overall, insurgent casualties were estimated at thirty dead and forty wounded on December 11 and at least as many on the following day. The Austrians lost a roughly equivalent number, but it was high levels of desertion from the imperial ranks that decided the outcome.

Primary sources: Hubert 1924, 190–200.

Secondary sources: Borgnet 1834, 2: 40–42; Galesloot 1977, 53–59; Gehuchten 1961, 29–32; Henne and Wauters 1845, 2: 363–70; Henne and Wauters 1975, 2: 322–33; Wauters 1973, 9: 44–45.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
028	1791	06	21	02	France	Meuse	Varennes-en-Argonne	3	2	04	09	1

The flight of the royal family was foiled after Jean-Baptiste Drouet, postmaster and innkeeper in Sainte-Menehould, recognized the king. He quickly roused a group of patriots, and by 11 P.M. on June 21, 1791, they managed to intercept the convoy at Varennes, just thirty miles from Montmédy, near the Belgian border. The king's unwillingness to risk harm to his family or bloodshed among the local population prevented the small force accompanying him from making an immediate escape. Fearing the arrival of military reinforcements, residents rang the tocsin and assembled a large body of poorly armed peasants from the surrounding countryside to prevent the king's departure. Their primary tactic was to barricade the streets and the bridge leading to the main road, using wooden beams, bundles of firewood, and wagons. These structures were successful in barring entry to a column of light cavalry that arrived from Dun as the royal party was about to be forced to depart for Paris around seven o'clock the next morning. A larger force arrived in the vicinity soon after, too late to be of assistance to the king, who was then accompanied by some 4,000 local national guardsmen on the first leg of his journey back to the capital.

Primary sources: Buchez 1834,353–56,421; Choiseul 1822,90–92; Fournel 1890, 309–29; Tourzel 1883, 316–27.

Secondary sources: Aimon 1928, 314–29; 1936,134–60; Tackett 2003.

Maps: Aimon 1936.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
029	1795	05	23	01	France	Seine	Paris	3	0	02	05	1

The last great popular uprising of the revolutionary period produced a confrontation between the post-Thermidorian Convention and Parisian sansculottes in May 1795. On 1 Prairial, Year III, a crowd of demonstrators, clamoring for bread and the Constitution of 1793, invaded the assembly chambers and killed the deputy J.-B. Féraud. The remnants of the Mountain compromised themselves by trying to take advantage of the temporary shift in the power balance that these developments created. The moderates soon regrouped and seized the opportunity to order the arrest of fourteen Montagnard deputies as well as Féraud's killers. On 2 Prairial, another standoff occurred between a crowd of 20,000 from the faubourg Antoine and about 40,000 uniformed men guarding the Assembly, but further bloodshed was avoided. The Convention had called in army reinforcements, including several thousand cavalry, and by 3 Prairial, the equilibrium of forces had changed decisively, emboldening representatives to attempt to break the back of sansculottes' resistance once and for all. Early in the morning of 4 Prairial, General Kilmaine led 1,200 men into the hostile district. His forces, too few in number to mount an adequate defense if challenged, consisted of *muscadins* (among them Louis Costaz and Hyde de Neuville, who have left us accounts of these events) and national guards from sections of the city loyal to the Convention, as well as about 200 regular soldiers and 200 mounted dragoons. Kilmaine's nominal objective was to enter the faubourg Saint-Antoine to search for Féraud's assassins, who had been freed by the crowd as they were being led to the guillotine on the previous day. The Convention's ultimate intention, however, was to disarm the popular movement. Once fully engaged in the faubourg, Kilmaine found his path obstructed by a series of barricades constructed by local residents. He was able with difficulty to persuade the insurgents to open a passage through the first of these structures. A confrontation at the second barricade was far tenser, because Kilmaine's rear guard had seized the faubourg's cannon. Kilmaine's forces were allowed to proceed only after those weapons had been restored to the people. The column was allowed to pass through a third barricade only after threatening to destroy it with its own artillery. After Kilmaine's troops had extricated themselves (without casualties on either side), military forces loyal to the Convention, numbering roughly 25,000, proceeded to surround the faubourg Saint-Antoine, and the three rebellious *sections* were threatened with having their supply of food cut off if resistance was not ended. Insurgents had erected an additional but unspecified

number of barricades in anticipation of this confrontation. Scattered fighting on 4 and 5 Prairial resulted in a small number of casualties, but in the end the popular forces capitulated with little bloodshed, turning over their cannon and allowing themselves to be disarmed. Hundreds of arrests followed. Wildly discrepant estimates of insurgent strength have been offered, but the rebels appear to have numbered in the thousands. The only barricades about which details are provided are the three discussed in Kilmaine's report, though additional structures are mentioned in connection with the subsequent standoff. Nearly bloodless, these events confirmed the end of sansculottes' political power and the radical phase of the French Revolution. With the defeat of 4 Prairial, the post-Thermidorian order seemed well established.

Primary sources: Costaz 1795; Kilmaine 1795; Neuville 1888, 124–26.

Secondary sources: Gendron 1979, 201–54; Lacretelle 1842, 224–29; Mathiez 1931, 213–14; Tarlé 1959, 218–238; Tønneson 1959, 253–323; Z. n.d., 9–13.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
030	1795	10	05	02	France	Seine	Paris	3	3	04	10	1

Following Thermidor and the defeat of populist forces on 4 Prairial, royalist factions were next to engage in a test of strength against the National Convention. Their uprising in October 1795 was prompted by the Convention's plan to form a "patriot" battalion consisting of republicans recently released from prison. Denouncing this "return of the Terror," royalists mobilized their own military force under the command of General Danican. The troops of the Convention were led by Barras, with the able assistance of Napoléon Bonaparte. The confrontation came to a head on 13 Vendémiaire. Initial fighting in the rue Saint-Honoré produced no clear-cut result until Bonaparte—whether acting on Barras's orders or on his own initiative has remained a matter of dispute—directed murderous artillery fire at the insurgents who had begun the construction of barricades. According to Barras, a barricade at the barrière des Sergens had to be taken at bayonette point, and he was obliged to give orders to fire on those who were unpaving the streets. By the time that the districts near the Panthéon and the Théâtre-Français were pacified on 14 Vendémiaire, "the remains of a few barricades" were the only traces of the fighting. The sections in revolt were disarmed, and order was quickly restored. Most contemporary accounts have told the story from the perspective of the Convention (and Danican's is not helpful on practical details), but it would appear that insurgents

numbered at least 3,000; that several barricades were attempted, though few, if any, were completed before the insurgents were overpowered by artillery fire; and that as many as 300 insurgents were wounded or killed. These barricades, incomplete though they may have been, remain notable for the fact that they represent the rare instance (in the context of French history, at any rate) of structures built by royalists for use against a republican regime.

Primary sources: Barras 1795; Lacretelle 1842, 258–64; Réal 1796, 37–91; Tannatali 1966, 110–14.

Secondary sources: Mignet 1865, 2: 161–64; Roguet 1850, 68–69; Rose 1907, 1: 65.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
031	1814	03	30	01	France	Seine	Paris	4	2	02	08	1

As an allied force of over 100,000 advanced on Paris in March 1814, a French army of no more than 30,000 soldiers conducted a heroic but short-lived defense of the capital before agreeing to a cease-fire and preparing to abandon Paris on the evening of March 30. Approximately 12,000 Paris national guardsmen, who had been armed and mobilized the morning of the attack to protect the perimeter of the city, were charged by Maréchal Moncey with saving the honor of the capital by mounting a final defense. As one aspect of that effort, the National Guard, with the help of noncombatants, including women and children, constructed at least two barricades at the foot of Montmartre (one near the barrière de Clichy) for use against Prussian and Russian troops. Although constructed for use against an invading army, these structures were the work of the civilian population (as well as elements of the local militia) and thus qualify under the definition of barricades employed in this study.

Secondary sources: Wairy 1915, 3: 343–45; Girard 1964, 14–17.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
032	1827	11	19	02	France	Seine	Paris	2	1	02	05	1

By the fall of 1827, the autocratic style and mercurial policies of Charles X had deprived his government of popular support. The disbanding of the Paris National Guard in late April had already alienated a large part of the population, and the Villèle ministry's dissolution of the National Assembly and call for new legislative elections became the occasion for voters to express their dissatisfaction by returning liberal candidates to office. Two evenings of

celebration of this popular electoral victory led to collisions with troops, the construction of several barricades, and substantial casualties. Beginning on the evening of November 19, 1827, crowds roamed the city demanding that residents illuminate their houses and throwing stones to break the windows of those that refused. Police initially allowed the disturbances to develop without intervening, before coordinating repressive activities with the military. By midnight, four sturdy barricades, erected in the neighborhoods surrounding the Hôtel de Ville, had been captured by troops, despite spirited resistance. During the night of November 20, three more barricades were constructed. The attack on these structures resulted in three or four insurgent deaths and a substantial number of wounded. More than one hundred were arrested over the course of the two-day uprising, “a dress rehearsal for [the 1830] revolution” (Tombs 1996, 348).

Primary sources: *Relation des événements arrivés à Paris* (1839); Dumolart 1827, 1–13; Isambert n.d.; Isambert 1828; Rémusat 1959, 2: 202–05.

Secondary sources: Bordier and Charton 1860, 575–76; Caron 1995, 5–6; Z. n.d., 23–28; Lauck in Corbin and Mayeur 1997; E. L. Newman 1974, 47–54; Tombs 1996, 348.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
033	1830	07	27	03	France	Seine	Paris	4	4	16	24	1

News of the French army’s triumph in Algeria had emboldened Charles X’s ministry to publish a series of unpopular, repressive ordinances aimed primarily at restricting the freedom of the press in July 1830. This attack on the Charter adopted at the time of the 1814 Restoration prompted the first large-scale, successful Paris insurrection of the nineteenth century. Agitation began on July 26, 1830, after printing workers were told by their employers that there would be no more work until the ordinances were repealed. Unrest soon spread to other workers and was led in part by students from the schools of law, medicine, and commerce, and especially by *polytechniciens* and republican cadres. Overt conflict began on the evening of July 27 with an exchange of gunfire near the intersection of the rue Saint-Honoré and the rue Neuve des Petits-Champs. Auguste Fabre claims to have recommended breaking street lamps and encumbering the streets with barricades to impede the passage of troops (Fabre 1833, 127), but E. L. Newman (1974, 52) cites another contemporary account according to which people in the crowd shouted, “Let’s do as we did in 1827 in the rue Saint-Denis, let’s build some barricades.” Conflict engulfed the entire

city on July 28 and was decided by the following day. Some 4,000 barricades were constructed in three days of fighting by crowds in which workers, students, military veterans, and members of the disbanded National Guard were prominent (but for a dissenting view of the crowd's composition, see E. L. Newman 1974, 27–30). According to one source (Caron 1997), the first barricade went up at 5 P.M. on July 27 near the Théâtre-Français, closely followed by others in the rue Saint-Honoré. (Note, however, that certain sources indicate that barricade construction was under way as early as July 26.) At its peak on July 29, barricade building affected every quarter and most streets throughout the city. Insurgent casualties are said to have run as high as 2,000 dead and 6,000 injured, but Tombs 1996, 351, offers a more restrained estimate of 500 dead and 1,500 wounded on the side of the insurgents, to which might be added 150 dead and 600 wounded on the part of the regime's defenders.

Primary sources: Bazin 1833, 16–17; Courson 1914, 176–95; Fabre 1833, 1: 120–46; Wiesse de Marmont 1857; Potter 1839, vol. 1; Rémusat 1959.

Secondary sources: Blanc 1846, 1: 175–336; Bordier and Charton 1860, 581–85; Caron 1995, 7–10; Fabre 1833, 120–46; E. L. Newman 1974; Pinkney 1972, 104–271; Touchard-Lafosse 1845, 898–910; Weill 1928, 23–24.

Images: See [figures 25, 26, 33](#), this volume; Agulhon 1983a, 566–67 construction; Blanc 1882, 47, 85, 97; F.-P. d'Orléans 1993, 515; Simond 1900–1901, 1: 640.

Maps: Bibliothèque nationale, Département des cartes et plans, 83 09 P3 12, Ge AA 297, Ge C 7172, Ge D 5605, and Ge DD 5711; Blanc 1882, 76–77, endpaper; Simond 1900–1901, 1: 641.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
034	1830	07	30	01	France	Loire-Atlantique	Nantes	3	2	04	09	0

Word of the four ordinances arrived in Nantes forty-eight hours after their publication in Paris. A minor clash occurred between gendarmes and the crowd on July 29, 1830, resulting in a few arrests. However, only with the arrival of the postal coach on July 30 did news of the Paris uprising spur the construction of barricades in several streets and on bridges. After a gunsmith's shop was looted of 600 rifles, a crowd confronted troops, a shot rang out, and in the ensuing mêlée, nine or ten demonstrators were killed, while thirty-nine more were wounded. Military casualties amounted to six dead, thirteen wounded.

Secondary sources: Giraud-Mangin 1931, 461–65; Pilbeam 1999, 77–78.

#	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
035	1830	07	31	01	France	Rhône	Lyon	3	0	04	07	0

Liberals in Lyon were quick to respond to news of the July ordinances and to the increasingly alarming reports being conveyed by telegraph from Paris. On July 31, 1830, an armed crowd raised barricades in the place des Terreaux, the site of the Hôtel de Ville. Widespread fraternization took place between insurgents and the troops of the line. The mayor and prefect capitulated to the demands of the crowd rather than risk a pitched battle. As a result, a provisional government was formed, but the incident produced no loss of life.

Secondary sources: Bezucha 1975, 121; Montagne 1966, 94–99.

#	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
036	1830	08	25	11	Netherlands	Flanders	Brussels	3	2	04	09	1

The July Days in France had helped to sharpen Belgian resentment at Dutch rule and give hope to those agitating for a separation from the Netherlands. Riots broke out in Brussels on August 25, 1830, and the first barricades appear to have been built that evening. Further clashes between the crowd and troops on the following days led to the formation of a bourgeois militia. As yet the movement had not adopted revolutionary goals, but rumors that a Dutch army was approaching the city led to the construction of additional barricades on August 31, 1830. This proved to be a false alarm, but when the prince of Orange entered the city on September 1, accompanied only by members of his general staff, barricades were still present. Only after the prince left and the local garrison was withdrawn from the city on September 3, was calm restored. Fears of Dutch military intervention nevertheless led residents to reinforce the city's defenses.

Secondary sources: Blanc 1846, 3: 82–86; Demoulin 1934, 82–83; 1950, 16–26; Juste 1872; Mackintosh 1880, 32; Van Neck 1909, 34–35.

Images: See [figures 13–14](#), this volume; Van Neck 1905, 40, 43, 50, 58, 80, 84.

Maps: Van Neck 1905, 56–57.

#	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
037	1830	09	21	07	Netherlands	Flanders	Brussels	3	4	04	11	0

The approach of a Dutch army on September 21, 1830, prompted residents of

Brussels to begin constructing barricades in various parts of the city. The attack of the royal army, numbering about 10,000 soldiers, began in the early morning of September 23 and achieved some initial success. Dutch troops were able to seize the Royal Park and palaces, but popular forces constructed barricades along the army's line of retreat, encircled their relatively unfavorable positions, and exacted steady casualties over four days of fighting. After the failure of Prince Frederick's efforts to negotiate a cease-fire, the Dutch army withdrew during the night of September 26–27. The location of a dozen barricades are specified in military reports, but it seems likely that the number actually constructed was two or three times higher. According to Van Neck, the insurgents lost 300 to 450 dead and suffered 750 to 1,750 total casualties. Demoulin 1950, 149, indicates 108 dead and 620 wounded among the soldiers and 430 dead and 1,200 wounded among the insurgents.

Primary sources: Van Halen 1831, 2–52.

Secondary sources: Blanc 1846, 2: 100–102; Demoulin 1934, 112, 121–33, 151–52; 1950, 60–72; Leconte 1945; 1949, 3–21, 168–74; Mackintosh 1880, 89, 96–97, 119–26, 136; Van Neck 1905, 40–87.

Images: Blanc 1846, 2: frontispiece; Demoulin 1950, frontispiece; Van Neck 1905. 40, 43, 45, 46, 49, 50, 55, 58, 80.

Map: Van Neck 1905, 56–57.

#	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
038	1830	09	23	01	Netherlands	Flanders	Tirlemont	2	1	02	05	0

When Dutch troops chased from Louvain attempted to take up positions in Tirlemont in September 1830, residents refused them entry by barricading the city gates.

Secondary sources: Mackintosh 1880, 126; Van Neck 1905, 100.

#	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
039	1830	09	24	02	Netherlands	Liège	Liège	3	0	02	05	0

News of the attack on Brussels (see event 037) destroyed what little legitimacy the government had left. Liège, which had been at the forefront of the movement for the liberation of Belgium, but was as yet unaware of the outcome in Brussels, was prey to rumors. Arms shops were looted on September 23, 1830. On September 24, a group of soldiers sent from the citadel to scavenge for food was

mistaken for the avant guard of a Dutch attack. When word spread that Dutch soldiers had left the Citadel, barricades went up in city. The rumor proved to be false and the barricades were short-lived, though as many as 10,000 citizens were eventually involved in laying siege to the Citadel, beginning on September 27.

Secondary sources: Demoulin 1950, 98–100.

#	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
040	1830	09	28	02	Netherlands	Flanders	Ghent	2	1	02	05	0

News from Brussels and Bruges incited the residents of Ghent to build barricades and attack forces loyal to the Hague, including 2,000 royal soldiers. News of the Belgian victory in Brussels caused barricades to be built in at least two locations within the city on September 28, 1830. Further disturbances occurred on the following day, causing troops to withdraw to the citadel. The number of barricades was not specified in these sources, but appears to have been from 10 to 20. There were casualties on both sides, including several deaths. A compromise between the military and civilian authorities resulted in the troops being withdrawn to the citadel. The question of control over the city was resolved only on October 17, when the arrival of the Belgian-Parisian Legion gave the insurgents a credible threat of being able to carry out an assault on the citadel, causing the military to capitulate.

Secondary sources: Demoulin 1950, 114–15.

#	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
041	1830	09	30	01	Netherlands	Liège	Sainte-Walburge	2	1	02	05	0

An effort by the Dutch army to relieve troops besieged in the citadel in Liège in September 1830 prompted the construction of barricades by volunteers from this neighboring town, who turned back the relief column before it could reach its goal.

Secondary sources: Demoulin 1950, 100–101.

#	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
042	1831	11	22	02	France	Rhône	Lyon	4	3	08	15	1

After striking silk workers were fired upon by National Guard units among

whose members silk merchants were prominent, an insurrection erupted in the working-class districts of Lyon on November 21, 1831. Troops used artillery to remove barricades constructed on November 22, while residents fired rifles and rained down tiles, stones, and even furniture from the rooftops. The fighting lasted for two days. There may have been as many as 30,000 workers involved. The local garrison suffered more than 300 casualties, while there were some 600 dead or wounded among the insurgents.

Secondary sources: Bezucha 1975, 132; Blanc 1846, 3: 45–81; Charl  ty 1921, 65–67; Dumas 1989, 560–65; Montagne 1966, 140; Perdu 1933, 27–34.

Images: Blanc 1882, 433.

#	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
043	1832	03	12	02	France	Is��re	Grenoble	3	2	04	09	1

On March 11, 1832, residents of Grenoble celebrated the last day of carnival with a parade that was to be followed by a masquerade ball. When a group of young men costumed themselves satirically as members of the government, the newly arrived prefect, Maurice Duval, took offense and tried to have them arrested for sedition. This led to a skirmish in which stones were thrown at police and soldiers. The prefect then cancelled the masked ball, the highlight of the carnival season. In response, residents organized a charivari in Duval’s honor on March 12. Duval’s order for the National Guard to muster was ignored. A sizable crowd was greeted by troops from the 35th Infantry Regiment who proceeded to disperse demonstrators at bayonet point, injuring more than twenty, including some women and children. As news of this clash spread through the city, an attempt was made to erect barricades, though troops quickly dismantled the few that were completed. On the morning of March 13, barricades again appeared in the city, and the crowd demanded that those responsible for the previous day’s repression be brought to trial. In the ensuing conflict, the prefect, the commanding general, and the local military governor were effectively held captive by insurgents for several hours. The “three *journ  es* of Grenoble” ended in a stalemate. The 35th Regiment was soon transferred out of Grenoble, and the local branch of the National Guard was disbanded.

Secondary sources: Blanc 1846, 3: 178–99; Breunig 1962; Kerr 2000, 197–205.

#	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
044	1832	06	05	03	France	Seine	Paris	3	3	08	14	1

Since the July Days of 1830, Paris republicans and other opponents of the new regime had expressed lingering resentment that “their” revolution had been stolen. This included collisions with police and troops on July 14, 1831, in connection with the planting of a liberty tree, and on the first anniversary of the July Days. The year 1832 began with a political trial (in which Blanqui and Raspail were among the defendants) that worked out badly for the government. Soon thereafter, a cholera epidemic broke out. When it claimed the life of Casimir P rier in May 1832, republicans were emboldened to form alliances with the dynastic Left and with Bonapartists. They may even have received support, in the form of money and arms, from the Legitimists. A coalition of opposition parties used the funeral procession of General Lamarque—a military leader of the Napoleonic period, member of the left opposition, and friend of Lafayette—to rouse the population of the capital. Despite heavy intermittent rains, huge crowds, estimated at anywhere from 24,000 to 100,000, including many notables, took part. Prefect Gisquet ordered two battalions of the Municipal Guard to accompany the procession and deployed anywhere from 10,000 to 24,000 soldiers throughout Paris. During a stop along the route, a horseman mysteriously appeared, carrying a red banner with a black border (referred to as a “red flag”) on which was embroidered “Liberty or Death!” This stirred up part of the crowd but alienated many others. When the procession reached the pont d’Austerlitz, some demonstrators proposed carrying the general’s coffin to the Panth on. The result was a confrontation with municipal guards and dragoons, in the course of which the proverbial shot rang out from an unknown quarter. Thus began a short-lived republican insurrection. Most participants were artisans, students, and political militants, augmented by a sprinkling of artists and journalists and led by a small coterie of veteran revolutionaries. Those taking part in the actual fighting appear to have numbered anywhere from 200 to 1,000. Barricades were built, starting at 6:30 P.M. on June 5 near the porte Saint-Denis. Initially, barricades were built on both banks of the Seine, and nearly half the city was affected by the insurrection. However, with the arrival of nightfall, a dramatic shift of momentum occurred. Republican leaders met at the headquarters of the newspaper *Le National* and decided not to call for a general insurrection. On June 6, the National Guard belatedly decided to support the king. Participation was soon confined to hardcore republicans, who were gradually driven back by national and municipal guards to the vicinity of the rue Saint-Martin, where cannon fire was used to destroy barricades. About sixty insurgents made a desperate last stand in the area immediately surrounding the Eglise Saint-Merri. They were overwhelmed by as many as 60,000 soldiers and policemen under the command of Mar chal Soult. By the evening of June 6,

all resistance had ceased. In the aftermath, as many as 1,000 arrests were made. Perhaps 900 were killed or wounded, among whom 70 soldiers died and 290 were wounded. Some 200 barricades were constructed in all, mainly on the right bank. The uprising never garnered broad support from the general population, and insurgents' cries of "Vive la République!" went unanswered.

Primary sources: Alton-Shée 1869, 121–123; Blanc 1846, 3: 267–318; Gisquet 1840, 2: 189–292; Heine 1884, 213–23; 1906, 7: 275–88, 299–315; 1994, 183–93; Lucas-Dubreton 1932; Nadaud 1976, 255–59; Vermeil 1939, 247–50.

Secondary sources: Bouchet 2000; Caron 1995, 11–12; Charléty 1921, 77–79; Dumas 1989, 813–52; Kudlick 1996, 192–95, and nn. 72–80 for biblio.; Tulard 1964, 82n28; Weill 1928, 68–70; Pinkney 1975, 193.

Images: See [figure 1](#), this volume; Blanc 1882, 726; Bouchet 2003, 35–7; Martin 1867, 5: 9; Simond 1903, 9.

Maps: Bouchet 2000, 31, 36.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
045	1833	01	09	01	France	Seine	Clichy-la-Garenne	1	0	02	03	1

Abbé Auzon had been conducting services according to the nonconformist doctrines of Abbé Châtel in Clichy, then a small town just outside Paris, since 1831. In January 1833, an order sealing his church and directing Auzon to vacate the premises sparked a riot among local parishioners, who broke the seals and constructed a single barricade in an effort to wrest control from the authorities. Calm was quickly restored following the arrest of eight to ten individuals.

Primary sources: *L'Echo de la Fabrique*, no. 4 (January 27, 1833).

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
046	1834	04	09	02	France	Rhône	Lyon	3	3	04	10	1

A large-scale insurrection erupted both in Lyon and in the neighboring communes of la Croix-Rousse, la Guillotière, Vaise, and Saint-Clair in April 1834. Much of the organization was provided by the Société des droits de l'homme, which was then operating under color of a mutual aid society. At least thirty barricades were constructed in the center of Lyon alone, where insurgents, who numbered several thousand, set up a first aid station, a powder factory, and a workshop for making bullets. They made effective use of houses adjoining

barricades. Six barricades were built in Vaise in the early fighting, five more in Perrache on April 10, several more in Saint-Clair. Insurgents in Lyon posted copies of an insurrectionary declaration from 1793. Another of their posters was dated “Lyon, le 22 germinal an XLII de la République.” Estimates of armed insurgent strength ranged from 700 to 3,000, but probably only 600 to 1,000 actually fought, as arms were often lacking. According to the Perdu account, 171 insurgents died and 388 more were wounded. There were some 600 arrests, but half of those were soon released. Between 7,000 and 8,000 soldiers were involved, of whom 50 to 100 died and 250 to 350 were wounded. The army used artillery to destroy barricades. Army casualties on the first day alone were 69 wounded (of which 18 subsequently died) plus 17 killed outright. In general, the 1834 Lyon uprising was far better organized than that of 1831, but it enjoyed far less popular support.

Primary sources: *Histoire des événemens de Lyon* (1834), 13–35; Blanc 1846, 4: 223–87; Girod de l’Ain 1834, 224–73; France, Cour des pairs, 1834–36, 74–85.

Secondary sources: Guizot 1860, appendices; Montagne 1966, 180; Perdu 1933, 69–88.

Images: Blanc 1846, 4: frontispiece; 1882, 719; Charléty 1921, 106; Montagne 1966, 176.

Maps: Bibliothèque nationale, Département des cartes et plans, Ge C 3005.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
047	1834	04	10	02	France	Loire	Saint-Etienne	3	1	02	06	0

In response to the outbreak of a workers’ revolt in Lyon, as many as 3,000 to 4,000 insurgents gathered arms and built barricades in the Loire *département* in April 1834. (The locations of three are specified in secondary sources, but there may have been more.) National Guard units were dispatched to the capital, Saint-Etienne, from other towns in the *département*, but by the time they arrived, troops and gendarmes had already succeeded in capturing the insurgents’ barricades. The soldiers suffered light casualties as a result of being bombarded with rocks from the roofs and being shot at from windows. With news of the failure of the Lyon insurrection, all resistance crumbled.

Secondary sources: Girod de l’Ain 1834, 1: 327–31; Perdu 1933, 77.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
048	1834	04	11	01	France	Saône et Loire	Chalon-sur-Saône	1	0	02	03	0

News of the Lyon insurrection sparked a small-scale revolt, led by members of the Société des droits de l'homme and intended to prevent the departure of troops to suppress the Lyon revolt from the Chalon-sur-Saône region in April 1834. A total of one barricade was built. This solitary structure was quickly captured without loss of life.

Secondary sources: Girod de l'Ain 1834, 1: 16, 334–35.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
049	1834	04	11	01	France	Isère	Vienne	1	0	02	03	0

Workers built two barricades in the Isère *département* in April 1834 to prevent passage of troops bound for Lyon to repress the insurrection then in progress. These were quickly dismantled by the troops, who then continued on their way.

Secondary sources: Girod de l'Ain 1834, 1: 333.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
050	1834	04	13	02	France	Seine	Paris	3	2	04	09	0

News from Lyon created effervescence in the capital in April 1834. Since the telegraph had been disabled, news first arrived by mail coach. People gathered at several sites on the right bank in the eastern half of the city on the evening of April 13. Thirty-four barricades were constructed, principally but not exclusively in the neighborhood surrounding the Eglise Saint-Merri (six either in or adjoining the rue Transnonain). Though one source claims that 2,000 arrests resulted, the insurrection did not garner broad support from the general population and was suppressed within twenty-four hours (by 7 A.M. on April 14). A substantial number of insurgent casualties was recorded (probably no fewer than 80 deaths), including the massacre of the residents of a building in the rue Transnonain from which the troops believed that sniper fire had come. Eleven soldiers were killed and thirty-five wounded.

Primary sources: Alton-Shée 1869, 126–27; *Journal de Paris*, April 13–15, 1834, 1–3.

Secondary sources: *Histoire des événements de Lyon* (1834), 35–39; Caron 1995, 12–14; Charléty 1921, 104–5; Girod de l'Ain 1834, 1: 351–92; Perdu

1933, 81n1; Pinkney 1975, 196; Tulard 1964, 82n28, 137–38.

Images: Bouchet 2003, 37–45.

Maps: Bibliothèque nationale, Département des cartes et plans, Ge C 3544.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
051	1834	04	13	02	France	Jura	Arbois	2	0	02	04	0

News of the Lyon insurrection was conveyed to the Jura *département* by private letters and the arrival of newspapers on April 10, 1834. This sparked gatherings in the street, led by members of the Société des droits de l’homme, on April 11. The authorities called in one company of infantry on the following day. On the evening of April 13, 300 to 400 demonstrators gathered. When the stage coach arrived at 9:30 P.M., a passenger claimed that the Republic had been declared in Lyon. The crowd sang the “Marseillaise,” then occupied the Hôtel de Ville, seizing 75 rifles and disarming 28 soldiers stationed there. After the tocsin was sounded, several barricades, consisting for the most part of overturned vehicles, were built at the entrances to the town, and additional military units were disarmed. A red flag was flown (and the tricolor burned, in one instance). A group of 100 residents was sent to try to obtain powder from the storehouse at Poligny, but the subprefect had already sent it all off to Lons-le-Saunier. Before troops could arrive to repress this uprising, news came that the insurrections in Lyon and Paris had been put down. The insurgent leader, d’Epercy, fled to Switzerland, and the movement quickly dissipated. There was no loss of life, only a few minor injuries, and relatively limited property damage. Thirty-nine arrest warrants were issued, resulting in about twenty prison sentences ranging from five to ten years’ duration.

Primary sources: Girod de l’Ain 1834, 1: 16, 336–38.

Secondary sources: Perreux 1932, 21–25.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
052	1839	04	04	01	France	Seine	Paris	1	1	02	04	1

Several large groups of workers gathered at sites in central Paris. One such group marched to the city’s suburbs, where they proceeded to pillage a gun shop. Another proceeded to construct a single barricade near the pont d’Orsay, which was promptly attacked by 150 municipal guards, supported by fifty more on horseback.

Primary sources: “Bulletins de Paris,” Archives nationales F7 3890.

Secondary sources: Harison 1996, 1.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
053	1839	05	12	02	France	Seine	Paris	2	3	04	09	1

Organized by the Société des saisons, of which Barbés and Blanqui were the principal leaders, the insurrection of 1839 was originally scheduled for May 5, but it was put off for a week after the police learned of insurgents' secret preparations. On the afternoon of May 12, a band of insurgents, some wearing Phrygian caps, numbering anywhere from 150 to 700, most of whom were artisans and workers, broke into the shop of the gunsmiths Lepage frères. The uprising was centered in three quarters: Saint-Denis, Montmartre, and Saint-Martin. Many barricades were built—using techniques anticipating Blanqui's later treatise *Instructions pour une prise d'armes*, according to Blanc's description—but only a few were energetically defended. A red flag was flown from one. Artillery was brought in but apparently not used. About two dozen barricades were taken by National Guard and army units on the first day. By the end of the fighting on May 13, six municipal guards, about 50 soldiers, and 100 insurgents had died. (Pinkney says eighteen soldiers died and sixty-two were wounded.)

Primary sources: Alton-Shée 1869, 319; Blanc 1846, 5: 381–401; and, all from 1839: “Détails des troubles et désordres qui ont eu lieu à Paris”; “Détails circonstanciés sur les événemens qui ont eu lieu à Paris”; “Détails exacts de tout ce qui s'est passé hier dimanche”; “Nouveaux détails très-exacts”; France, Cour des pairs 1839, 4–277; and *Relation des événements arrivés à Paris dans les journées des 12 et 13 mai 1839*.

Secondary sources: Charléty 1921, 158–59; Dommanget 1969, 185–239; Tulard 1964, 82; Pinkney 1975, 196–97.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
054	1841	07	08	02	France	Haute-Garonne	Toulouse	2	0	02	04	1

The resumption of a census of properties (the *recensement Humann*, involving the counting of doors and windows with the presumed intention of increasing tax assessments) led to unrest in Toulouse, lasting from July 6 through July 9, 1841. Disorderly assemblies gave rise mainly to rock throwing until July 7, when a funeral procession for a National Guard officer resulted in fifty arrests. Cords

and chains were stretched in certain streets to restrict access by cavalry units, and on July 8, barricades were constructed in at least two locations. One insurgent was seriously wounded and forty-five more arrests were made. Heavy rains on July 9–11 appear to have temporarily dampened spirits, creating a break in the action.

Primary sources: *Le Moniteur universel*, July 15, 1841, 1819, 1834; July 17, 1841.

Secondary sources: Aminzade 1981, 117–18; Caron 2002, 96–101.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
055	1841	07	12	04	France	Haute-Garonne	Toulouse	2	1	04	07	0

This event represented an expansion of the preceding one, but because of the rain-induced hiatus, it counts as a separate event under the definition of barricade event used here. On July 12, 1841, demonstrations resumed on a larger scale thanks to increased participation on the part of workers. A gunsmith's shop was pillaged and ten to twenty new barricades were erected in the faubourgs Saint-Etienne and Saint-Aubin by insurgents linked by their common trade or neighborhood of residence. Insurgents also rained roof tiles down on the soldiers. The National Guard eventually managed to disperse the crowds, but new incidents occurred on the following morning involving the construction of additional barricades. It was only on July 15 that calm was restored and the barricades were dismantled. One or two insurgents were killed and an unknown but substantial number were wounded. Social control forces sustained 134 injuries. The prefect and attorney general were forced to leave the city. The former was subsequently removed from office for having abandoned his post.

Primary sources: *Le Moniteur universel*, July 15, 1841; July 17, 1841.

Secondary sources: Agulhon 1983a, 565; Aminzade 1981, 118; Caron 2002, 101–9.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
056	1841	07	19	02	France	Gers	Auch	1	0	02	03	0

A crowd attempted to prevent the departure of locally garrisoned troops that had been summoned to help put down unrest in Toulouse in July 1841. They were said to have been stirred up by an emissary sent from Paris, who was arrested. The demonstrators constructed barricades on two bridges and on the road

leading to Toulouse, using handcars, prunings, and uprooted street lamps. The unrest was quickly subdued without resort to firearms. No injuries were reported.

Primary sources: *Le Moniteur universel*, July 22, 1841.

Secondary sources: Caron 2002, 145.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
057	1841	08	09	01	France	Lot-et-Garonne	Sainte-Livrade-sur-Lot	1	0	02	03	1

In connection with the *recensement Humann*, insurgents barricaded the gates of the town of Sainte-Livrade-sur-Lot.

Secondary sources: Caron 2002, 145.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
058	1841	08	10	01	France	Lot-et-Garonne	Villeneuve-sur-Lot	1	0	02	03	0

In connection with the *recensement Humann*, insurgents barricaded the bridge over the Lot River.

Secondary sources: Caron 2002, 145.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
059	1841	09	07	01	France	Gironde	Bazas	1	0	02	03	0

Few details concerning this event, connected to the *recensement Humann*, have survived. One barricade was erected in the rue Taillade in the town of Bazas, but it was immediately removed by gendarmes, commanded by the subprefect in person. Two gendarmes were wounded.

Secondary sources: Agulhon 1983a, 565; Caron 2002, 145.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
060	1841	09	09	03	France	Puy-de-Dôme	Clermont-Ferrand	2	2	04	08	0

The *recensement Humann* also incited stiff resistance in September 1841 in Clermont-Ferrand. Several barricades were constructed on September 9, using paving stones and 150 of the city's 200 street lamps. The 1,200 soldiers

available were not sufficient to control the insurgents, and 50 soldiers were wounded in the fighting. Two arms dealers' shops were looted, and two rioters were killed.

Hostilities resumed on the evening of September 10. Crowds in which women were prominent participants constructed barricades of paving stones and carriages. (The troops were also ordered to build their own "barricades," but these do not count for our purposes.) Fighting was intense, and no fewer than six soldiers lost their lives. At least seventeen insurgents (two of them women) were killed and a much higher number wounded. By the morning of September 11, the insurrection appeared to have been defeated.

Secondary sources: Agulhon 1983a, 565; Caron 2002, 191–202.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
061	1843	02	13	02	Switzerland	Geneva	Geneva	2	0	02	04	1

A popular opposition movement, angered by a vote of Geneva's cantonal *parlement*, mounted an insurrection. Militants attempted to capture a powder depot on the left bank of the Rhône but were driven back into the Saint-Gervais quarter, where they built barricades on the bridges. On the following day, mediation by the municipal authorities succeeded in calming the city. An amnesty was proclaimed, and the insurgents destroyed the few barricades they had constructed.

Secondary sources: Vuilleumier 1997, 399–402.

Images: *Révolutions de 1848*, 1998a: 115, 190 (#132).

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
062	1846	10	06	03	Switzerland	Geneva	Geneva	2	1	02	05	1

In October 1846, civil war briefly broke out between agrarian Catholic cantons and their more liberal Protestant counterparts in Switzerland. Radicals seized control of Geneva and declared a provisional government in response to the Grand Council's refusal to press for the dissolution of the conservative Sonderbund, a coalition of Catholic cantons. A series of protests led to an armed insurrection, centered in the Saint-Gervais district, beginning during the night of October 6 to 7. Barricades were built on the bridges that controlled access to the island where the insurgents had massed their forces. These structures were few

in number but well built, and though largely left unmanned after the fighting began, they resisted artillery fire and the efforts of sappers for several hours. In the end, a federal constitution helped to resolve these regional differences by granting a greater degree of local autonomy.

Secondary sources: Halperin 1948, 61–62; Vuilleumier 1997, 402–405.

Images: *Révolutions de 1848*, 1998a: 64, 190 (#131).

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
063	1847	04	21	03	Prussia	Brandenburg	Berlin	3	0	02	05	1

The European subsistence crisis produced unrest in the German states in April 1847. Rising grain prices threatened famine, and a typhus epidemic killed thousands in Silesia. Troubles spread to the cities. In Berlin, rioting was spread over three days in what came to be known as the “Potato Revolution.” For the most part, people attacked bakeries and butcher shops, but one barricade was built before the army clamped down and restored order.

Secondary sources: Droz 1957, 109; Langer 1966, 106; Meyer 1912, 87; Namier 1962, 4; Valentin 1930, 1: 84; Wernicke 1978, 81–85.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
064	1847	04	XX	XX	Württemberg	Württemberg	Ulm	2	0	02	04	X

No details available beyond the simple mention that barricades were constructed in Württemberg in April 1847 as part of this protest against rising food prices before the insurgents were repressed by the military.

Secondary sources: Droz 1957, 109.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
065	1847	04	XX	XX	Württemberg	Württemberg	Stuttgart	2	0	02	04	X

No details available beyond the simple mention that barricades were constructed in Württemberg in April 1847 as part of this protest against rising food prices before the insurgents were repressed by the military.

Secondary sources: Droz 1957, 109.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
066	1848	01	12	07	Kingdom of the Two Sicilies	Sicily	Palermo	3	2	04	09	1

On January 12, 1848, a popular rising of artisans, joined by some nobles and bourgeois, demanded freedom of the press and the restoration of the constitution of 1812. Toward evening, the first barricades went up in Fieravecchia, the poorest quarter of the city. (Although Maurice cites La Farina to the effect that there were no barricades, the preponderance of the evidence clearly contradicts that assertion. Barricades persisted for roughly a week.) Initially, insurgents were few in number and poorly armed, but reinforcements flowed in from the surrounding countryside. Crowds set about destroying customs barriers where excise taxes were collected. The movement's objectives ranged from a liberal constitution to Sicilian independence in the context of an Italian federation. Over the next few days, participants managed to overcome the resistance of six or seven thousand Bourbon troops and an expeditionary force of five thousand additional soldiers sent from Naples, all of whom were forced to withdraw after a massive demonstration on January 27, at which members of the upper classes joined the insurgents. In all, about three dozen insurgents were killed. In response to demands for reforms, Bourbon King Ferdinand II formed a liberal ministry, authorized a national guard, and, by February 11, issued a constitution modeled on the French Charter of 1830. However, residents spurned his offer of democratic institutions under his continued sovereignty in favor of their own independent version.

Primary sources: *Illustrated London News*, January 29, 1848, 48.

Secondary sources: Acton 1961, 189–96; Breunig 1977, 252–53; Garnier-Pagès 1861, 1: 38–83; Gildea 1987, 85; Ginsborg 1979, 80–81; Hearder 1983, 142–43; Maurice 1887, 171–78; D. M. Smith 1968, 415–18; 2000, 57–59; Sperber 1994, 111–13; Stearns 1974, 125.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
067	1848	02	22	04	France	Seine	Paris	4	3	16	23	1

In response to a campaign for political reform, the government prohibited a popular banquet, scheduled to take place in Paris on February 22, 1848. The reaction in the capital was immediate. Barricades were built on that first day, despite intermittent downpours. On February 23, the king dismissed his unpopular minister Guizot. People gathered that evening to celebrate this victory

before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where a tense confrontation with troops led to “the massacre of the boulevard des Capucines.” At least thirty-five unarmed protesters were killed and a larger number wounded. During the night that followed, the mobilization became general. More than 1,500 barricades were built on February 24, and within forty-eight hours, Louis-Philippe had abdicated and left Paris, ending the French monarchy. Total casualties have been estimated at 290 deaths among the insurgents and 80 among the social control forces.

Primary sources: Crémieux 1912; Freycinet 1911, 1–21; Heine 1906, 8: 512–16; *Illustrated London News*, February 26, 1848, 118–20; March 4, 1848, 127–44, 146, 150–51, 154–56, 158; March 11, 1848, 159–64; March 18, 1848, 175–76; Normanby 1857, 1: 68–125; Proudhon 1875, 278–84; Stern 1862; Faure 1859

Secondary sources: Caron 1995, 14–15; Price 1972; Stearns 1974, 72–75; Tulard 1964, 168–70; Vigier 1982, 55–80.

Images: See [figures 3, 17, 19, 24, 29, 31](#), this volume; *Révolutions de 1848*, 1998a: 134–35 (#2); 130, 196 (#150); 1998b: 85–86 (#9); Bios 1898, 75; *Illustrated London News*, March 4, 1848, 131; March 11, 1848, 159, 163; March 18, 1848, 182; *Illustrirte Zeitung* (Leipzig), no. 245 (March 11, 1848): 177.

Maps: Bibliothèque nationale, Département des cartes et plans, DL17.1850; Nougarede de Fayet 1850, endpaper.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
068	1848	03	04	02	Bavaria	Bavaria	Munich	3	2	04	09	0

Munich had already been in an uproar in January and February 1848 over the Lola Montez affair. When news of the Paris insurrection arrived, followed by word of growing nationalist agitation in Baden, barricades were raised in the streets of Munich by crowds demanding a republic. King Ludwig I was forced to abdicate in favor of his son. The action in Munich reinforced movements in other southern German states.

Secondary sources: Lougée 1972, 114; Maurice 1887, 221–22; Sperber 1994, 112–14; Stearns 1974, 141.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
069	1848	03	13	07	Prussia	Brandenburg	Berlin	4	3	08	15	0

Following a tumultuous gathering on March 5, sparked by news of the revolution in Paris, a direct clash between demonstrators and troops occurred in Berlin on March 13, 1848, leading to the construction of the first barricade in the Grünstrasse. (Some writers—e.g., Sigmann 1973, 240—date this uprising from March 18, making no mention of barricades before that date and attributing those built on March 18 to the influence of the Vienna insurrection. It does appear that news from Vienna helped precipitate a renewed collision on March 16. However, Stadelmann and Maurice are categorical in dating the initial use of barricades to March 13, before Berliners had any inkling of developments in Vienna.) Further collisions between the people and cavalry on March 14 and 15 resulted in widespread barricade construction and the first deaths. Fighting in the Prussian capital intensified after news of the Vienna insurrection arrived on March 16. Mounting civilian casualties led King Frederick William IV to promise a new constitution, a free press, and a new assembly. On the afternoon of March 18, a large crowd gathered to applaud the king, but when troops attempted to clear the square, the proverbial shots rang out, and a large number of additional barricades (136 according to the map in Wernicke, but as many as 5,000 according to a less-than-credible account cited in Geist and Kürvers) were erected by workers. By midnight of March 18, the troops had placed the insurgents—only a few thousand of whom, at most, possessed arms—on the defensive; but faced with the prospect of an imminent but bloody victory, the king decided to withdraw the troops and end the fighting. Perhaps 200 to 300 insurgents were killed and 1,000 arrested before the army garrison of some 15,000 was withdrawn to Potsdam and a citizens' militia formed to police the city. Insurgents made use of adjoining buildings, while troops employed artillery cannon loaded with grapeshot against barricade positions.

Primary sources: Ebers 1893, 112–32; Eyck 1972, 51–68.

Secondary sources: Breunig 1977, 260–62; Dahlinger 1903, 11–12; Droz 1957, 195–206; Gildea 1987, 87–88; Hamerow 1972, 100–102; Holborn 1982, 50–54; Maurice 1887, 247–49; Noyes 1966, 64–70; Ponteil 1955, 73–74; Robertson 1967, 118–22; Sigmann 1973, 257–58; Sperber 1994, 112–14; Stadelmann 1975, 56–67; Stearns 1974, 146–48.

Maps: Geist and Kürvers 1980, 356–57; Schmidt et al. 1973, frontispiece; Wernicke 1978, 88–89.

Images: Almond 1996, 105; Bloss 1898, 143, 145; Blum 1898, 179, 180, 183, 185; Bouillon et al. 1978, 127; *Révolutions de 1848*, 1998a: 161–62 (#66); Gall 1998, 120–22, 158, 177; *Illustrated London News*, April 1, 1848, 207; Lougée 1972, 119, 120; Schmidt et al. 1973, 88–89.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
070	1848	03	13	03	Austrian empire	Austria	Vienna	4	2	08	14	0

Beginning on February 29, 1848, with the first reports of fighting in Paris and bolstered by news of the declaration of a republic two days later, Vienna experienced widespread political mobilization; but only with the meeting of the Lower Austrian Estates General on March 13 did a revolutionary movement take shape. The assembly was mobbed by demonstrators, mostly students, calling for reforms. When clashes with troops resulted in the deaths of forty-five people, the mayor called upon the Civic Guard to maintain order. In the course of a further encounter on that same day, barricades were built in the narrow streets of the old city, and the militia went over to the insurgents. On the following day, Metternich resigned, censorship was abolished, and a full-scale citizens' militia of 30,000 was authorized. On March 15, a constitution was promised. These events in Vienna had repercussions in other parts of the Austrian empire, including Prague, Budapest, and the Italian states.

Secondary sources: Deak 1979, 66–68; Droz 1957, 183–84; Endres 1949, 253–58; Gildea 1987, 88; Maurice 1887, 225–47; Pech 1969, 63–65, 139; Polisensky 1980, 94–100; Rath 1957, 57–89; Stiles 1852, 1: 104–11.

Images: Almond 1996, 109; Badischen Landesmuseum Karlsruhe 1998, 280–81; Bouillon et al. 1978, 125; *Journées illustrées de la révolution* (1848–49), 58; Smets 1876, 265, 273, 281, 285, 301.

Maps: Smets 1876, 289.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
071	1848	03	15	02	Austrian empire	Hungary	Buda- pest	4	1	08	13	0

News of the February revolution in Paris, followed by word of the March events in Vienna, stirred residents of Budapest, particularly students, to revolt on March 15, 1848. Despite the rainy weather, Sándor Petőfi spoke before 10,000 demonstrators before proceeding to the city hall and constituting a Committee of Public Safety. Barricades were an integral element of the uprising, even though support for the radical camp was so overwhelming that the authorities were obliged to make sweeping concessions and the insurgents' victory was essentially bloodless. In the immediate aftermath of March 15, 1848, a revolutionary committee was created and a citizens' militia established. Soon thereafter, the Diet moved to Budapest and declared a Hungarian national

government, largely independent of Austrian oversight.

Secondary sources: Deak 1979, 68–73; Kamenka 1972, 142; Sperber 1994, 112–14, 133; Stearns 1974, 106–7.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
072	1848	03	17	XX	Austrian empire	Grand Duchy of Kraków	Kraków	3	1	02	06	0

Jonathan Sperber's map specifies that barricades were constructed, though no details are provided in the text.

Maps: Sperber 1994, 112–14.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
073	1848	03	18	05	Austrian empire	Lombardy- Venetia	Venice	3	2	04	09	0

Rumors of unrest in Vienna began to circulate in Venice on March 16, 1848. When Metternich's flight was confirmed by the arrival of a postal steamer the next morning, a crowd assembled in the Piazza San Marco, first calling for the release of Daniele Manin and Nicolo Tommaseo, leaders of the patriotic movement, and then itself freeing them. A mass assembly was called for March 18, leading to collisions in which eight Venetians were killed and nine seriously wounded. Driven from the great Square of St. Mark, the crowd rallied, taking up positions on roofs and behind barricades. By 9 P.M., news arrived that constitutional rule had been granted for Lombardy and Venetia. First rumors of fighting in Milan reached Venice on March 20–21. Manin had called for the organization of a civic guard, which allowed him subsequently to capitalize on a mutiny among arsenal workers on March 22. After he had captured the Arsenal, troops were called in, but 3,460 of the 8,370 soldiers in the Austrian ranks were Italians, and most went over to the revolt. Within hours, Austrian officials had capitulated and the remaining troops had left the city. The resurrection of the Republic of Saint Mark was proclaimed and a new government was established under Manin's leadership.

Secondary sources: Gildea 1987, 89; Ginsborg 1979, 89–102; Polisensky 1980, 105; Robertson 1967, 386–87; Sperber 1994, 112–13; Stiles 1852, 1: 291–337; Trevelyan 1923, 84–85, 91–121.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
074	1848	03	18	05	Austrian empire	Lombardy	Milan	4	3	16	23	0

News of Metternicht's fall arrived in Milan on the evening of March 17, 1848, leading to demonstrations, then spontaneous insurrections throughout the kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia (which was part of the Austrian empire). In Milan, mainly working-class insurgents constructed barricades on March 18, which they defended during the "Five Glorious Days" against Austrian Field Marshal Josef Radetzky's troops, who retreated to the citadel, then were chased from the city. The Austrians made use of artillery against some of the 1,500 to 2,000 barricades that were constructed, some made of the most improbable materials, including sofas and pianos. The Austrians estimated their losses at 700 men, though Italians claimed to have killed or wounded as many as 4,000. On the side of the insurgents, some 300 to 400 died in the fighting. A provisional government set up by insurgents on March 22 was quickly dominated by monarchists who supported Carlo Alberto of Piedmont as their chief protection against the return of the Austrian army. Radetsky was nonetheless able to withdraw his forces, essentially intact, to the forts of the Quadrilateral, whence he launched the subsequent, successful counterattack that restored Austrian domination over much of the Italian peninsula.

Primary sources: *Illustrated London News*, April 15, 1848, 251–52; April 29, 1848, 274.

Secondary sources: Breunig 1977, 273; Garnier-Pagès 1961, 1: 80–83; Gildea 1987, 89; Ginsborg 1979, 128–35; Kamenka 1979, 142; Martinengo-Cesaresco 1910, Maurice 1887, 260–69; Polisensky 1980, 103–04; Robertson 1967, 340–45; Smith 2000, 62–63; Stearns 1974, 129–31; Stiles 1852, 1: 188–204.

Images: Almond 1996, 102; Bertolini 1897, 361, 369; *Révolutions de 1848*, 1998a: 76, 148 (#36); Badischen Landesmuseum Karlsruhe 1998, 290; Gall 1998, 96; *Illustrated London News*, April 15, 1848, 251; April 29, 1848, 274; *Journées illustrées de la révolution* (1848–49), 324; *L'Illustration*, June 3, 1848, 209.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
075	1848	03	26	XX	Spain	Castille	Madrid	2	3	04	09	0

Following the February Days in Paris, a coalition of revolutionary factions—one consisting of military officers and headed by Colonel Joaquín de la Gandara,

another representing progressives led by José María Orense—organized a coup attempt in Madrid. Encouraged in part by a communication from the British foreign secretary, they planned an uprising for March 26, 1848. Due to a miscommunication, the 600 men of the rank and file were propelled into action in the absence of their leaders. The barricades they built were said to be the first ever constructed in Spain, but they were quickly overwhelmed by government forces.

Secondary sources: Kamenka 1979, 142; Molares 1848, 144–48; Price 1989, 41–42.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
076	1848	03	27	02	Romania	Moldavia	Iași	1	1	02	04	0

French influence was a powerful force in both Moldavia and Walachia, thanks to the political activities of returning students and workers. Barely a month after the February Days, a rising was attempted after several hundred people had gathered for a meeting in the capital city. However, the movement was small and enjoyed no peasant support, and the reigning hospodar (lord), Prince Stourdza, had no difficulty dealing with “the feeble attempts to erect barricades.”

Secondary sources: Roller 1948, 300–303.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
077	1848	3	28	5	Belgium	Flanders	Ghent	3	1	02	06	0

Workers had been gathering daily at the railroad station in Ghent to await the train from Paris in the expectation that members of the republican Belgian Legion would arrive. On March 28, 1848, they placed a beam and a vehicle crossways in the road as the beginnings of a barricade. Though signs of mobilization were also observed in many other towns and particularly in the regions of Belgium bordering on France, only in Ghent, where protestors made several attempts at digging up paving stones in public squares, did their actions take the form of barricade construction. Perhaps 1,000 residents took part in the unrest, and two died. Only a single barricade was ever actually built, and it was abandoned as soon as troops arrived.

Secondary sources: Dhondt 1948, 119, 122; Quentin-Bauchart 1907, 200.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
078	1848	03	31	XX	Prussia	Rhine-land	Saarlouis	2	1	02	05	0

This town was the scene of an insurrection during which barricades were erected to the strains of the “Marseillaise.” In addition, residents wore tricolor cockades and formed a civic guard. Prussian forces repressed the rebellion, executing a number of insurgents.

Secondary sources: Blaison 1933, 5n2.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
079	1848	04	22	06	Baden	Baden	Freiburg	2	1	02	05	1

The First Baden revolution involved an attempt to establish a republic by insurrection, beginning in the second week of April 1848. The grand duke’s appeal for help from the Federal Diet resulted in Hessian troops being sent to help put down the rebellion. Friedrich Hecker and Gustav Struve had mobilized an insurgent force in the neighborhood of Lake Constance in mid-April. Hecker was defeated near Kandern on April 20. Struve was defeated near Steinen soon thereafter. On April 24, the “German Democratic Legion,” led by the poet Georg Herwegh, consisting of emigrant workers recruited in Paris, crossed the border. A handful of barricades were raised in Freiburg by residents in response to this initiative, but the German Legion was defeated on April 27 near Dossenbach. The barricades apparently were situated in the Breisgau district of the city. According to Van Creveld 1989, 158, the first recorded military use of the railroad took place during the repression of this liberal uprising in Baden.

Secondary sources: Blaison 1933, 105–6; Gildea 1987, 93; Hamerow 1972, 120; Kamenka 1979, 143; Polisensky 1980, 120; Stadelmann 1975, 88–89; Stearns 1974, 142.

Images: Badischen Landesmuseum Karlsruhe 1998, 237–38; Gall 1998, 158.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
080	1848	04	25	XX	Austrian empire	Grand Duchy of Kraków	Kraków	3	3	02	08	1

Austria began efforts to reassert its control over the Polish city by prohibiting the return of Polish emigrants from France and elsewhere and by attempting to disarm the recently created Polish National Guard. The result was a mass

demonstration that led to an attack on government buildings and a full-scale insurrection, complete with barricades. Austrian troops were forced to withdraw from the city center, but after setting up artillery on the surrounding heights, they compelled the rebels to surrender.

Secondary sources: Deak 1979, 79; Hahn 2001, 178–79; Kamenka 1979, 143; Koralka 2001, 164–65.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
081	1848	04	26	02	Grand Duchy of Baden	Baden	Mannheim	1	0	02	03	0

I can document at least one barricade, on the Rhine Bridge, in Mannheim on this date, largely from the images referenced below.

Images: Badischen Landesmuseum Karlsruhe 1998, 237–38, 241–43; Blos 1898, 203; Gall 1998, 155.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
082	1848	04	27	XX	France	Haute-Vienne	Limoges	3	0	02	05	0

The political situation in Limoges, already polarized in the wake of the February revolution, veered in the direction of armed conflict in connection with the elections of April 23, 1848. Workers harassed peasants who came to the city to vote. Despite these pressures, the tabulation of ballots on April 26 went against the radicals, and only two of the candidates from the radical slate were elected. On April 27, a crowd pillaged three gunsmiths' shops in Limoges and built two barricades. It removed the commander of the National Guard and disarmed the rank and file. It also set up a new municipal administrative committee, which lasted for two weeks. By then, 3,000 troops dispatched from Paris had surrounded the city. The revolt was ended by mid-May without significant bloodshed. Insurgents numbered in the thousands, but casualties were minimal and just forty-one insurgents were arrested and tried. Victor Chazelas characterizes it as “more than a demonstration, but less than an insurrection” and emphasizes its roots in the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the working class.

Primary sources: Garnier-Pagès n.d., 2: 325–26.

Secondary sources: Bourgin 1948a, 98; Chazelas 1911, 41–65; Merriman

1974, 32–38; Merriman 1978, 7–13; Merriman 1985, 76–78; Seignobos 1921a, 80–81; Vigier 1982, 153–74.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
083	1848	04	27	03	France	Seine-Maritime	Rouen	2	2	04	08	0

By 1848, Rouen, a center of cotton textile production, was among the most industrialized regions of France. Though factory employees were arguably better off than the still sizable group of home workers, tensions in the depressed industrial sector were acute, sometimes manifesting themselves in bouts of Luddism or in xenophobic reactions against the English. Ongoing economic disputes between workers and factory owners during March formed the backdrop to the political conflict. The more immediate cause was the announcement of the outcome of the April 23 elections, in which Frédéric Deschamps, seen as the champion of the radical working class, failed to win a seat in the Legislative Assembly. A confrontation between workers and the mainly middle-class National Guard (backed up by troops of the line and the 19th battalion of the Paris Garde mobile) precipitated a bloody two-day conflict. Thirty-six barricades were built in the inner city on the morning of April 27; others were subsequently erected in more peripheral locations. Attempts made to recruit insurgents from neighboring towns were largely unsuccessful. The authorities had at least 5,000 armed men at their disposal. Cannon were used to remove barricades. The repression was overseen by Antoine Sénard, Deschamps's rival, who would later preside over the National Assembly at the time of the June Days in Paris. Estimates of the number of insurgent dead ranged from eleven to nearly a hundred. The total of those wounded was somewhere between seventy-six and several hundred. Somewhere between 250 and 500 were arrested, though as many as 200 were almost immediately freed. Several soldiers were wounded, but no deaths were reported.

Primary sources: *Procès des insurgés de Rouen: Cour d'assises du Calvados* (n.d.); Garnier-Pagès n.d., 326–32; *Illustrated London News*, July 1, 1848, 435; Leblanc 1908, 30; Ménard 1904, 86–87.

Secondary sources: Dubuc 1948, 243–64; Merriman 1974, 34; Merriman 1978, 13–18; Rittiez 1867, 2: 224–32; Seignobos 1921a, 81–82.

Images: *Révolutions de 1848*, 1998b: 37, 97 (#29).

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
084	1848	04	28	02	France	Seine-Maritime	Elbeuf	2	0	02	04	0

In response to events in Rouen, workers in Elbeuf staged a brief insurrection in April 1848, including a total of seven barricades, in a futile attempt to prevent troops from leaving to help suppress the Rouen uprising. Five insurgents were wounded in the fighting. The repression was led by the manufacturer Victor Grandin. About 115 were arrested, though many fewer were convicted.

Secondary sources: Dubuc 1948, 264–69; Garnier-Pagès n.d., 332; Merriman 1978, 18–20.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
085	1848	04	23	XX	France	Rhône	Lyon	2	0	02	04	0

Barricades were built after the April 23, 1848, elections turned out contrary to workers' expectations. Josephine Courtois, who earned the nickname "Queen of the Barricades" for her part in these events, would turn up at the time of the Paris Commune in a similar role.

Secondary sources: Bourgin 1948a, 98; Edwards 1971, 318.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
086	1848	05	01	04	Prussia	Rhineland	Trier	2	1	02	05	0

Fighting broke out between activists and Prussian troops during elections in the first days of May 1848. The Civic Guard was divided. Barricades were built and a red flag flown from the tower of St. Gandolph's church. Some leaders assisted in constructing barricades. Troops were driven back, first to their barracks, then to the citadel, but the insurrection was abandoned after the city was threatened with bombardment. In the aftermath, the Civic Guard was dissolved and democratic leaders were arrested.

Secondary sources: Siemann 2001, 772, 776; Sperber 1991, 182–83.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
087	1848	05	13	03	Kingdom of the Two Sicilies	Naples	Naples	3	4	04	11	0

As the new parliament was about to be sworn in, conflict erupted between the Bourbon king Ferdinand II and deputies over whether the latter had the power to modify the January 29 constitution. When radicals and some elements from the National Guard, fearing a monarchist coup, began to build barricades in the city, the king called out the Swiss Guard. A brief but bloody struggle ensued, leaving roughly 2,000 dead and many more wounded; at least two-thirds of the casualties were insurgents. In all, 79 barricades were constructed. The royal troops were backed by *lazzaroni* (local recruits from the poorer classes) who engaged in widespread looting and were said to be responsible for atrocities. Thus, much as the kingdom had been first in revolution in 1848, it also preceded all other European nations in reaction.

Primary sources: *Illustrated London News*, June 3, 1848, 354; June 10, 1848, 374; July 1, 1848, 437; *Journées illustrées de la révolution* (1848–49), 321–22.

Secondary sources: Acton 1961, 232–45; Gildea 1987, 90; Maurice 1887, 352–53; Stearns 1974, 135.

Images: See figure 16, this volume; Almond 1996, 103; Bertolini 1897, 393; *Illustrated London News*, June 3, 1848, 354; *L’Illustration*, June 3, 1848, 209; *Illustrate Zeitung* (Leipzig), no. 259 (June 17, 1848): 402; *Journées illustrées de la révolution* (1848–49), 321; Langer 1969, #63; Schmidt et al. 1973, 164; Sperber 1994, 195.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
088	1848	05	25	05	Austrian empire	Austria	Vienna	4	1	08	13	0

Radicals, unhappy with the constitution offered by Emperor Ferdinand, organized a demonstration on May 15, 1848. Among 10,000 participants, students and national guards were especially prominent. Their purpose was to demand a single-chamber Constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage. Under pressure from the crowd, which refused to withdraw before being given satisfaction, the government capitulated on all demands. However, the crowd learned the next day that the emperor had fled the capital for Innsbruck. When a subsequent effort was made on May 25 to close the university and dissolve the “Academic Legion,” students were supported by workers who poured in from the suburbs, helping build between 160 and 200 barricades, which were not cleared until May 29. The radicals’ victory over the government’s ministers was all but bloodless. (A journeyman tanner was the only reported death.) It led to the declaration of universal suffrage, the formation of a revolutionary

government, and the creation of a “Committee of Public Safety.”

Secondary sources: Endres 1948, 258–65; Gildea 1987, 95; *Journées illustrées de la révolution* (1848–49), 335–37; Kofalka 2001, 165–66; Polisensky 1980, 123; Rath 1957, 205–22; Robertson 1967, 224–28; Stearns 1974, 102; Stiles 1852, 1: 134–37.

Images: See figures 20–21, this volume; Bach 1898, 177, 197, 201, 205, 225, 261, 264–65, 269, 293, 297, 360–61; *Révolutions de 1848*, 1998a: 24, 176 (#103); Gall 1998, 125, 126; Knaus and Sinkoviez 1998, 124, 128, 129; Langer 1969, #62; Lougée 1972, vii; Maisel 1988, 27; Schmidt et al. 1973, 214; Tietze 1925, 118, 119, 123.

Maps: Bach 1898, 409.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
089	1848	06	12	06	Austrian empire	Bohemia	Prague	4	2	08	14	0

The overthrow of Louis-Philippe became known in Prague on February 29, leading to a public meeting on March 9, 1848, at which a reform petition was drafted and subsequently promulgated on March 11. Students and workers were roused into action, but no acts of overt rebellion occurred, despite recent news of the May outbreak in Vienna, until after the arrival of Field Marshal Prince Alfred Windischgrätz on May 20. His efforts to establish strict military control over the city sparked rallies in late May and, on June 12, an attempted charivari led to a confrontation between soldiers and marchers that began six days of insurrection. Barricades were built near St. Vaclav’s Square and in the narrow streets of the Old Town. Czech students, influenced by their Viennese counterparts, provided leadership. The insurrection was eventually crushed by the application of overwhelming force. The army fielded at least several thousand soldiers, while the insurgents mustered between 1,200 and 3,000 volunteers, roughly half of whom were students. A minimum of forty-three died and eighty-eight were wounded. Stearns says that “Hundreds of barricades were quickly erected.” Polisensky and Pech cite estimates that 400 barricades were built, though only 15 were judged to be “strategic.” This was made possible in part by the presence of a Viennese student who offered his Prague counterparts instruction in the art of barricade construction and a number of Czech students enrolled at the University of Vienna who had taken part in earlier events in the imperial capital. Residents of Prague received little support from the countryside, and tensions between Czechs and Germans were superimposed

upon social and political issues. The army used artillery bombardment to reduce the city. In the wake of the repression, most of the political gains realized in March were erased.

Secondary sources: Gildea 1987, 95; Klima 1948, 294–97; Kofalka 2001, 165; Maurice 1887, 323–32; Mejdricka in Corbin and Mayeur 1997; Pech 1968, 341–70; 1969, 139–66; Polisensky 1980, 151–61, 210; Rath 1957, 258–63; Sperber 1994, 205; Stearns 1974, 112–13; Stiles 1852, 1: 375–87.

Images: *Révolutions de 1848*, 1998a: 24, 188 (#127); 18, 189 (#128); Gall 1998, 156; Schmidt et al. 1973, 170; Smets 1876, 373; Tichy 1948.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
090	1848	06	14	01	Prussia	Brandenburg	Berlin	2	1	02	05	0

Students and workers, concerned about the military occupation of their city and their own lack of arms, attacked the arsenal on June 14. This led to a confrontation that evening between a crowd and the Citizens' Guard. When a shot rang out, a street battle began, pitting the bourgeois Citizens' Guard against worker-insurgents. Red flags appeared, a republic was declared, and barricades went up. The unrest lasted only until the arrival of troops around midnight.

Secondary sources: Droz 1957, 363; Stadelmann 1975, 67.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
091	1848	06	22	02	France	Bouches-du-Rhône	Marseille	2	1	04	07	0

Beginning on June 12, 1848, Parisian volunteers arrived in Marseille with the intention of forming an "Italian Legion" to help Piedmont-Sardinia in its struggle with Austria. Their help was refused, but some stayed on in Marseille and participated in the insurrection that began on June 22, at a moment when a crisis in the capital was clearly brewing but had not yet reached the stage of overt hostilities. On that day, barricades were constructed in several locations around the city. Local officials, led by Prefect Emile Ollivier, tried initially to mediate, but in the end called in the army and National Guard. Using artillery, these forces managed to restore order by midday on June 23, just as the Paris insurrection was getting under way. Insurgents were said to number between 700 and 800. One source indicated that they constructed at least ten barricades and suffered nine dead and fifteen wounded. The social control forces lost at least six

men. More than 600 arrests were made, although 400 of those were soon released. It is clear that several deaths occurred among the insurgents, though no precise numbers are available.

Primary sources: P. D. 1848, 42–56; T. B. 1850, 23–35.

Secondary sources: Vigier 1982, 212–13.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
092	1848	06	23	04	France	Seine	Paris	4	4	08	16	1

The reorganization of the National Workshops was made public on June 22, 1848. Crowds gathered that afternoon and a rendezvous was given for the next morning. The first barricades went up in the early hours of June 23. The Parisian National Guard was divided, with the bourgeois legions of the western part of the city remaining loyal to the moderate government, and those from the working-class quarters of the eastern part going over to the insurgents. During three days of heavy fighting, the Garde mobile assumed a leading role in the repression, supported by troops quickly brought in from the surrounding region. At least 30,000 men participated in this attempt to restore order. Additional numbers soon began arriving from the provinces, but few of these reinforcements actually took part in the fighting. Combat was largely restricted to the eastern half of the city, and more than 400 barricades were built in all. Estimates of the number killed ranged from the government's official figure of 3,000 on both sides to third-party calculations that generally ran much higher (to 20,000 deaths just among insurgents in one case). Initial arrests totaled 16,000, though about 5,000 of these were freed almost immediately.

Primary sources: Bergier 1924, 117–33; Camp 1876, 265–81; *Illustrated London News*, July 1, 1848, 417–19, 426–28; Ménard 1904, 145–67; Normanby 1857, 27–48, 74–80, 94–97; Pierre n.d.; Stern 1862.

Secondary sources: Caron 1995, 14–15.

Images: See cover and figures 2, 30, 34, this volume; *Journées illustrées de la révolution* (1848–49), 189; *Révolutions de 1848*, 1998a: 141 (#19); 142 (#21); 196 (#151); 1998b, 59, 102 (#35); 100, 102 (#36); Girard 1981, 35, 39; Gall 1998, 287 (*Barricade dans la rue Soufflot*); *Illustrated London News*, July 1, 1848, 415, 418–19, 426–27, 432–33; Seignobos 1921, 102.

Maps: Agulhon 1983b, 59; Bibliothèque nationale, Département des cartes et plans, Ge D 1761; Dautry 1957, 2; Duby 1970–72, 2: 408; Girard 1981, 36; Murat 1987, 518; Pagès-Duport 1848; Simond 1900–1901, 2: 347; Schmidt et al.

1973, 182; Vigier 1982, 192.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
093	1848	06	24	01	France	Seine-et-Oise	Essonnes	1	0	02	03	0

Workers in the town of Essonnes took advantage of the departure of the National Guard units from nearby Corbeil in June 1848 to construct a barricade with the intention of preventing the passage of troops from Fontainebleau to Paris. The Essonnes National Guard refused to assist in dismantling this single barricade.

Primary sources: Archives historiques du Ministère de la Guerre F¹ 16, cited in Price 1975, 112.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
094	1848	07	28	01	Ireland	Tipperary	Killenaule	1	0	02	03	0

Leaders of the Young Ireland movement, including William Smith O'Brien, encouraged by developments in France, believed that a general rising against English rule was feasible in 1848. Famine conditions had driven their followers to the point of desperation, and public sentiment in the southern counties of Limerick, Waterford, and Tipperary seemed ripe for action. A delegation was sent to France in hopes of obtaining some show of support. Little was actually forthcoming, but some members stayed on to study insurrectionary tactics. At home, mobilization efforts achieved mixed success, given the almost total lack of arms. On the morning of July 28, a crowd of about twenty miners and tenant farmers was summoned by the chapel bell to the town of Killenaule. When news arrived that a column of dragoons was approaching, Terence Bellew MacManus gave the cry, "Up with the barricades!" and proceeded to direct those present in raising a structure made of empty turf carts and wooden beams at one end of the principal street. Two other barricades may also have been erected in the town. Once the soldiers had begun their passage down that street, MacManus and seventy followers constructed an additional barricade made of stones and an iron gate at their rear, cutting off their retreat. A tense confrontation with the troops ensued. Now surrounded by the people, the commanding officer inquired why his passage on an ordinary patrol was being impeded. When he pledged on his honor that he had no intention of seeking to arrest O'Brien, the barricade was partially dismantled and the troops allowed to leave the town. Despite the

construction of at least two barricades, no fighting resulted and no casualties were sustained on either side.

Primary sources: Doheny 1951, 175–78; Duffy [1883] n.d., 533–37, 664–66; *Illustrated London News*, August 5, 1848, 69–70; August 12, 1848, 81–90; Sullivan et al. 1879, 121.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
095	1848	07	29	01	Ireland	Tipperary	Farrenrory	2	1	02	05	0

In the aftermath of the confrontation at Killenaule, the leaders of the Young Ireland movement repaired to Boulagh Commons for a strategy meeting. The next morning, a contingent of police from Callan descended on Ballingarry, where the leaders were still gathered. As they approached Farrenrory, three miles distant, they encountered a barricade that that McManus described as “hasty but effectual.” It had been quickly thrown up by a body of men, mostly miners, numbering between 100 and 400, according to various sources. One of these accounts indicated that it was a shot fired prematurely from behind the barricade by one of the insurgents that caused the police to seek refuge in a nearby farmhouse. In the confrontation that followed, three of about 120 insurgents were killed and several wounded before military reinforcements arrived to relieve the besieged policemen, forcing the rebels to disperse.

Primary sources: Doheny 1951, 180–83; Duffy 1883, 681–87; *Illustrated London News*, August 5, 1848, 69–70; August 12, 1848, 81–82, 88, 96; Sullivan et al. 1879, 122.

Secondary sources: Bensimon 2000, 154; MacDonagh 1945, 57–60.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
096	1848	08	11	01	Germany	Hamburg	Hamburg	1	0	02	03	0

Spontaneous disturbances in the city’s streets gave rise to an unsuccessful effort to build a barricade. Another source made reference to “a few examples of barricade building,” but treated them as token efforts.

Secondary sources: Breuilly and Prothero 2001, 381–82; Langewiesche 1989, 187; Langewiesche 2001, 137.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
097	1848	08	04	03	Austrian empire	Lombardy	Milan	4	1	08	13	0

After the Austrians defeated Carlo Alberto, the Piedmontese army retreated to the vicinity of Milan, which it entered on August 4. Though the king had initially discouraged a popular defense, barricades were built throughout the city. These structures, which went up in a matter of hours and in some quarters appeared “every twenty yards,” often employed materials derived from the demolition of the houses of those who had left the city because of the March uprising. When Carlo Alberto capitulated to the Austrians, the Milanese felt betrayed and tried to prevent him from leaving. In the end, his army withdrew under cover of night, accompanied by a large portion of the Milanese population. Those who remained behind demolished the barricades just prior to the Austrian reoccupation of the city.

Primary sources: Godechot 1971, 399–410; *Journées illustrées de la révolution* (1848–49), 328.

Secondary sources: Garnier-Pagès 1861, 1: 517–31; Robertson 1967, 355–56; Smith 2000, 72–73; Stiles 1852, 1: 253–59.

Images: *Journées illustrées de la révolution* (1848–49), 324 (does not clearly show barricades).

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
098	1848	09	17	03	Germany	Hesse	Frank- furt	3	2	04	09	0

When the Frankfurt parliament voted its acceptance of an armistice with Denmark on September 16, this decision not to contest the Prussian government’s action gave rise to widespread popular discontent. Radicals and workers, most of whom were said not to be residents of the city, began throwing up barricades (forty were constructed by noon on September 18) and attacked the church where the parliament was meeting. Four battalions of federal troops (half Austrian, half Prussian) were called in to occupy the city the next day. Fighting broke out at 3 P.M. and continued on and off until 10 P.M. The battle was decided by the arrival of artillery from Hesse and Württemberg. The repression had about 12,000 soldiers at its disposal by the time a state of siege was declared. Insurgents lost anywhere from 33 to 80 dead and roughly 132 wounded; there were more than 60 casualties among the soldiers.

Primary sources: *Journées illustrées de la révolution* (1848–49), 338.

Secondary sources: Dahlinger 1903, 20; Droz 1957, 311–15; Hamerow 1972, 126; Maurice 1887, 375–76; Sperber 1991, 315–17; Sperber 1994, 214; Stearns 1974, 165; Strandmann 2000b, 121.

Images: See figure 15, this volume; Bloss 1898, 405; Blum 1898, 313; 333; Gall 1998, 311; *Journées illustrées de la révolution* (1848–49), 333; Schmidt et al. 1973, 211–12.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
099	1848	09	25	03	Prussia	Rhineland	Cologne	3	0	04	07	0

In response to the September crisis and to local resentment against Prussian troops, a meeting was called in the Alter Markt, which escalated into barricade building. Insurgents, numbering as many as 2,000, gathered arms, and the police and civic guard proved unable or unwilling to restore order. However, faced with a decision to go up against the artillery in the city's fortress, and knowing that the risings in Frankfurt and Baden had been put down, insurgents dispersed, and the barricades were dismantled on September 27.

Primary sources: *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, no. 115 (October 12, 1848).

Secondary sources: Sperber 1991, 317–19.

Images: Schmidt et al. 1973, 209.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
100	1848	10	06	26	Austrian empire	Austria	Vienna	4	4	08	16	0

Austrian troops quartered in Vienna were ordered to leave for Budapest to help suppress the revolutionary Hungarian government. On October 5, 1848, the workers' newspaper *Die Nationalzeitung* called for the construction of barricades to prevent their departure. The troops' mobilization on October 6 sparked an uprising in Vienna, in the course of which barricades were built and the arsenal attacked and looted of 30,000 rifles. Most of the departing troops refused to cross the barricade on the Danube Bridge and some went over to the insurgents. After the emperor fled his capital for the second time that year, the minister of war was murdered by the crowd, the liberal ministry fell, and the city was placed under the rule of a revolutionary Committee of Public Safety. Lieutenant Field Marshal Count Josip Jelačić was called in to restore order in Vienna, and in anticipation of his arrival, more barricades were erected

throughout the city on October 10. Robert Blum and a delegation from the Frankfurt Congress arrived on October 12 with a message of solidarity from German democrats. They went on to participate in street fighting against Austrian troops that began on October 23. A government ultimatum expired on October 26. Field Marshal Windischgrätz ordered an attack on the suburbs, initially in Leopoldstadt. Barricades were built by workers and students (women as well as men), and many were concentrated in Jägerzeile street and the surrounding working-class district. The attack began in earnest on October 28, with troops taking some thirty barricades at bayonet point. Radicals and students held out until October 30, when news that Hungarian troops were coming to the aid of the rebels, which had spurred a new wave of barricade building, proved unfounded. Troops, numbering 70,000 in all, lost over 1,200 dead. Insurgent casualties are unknown but presumed to be somewhere between 2,000 and 5,000. Anywhere from 1,600 to 2400 insurgents were arrested subsequently, and nine were executed, including Blum.

Primary sources: *Journées illustrées de la révolution* (1848–49), 345–46, 351–53.

Secondary sources: Breunig 1977, 271; Droz 1957, 330–42; Endres 1948, 267–72; Eyck 1972, 126–28; Polisensky 1980, 185–95; Rath 1957, 317–65; Sperber 1994, 215–17; Stadelmann 1975, 146–50; Stearns 1974, 118–22; Stiles 1852, 2: 92–140.

Images: Bach 1898, 297, 533, 537, 561, 685, 689, 721, 737, 753, 793; *Révolutions de 1848*, 1998a: 50, 177 (#105); Bouillon and Sohn 1978, 125; Gall 1998, 333.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
101	1848	10	16	01	Prussia	Brandenburg	Berlin	2	2	04	08	0

The initial precipitant was a Luddite action by canal workers, some of whom were subsequently fired. During the resulting protests, the Citizens' Guard intervened and five of its members were killed. That evening, barricades were built in several quarters of Berlin. These were taken by assault by the Citizens' Guard, resulting in the death of eleven residents. The insurgents' calls for assistance from democratic forces in Vienna elicited only a lukewarm response.

Secondary sources: Droz 1957, 363; Hamerow 1972, 181–82; Stadelmann 1975, 150–53.

Images: Wheatcroft 1983, 49.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
102	1848	11	01	02	Austrian empire	Galicia	Lemberg (Lvov or Lviv)	2	2	04	08	0

A conflict between soldiers of the Austrian army and local National Guard units gave rise to a confrontation during which barricades were erected in various places in the city. Guardsmen took an army commander prisoner. Hopes for a peaceful settlement were dashed when renewed fighting broke out in the early hours of November 2. The insurgents took up positions in the university district, where they adopted the red flag. Artillery was used to reduce the insurgent barricades.

Primary sources: *Journées illustrées de la révolution* (1848–49), 354–55.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
103	1849	03	XX	XX	Kingdom of the Two Sicilies	Sicily	Palermo	3	1	04	08	0

In an attempt to regain control over Sicily, King Ferdinand II landed a sizable army in September 1848 and proceeded to attack Messina. That city was captured in bitter fighting which gave rise to the demand by British and French officials for a six-month armistice. After it had expired, royal troops mounted an assault on Palermo. As the Bourbon army approached that city, the defiant population, whose defense was being organized by the Pole Ludwik Mieroslawski, dug trenches and built barricades, on which they placed red flags. With the realization that outside help would not be forthcoming, resistance in Palermo rapidly disintegrated, so that casualties remained relatively light. The Neapolitan army under the command of General Carlo Filangieri occupied the city on May 15, 1849.

Secondary sources: Smith 1968, 423–25.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
104	1849	03	30	XX	Austrian empire	Lombardy	Brescia	3	3	04	10	0

Except for 500 soldiers garrisoned in the citadel, Austrian forces had been removed from the city in order to participate in the invasion of Piedmont. Residents revolted on March 23, 1849, in sympathy with the Piedmontese, but were unable to capture the citadel. Three to four thousand Austrian troops

arrived on March 30 to reoccupy the city. Residents “barricaded their streets and entrenched themselves in their houses.” (Military forces trapped in the city built their own “barricades,” but these would not qualify under the definition used in this study.) The revolt was repressed with heavy civilian casualties.

Secondary sources: Bertolini 1897, 462–64; Martinengo-Cesaresco 1910, 137–45; Stiles 1852, 2: 273–74.

Images: Bertolini 1897, 489.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
105	1849	05	03	01	Prussia	Silesia	Breslau (Wrocław)	2	1	02	05	0

Though they lasted only a single day, barricades were constructed by residents of this Silesian town, whose possession was long disputed between Poland and Prussia.

Secondary sources: Noyes 1966, 343; Stadelmann 1975, 180, 185.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
106	1849	05	03	07	Saxony	Saxony	Dresden	3	3	08	14	0

The reaction in Saxony to the autumn events in Vienna, including the execution of Robert Blum (who was from Leipzig), took the form of a democratic victory in elections for the Saxon parliament, setting up a confrontation between that body and the monarchist government of King Friedrich August II. Petitions to obtain recognition of the new national constitution were rejected by the government in April. When the king dissolved both houses of parliament as well as the Communal Guard and called for the assistance of Prussian troops, crowds began to mobilize. A Committee of Safety was formed and an attempt was made to seize the arsenal, resulting in troops firing into the crowd, killing fifteen. Barricades went up on that same afternoon, and remained in place until the end of the fighting on May 9. Forces from Dresden were reinforced by volunteers from Leipzig, Erzgebirge, Chemnitz, and elsewhere. According to Gall 1998, there were 108 barricades in all, some of them built under the supervision of the sculptor and state architect Gottfried Semper. The government dispatched a telegraphic appeal to Berlin during the night of May 3–4. The king and most of his ministers fled the city the following day, and a provisional government was declared from the balcony of the city hall soon thereafter. The Saxon military, which initially wavered, was reinforced by Prussian troops on May 5. Although

the 5,000 soldiers were outnumbered by 8,000 to 10,000 insurgents, they quickly overcame resistance. Among those who assumed a role in these events were the liberal reformer Heubner, the Russian anarchist Michael Bakunin, the composer Richard Wagner, August Röckel, and Stephan Born (who happened to be present at the time of the outbreak). Some 250 insurgents lost their lives and 400 more were seriously wounded.

Primary sources: Bakunin 1977, 141–50; Wagner 1983, 391–414.

Secondary sources: Droz 1957, 601–6; Holborn 1982, 88; Ernest Newman 1960, 67–103; Noyes 1966, 342–45; Robertson 1967, 183–85; Stadelmann 1975, 183; Stearns 1974, 193.

Images: Blos 1898, 537; Gall 1998, 386, 390; *Illustrated London News*, June 16, 1849, 404; Schmidt et al. 1973, 284.

Maps: Ernest Newman 1960, opposite p. 43; Schmidt et al. 1973, 290.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
107	1849	05	06	02	Poland	Silesia	Breslau (Wrocław)	2	1	02	05	0

On May 6, democrats in Breslau attempted to prevent the departure of an artillery battery for Dresden to help put down the insurrection there. The insurgents constructed barricades, which were destroyed by the troops. Though the city had been considered a hotbed of working-class radicalism, its barricades lasted only into May 7.

Secondary sources: Droz 1957, 604; Noyes 1966, 343.

Images: Schmidt et al. 1973, 292.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
108	1849	05	07	02	Saxony	Saxony	Leipzig	2	1	02	05	0

Stirred by the insurrection in nearby Dresden, the city of Leipzig went only so far as to place itself under the protection of the national government in Frankfurt on May 6. A rising fizzled after a “few barricades” were erected during the night of May 7–8, but resistance was never serious, and the insurrection proved short-lived.

Primary sources: Wagner 1983, 391–414.

Secondary sources: Droz 1957, 604; Noyes 1966, 343.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
109	1849	05	09	07	Prussia	Rhineland	Elberfeld	3	1	04	08	0

In May 1849, led by the Civil Guard, Elberfelders declared their loyalty to the National Assembly and clashed with troops. After building barricades, they succeeded in driving the troops from their city and proclaimed a “revolutionary committee of public safety.” News of their success spurred brief outbursts in Dusseldorf (see below) and in neighboring localities like Berg, la Mark, and Solingen, some of which sent contingents to Elberfeld. Friedrich Engels, a native of the nearby town of Barmen, arrived on May 11, bringing two cases of cartridges. He was appointed “inspector of the barricades,” but was soon asked to leave for having replaced the black-red-gold flags on the barricades with red ones. A bloody final confrontation was avoided as the insurrection melted away. By the time that Prussian troops arrived on May 17, the barricades had been taken down. Perhaps 2,000 to 3,000 insurgents took part. At least one army officer was killed. As many as forty barricades were said to have been erected.

Primary sources: *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, no. 295 (May 11, 1849); no. 300 (May 17, 1849).

Secondary sources: Droz 1957, 597–98; Hamerow 1972, 193; Noyes 1966, 344; Sperber 1991, 237, 367–68, 378–80; Stadelmann 1975, 185.

Images: Schmidt et al. 1973, 293–94.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
110	1849	05	09	02	Prussia	Rhine	Düsseldorf	2	2	04	08	0

On the evening of May 9, a rumor circulated that Prussian troops retreating from Elberfeld were making their way toward Dusseldorf. Engels reported “fierce barricade fighting in all streets,” aimed at keeping troops out of the city. Martial law was declared the next morning, and order was quickly restored. Insurgent casualties included about twenty dead.

Primary sources: *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, no. 295 (May 11, 1849).

Secondary sources: Droz 1957, 597–98.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
111	1849	05	17	02	Prussia	Westphalia	Iserlohn	3	3	04	10	0

A demonstration was organized in support of the Hungarians on May 9, 1849. On the following day, the Citizens' Guard seized the arsenal. A Committee of Safety assumed power on May 11 and proceeded to arm local insurgents, who numbered about 3,000. However, the town was quickly isolated. When Prussian troops entered Iserlohn on May 17, shots were fired and a soldier killed. As fighting spread, insurgents constructed barricades. In the ensuing repression, a hundred insurgents died. Prussians used the railroad to move troops and the telegraph for communications.

Secondary sources: Droz 1957, 599–600; Randers-Pehrson 1999, 489–91.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
112	1849	06	02	30	Italy	Roman Republic	Rome	3	2	04	09	0

The French army attacked Rome on April 30, 1849, meeting powerful resistance from Garibaldi's legion, which drove the French back to the Roman seaport, the Civita Vecchia. While the French awaited reinforcements, the Romans prepared their defense, which included barricades. The siege began on June 2. There were 30,000 French troops, and they made liberal use of artillery throughout the month of June. Republicans capitulated to the French on July 1 after Garibaldi and several thousand insurgents fought their way north from Rome. French forces occupied the city on July 3.

Secondary sources: Le Men 1998, 81; Robertson 1967, 371–74; Stearns 1974, 209.

Images: Le Men 1998, 151.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
113	1849	06	13	01	France	Seine	Paris	3	1	02	06	1

After failing in his bid to have the French legislature impeach President Louis Napoléon for using French troops to overthrow the Roman Republic and restore Pope Pius IX, the democratic socialist leader Alexandre-Auguste Ledru-Rollin called for a protest demonstration. No serious preparations for an insurrection had been undertaken, but participants hoped their actions would arouse the people and the military. Response was spotty, and the sparse crowds (perhaps 6,000–8,000) that gathered to build a few barricades were quickly dispersed by General Changarnier, commander of both the Parisian National Guard and the army garrison of the capital. Many of the leaders were arrested, and Ledru-

Rollin himself fled into exile. Seven insurgents were killed. There were faint echoes in the provinces, but only in Lyon was there concerted action.

Primary sources: Lefrançais 1902, 93–95.

Secondary sources: Bourgin 1948a, 103; Pilbeam 1995, 232; Prince 1972, 249; Seignobos 1921a, 138–39; Sperber 194, 235.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
114	1849	06	14	03	France	Rhône	Lyon	3	3	02	08	0

In response to the French action against the Roman republicans and news of an uprising in Paris, silk weavers in Lyon built barricades in June 1849. Insurgents fraternized with soldiers near the Hôtel de Ville and in the Croix-Rousse district, and some members of the 17th Light Cavalry went over to the rebels. Eight barricades were constructed in the suburbs. Troops, using artillery against the insurgents, quickly repressed the short-lived movement. Anywhere from fifty to 200 participants may have been killed, with casualties said to have been equally distributed between the two sides. Between 800 and 1,200 arrests resulted.

Secondary sources: Bourgin 1948a, 103; Montagne 1966, 253–87; Price 1972, 249; Seignobos 1921a, 139; Sperber 1994, 235.

Images: Montagne 1966, 288.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
115	1849	06	14	XX	Bavaria	Palatinate	Kirchheim-bolanden	2	2	02	06	0

Barricades were stubbornly defended by residents against Prussian troops in June 1849. At least a dozen were killed and many more wounded.

Secondary sources: Dahlinger 1903, 120–21.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
116	1849	06	15	01	France	Isère	Vienne	2	1	02	05	0

Crowds raised barricades in Vienne in June 1849 in order to prevent troops from departing to help repress the insurrection then under way in Lyon.

Secondary sources: Moss 1984, 410.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
117	1849	06	19	01	Romania	Walachia	Bucharest	2	2	02	06	0

The movement to institute constitutional rule in Walachia was very briefly crowned with success before intrigues instigated by Turkey and Russia, Romania's more powerful neighbors, crushed the fledgling movement, resulting in a military occupation by Russian forces. On June 19, initial collisions produced nine insurgent deaths and more than a dozen wounded before defenders of the provisional government raised two barricades near the palace, demanding vengeance for their losses. Negotiations aimed at the surrender of those who had commanded the troops resulted in cannon being handed over to the people and in troops fraternizing with city residents. It is worth noting that many members of the movement's leadership had ties to Paris.

Primary sources: Héliade Rădulescu 1851, 107–24.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
118	1851	11	18	01	France	Ardèche	Bourg-Saint-Audéol	2	1	02	05	0

The arrest of the adjunct-mayor caused a violent confrontation between troops and the local population at Bourg-Saint-Audéol in November 1851. Residents built barricades and threw rocks at soldiers. Gunfire was exchanged, and one insurgent was killed by the police commissioner. After the uprising was quelled, seventeen arrests were made.

Secondary sources: Dessal 1951, 87n13.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
119	1851	12	03	03	France	Seine	Paris	3	3	04	10	1

On Tuesday, December 2, 1851, Prince-President Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte moved to arrest key opposition political figures, prevent the National Assembly from meeting, and effect constitutional changes by personal decree. There appear to have been several uncoordinated attempts to rouse the Paris population to resist the coup. The construction of barricades began on Wednesday, December 3, but in the absence of a massive turnout, insurgents rarely tried to hold their positions in the face of attacks by troops. Perhaps the most concerted effort was made by radical republicans, who set up a headquarters in the Ecole

d'arts et métiers. Their "Committee of Resistance" which included Hugo, Schoelcher, de Bourges, etc. had issued its call for Parisians to erect barricades, and on Wednesday morning, about twenty republican deputies, wearing their tricolor scarves, were joined by a handful of workers from the faubourg Saint-Antoine in building a "frail barricade." This structure, at the intersection of the rues Cotte and Sainte-Marguerite, consisted mostly of overturned vehicles and was largely symbolic. After troops arrived, a shot was fired by an insurgent, killing a soldier. The troops fired back, killing Representative Jean-Baptiste Baudin. Other barricades were built in the quarters north of the Hôtel de Ville, but they were aggressively defended only in the rue Beaubourg, where several insurgents were shot. The insurrection was allowed to develop on December 4, while troops were held back. About 70 barricades were built before, around 2 P.M., roughly 30,000 troops were called in against approximately 1,200 insurgents. Most resistance had ended by 4 P.M., but there were reports of some barricades having lasted into the following morning, December 5. Despite the hopes and expectations of the militants, the memory of the June Days remained too powerful, and the people of Paris never rallied to their cause. Military casualties totaled 27 dead and 181 wounded. No reliable figures are available concerning insurgent wounded, but some sources offer estimates as high as 800 dead, and the official figure of 380 should probably be considered a minimum.

Primary sources: *Illustrated London News*, December 13, 1851, 673–85; 697–99.

Secondary sources: Caron 1995, 15–16; Price 1972, 289; Latimer 1898, 160; Seignobos 1921a, 206–10; Ténor 1868a, 188–302; Vigier 1982, 306–14.

Images: Girard 1981, 72; *Illustrated London News*, December 13, 1851, 676, 680, 684; Simond 1900–1901, 2: 396.

Maps: Murat 1987, 522 (shows distribution of events throughout France).

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
120	1851	12	03	02	France	Gers	Condom	2	0	02	04	0

Two days of unrest saw republicans assume control of the town in December 1851. Aside from asserting that barricades were built, the historian Bertrand Carbonnier provides no details. Once news from Paris made it clear that mobilization against the coup was scattered, all resistance in Condom ended. There were no casualties on either side during the actual unrest, but a large number of arrests resulted.

Secondary sources: Carbonnier 2001, chap. 7, C; Ténor 1868b, 140–42.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
121	1851	12	04	01	France	Jura	Poligny	2	0	02	04	0

Ambiguous news of events in the capital caused people to assemble in Arbois in December 1851, but only in nearby Poligny did action take a more serious turn. The subprefect was arrested and barricades were built on December 4. Troops brought in from Salins managed- to put down the scattered pockets of unrest with little difficulty. A considerable number of arrests were made, but no serious casualties are mentioned in reports.

Secondary sources: Perreux 1932, 36–37.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
122	1851	12	04	01	France	Gers	Fleurance	1	0	02	03	0

The population of this small town took up arms as of the morning of December 4, 1851. They occupied the town hall, surrounded the barracks of the local gendarmes, and constructed a barricade where the main road from Auch entered their town. These activities were interrupted by the arrival of the newly appointed prefect and soon thereafter of the subprefect. After pointing out the uselessness of armed resistance to the coup, these officials formally called upon the crowd to disperse. In the end, the insurgents acquiesced, dismantling their barricade without further incident. Several arrests were made, but no casualties resulted.

Secondary sources: Ténor 1868b, 126–28.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
123	1851	12	04	01	France	Hérault	Béziers	3	2	02	07	0

After the telegraph brought word on December 3, 1851, of Louis-Napoléon's coup, supporters of the Republic in Béziers resolved to undertake armed resistance, beginning the next morning. As many as 3,000 men gathered by 6 A.M. on December 4. Their numbers made them overconfident. When they confronted a small detachment of 100 soldiers, they simply marched on them without taking any precautions. A volley by the soldiers killed or wounded seventy insurgents. Only then did the latter build barricades. When reinforcements arrived to relieve the soldiers, the insurgents were caught in

between, and the cavalry was able to sweep through those streets that had not been barricaded.

Secondary sources: Ténôt 1868b, 152–62.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
124	1851	12	04	02	France	Sarthe	La Suze-sur-Sarthe	1	0	02	03	0

When news of the coup arrived from Paris in December 1851, the working population of the commune of La Suze-sur-Sarthe was mobilized by Ariste Trouvé-Chauvel, former finance minister under the Second Republic. Local democrats occupied the town hall, disarmed gendarmes, and built barricades at the entrances to the town. After a two-day wait, when support from the surrounding region failed to materialize, the town submitted without armed conflict. No casualties were sustained on either side.

Secondary sources: Ténôt 1868b, 6.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
125	1851	12	04	04	France	Gers	Mirande	3	0	04	07	0

After Louis-Napoléon's coup, members of the local Montagnard society in Mirande sought approval from the organization's departmental leadership to seize power in their town. They were given permission on the evening of Wednesday, December 3, 1851, and proceeded, the next morning, to sound the tocsin, beat the general alert, and arrest local authorities, including the subprefect. Much of the rest of that day was spent barricading the town and launching appeals for support to peasants from the surrounding regions. Thanks to their barricades and to arms commandeered from the subprefect's office, insurgents were able to turn back, without a fight, a small detachment of soldiers sent from Auch. The barricades were dismantled by the rebels themselves in the early hours of December 7 after news arrived that additional troops were coming to restore order. At least one opponent of the uprising and several soldiers were wounded in confrontations in Mirande or its immediate environs, but there appear to have been no casualties among insurgents, whose numbers may have reached as high as 6,000. A large number of arrests followed the collapse of the insurrection.

Secondary sources: Margadant 1979, 234–35, 253–54; Ténôt 1868b, 128–40.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
126	1851	12	05	01	France	Lot-et-Garonne	Villeneuve-sur-Lot	1	0	02	03	0

When Villeneuve-sur-Lot's seven gendarmes were ordered to Agen in December 1851, a rumor circulated that they had gone for reinforcements. Residents built barricades on the bridge across the Lot River to prevent troops for entering their town. Members of the Municipal Council opposed this move and persuaded the insurgents to remove the barricades without a physical engagement.

Secondary sources: Carbonnier 2001, chap. 5, B.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
127	1851	12	06	03	France	Nièvre	Clamecy	3	1	04	08	0

When news of Louis-Napoléon's coup arrived in December 1851, a crowd of 700 to 800 men, women, and children gathered, singing the "Marseillaise." Militant republicans forced their way into the local jail and liberated a few of their comrades. A collision followed when this small crowd encountered a patrol of six gendarmes dispatched by the subprefect, with casualties resulting on both sides. After the police withdrew, the insurgents took control of the town and recruited artisans and peasants from the surrounding area until their numbers had swelled to 2,000 to 3,000. On December 6, news arrived that all resistance had ended in Paris, but Eugène Millelot persisted, calling upon his followers to built barricades. Sources indicate that a total of fourteen were constructed, mostly near the town gates. Defections occurred, beginning on the night of December 6 and accelerating through the next day and a half. By noon on Sunday, December 7, with the arrival of about two hundred troops, led by the prefect, new barricades were raised and a collision occurred in which several insurgents died. News that the Paris insurrection had failed caused the eventual collapse of resistance. Overall, several were killed and a larger number wounded on both sides. As many as 1,000 insurgents manned the barricades at the time the order to disperse was given. A terrible repression ensued, including at least 1,500 arrests.

Secondary sources: Margadant 1979, 238, 251–52; Ténor 1868b, 36–67; Vigier 1982, 315–27.

Maps: Vigier 1982, 321.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
128	1851	12	07	02	France	Nièvre	Neuvy-sur-Loire	2	1	02	05	0

News of Louis-Napoléon's coup in December 1851 had already caused considerable agitation in Neuvy-sur-Loire. When inhabitants learned of events in Clamecy, passions exploded. A crowd formed on December 7. It proceeded to seize rifles stored at the town hall, disarm the local gendarmes, and throw the mayor in jail. The town priest was wounded while trying to escape from the insurgents. When infantry were dispatched the next day, they found residents in position behind barricades, ready to defend themselves. The soldiers succeeded in capturing the barricade erected at the entrance to the town and soon established control. In addition to a number of summary executions, residents were subject to mass arrests.

Secondary sources: Ténôt 1868b, 68–70.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
129	1851	12	08	02	France	Loiret	Bonny-sur-Loire	2	0	02	04	0

News from Paris of Louis-Napoléon's coup in December 1851 raised public concern in Bonny-sur-Loire to fever pitch. After Sunday mass, the tocsin was sounded. Four hundred armed men and a number of women took to the streets to cries of “Vive la République! Vive la Constitution!” This crowd encountered two gendarmes returning from patrol, and in the ensuing confrontation, one of them was killed. This was the only casualty that occurred. Insurgents tried to mobilize the nearby towns of Gien and Briare, without success. They returned to Bonny and constructed barricades on December 8 with the announced intention of defending their community. The insurrection dissolved, however, when a column of infantrymen appeared the following day.

Secondary sources: Ténôt 1868b, 12–15.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
130	1854	07	18	08	Spain	Castille	Madrid	3	3	08	14	0

Against the backdrop of conflict over the Spanish succession, the throne passed to Queen Isabella II in 1843, following the troubled regency of her mother, Maria Christina. A decade of conflict between liberals and conservatives failed to achieve any lasting resolution. In 1854, a coalition of military leaders called

for a change of government. Their initiative produced little echo among the people until joined to additional demands for electoral reform and the liberalization of political rights. Broadened mobilization led to uprisings in several Spanish cities, including Madrid, where a few barricades went up on July 18, manned by a mix of members of the working and middle classes. Modest casualties were sustained on both sides of the fighting during this first day of unrest.

The conflict expanded on July 19. Hundreds of barricades were built, and residents of the capital prepared for a confrontation with approximately 3,500 government troops. The number of dead gradually rose on both sides. By July 25, some 280 large (and an undetermined number of smaller) barricades had been constructed.

The political crisis was partially resolved when General Espartero was called to the capital to head a coalition government, with the support of the Liberal Union, an alliance between *progresistas* and *moderados*. It was to supervise the drafting of a new constitution adopted in 1856. With Espartero's arrival, calm was gradually restored in Madrid, and the barricades dismantled.

Primary sources: *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* 76, no. 465 (July 1854): 359–65; *Gentleman's Magazine*, n.s., 42 (July–December 1854): 184: 184.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
131	1854	08	28	02	Spain	Castille	Madrid	2	0	04	06	0

Lingering popular resentment directed at Queen Mother Maria Christina because of her autocratic and repressive rule as regent fueled efforts to force her to leave Spain in disgrace. During the night of August 28–29, 1854, a considerable number of barricades were constructed by a few hundred insurgents, who considered the government to have broken faith with the people by trying to reach an accommodation with the dowager queen. The insurrection ended without bloodshed the following day, but did lead to the dissolution of the revolutionary junta and new elections.

Primary sources: *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* 76, no. 465 (July 1854): 494–95; *Gentleman's Magazine*, n.s., 42 (July–December 1854): 494–95.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
132	1860	05	27	04	Kingdom of the Two Sicilies	Sicily	Palermo	3	3	04	10	1

When Garibaldi, at the head of perhaps 5,000 men, attacked Palermo on May 27, 1860, the city immediately rose up and residents constructed numerous barricades. The insurgents, soon reinforced by additional Piedmontese forces, established control over most of the city. After four days of fighting, the governor agreed to a cease-fire and, soon thereafter, evacuated the city and withdrew his troops, numbering more than 20,000.

Primary sources: Adams 1920, 243–45.

Secondary sources: Girard 1981, 395–99.

Images: *Illustrated London News*, June 23, 1860.

Maps: Adams 1920, 244n10; *Illustrated London News*, June 23, 1860.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
133	1868	03	11	01	France	Haute-Garonne	Toulouse	2	0	02	04	1

In March 1868, the government’s attempt to reform conscription laws mobilized some 1,700 republican demonstrators, who sang the “Marseillaise” and marched through the city of Toulouse carrying the red flag. On March 11, a few hundred young workers refused to register and built barricades from overturned carts in the faubourg Saint-Cyprien. Troops quickly reestablished calm and dismantled the barricades, arresting 76 insurgents.

Secondary sources: Aminzade 1981, 211–12.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
134	1869	06	10	01	France	Seine	Paris	4	0	02	06	1

The first round of legislative elections in May 1869 produced a resounding republican victory in Paris; but results from the second round, delivered on June 6 and 7, proved disappointing for Paris radicals, who found it difficult to accept Henri Rochefort’s loss. For several evenings, large and unruly crowds formed on the boulevards, and on June 10, “a tiny beginning of a barricade” was attempted in the rue Vivienne, but it is the only one reported in these events. Although perhaps as many as 30,000 protesters were mobilized, there appear to have been few, if any, casualties.

Primary sources: Halévy 1935, 1: 209–11.

Secondary sources: Girard 1981, 395–99.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
135	1869	10	06	01	Spain	Catalonia	La Bisbal	3	1	02	06	1

A federalist revolt provided the occasion for a confrontation between troops commanded by the military governor of Girona and about 2,000 republicans in October 1869, with the construction of at least one barricade.

Images: *Le Monde illustré* October 30, 1869, 276.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
136	1870	02	07	03	France	Seine	Paris	1	1	04	06	1

On January 10, 1870, the emperor's cousin Pierre-Napoléon Bonaparte, killed Victor Noir, a radical journalist who worked for Henri Rochefort's paper *La Marseillaise*. In anticipation of the funeral procession for Noir on January 12, Rochefort issued a call for insurrection. On the appointed day, as many as 100,000 sympathizers marched. Rochefort, perhaps fearing a ruthless repression of republicans, turned cautious. No insurrection ensued, though Rochefort was charged with inciting a revolt. On the evening of February 7, the ministry decided to proceed with Rochefort's arrest. Gustave Flourens was presiding over a protest demonstration in Belleville when news of Rochefort's incarceration first circulated. Flourens ordered the arrest of the commissioner of police (present at the demonstration as an observer), called upon the quarter to rise in revolt, and declared that the revolution had begun. Eighteen barricades were built over a three-day period by several dozen insurgents singing the "Marseillaise," but the response of Parisians was generally lukewarm. Spirited resistance was confined to a few locations like the huge barricade in the rue Saint-Maur, which changed hands three times. Casualties included several deaths and about 150 wounded in all. Hundreds were arrested. This failed attempt at insurrection was subsequently used to justify the arrest of an estimated 300 to 600 Paris leftists.

Primary sources: Adam 1905, 426–30; Dalotel, Faure, and Freiermuth 1980, 346–54; Halévy 1935, 2:55–56; *L'Illustration*, February 12, 1870, 114; *Le National*, February 10, 1870, 1–2; *La Réforme*, February 10–12, 1870.

Secondary sources: Girard 1981, 405–6; Nord 1993MS, 21, 24–25; Simond 1900–1901, 2: 709–12; Weill 1928, 396.

Images: Dalotel and Freiermuth 1982, 15; *L'Illustration*, February 12, 1870, 112, and February 19, 1870, 201; Edwards 1973, 51, 57; Girard 1981, 400; *Le Monde illustré*, February 19, 1870, 124; *Illustrated London News*, February 19,

1870, 201; Lépidis 1975, 239, 240; McCauley 1994, 188; Simond 1900–1901, 2: 712.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
137	1870	02	08	01	France	Bouches-du-Rhône	Marseille	2	0	02	04	0

Residents in Marseille reacted in February 1870 to news of Rochefort's arrest and the subsequent events in Paris. Crowds formed on the evening of February 8 and attempted to build a barricade in the place aux Veufs. This action was resisted by a combined force of police and gendarmes, with about 100 arrests.

Primary sources: *La Réforme*, February 12, 1870, 2.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
138	1870	04	04	02	Spain	Catalonia	Gracia; Barcelona	3	2	04	09	1

Against a backdrop of uncertainty over the succession to the Spanish throne, first the village of Gracia and then neighboring Barcelona were shaken by an insurrection resulting from the efforts of authorities to conduct a draft lottery. Residents constructed barricades and set fire to the provincial archives in an attempt to destroy the records on which conscription lists were based. Women were said to have taken a prominent role in the unrest, ringing the tocsin, marching through the streets with the revolutionary flag, and even taking up the arms of dying combatants. On the morning of April 5, insurgents also attacked trains, one of which was transporting troops to support the repression.

Primary sources: *L'Illustration*, April 23, 1870, 294.

Images: *L'Illustration*, April 26, 1870, 296.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
139	1870	05	09	03	France	Seine	Paris	2	1	02	05	1

A plebiscite was held on Sunday May 8, 1870. In anticipation of unfavorable results, leftists led by Auguste Blanqui engaged in agitation on three successive nights. On the evening of May 9, crowds in Belleville and Menilmontant cried, "Vive Rochefort!" and "Vive la République!" and attempted to fraternize with National Guard units. A large and sturdy barricade was constructed in the rue Saint-Maur. Its capture by the National Guard resulted in one insurgent death and two guardsmen being wounded. Several hundred arrests resulted. A

contemporary drawing showed a barricade nested in the scaffolding of the Eglise Saint-Joseph, built on May 10.

Primary sources: *L'Illustration*, May 21, 1870, 367–70.

Secondary sources: Dalotel, Faure, and Freiermuth 1980, 355–67; Dalotel and Freiermuth 1982, 15; Simond 1900–1901, 2: 712–14.

Images: *Illustrated London News*, May 21, 1870, 520; *L'Illustration*, May 21, 1870, 368; Simond 1900–1901, 2: 712–13.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
140	1871	03	18	13	France	Seine	Paris	3	2	04	09	1

When the Versailles government tried to capture the cannon on Montmartre, the people, including insurgent units of the National Guard, responded with the spontaneous construction of barricades near the Buttes-Chaumont, around the place de la Bastille, and in the vicinity of the Hôtel de Ville, among other places. This seems to have occurred independently in each *arrondissement*, but with the greatest concentration on the right bank and in the eastern half of the city. The appearance of dozens of such structures helped decide Thiers to withdraw from Paris to Versailles, abandoning the city to the insurgents.

Secondary sources: Dalotel and Freiermuth 1982, 16–17; Edwards 1971, 143–45.

Images: See [figures 4, 28](#), this volume; Edwards 1971, 145; 1973, 56.

Maps: Bibliothèque nationale, Département des cartes et plans, Ge D 16417.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
141	1871	03	30	02	France	Aude	Narbonne	2	1	02	05	0

The movement in Narbonne in support of the Paris Commune made a last-ditch effort in March 1871 to resist the authorities' efforts to suppress all protest. The radical journalist Emile Digeon rejected an offer of amnesty and ordered the streets surrounding the Hôtel de Ville to be barricaded. In a preliminary skirmish, two insurgents were killed and three wounded. As the moment of confrontation approached, resistance crumbled, however, and the movement collapsed without further hostilities. A number of arrests followed.

Primary sources: Lissagaray 1967, 178–79.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
142	1871	04	02	05	France	Seine	Courbe- voie; Paris	2	2	02	06	0

Versailles forces attacked three federal battalions of the Paris Commune, numbering about 600 men, who were occupying Courbevoie and had erected a barricade as their primary fortification. In the face of a Versailles assault, the Communards were forced to withdraw, after losing twelve dead and a small number of prisoners. The noise of this engagement reached Paris, whose residents feared the start of another siege. They hastened to restore the city's barricades (particularly a large one on the Neuilly bridge) and reposition cannon on the ramparts. On the following day, federal forces attempted a sortie in the direction of Versailles. This ended disastrously, revealing the weaknesses in the command structure of the Commune, though by December 6, it had been able to regain some of the lost momentum and reoccupy Courbevoie.

Primary sources: Lissagaray 1967, 162–70, 190–95.

Secondary sources: Thomas 1966, 57.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
143	1871	04	04	02	France	Haute- Vienne	Limoges	3	1	02	06	0

When news arrived that the Versailles army had crushed the April 3, 1871, sortie from Paris, workers in Limoges fraternized with 500 soldiers about to depart to join the Versailles forces and succeeded in winning them over. The local National Guard expressed their support for the Commune, crying “Vive Paris! A bas Versailles!” The garrison made some concessions to the crowd but prepared to put down an impending insurrection. Federalist forces seized the prefecture and began the construction of barricades. In a brief confrontation, the commander of the garrison, Colonel Billet, was killed. However, the resistance dissipated overnight, and on April 5, the prefecture changed hands without further fighting. Many arrests followed.

Primary sources: Lissagaray 1967, 179–81.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
144	1871	04	08	01	France	Haute- Garonne	Toulouse	2	0	02	04	0

The short-lived revolutionary commune in Toulouse erected barricades in two streets near the city hall in April 1871, but when shots were fired above the heads of demonstrators, the protesters quickly dispersed without injuries on either side.

Secondary sources: Aminzade 1981, 255–57.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
145	1871	05	01	02	France	Rhône	Lyon	2	2	02	06	0

After parts of Lyon had abstained from the April 30, 1871, elections, calls were issued on the following day in the Guillotière district for workers to take up arms in support of Parisians. On Sunday afternoon, two or three large barricades were constructed under the supervision of a “former Garibaldian officer” to block the passage of troops. In the ensuing fighting (which included the use of cannon by the government forces), a number of soldiers and the prefect were wounded. Insurgent casualties were estimated by one source at about fifty. Combat continued through the early morning of May 2.

Primary sources: *Le National*, May 7, 1871, 3; Lissagaray 1967, 277–79.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
146	1871	05	13	01	France	Seine	Issy	3	1	02	06	0

The Commune’s delegate at war Louis Rossel asked Paul-Antoine Brunel to assume responsibility for the defense of Issy. Brunel made a desperate but vain effort to prevent Versailles forces from capturing the city and fort. His plan included the building of barricades. However, with no reinforcements, and subject to constant bombardment, the federalist forces were obliged to retreat.

Primary sources: Lissagaray 1967, 283–85.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
147	1871	05	21	08	France	Seine	Paris	4	4	08	16	0

The Commune’s Commission of Barricades employed paid labor to erect a few massive and heavily fortified structures at prominent but largely symbolic points in the city like the corner of the place de la Concorde and the place de Vendôme. Of the “barricades” constructed in advance at selected locations, not one mounted an effective resistance against Versailles forces, because they could simply be outflanked, attacked from the rear, or ignored altogether. Once

fighting began in earnest, most defenders repaired to their own quarters, throwing up hundreds of spontaneous barricades, often on sites that had witnessed barricade construction in 1870. The Versailles forces consisted of 110,000 soldiers. Their casualties were just 400 killed and 1,100 seriously wounded. The number of actual insurgents has been estimated at anywhere from 3,000 to 20,000 (depending on how rigorous one's standards for gauging participation). The repression included a bloodbath in which thousands were executed. Only about 700 were arrested. The number of barricades was variously estimated to have been between 400 and 600, but the *Ecole nationale des ponts et chaussées* (civil engineering college) enumerated precisely 590 in the ten most active *arrondissements* alone and reported that 6,700 bodies had been found in the streets.

Primary sources: Camp 1881, 229–37; *Le National*, May 29–30, 1871; Lissagaray 1967, 304–81; Senisse 1965, 136–50.

Secondary sources: Dalotel and Freiermuth 1982, 19–20; Tombs 1981, 137–200.

Images: See [figures 5, 27](#), this volume; Balathier-Bragelonne 1872; Dalotel and Freiermuth 1982, 14, 16; Edwards 1973, 159, 165; *L'Illustration*, February 12, 1870; Leighton 1871, 27, 46, 92, 297, 319.

Maps: Bibliothèque nationale, Département des cartes et plans, Ge D 16417; Simond 1900–1901, 3: 51.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
148	1886	XX	XX	XX	France	Aisne	Saint- Quentin	2	0	02	04	1

A weavers' strike led to desultory barricade activity in Saint-Quentin in 1886.

Secondary sources: Perrot 1984, 194.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
149	1888	08	08	XX	France	Seine	Paris	2	0	02	04	1

A strike of navvies or ditch-diggers gave rise, on the occasion of the funeral of Emile Eudes—a Blanquist who had been prominent at the time of the Paris Commune—to an attempt to build a barricade and mobilize the capital in 1888.

Secondary sources: Perrot 1984, 194.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
150	1888	XX	XX	XX	France	Somme	Amiens	2	0	02	04	X

A weavers' strike gave rise in 1888 to desultory barricade activity in Amiens.
Secondary sources: Perrot 1984, 194.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
151	1889	XX	XX	XX	France	Aisne	Saint- Quentin	2	0	02	04	X

A weavers' strike gave rise to desultory barricade activity in Saint-Quentin in 1889.
Secondary sources: Perrot 1984, 194.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
152	1889	XX	XX	XX	France	Nord	Pérenchies	2	0	02	04	X

A weavers' strike led to the building of a single barricade in Pérenchies in 1889.
Secondary sources: Perrot 1984, 194.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
153	1889	XX	XX	XX	France	Nord	Neuvilly	2	0	02	04	X

A weavers' strike led to the building of a single barricade in Neuvilly in 1889.
Secondary sources: Perrot 1984, 194.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
154	1893	07	03	01	France	Seine	Paris	3	0	02	05	1

A student procession, intended as a protest against Senator Béranger, sparked riots in the Latin Quarter on a Saturday evening in July 1893. About 2,000 students had gathered in the place de la Sorbonne. When three police officers appeared, the students pursued them as far as the rue Soufflot. In the ensuing struggle between police officers and students, one bystander was killed and an unspecified number of protesters were wounded. No mention of barricades was made in the source cited below, but the accompanying image shows an omnibus being overturned to form part of a barricade in the boulevard Saint-Germain.

Secondary source: Simond 1900–1901, 3: 458–61.

Images: Simond 1900–1901, 3: 51.

No.	Year	Month	Day	Duration	Country	Province	City	#Is	#Dead	#Bs	Magnitude	Ind?
155	1898	05	08	03	Italy	Lombardy	Milan	3	3	08	14	1

A municipal excise tax on flour, leading to a sharp rise in the price of bread, sparked a series of popular uprisings. The “three days of Milan,” the last barricade event of the nineteenth century, resulted in the construction of barricades in the Largo La Foppa district. General Fiorenzo Bava-Beccaris used cannon to put down the revolt. Victims among the insurgents numbered between 80 and 300.

Secondary sources: Perrot 1984, 194.

Images: Lyttelton 1989, 14; Pirovano 1982, 321.

APPENDIX B

Did the Wave of Revolutionism in 1848 Originate in Paris or Palermo?

Although historians, almost without exception, have maintained that the rapidly expanding insurrectionary convulsions of 1848 emanated from Paris, it is possible to single out a handful of dissenting opinions. Louis Garnier-Pagès, for example, contended that unrest in certain communes of the Abruzzi region, the province of Salerno, the city of Messina, and some parts of Calabria had been set in motion by events in Palermo.¹ Marx makes the somewhat vaguer claim in *The Class Struggles in France* that “the bloody uprising of the people in Palermo worked like an electric shock on the paralyzed masses of the people and awoke their great revolutionary memories and passions.”² Among twentieth-century commentators, Paul Ginsborg similarly writes of Palermo’s “electrifying effect on the rest of the peninsula.”³ Jacques Godechot has argued even more forcefully for the significance of the Sicilian events.⁴ He not only adds Genoa to the list of sites incited to rebel by the news of the uprising in Palermo but goes so far as to suggest that, even had the February revolution in Paris not taken place, the uprising in Sicily might have initiated a chain reaction that would have ended by engulfing the rest of Europe, albeit at a slower pace. More recently, Reinhart Koselleck has boldly claimed: “Not surprisingly, then, the revolution of 1848 first broke out in southern Italy, in *Palermo* and *Naples*, where constitutions were forced onto the ruling monarchy. From there it spread to France.”⁵

My inability to uncover evidence that Parisians active during the February Days made reference to or had in mind the previous month’s events in Palermo has convinced me that the Sicilian insurrection’s direct influence was largely confined to the Italian-speaking world. Still to be addressed is the intriguing fact that the kingdom of Naples and Sicily remained at the forefront of the 1848

events not just during the expansive revolutionary phase in the spring of that year but also as the political tide turned toward reaction as the summer months approached. Specifically, a follow-up insurrection occurred in Naples in mid-May. It was put down with the help of the *lazzaroni* (a term used to refer to the street people of that city, whom Marx categorized as lumpenproletarians) more than a month before the June insurrection in Paris was repressed thanks to the spirited participation of the Garde mobile (on whom Marx heaped even greater scorn.) In this case too, the Paris events were seen as pivotal in reversing the momentum of political developments on the Continent, while the role of the conflict in Naples went all but unnoticed.

One difficulty in positing the Palermo insurrection as the starting point for the cataclysmic sequence of 1848 revolutions is that, while it may have preceded the February Days in Paris, it was itself anticipated by several other, significant insurrectionary episodes. For example, the so-called potato revolution of April 1847, which brought unrest (accompanied by a handful of barricades) to Berlin and other German towns, might just as readily be viewed as the point of departure for the spurt of mid-century unrest. Another candidate might be the renewal of the civil war in Switzerland, which had already produced two minor barricade events in Geneva as early as 1843 and 1846. However, in November 1847, the threat to Swiss national unity was dispelled when liberal forces supporting increased centralization of government defeated the Sonderbund, a coalition of breakaway Catholic cantons. Though Peter Stearns considers this episode to have been “independent of developments elsewhere,” its influence on Baden was clear, thus justifying its having occasionally been cited as the direct antecedent of the revolutionary wave of 1848.⁶ Agitation in Tuscany, which had prompted the grand duke to grant a charter by mid-February, could also be seen as a legitimate precursor, even though the provisions of the new charter had yet to be implemented at the time Louis-Philippe was forced to relinquish his throne.⁷

Certain participants in the 1848 uprisings pointed to yet more distant origins for the tumult of that year. Among them was the composer Richard Wagner, whose autobiography traces his personal awakening to the siren song of political rebellion back to the July revolution of 1830, even if the lesson he drew from that episode of his youth was that revolutionary change remained a remote prospect at best. He also cited the Sonderbund war in Switzerland and the Sicilian “revolution” at the start of 1848 as the events that turned the eyes of the expectant (though not his own) “in great excitement to Paris to discern the effect of these revolts.”⁸ These harbingers notwithstanding, Wagner was firm in his

conviction that the Paris insurrection of February had ushered in the new revolutionary era in Europe.

As a general rule, historians have given little credence to the notion that these earlier antecedents—whether considered individually or collectively—could have triggered so great an outpouring of insurrectionary activity, absent a revolution in Paris. The contrary view, directly attributing the sharp increase in revolutionary mobilization to the impact of renewed unrest in France, has been commonplace.⁹

The point is not that Paris was immune to the influence of rebellions originating elsewhere. The 1834 insurrection in Lyon, which precipitated a smaller rising in the capital city, disproves that proposition handily enough. Still, asymmetries in the way that people process and communicate their understanding of the world around them consign an incident in a single small and peripheral location to oblivion, whereas another event—even when comparably limited in scope—in a populous, centrally placed, and closely watched venue tends to be perceived as full of portent.

Paris, of course, was often treated as a special case because of its unique history of revolutionary upheaval. The least sign of insurrectionary activity there tended to cast events in less conspicuous locations into the shadows. Thus, Palermo in January 1848, much like Brussels in September 1787 or Geneva in January 1789, have remained all but overlooked as the opening acts of the great revolutionary dramas that followed. Preliminary events in Switzerland, Prussia, Wurttemberg, Sicily, and elsewhere in 1846 and 1847 have attracted even less attention. What they *do* indicate, through their use of barricades, is that familiarity with the French insurrectionary repertoire had already penetrated people's thinking and spread widely across the Continent by the 1840s. This helps explain why a triggering event like the February revolution in France could have such an immediate and far-reaching impact.

APPENDIX C

The Barricade and Technological Innovations in Transport and Communications

The rail system in France had begun a tremendous expansion in the 1840s, but the midcentury economic crisis brought much of that activity to a halt. At the time of the February revolution in France, only a few of the major domestic lines had been completed and, with the exception of Belgium, international rail connections were lacking.

The semaphore telegraph invented by Claude Chappe had actually been in use in France since the 1790s, but it had not caught on elsewhere on the Continent, and in 1848, it continued to operate only within the borders of France. Because it relied on line-of-sight transmission, requiring relay stations spaced at roughly five-to ten-mile intervals, this technology was expensive to set up and maintain and therefore limited to a few major routes. The network had, however, already come into play during the 1830 revolution, in two entirely different contexts. According to Alexandre Dumas *père*, the government used it to make a futile attempt to summon additional troops to the capital, while telegraphic reports of the Paris uprising spurred residents of Lyon to erect barricades there.¹

By February 1848, an expanded telegraphic network enabled large provincial cities (and smaller centers that happened to be located directly along the semaphore routes) to stay abreast of events in Paris, although the government's strict control over access to the system meant that all communications reflected the official viewpoint. By the time of the June Days, insurgent forces, recognizing the potential advantage to be gained by capturing a transmission station, used the telegraph to send out news of the Paris uprising. They succeeded, in fact, in alerting the people of Arbois (in the Jura mountains),

though this effort to elicit provincial support for the rebellion in the capital proved to be of little practical consequence.

Louis Garnier-Pagès may have been technically correct when he hinted that the telegraph had played a role in the spread of revolution to neighboring countries, even though no international telegraphic network yet existed. Members and representatives of the provisional government who were at odds with its noninterventionist foreign policy hatched a plan to provide surreptitious support for the invasion of Belgium. As related in [chapter 6](#), a critical last-minute exchange between Ledru-Rollin, minister of the interior in Paris, and his collaborator Charles Delescluze, the radical *commissaire* of the *département* of the Nord, was conveyed by semaphore. Delescluze had urgently inquired whether he should deliver arms to members of the Belgian Legion before they crossed the border with the intention of overthrowing King Leopold. Unfortunately, Ledru-Rollin's telegraphically ambiguous one-word response—"Non!"—was misinterpreted somewhere along the line of transmission as a refusal to reply on the part of the minister rather than an answer to Delescluze's question. As a result, the message was never delivered, and, left to decide on his own, Delescluze consigned a wagonload of rifles to this ill-fated incursion into Belgian territory, with the disastrous consequences recounted earlier.²

In many ways, the relationship between the emerging infrastructure of communications and transport and the outbreak of revolution in 1848 was the opposite of what has been asserted by Garnier-Pagès and others: the events of that year demonstrated the enormous political benefits that *governments* could realize by investing in the new technologies. Take as a case in point the vote of the Assembly in the mid-1840s that committed France to a plan to install a new *electric* telegraph line between Paris and Lille. It was not yet in service at the time of the revolution of February 1848 and played no part in those events. However, following the 1848 experience, the government rapidly implemented a system based in part on Samuel Morse's innovations—which made the new system faster, cheaper, and more secure; and, unlike the semaphore telegraph, it was also less subject to meteorological disturbances and capable of operating both day and night. Cross-channel service began in 1850, and, by 1851, the government's use of the system to send dispatches to provincial prefects played a critical role in restricting the spread of uprisings against Louis-Napoléon's coup d'état.³

Development of trans-European rail connections followed a somewhat similar pattern. At the time of the Dresden uprising in May 1849, the Saxon and Prussian governments, which had already inaugurated an internal telegraphic

link, provided a glimpse of the future by bringing in trainloads of outside troops with unprecedented speed to attack rebel barricades.⁴ The incident demonstrated, for any who were in doubt, that governments were better positioned than insurgents to make effective use of the new technologies. Efforts by European states during the second half of the century to exploit these innovations to consolidate administrative control and repress civil disturbances is one important reason why, contrary to Garnier-Pagès's intuition, revolutionary mobilization on a scale approaching the 1848 firestorm has been so rare, and why the level of insurrectionary activity in Europe, including barricade events, began its secular decline at about that time.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1. THE INSURGENT BARRICADE

Epigraph: “Barricade. s. f. Espece de retranchement qu’on fait ordinairement avec des barriques remplies de terre, pour se deffendre, se mettre à couvert de l’ennemi” (Académie française 1694, 2: 85). This is the earliest formal definition of the term that I have been able to identify.

1. Appendix A catalogs incidents by date and location, indicates pertinent primary and secondary sources, and provides a brief and circumstantial account of what happened, with particular emphasis on the role of barricades. The description of the June 1832 unrest that follows is based largely on contemporary narratives. As is common in insurrectionary situations, even eyewitness accounts differ on essential details such as the order and timing of events.

2. On the history and significance of funerals from the time of the French Revolution, see Ben-Amos 2000, 17–109.

3. The German writer Heinrich Heine, then living in Paris, treated the involvement of Legitimists as an unfounded rumor (Heine [1832] 1994, 188). However, it is difficult to discount the categorical statements by well-informed observers of opposing political views like the *préfet de police* Henri Gisquet (1840, 2: 197, 202–3) and the socialist Louis Blanc ([1830–40] 1846, 3: 270).

4. Many of these elements were borrowed from the 1827 procession for Manuel. Induction into the Panthéon had also been demanded by the mourners at Constant’s funeral in 1830. Culminating a successful uprising with a visit to the Hôtel de Ville had been a ritual element of Parisian insurrections since 1789 and was a notable feature of both the 1830 and 1848 revolutions. On these specific aspects of the 1832 events, see Gisquet 1840, 2: 207–9.

5. Heine [1832] 1884, 214. See *ibid.* for many of the details in this account, supplemented by Gisquet 1840, vol. 2.

6. Lucas-Dubreton 1932, 162. The source of that shot in June 1832 has never been established, any more than it has been possible to ascertain who set in motion the bloodshed in Nantes in July 1830, the February 22, 1848, massacre in the boulevard des Capucines in Paris, or the deadly Berlin rioting that followed in both March and June, among the many nineteenth-century barricade events cataloged in appendix A that began in similar fashion.

7. *Le National*, June 9, 1832.

8. No esoteric skills were required to build a barricade, but professional knowledge was always welcome. During the 1832 insurrection, Martin Nadaud, who had arrived in the capital just two years earlier to seek employment as a seasonal construction worker, helped build a barricade in the rue Saint-Martin. He also related how, soon after the defeat of the uprising in June 1832, he and three of his fellow masons received a heartfelt round of applause at a meeting of the local chapter of the Société des droits de l’homme after volunteering that they knew where to get their hands on crowbars, hammers, and planks should the need to build barricades arise again. See Nadaud [1895] 1976, 256–57.

9. See “Détails des troubles,” 1, 3–4; “Détails exacts,” 1; *Relation des événements*; “Nouveaux détails très-exacts,” 1 (all 1839); Blanc [1830–40] 1846, 3: 283. Bouchet 2000, 17, cites a request to the mayor of the then eighth arrondissement by two arms dealers for military protection of their establishments “to prevent so large a quantity of arms from falling into the hands of troublemakers.”

10. Bouchet 2000, 17, and Gisquet 1840, 2: 213–17, estimate that insurgents thus obtained 4,000 rifles and a large quantity of ammunition. Bouchet’s reconstruction of events, undoubtedly the most comprehensive available, is noteworthy, not only for the range of published and archival sources on which he draws, but also because his account succeeds in conveying the sense of contingency that obtained as events were unfolding.

11. Blanc [1830–40] 1846, 3: 277, 281, emphasizes the insurgents’ early efforts to fraternize with soldiers, reporting one encounter in which an officer of the 12th light infantry confided to a student leader of the procession, “I am a republican; you can count on us.” The number of those who engaged in actual combat is a matter of some dispute. Roughly 1,000 were detained after the fighting had ended, but the sheer number of arrests is typically an imprecise indicator of the size of an uprising.

12. See Bouchet 2000, 18.

13. Alton-Shée 1869, 1: 122; Heine [1832] 1994, 187.

14. See Blanc [1830–40] 1846, 3: 292–93, 313–15, and Dumas [1852–53] 1989, 2: 834–43. Blanc notes that the rebel commander, whose surname was Jeanne, survived the fighting. He was subsequently arrested, tried, convicted, and deported as a result of his participation in the failed insurrection.

15. As usual in conflicts of this type, the figures given can be no more than approximations, particularly for the losing side. In general, in describing barricade events, I indicate the range of estimates of insurgent strength or of casualties offered by contemporary sources or cite the considered judgment of a trustworthy secondary source. In this case, the most comprehensive recent survey of the literature renounced the attempt to quantify the loss of life, stipulating only that the number of barricades was at least 200 (Bouchet 2000, 34). More specific (but incomplete and perhaps partisan) casualty estimates are provided by Gisquet, who explicitly notes the difficulty of establishing the number of insurgents wounded (Gisquet 1840, 2: 237–38).

16. In our own day, of course, that episode has been played out before millions more in the French- and English-speaking worlds, thanks to Claude-Michel Schönberg’s musical adaptation *Les Mis*, the second act of which begins with a stage reenactment of the construction of a barricade in hardly less time than many of its real-life equivalents required to progress from concept to finished product.

17. This way of framing the comparison takes into account the facts that barricades were much more numerous in 1830, and that some of the streets in which barricades were built during the July Days no longer existed at the time of the February revolution.

18. Victor Hugo describes one such incident from the resistance to the December 1851 coup in *Napoléon le Petit* (Hugo [1852] 1879, 94). In extreme cases, it was not unheard of for such a structure to change hands more than once. That is what happened in early February 1870, when barricades built by republican insurgents passed back and forth between supporters of Gustave Flourens and the imperial army several times before the uprising was repressed. See Dalotel, Faure, and Freiermuth 1980, 347–54.

Equally problematic are structures, frequently referred to as “barricades,” built by soldiers to defend themselves against either civilian attackers or opposing armies. Examples of the former include incidents from the Paris insurrection of 1832 (Chenu [1850, 11]), the Lyon uprising of 1834 (*Histoire des événements de Lyon* [1834], 22, 24), and Perdu [1933, 76], and the resistance in the adjacent provinces of the Drôme and Var following Louis-Napoléon’s 1851 overthrow of the French Second Republic (Ténot 1868b, 208–9, 292–97; Margadant 1979, 299–301). The latter case is represented by the defense of Châteaudun in which 1,200 French soldiers—perhaps not incidentally Parisians for the most part—attempted to halt the advance of the invading Prussian army in October 1870 (Agulhon 1983a, 584) and the “barricades” subsequently built in Bagneux by those same Prussians for use against the French (Vizetelly 1882).

19. This discussion of barricade materials has been based on sources too numerous to cite individually. A

sampling of references that would take in every barricade component mentioned in this section would include “Histoire de la journée des barricades de Paris, mai 1588” (1836), 383; Bodi 1979, 45; Caussidière 1849, 1: 47–48; Dalotel and Freiermuth 1982, 16, 19; Dumas [1852–53] 1989, 61, 385; Duveau 1967, 174; Ebers 1893, 120–21; Girod de l’Ain 1834, 226–37; Isambert 1828, 34, 39; Mariéjol 1911, 271; Mousnier 1978, 264; *Le National*, May 30, 1871, 2; Senisse 1965, 77; St. John 1848, 82–83, 92–93; and Tocqueville 1971, 48. Flaubert ([1869]1981, 285) and Hugo ([1852] 1879, 80; 1982, 927, 988–99) provide colorful, even whimsical, lists of their own.

20. *Grande encyclopédie* (1887), 491.

21. There exists an alternate derivation which at first glance makes just as much sense, as it traces the origin of the term to the French verb *barrer*, meaning to block or bar passage. However, following the historian J.-A. de Thou, Larousse (1866, 262) and most other experts have agreed that the combination of the term *barrique* and the suffix *-ade* was first used to connote an ensemble of many barrels. “No convincing argument has yet been adduced to disprove the traditional derivation,” T. E. Hope concludes, after a thorough review of the etymological possibilities (Hope 1971, 1: 327). Both the term and the practice itself may have been Gascon in origin and may have developed by analogy to the established concept of a *gabionade* in siege warfare (from *gabion*, a wicker cylinder that could be filled with dirt or stones in order to build fortifications or the footings of bridges, dams, and earthworks).

22. Duveau 1967, 174.

23. Girod de l’Ain 1834, 226.

24. See *Le National*, February 10, 1870, 2. Unfortunately for the insurgents, they were unable to make use of their prize (or of a second omnibus acquired in the same way) before being attacked and dispersed by a force of forty police agents armed with swords.

25. Although the custom of planting “liberty trees” had a different origin altogether, it also served to repair the damage done to Paris streets completely denuded by the major insurrections of the nineteenth century (with some 1,300 trees cut down in the 1830 revolution alone).

26. The commission spent a total of 80,000 francs to pay several hundred laborers and as many as 1,500 women (sewing sandbags at a piece-rate of eight centimes each) to work on these projects.

27. The very fact that figure 5 is a photograph speaks volumes on this subject. Given the state of photographic technology, it was still impractical in 1871 reliably to capture barricade combat or even barricade construction. Because of the long exposure times required, the photographer’s subject had to remain stationary, which explains why the barricade photos of the period were set pieces, showing only structures built long in advance of their anticipated use and manned by defenders in static poses (with no opposing forces in evidence). These are a far cry from the highly animated scenes of contestation pictured in period engravings of insurrectionary activity, and, for that reason, this is the only photograph of a barricade included in this work.

28. For similar examples from the Middle Ages, see Roguet 1850, 3–12ff.

29. England’s superior military organization had allowed it to win spectacular victories during the previous century. By the early 1420s, King Henry V had established control over the greater part of France, a country both richer and more populous than England itself. When he died in 1422, his ten-month-old son Henry VI became heir to the crowns of both countries. During the new king’s minority, power was shared among his three uncles. John, duke of Bedford, governed France. English affairs were managed by the King’s Council, split into rival camps headed by Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, leader of the pro-war party, and the bishop of Winchester, standard-bearer of those who favored peace.

30. A pipe was actually a large cask used for the transport of wine. A hurdice (also hurdis) was a type of temporary palisade comprising several portable rectangular frames (hurdles) made of wicker or wattle. Hurdices were commonly used to pen sheep that had been driven to the vicinity of London to be sold at market. See *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. For help in sorting out discrepancies among the vernacular chronicles of the period, see Gransden 1982, 222–23.

31. The synopsis of these events in Gairdner 1876, 159, reads as follows:

And by-tywe ix and x of the belle ther come certayne men of the Byschoppys of Wynchester and drewe the chaynys of the stulpys at the brygge ende in Southeworke is syde, the whiche were bothe knyghtys and squyers, with a grete mayny of archerys, and they enbaytaylyd them, and made defens of wyndowys and pypys as hyt hadde bene in the londe of warre, as thowe they wolde have fought agayne the kyngys pepylle and brekyng of the pes.

The account quoted in Thomas and Thornley 1938, 139, which is nearly identical to that of Kingsford 1905, 77, adds some useful particulars:

And in forbarryng of the kynges high wey lete drawe the Cheyne at the Stulpes there and sette up pipes and hurdeyses in maner and fourme of Bulwerkes And sette men in Chambres Solers and Wyndowes with bowes and arowes and other wepyn to thentent of fynal destruccion of my said lord of Gloucestre persone as well as of these that than hadde come with hym.

32. Naturally, the original term was also used in the French-speaking regions of Belgium and Switzerland, which also experienced barricade events in the period in question. In the case of Algeria, the only non-European country for which I have uncovered a barricade event in the period encompassed by this study, the French military and colonial presence is sufficient explanation for the adoption of the standard terminology.

Of course, my insistence that contemporaries must have labeled their creations as barricades should not be interpreted to mean that I am prepared to accept as valid any structure so identified. We have already seen that contemporaries sometimes applied the term quite promiscuously, based on superficial criteria that would not withstand close scrutiny.

33. References to repertoires of collective action (or repertoires of contention) are scattered throughout Charles Tilly's writings. Here I have primarily relied on the following sources where the concept is discussed at length: Tilly 1976, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1995, and 1997; and Tilly and Tilly 1981.

34. This is a paraphrase of the language used by Tilly in one of his first formulations of the concept (1976, 39; unfortunately dropped from the published 1977 version of what first circulated as a working paper). Though the way Tilly has applied the concept of repertoires in historical analysis has varied somewhat over time, this underlying rationale has remained consistent, as evidenced by this 1995 restatement: "The word *repertoire* identifies a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice" (1995, 26).

35. Tilly 1986, 4.

36. Tilly and Tilly 1981, 19. Within the metaphor of the repertoire, such knowledge equates to "knowing one's lines," while prior experience might be likened to "rehearsals."

37. Tilly 1977, 493; 1983, 463; 1986, 33, 37; 1995, 27.

38. Proudhon 1875, 284.

39. Tocqueville's and Heine's remarks are referenced in the concluding chapter of this work, along with Karl Marx's parallel reflection from *The Eighteenth Brumaire*.

40. The just price was generally equivalent to what individuals were accustomed to pay in "normal" times and corresponded to expectations set by the community's sense of a "moral economy" rather than what market forces dictated. The classic description of this is, of course, E. P. Thompson's 1971 article. An even more vivid sense of the recurrent character of these behaviors can be gleaned from Rudé's 1973 study *The Crowd in the French Revolution*.

41. Though often thought of as phenomena of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, food riots and grain seizures are well documented as early as 1347. See, e.g., Sharp 2000.

42. The paradox presented by barricades, viewed as a routine, is that insurgents' activities are "framed" within a repertoire of collective action that both constrains participants within definite patterns of behavior and demands that the process retain a considerable degree of spontaneity. A number of standard definitions seem to acknowledge the spur-of-the-moment character of the barricade by speaking of a *retranchement provisoire* (temporary retrenchment) (*Dictionnaire de la politique française* [1967], 95), *fait à la hâte* (created in haste) (*Grande encyclopédie* [1887], 491), using *des moyens de fortune* (improvised materials) (*Grand Larousse* [1971], 1: 382). But those same three sources also call attention to the fact that barricades were in "customary usage" since well before the modern era and represented "nothing new."

In emphasizing that a minimum of spontaneity was indispensable, I in no way wish to imply that barricades spring from nowhere. In virtually every instance, the ground has been prepared by severe social dislocations (the rising price of bread, widespread unemployment, political crises, etc.), and immediate precipitants of major barricade events typically follow settled patterns. Often such disturbances are set in motion by the authorities' attempts to summon troops to police the capital city (May 1588 and again in July 1789); arrest opposition leaders (August 1648); impose repressive ordinances (July 1830); prevent a public assembly aimed at promoting political reform (February 1848); revoke an important social welfare policy (June 1848); or crush resistance to a deeply unpopular political action like a coup (December 1851).

CHAPTER 2. THE FIRST BARRICADES

Epigraph: "Histoire de la journée des barricades de Paris, mai 1588" ([1588] 1836), 383.

1. My allusions to works demonstrating the indeterminacy of origins refer to White 1962 and Batchen 1997.

2. "All the world has heard of the *barricades* of Paris, a day of all others the most infamous to the French Name, and to the inviolate respect that Nation has ever born to their natural Princes, that ever hapned [*sic*] since the first foundation of that Monarchy" (Girard 1670, pt. 1, bk. 2, 72).

3. The main purpose of the several French *parlements* was to adjudicate legal disputes. I have chosen not to translate the term *parlement*, because the obvious English equivalent, "parliament," inevitably connotes a legislative rather than judicial institution. "Huguenot" was the traditional label for French Protestants.

4. Henri III's wife, Louise, a member of the House of Lorraine, appears to have taken no active part in the political affairs of her time. In the account that follows, as in the documents of the period, references to "the queen" signify the queen mother, Catherine de Médicis.

5. According to Cayet ([1608] 1838, 38), when ultra-Catholics pledged obedience to the king, they added the qualification, "as long as he is Catholic and not complicit with heretics."

6. I have greatly oversimplified the alignment of forces for the purpose of this rapid review. In fact, the Protestant king of Navarre had many moderate Catholic allies, while the Catholic camp was riven by factions that often had more to do with internal power struggles and personality clashes than with confessional differences.

7. Cayet [1608] 1838, 33.

8. In addition to his own exploits on the battlefield, modest but timely cash payments to certain bands of mercenaries had persuaded them to return home. See Chalambert 1898, 65; Cayet [1608] 1838, 40.

9. Bonnardot 1902, 9: 32–33. On the impact that the news had on French popular opinion, see Chalambert 1898, 47–48.

10. Its name referred not to the number of members but to the fact that the capital was divided into sixteen quarters, where the organization served as a kind of shadow government.

11. Chalambert 1898, 55–59.

12. A highly placed administrative officer in the royal bureaucracy, Poulain was recruited by Jean

Leclerc, a Leaguer zealot who hoped that Poulain's official position would enable him to buy arms for the League without arousing suspicion. By providing this service, Poulain managed to insinuate himself into the secret councils of the organization. See L'Estoile 1943, 557.

Cimber and Danjou (1836, 284–85) considered Poulain's testimony unreliable, for the obvious reason that his was the account of a paid informer. Though their caution seems well justified, a comparison with other contemporary accounts reveals no glaring inconsistencies. Moreover, Poulain's official report was made in 1588, before memory of events had a chance to cloud and at a time when it was still subject to challenge from other parties. On balance, I find Poulain's version of events—specifically regarding the existence of conspiracies that long predated the Day of the Barricades of May 1588—quite plausible and agree with Barnavi (1980, 61) that his deposition is “the best source for the details of the Leaguer conspiracy during this early period.”

13. See Gaulle 1839, 460; Poulain [1588] 1836, 319.

14. On the king's prohibition (and the many ambiguities over whether it was properly delivered or understood), see Cayet ([1608] 1838, 44–51); L'Estoile 1943, 549; “Amplification des particularités” ([1588] 1836), 352; *Grande encyclopédie* (1887), 492; Larousse 1866, 262; Gaulle 1839, 462; Touchard-Lafosse 1845, 221.

15. See Larousse 1866, 262, who cites Davila as his source. Guise made a point of entering the city with a personal guard of only eight noble retainers, but over several days, hundreds of armed men loyal to his cause gradually infiltrated Paris and its suburbs. See Cayet [1608] 1838, 44, and Pasquier [1588] 1966, 287.

16. L'Estoile 1943, 550; Pasquier [1588] 1966, 289; and “Histoire de la journée des barricades de Paris, mai 1588” [1588] 1836, 368–69.

17. Aubigné [1620] 1993, 183; L'Estoile 1943, 551.

18. “Amplification des particularités” [1588] 1836, 353.

19. See Chalambert 1898, 74. The residence of the duc de Guise will be familiar to many historians of France as the Hôtel de Soubise, the erstwhile location of the French National Archives. Before being purchased and renovated at the end of the seventeenth century by François de Rohan, prince de Soubise, it belonged to the House of Lorraine, and in 1588, it was the personal residence of the duc and other members of the House of Lorraine when they were in Paris.

20. See Pasquier [1588] 1966, 290.

21. Chalambert 1898, 75.

22. Bonnardot (1902, IX, 113–15); Pasquier ([1588] 1966, 289). The Paris militia, created in 1562, was commanded by local notables, while the rank and file consisted almost exclusively of property-owning residents of the capital.

23. Bonnardot 1902, 9: 116–17.

24. [Saint-Yon?] [1588] 1836, 334–35; Cheverny 1823, 106–7; L'Estoile 1943, 551–52; Cayet [1608] 1838, 44.

25. Pasquier [1588] 1966, 290; L'Estoile 1943, 553.

26. Given mounting tensions, the city fathers had taken precautions against outbreaks of violence as early as the previous fall. An entry in the municipal registers for October 13, 1587 directed supervisors of public works to inspect and repair the chains in each quarter. See Bonnardot 1902, 9: 80.

27. L'Estoile 1943, 554. Aubigné (1993, 185) agreed that it was “students who were the first to take to the streets,” and that the comte de Brissac found them more than ready to follow his instructions. Pasquier ([1588] 1966, 291) observed that Brissac was able to set up his headquarters in the place Maubert without meeting the slightest resistance because the king's guards were under strict orders to refrain from creating a disturbance.

28. Charles II de Cossé, comte (later first duc) de Brissac, was the scion of a French military family of considerable note. Born in 1550, he was the second son of a marshal of France. At the age of thirty-two, he

commanded an ill-fated expedition to the Portuguese Azores, aimed at preventing an expansion of Spanish influence in that region. Though he was given a commendation for bravery in action, the sinking of his ship cost him the trust and favor of Henri III, who withheld advancement to the rank of admiral, declaring that young Brissac “was good on neither land nor sea.” In order to reclaim the position of governor of Angers that he had held before the expedition, Brissac was obliged to retake the city from the Huguenots, who had occupied it in his absence. This service to the Catholic cause brought him to the attention of the duc de Guise, under whom he saw action in the capture of the fortified towns of Douzy and Rocroy and, in 1587, at the battles of Vimory and Auneau. He was an ideal choice as Guise’s liaison with the Paris Sixteen, since his father had held the post of governor of Paris in an earlier time of trouble and was fondly remembered for having taken the initiative of placing arms in the hands of the people. Brissac is reputed to have taken understandable pride in the technique with which his name would thenceforth be associated, but he apparently had not forgotten Henri III’s earlier jibe. According to Aubigné ([1620] 1993, 185), after witnessing the devastating impact of the barricade in action, he is said to have boasted, “At least the king will know I have found my element and that I am good on paving stones.”

29. [Saint-Yon?] [1588] 1836, 334.

30. “Amplification des particularités” ([1588] 1836), 356; Pasquier ([1588] 1966, 291); [Saint-Yon?] [1588] 1836, 336.

31. Cayet [1608] 1838, 44.

32. Crucé was also said to have sent three members of his household to the Latin quarter to sound the alarm at 4:30 A.M. on May 12, claiming that Huguenots had arrived in the faubourg Saint-Germain. According to Cayet ([1608] 1838, 45), “Crucé, who directed those from the university, was among the most ardent.”

33. Of course, some period sources—for example, Cayet himself—relied in part on Poulain’s account, and therefore cannot be considered independent. The most that can be said is that contemporaneous histories, written by participants in as well as observers of the main events, reveal no blatant contradictions with the story presented by Poulain.

34. Poulain [1588] 1836, 298. This response speaks to not only the nature of class relations in sixteenth-century France, but also the care taken, even by those set on seizing power by violent means, to safeguard a new regime’s chances of achieving legitimacy in the eyes of the people.

35. The precise phrase used by Poulain ([1588] 1836, 299) is “voleurs et gens mécaniques.”

36. Poulain [1588] 1836, 299–300. Cromé [1593] 1977, 99, places Mayenne’s meeting with the Sixteen in March. Cayet ([1608] 1838, 51) adds that the Sixteen had even stored, in houses near the main streets and bridges of the city, a quantity of weapons to be used in support of the initial barricades.

37. Poulain claimed he took this step with great reluctance and only after being forced to the realization that the true objective of the conspirators was to dethrone Henri III in favor of the House of Lorraine. Though Poulain insisted that he acted out of loyalty to the king, it is worth keeping in mind that he also was promised 20,000 écus in payment for information received.

38. Poulain ([1588] 1836, 320) describes being confronted by a leader of the League and informed that his treachery had been discovered. His situation was perilous, but he brazened it out, and it soon became apparent that this was just a test to see if he would betray himself. He continued to take part in the affairs of the Sixteen right up to the evening of May 11, when, having failed to show up with the contingent of armed men he was supposed to contribute to the uprising, he had no choice but to assume his treachery would be discovered. He immediately left Paris. When he heard the news that the king had himself fled from the capital on May 13, he set off to rejoin the royal party and seek its protection.

39. L’Estoile 1943, 552. A *cornette* was the distinctive broad cloth band, extending all the way to the floor, that lawyers wore around their necks.

40. [Saint-Yon?] [1588] 1836, 339.

41. L'Estoile 1943, 553; [Saint-Yon?] [1588] 1836, 338–39, 345. The latter source estimates the number of Parisians under arms to exceed 100,000. Though that seems implausible in a city of barely more than a quarter of a million inhabitants, this underscores how widespread participation was thought to be.

42. L'Estoile 1943, 553. See also Pasquier [1588] 1966, 291.

43. “Amplification des particularités” ([1588] 1836), 356.

44. “Histoire de la journée des barricades de Paris, mai 1588” ([1588] 1836), 377. On the term *prévôt de marchands* (“provost of merchants”), see n. 80 below.

45. Various primary sources describe the location differently, but it would appear that they all refer to the same incident. See L'Estoile 1943, 553; Cayet ([1608] 1838, 45); [Saint-Yon?] [1588] 1836, 345; “Histoire de la journée des barricades de Paris, mai 1588” ([1588] 1836), 383.

46. The loyalty of the Swiss Guard to the king was legendary, but it was not just a product of training or esprit de corps. The rank and file were deliberately recruited from among Swiss Germans because differences in culture and above all language effectively isolated them from the French people whom they might be asked to repress.

47. The figures cited derive from the primary sources, Cayet ([1608] 1838, 45; “Histoire de la journée des barricades de Paris, mai 1588” ([1588] 1836), 383; and [Saint-Yon?] [1588] 1836, 345. Secondary sources such as Julien de Gaulle (1839, 463) and the *Grande encyclopédie* (1887) offer casualty counts that vary even more widely, without, however, making clear the basis for their estimates.

48. Larousse 1866, 263.

49. “Histoire de la journée des barricades de Paris, mai 1588” ([1588] 1836), 381–82.

50. L'Estoile 1943, 555.

51. Pasquier [1588] 1966, 292.

52. According to some observers (e.g., Pasquier [1588] 1966, 293), the king had already decided to make his escape and simply made a show of sending Catherine de Médicis to negotiate. Others maintained that the queen mother had successfully argued, against the king's other advisors, that he should remain in the capital, and that she went to Guise with the sincere intention of finding an accommodation. (See Cayet [1608] 1838, 45.)

53. “Amplification des particularités” ([1588] 1836), 357; “Histoire de la journée des barricades de Paris, mai 1588” ([1588] 1836), 387.

54. In some versions (e.g., Pasquier [1588] 1966, 293), the king had already left before the queen mother's message was delivered; in others (see Cayet [1608] 1838, 45), it was only after Pinart's arrival, between four and five in the afternoon, that the king made his decision.

55. L'Estoile 1943, 556; Cayet [1608] 1838, 45–46; Aubigné 1993, 186n22; Bonnardot 1902, 9: 118n1).

56. De Thou 1854, 326.

57. Cayet [1608] 1838, 46.

58. Cayet ([1608] 1838, 46); L'Estoile 1943, 557; “Histoire de la journée des barricades de Paris, mai 1588” ([1588] 1836), 396–400.

59. L'Estoile 1943, 558; Aubigné 1993, 187; Cayet [1608] 1838, 46. See n. 80 below on the title *prévôt de marchands*.

60. D'Aubigné 1993, 187.

61. The pretext for this election, which took place as early as May 17 or as late as May 19, depending on which source one credits, was provided by the fact that three of the four sheriffs had abandoned their posts to follow the king.

62. Bonnardot (1902, 9: 118) describes the crowd as including “a large number of bourgeois notables.” This procedure, an early form of “direct democracy,” was not in itself a significant departure from customary practice. It was, nonetheless, quite irregular in at least two respects. First, it took place despite

the disapproval of the queen mother, who, in the king's absence, was the ranking authority in the capital. Second, such an assembly would normally have constituted only the initial stage of the selection process, producing a list of candidates from which the king would make his choice. In this case, it was Guise and not Henri III whose approval mattered. These aberrant procedures were the subject of lively comment in the Paris *parlement*. See "Histoire de la journée des barricades de Paris, mai 1588" ([1588] 1836, 404).

63. Cayet [1608] 1838, 47; L'Estoile 1943, 560; Bonnardot 1902, 9: 120–21.

64. Cayet [1608] 1838, 47; Bonnardot 1902, 9: 129). Since the lieutenant general was the king's chief military commander in the city, this action was tantamount to lèse-majesté.

65. Aubigné 1993, 187 and n. 24.

66. Aubigné 1993, 187; Bonnardot 1902, 9: 130–35.

67. The latter politely but firmly declined this offer. See L'Estoile 1943, 558, and "Amplification des particularités" ([1588] 1836), 361.

68. Cayet [1608] 1838, 54.

69. "Histoire de la journée des barricades de Paris, mai 1588" ([1588] 1836), 409.

70. Larousse 1866, 263.

71. L'Estoile 1943, 582. Both bodies were cut into pieces and burned, and the ashes scattered to the winds, so as to leave no relics. Though a number of Guise's relatives and lieutenants, League leaders, and Paris officials were also arrested, their lives were ultimately spared.

72. L'Estoile 1943, 583.

73. Pasquier [1588] 1966, 477–79.

74. See Monluc [1570] 1964, xvii. On the question of first usage, I have relied on the judgment of Imbs (1975, 4: 211) and Robert (1985, 1: 864). Other authors, citing different sources, turn out, on examination, to be in error. Though the rest of this note will be of interest only to specialists, I feel compelled to provide a concise review of the relevant evidence in the hope of clearing up the confusion that has surrounded this question.

Littre 1885, 1: 301–2, credits Aubigné, in his *Histoire universelle*, with having first used the term *barricade*, but this attribution is clearly untenable. Since Aubigné was born in 1552, it is all but certain that anything he wrote postdated Monluc's draft (though not necessarily its posthumous 1595 publication, presumably the source of Littré's confusion).

A more complex version of the same problem is represented by the text singled out by Imbs (1975, 4: 211) and Godefroy ([1881–1902] 1982, 8: 296). Both point to the *Apologie* of Ambroise Paré, one of the originators of modern surgical technique. Paré attended wounded soldiers during the siege of Metz in 1552, and his account ([1585] 1952, 37–50) of that siege mentions the use of barricades. However, the *Apologie* first appeared in a 1585 re-edition of his *Oeuvres*, more than thirty years after the events in question, and in this case we can be certain that the relevant section was drafted well after Monluc's text (Doe 1937, 121–22), since this addendum was written as a response to another author's attack on Paré that was published only in 1580.

Denis Richet (1990, 384) appears to have overlooked the significance of the lapses between the drafting, circulation, and publication of the respective works of Monluc and Paré when he referred to the former's account as having been written eighteen years after the latter's. In point of fact, it was composed at least ten years earlier. Indeed, it is quite conceivable that Paré read Monluc's text, since, as personal surgeon to four consecutive kings of France, he had a lively professional interest in the details of siege warfare, as well as ready access to manuscripts in the royal library, which is believed to have contained a copy of Monluc's manuscript.

Finally, some of the assertions that have crept into this controversy appear misleading, if not frankly self-contradictory. For example, various (but not all) editions of the *Le Robert* dictionaries (see, e.g., 1985, 864; 1990, 163), a standard and frequently consulted source on the first usage of French words, specify that the

verb *barricader* was first used in 1558. The claim is then advanced that this verb derived from the noun *barricade*. This is clearly anomalous, since the same source dates the first usage of the noun from 1570. My best guess is that Robert, who did not name the 1558 text to which he was referring, simply made an error, quite possibly by transposing the digits meant to refer either to the 1585 edition of Paré's *Apologie* or possibly to the 1588 edition of Pasquier's *Lettres historiques*, which is the source of first usage cited by Guilbert (1971, 1: 382) but which clearly postdates not only Monluc but Paré as well.

To summarize, though the events that Paré described occurred earlier (in 1552) than those recounted by Monluc, it is the latter who deserves to be credited with the first known written use of the term *barricade*, in 1571, based on his having circulated a manuscript (which would not actually be published until nearly twenty years after the author's death, in 1577). Paré's claim, based on having authored the first *published* work in which the word was used (printed in 1585), seems less relevant to deciding the question of when the concept of the barricade first came into being.

75. Monluc [1570] 1964, 716–25, 770–85. The author earned a bloodthirsty reputation in part for having ordered, after Mont-de-Marsan had fallen, the massacre of its surviving defenders in retaliation for the murder of six of his own captains at Navarreux a month previous.

76. The assaults on Mont-de-Marsan and Rabastens might be thought of either as attempts to reduce provincial rebellions or as acts of war. The tightness of their fit with the definition of barricade events developed in the previous chapter would vary accordingly. I have been persuaded, based on Monluc's description, that the structures in question qualify as barricades on grounds that they were constructed by civilian residents trying to ward off an attack by forces that claimed political (and religious) authority over them. By a curious coincidence, the Mont-de-Marsan district happens to be the very one in which General Lamarque, whose funeral procession was recounted in chapter 1, was born almost precisely two hundred years later.

77. See Cazelles 1984, 116.

78. Edward also possessed vast holdings in Ponthieu, Gascony, and Guyenne and exercised enormous influence in Flanders due to that region's dependence on the English wool trade. He had revived his claim to the French throne in 1337 after Philippe VI attempted to seize the province of Guyenne.

79. This was at a time when London was home to a mere 40,000 inhabitants and the population of the next largest French cities was just one-tenth that of Paris. See Cazelles 1984, 10.

80. Though *maire* (mayor) had already been adopted by other French cities at least as early as the fourteenth century, it was not until July 14, 1789, that it replaced the traditional title of *prévôt de marchands* in Paris. In the Middle Ages, this office was exercised by the head of the commercial brotherhood of "water merchants" to whom King Philippe-Auguste had, in 1192, granted a monopoly over the transport of provisions to and from the capital. Thanks to their exclusive right to navigate on the Seine, these water merchants enjoyed a favored position from which to organize the other guilds (*corps de métier*). They used this advantage to dominate elections to the city's governing board, led by the provost and four sheriffs (*échevins*) and seconded by twenty-four aldermen (*prud'hommes*) and a tiny administrative staff. See Perrens 1874, 33, and Cazelles 1984, 33–34. In this way, the *prévôt de marchands*, who continued to be chosen from the foremost ranks of the city's commercial classes, evolved into the head of the municipal government of Paris.

Though it is incidental to our purpose here, Marcel is also remembered as the individual responsible for the city's purchase of the Maison aux Piliers ("house on pillars") on the place de Grève, which served as headquarters for the municipal administration and remains to this day the site of the Paris Hôtel de Ville.

81. The three estates represented the clergy, the aristocracy, and—under the definition of the third estate in force at that time—the population of the cities. In practice, the last-named delegation consisted of relatively well-to-do members of the commercial classes. My abbreviated account glosses over many of the other differences between the fourteenth-century institution and the Estates General as they existed at the time of the French Revolution.

82. In effect, French kings could use their exclusive right to issue new coins to generate revenue simply by manipulating the proportion of gold and silver they contained. They did so often. To give some idea of how commonly this royal prerogative was exploited, Castelnau (1973, 150) calculated that there had been eighty-one such “changes” (*mutations*) in the six-year period from 1350 to 1355 and that the value of the currency had fallen by 90 percent between 1336 and 1356. Cazalis (1977, 31) estimated that a *marc* of silver (weighing approximately one half pound) could be purchased for just over five livres in 1350 when John the Good became king, but cost eleven livres in 1351, twelve in 1353, eighteen in 1355, and more than one hundred by the end of the decade. Perrens 1874 and Pastoureau 1986 cite different figures, but the general tenor of their remarks is the same. The practice of debasing the currency had been a particular point of contention at the 1355 meeting of the Estates General.

83. The *octroi* was a type of toll or local excise tax collected at the city gates on specific commodities (in this case, alcoholic beverages).

84. On the left bank, an exterior wall dating from the time of Philip Augustus was simply repaired. On the right bank, an entirely new wall had to be constructed. At the city’s western limit, the path of these new fortifications ran right between the Louvre and the Tuileries, bringing the castle within the city limits for the first time and roughly doubling the area enclosed by protective walls. See Cazelles 1984, 355, and Perrens 1874, 224.

85. The quotation is from Perrens 1874, 89. This source notes that “every evening [Parisians] barricaded the streets, guarding the gates night and day and only allowing those who were perfectly familiar to enter the city” (1874, 171).

86. Dulaure 1853, 1: 169. See also *Grande encyclopédie* (1887), 492, which directly links the introduction of chains by Etienne Marcel with the origin of the barricade.

87. The case that most sorely tests the limits of my assertion was reported by Marguerite de Valois (1971, 121), sister of the king of France and wife of the king of Navarre. She was traveling on a diplomatic mission to the Low Countries in 1577 when she passed through the town of Huy, not far from Liège. The region was in considerable turmoil, and the approach of her sizable retinue alarmed local residents, who rang the *tocsin*, stretched the chains, and made use of barrels (*barriques*) to isolate the foreign intruders. All that is missing from the queen’s account is an indication that the residents of Huy gave some sign in word or deed that they were exploiting an established pattern of collective action. As we shall see in chapter 5, only in the late eighteenth century would *all* of the elements specified in my working definition of a barricade event come together outside their country of origin. Significantly, when that happened, it was precisely in the Belgian provinces that the first barricades outside France proper were built.

88. Abbey of Bury St. Edmunds 1964, 143–45. See also Prestwich 1988, 109, though the version of the same incident given there differs in several particulars. Roguet, 1850, 12, notes the use of chains in nearby Bruges in the year 1302.

89. See Cazalis 1977, 101; Castelnau 1973, 122ff.; Nicholas 1971, 179.

90. Castelnau 1973, 24.

91. *Ibid.*, 122.

92. Marcel’s plan was to get the first and second estates to consent to higher taxes and ask the third estate to subsidize the pay of one man-at-arms for every hundred urban households. The *prévôt de marchands* correctly perceived that a rapprochement with Navarre would deprive Edward III of a valuable ally and potentially tip the balance of power in favor of French forces. Unfortunately, the peace treaty that the captive King Jean II was even then negotiating with the English proved devastating to the interests of both France and Navarre by precipitating the immediate collapse of any prospects for a compromise. In the ensuing chaos, the entire Paris basin was left vulnerable to attacks by mercenaries and marauders, whether they were the now-unemployed castoffs from the English armies or the poorly disciplined members of the force that Navarre had begun recruiting for an invasion of Normandy.

93. Cazelles 1984, 167.

94. Cazelles 1984, 212–14.

95. Perrens 1874, 170.

96. Froissart [ca. 1498]1874, 103.

97. Blue-and-red caps, their colors emblematic of Saint Martin and Saint Denis (the patron saint of Paris), were adopted by Marcel's retainers for purposes of mutual recognition. It was not until the fifteenth century that these became the official colors of Paris.

98. As regent, Charles de Valois may not have been entitled to wear a crown, but the symbolism of Marcel's removing the hat that graced the dauphin's head and placing it on his own seems obvious enough.

99. Naudet 1815, 228. Further complicating the situation, the great peasant uprising that gave us the term *jacquerie* broke out in May 1358. See Froissart [ca. 1498] 1963, 138–39. Three weeks of bloody attacks on nobles were followed by even bloodier reprisals after Charles of Navarre intervened to break the back of the revolt. Note that Marcel had been in correspondence with Guillaume Cale, leader of the peasant uprisings, in a failed attempt to cooperate in ousting royal forces from Meaux. Now, with Paris under direct attack by the dauphin's army, Marcel attempted to contract an alliance with Navarre, whom he appointed "Captain of Paris." But Navarre remained difficult to fathom and impossible to trust.

100. An atmosphere that included the looming threat of mob violence has been captured with great verve by Castelnau 1973, 243ff. Joseph Naudet (1815, 281), who had little sympathy for the *prévôt de marchands*, does not hesitate to liken the methods employed by Marcel to the expedients of the Terror, however anachronistically.

101. Charles of Navarre soon declared outright war on France. Edward III again crossed the channel, laid siege to Reims, and advanced against Paris. He was able to force acceptance of the 1360 treaty of Brétigny, which made major territorial concessions to England. When King Jean II died in 1364, still an unransomed captive of the English, the humiliation and dismemberment of France seemed unavoidable.

But the training in statecraft that the dauphin had received under such trying conditions served him well. At last able to rule in his own name as Charles V, he would halt and eventually reverse the calamitous slide of the French monarchy, win back much of the lost territory, and earn the right to the name "Charles the Wise" by which future generations would know him.

102. Castelnau 1973, 298.

103. *Grande encyclopédie* (1887), 492; Roguet 1850, 22–23.

104. Paschal [1562] 1950 documents the frequent use that residents of French cities made of chains just a few years before the introduction of the barricade was first documented by Monluc.

CHAPTER 3. THE BARRICADES OF THE FRONDE

Epigraph: Motteville [1723] 1855, 2: 155–56. Françoise de Motteville 1621?–89 was lady-in-waiting to the queen mother, Anne of Austria, in 1648.

1. Additional requests to place the city's chains in a state of readiness were made in November 1589 and twice in January 1590. On this entire series of alarms, see the municipal records of Paris for the period 1586–90 in Bonnardot 1902, 9: 142, 159, 312, 392, 501, 517, 583, 592.

2. Ruffi 1696, 1: 377.

3. See Richet 1990, 390; Nostradamus [1614] 1971, 899–900.

4. [Gonon?] 1842, 7.

5. Mousnier 1949, 63n1, 72; Descimon 1990, 401.

6. Mousnier 1949, 72–74; Ranum 1993, 56.

7. The Italian Giulio Mazarini distinguished himself first as a diplomat and papal nuncio to the French

court and subsequently as an advisor to Louis XIII. His formal role as head of the Council of State was twice interrupted by exile, but he remained influential with both the regent and the king until his death in 1661.

8. According to Ranum 1993, 107, certain members of the *parlements* had begun explicitly asserting the doctrine that these bodies “constituted the estates of the realm whenever estates-generals were not in session.”

9. Martin 1868–85, 2: 483, does not hesitate to characterize the *parlement*’s actions as “an attempted revolution.” All that was missing, it seemed, was a popular mobilization, and that would shortly be forthcoming.

10. Mousnier 1949, 55.

11. The French term *fronde* originally referred to a type of primitive slingshot. According to the duchesse de Montpensier, the word acquired its political connotation when one of the counselors of the Paris *parlement* used it to describe criticisms aimed at the person and policies of Cardinal Mazarin, for like the child’s toy—which, though officially outlawed in Paris, the city constables were powerless to repress—the jibes of the *frondeurs* could be used to pester and harass the authorities (Montpensier 1928, 105; see also G. Joly [1667] 854, 14).

The Fronde actually embraced a complex sequence of events that began in 1648 and extended—in the form of protests by officers of the royal courts, urban riots, rural tax revolts, and open civil war—to 1653. Because of the present narrow focus on barricades, only the initial phase of this tumultuous period will be considered here.

12. Mousnier 1978, 249.

13. The statute had originally aimed at realizing Etienne Marcel’s goal of freeing the city’s fortifications from obstructions and maintaining the population of the capital within defensible limits. Buildings that had been constructed without permission were subject to demolition or fines proportional to their surface area (hence, the need for teams of surveyors).

14. Ranum 1968, 209; Descimon 1990, 409.

15. France employed a system of tax farming in which the state sold the right to collect revenues to the highest bidder. The individuals or cartels purchasing these rights were not employees of the state but semi-autonomous agents, who were interested in maximizing the return on their investment and not averse to using unethical methods. According to Ranum 1968, 211, “Between thirty-four and forty-five percent of the gross tax revenue collected went to the *hommes de finance* as fees for collecting taxes.”

16. At first, Controller-General Particelli d’Hémery threatened to allow these “annual fees” to lapse at the start of 1648, directly jeopardizing the investment that magistrates had made in their offices. Judges responded by refusing to conduct normal business and agreeing among themselves that they would compensate the family of any member who died after the expiration of the right of hereditary transmission. Hémery next made the mistake of granting the renewal to all judges *except* those who were members of the *parlement*, expecting to split the royal courts and put added pressure on the only one that held the power of registration. Against the expectation of the King’s Council and most seasoned political observers, the other courts (the Grand Conseil, Chambre des Comptes, and Cour des Aides) closed ranks and refused to sacrifice the *parlementaires*. The controller-general then offered to grant renewal to all courts in return for judges agreeing to serve without salary for the next four years. In this case, it was the members of *parlement* who were exempted from having their salaries docked, for theirs was the only approval required to make the proposal law. This was a maneuver that combined cynicism with opportunism, since, as Lavissee 1911, 34, has pointed out, contrary to the norm in other royal courts, compensation in the *parlement* was worth less than the amount members owed for the Paulette tax. On this topic, see also Ranum 1993, 86–89, 104–9.

17. G. Joly [1667] 1854, 6.

18. A *lettre de cachet* was a written order bearing the seal of the king that could be enforced without further judicial review. Such a letter could be used to send an irksome political opponent into exile in the

provinces or abroad.

19. Period sources from which I have drawn the following account include “Relation véritable” (n.d.), 1–8; Brienne 1854, 98–100; Dubois 1865, 324–37; Dubuisson-Aubenay 1883–85, 2: 5–57; Joly [1667] 1854, 3–19; Motteville [1723] 1855, 2: 144–85; Ormesson 1860, 1: [André] 556–63, [Olivier] 554–71; *Régistres de l’Hôtel de Ville de Paris* (1846), 1: 15–38, 445–454; Retz [1717] 1854, 58–77; Retz [1717] 1872, 2: 14ff.; Talon 1732, 5: 250–79; and Vallier [1648] 1902, 82–101. Secondary sources covering this period are far too numerous to list beyond those cited in the text and included in the References. For a concise summary of events, compiled from a variety of seventeenth-century reports, see Alphonse Feillet’s appendix to Retz [1717] 1872, 2: 607–20. For an extremely helpful critical assessment of contemporary accounts and of secondary sources up to the time of its publication, see Mousnier 1949, 35–37.

The year 1648 witnessed two pivotal political developments, which appear at first glance to cut in opposite directions, but were both directly tied to the outcome at Lens. On the one hand, Condé’s victory was responsible for the Treaty of Westphalia, which brought the final phase of the Thirty Years’ War to a close in October 1648. On the other hand, it caused a hardening of the crown’s attitude toward the *parlements*, leading to the initial confrontation in Paris and the protracted struggles that followed. On the effects attributable to the arrival of this news, see Motteville [1723] 1855, 2: 145–47; Descimon 1990, 399; Talon 1732, 5: 251; Ormesson 1860, 1 [Olivier]: 554; and Retz [1717] 1854, 58.

20. Motteville [1723] 1855, 2: 149.

21. Brienne 1854, 99.

22. Talon 1732, 5: 253.

23. Dubuisson-Aubenay 1883, 51.

24. Most primary sources describe Broussel’s arrest, but Motteville ([1723] 1855, 2: 153) stipulates that her version is based on conversations with Lieutenant Comminges himself. Charton and Blancmesnil were presidents of the Chambers of Inquests and Petitions respectively.

25. Ormesson 1860, 1 [Olivier]: 556

26. G. Joly [1667] 1854, 9. Mousnier 1949, 39–40, 61 notes that the number of beggars and members of the underclass (*le bas peuple*) present in the capital was exceptionally high due to the ravages of the war. Although he specifically discounted the view that the subsequent insurrection was the result of high grain prices, noting that the cost of bread had peaked in 1644 and collapsed early in the following year, the history of agriculturally based economic crises in the modern era shows that strict a lag between price increases and urban unrest is common and often substantial.

27. Dubois 1865, 329.

28. Ranum 1993, 99. Motteville [1723] 1855, 2: 151, describes Broussel as possessing “the spirit of a man born under a republic.” The often acerbic Cardinal de Retz characterizes him as a man “with a reputation based more on integrity than ability” (Retz [1717] 1854, 70).

29. Maréchal de la Meilleraye almost immediately came upon a group of local residents destroying the last remnants of the broken-down coach initially used in Broussel’s abduction (Dubois 1865, 327). Greeted by stones thrown from the roofs and windows of nearby buildings, one of which bruised his shoulder, he ordered his men to fire a volley at the windows from which this aggression was thought to originate, wounding two men and a woman. Meilleraye personally shot and killed a porter who approached him saber in hand. He then withdrew his forces across the Pont-Neuf, where he encountered Maréchal de l’Hôpital, on a similar errand. When a group of artisans rashly decided to fire on this combined force of mounted troops, shots were exchanged and a few civilians were killed (Dubuisson-Aubenay 1883, 51). Over the next several hours, royal troops continued making sorties across the city with inconclusive results. Retz had gone out in his ecclesiastical robes in the hope of calming the people (see figure 9) and provides eyewitness reports of these incidents (Retz [1717] 1854, 63–64). His reward for his efforts at peacemaking was to be struck below the ear by a rock and knocked to the ground. He might have counted himself fortunate had he known the fate of his spiritual successors, the Archbishops Affre and Darboy who, on similar missions of mercy during

the Parisian insurrections of June 1848 and May 1871 respectively, lost their lives.

30. A few authors imply, with varying degrees of specificity, that barricades *were* built on August 26. These included Motteville ([1723]1855, 2: 156), Vallier ([1648] 1902, 88), C. Joly (1854, 160), and Brienne (1854, 99) among the primary sources, and the normally reliable Feillet (see Retz [1717] 1872, 611) among the secondary. One possible explanation for this confusion is the fact that on August 26, the municipal authorities issued an order (rescinded later that same day at the request of the queen regent) that chains be stretched throughout the city (*Régistres de l'Hôtel de Ville de Paris pendant la Fronde* [1846], 1: 17, 19). Since barricades were commonly found in association with chains, these authors may have inferred the presence of one from the presence of the other.

31. See *Régistres de l'Hôtel de Ville de Paris pendant la Fronde* (1846), 1: 17–19; Dubois 1865, 328–29; G. Joly [1667] 1854, 10, 13; Mousnier 1949, 74; and Lavissee 1911, 38. Motteville [1723] 1855, 2: 169, and the city registers imply, and Guy Joly explicitly asserts that this muster was undertaken “on order of the crown.” Joly argues persuasively that had it not been for this blunder, many bourgeois would never have taken up arms.

32. Dubois 1865, 329.

33. Mousnier 1949, 43–44 is contradicted by Dubois 1865, 334, which dates this action from the night of August 27–28.

34. G. Joly [1667] 1854, 11. Other sources on which this telegraphic summary is based include Dubois 1865, 329–31, Vallier [1648] 1902, 1: 91, and Ormesson 1860, 1 [Olivier]: 564.

35. Talon 1732, 5: 163. Dubuisson-Aubenay 1883, 54 describes the barricades that were concentrated near the Palais de Justice, the Palais-Royal, the rues Saint-Honoré and Saint-Denis, and the university quarter as being constructed of “barrels, gabions [cylindrical wicker baskets], and carts full of earth and manure.” One novel element, described by the editor of Retz’s *Oeuvres*, Alphonse Feillet (in Retz, [1717] 1872, 611), was the incorporation of ditches filled with water to protect the barricade flank more likely to be exposed to attack.

36. See Talon 1732, 5: 263–64. In fact, these shouts were more easily reconciled than may at first appear, since the insurgents made a sharp distinction between the ten-year-old king, to whom they remained loyal, and the members of the Royal Council, above all Mazarin, whom they hated. Not even the queen was exempt from their enmity, as even her lady-in-waiting acknowledged (Motteville [1723] 1855, 2: 170). The popular mind-set was best conveyed by yet another street cry of the day, “Vive le Roi tout seul!” “Long live the king alone!”

37. “Relation véritable” (n.d.), 4; G. Joly [1667] 1854, 11.

38. Talon 1732, 5: 267.

39. This man is variously identified by contemporary sources as a butcher, a cook’s assistant, or a seller of pots and pans. André d’Ormesson says that he seized Premier Président Molé by the collar (Ormesson 1860, 1: 561n1), but Olivier d’Ormesson (*ibid.*, 565) and Maître d’Hôtel du Roi Jean Vallier ([1648] 1902, 1: 93) claim that he actually pressed the muzzle of his pistol to Molé’s temple. Dubois 1865, 332, and Retz [1717] 1854, 68, assert that muskets and halberds were thrust against Molé’s stomach, while Guy Joly, in his typically colorful style, has him being tugged around by his long white beard (Joly [1667] 1854, 12).

40. See Dubois 1865, 331–33, for one version of the terms adopted in the final declaration. This and other sources intimate that Queen Mother Anne of Austria’s resolve had been softened by a conversation with the queen of England, who observed that the civil war in her country had begun in much the same way and advised a more conciliatory approach.

41. *Régistres de l'Hôtel de Ville de Paris pendant la Fronde* (1846), 1: 26.

42. “Relation véritable” (n.d.), 8.

43. *Régistres de l'Hôtel de Ville de Paris pendant la Fronde* (1846), 1: 29.

44. Olivier d’Ormesson had intended to return to Paris from Ambouille on August 28, but he postponed

his journey for a day because he was told that barricades would make it impossible for him to traverse the city. When he entered the capital on August 29, he encountered only a few streets whose pavement had been torn up and whose intersections were still encumbered by barrels filled with stones. Ormesson 1860, 1: 555.

45. Dubuisson-Aubenay 1883, 57.

46. The opulent palace that Louis XIV built at Versailles eventually allowed him to all but dispense with visits to Paris. In the final twenty years of his life, the king journeyed to the capital just five times and only briefly, and he specifically forbade his son to spend time there. See Ranum 1968, 289–90.

47. The reaction in the capital may seem excessive but was astutely based on the realization that the ability of the king to effect a timely escape and thus extract himself from the control of the Parisian crowd was the single best predictor of the ultimate outcome of the political struggle. In spiriting the young king from Paris in 1648, Louis XIV's advisors likely had in mind the experiences of Charles V in 1358 and Henri III in 1588, but somehow, those lessons seem subsequently to have been forgotten. The main case in point was Louis XVI, who failed to appreciate the gravity of acquiescing, however reluctantly, to his relocation from Versailles to Paris in October 1789. His decision to flee in June 1791 then came so late that its failure was bound to arouse the anger of the revolutionary authorities and cost him and the queen their lives. By immediately withdrawing from Paris, both Charles X and Louis-Philippe were able to survive the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 respectively, but when the first proved unable and the second unwilling to mount a forceful defense of his throne, they were obliged to accept a life of exile. In the modern era, only Thiers appears to have paid close attention to the historical precedents. In March 1871, he followed his own unheeded advice to Louis-Philippe in 1830 and thus managed to weather the challenge posed by the Paris Commune.

48. Indeed, by 1652, a number of military leaders, including both Condé and Turenne, the commanders of the opposing armies, had switched sides.

49. The only exception I am aware of is the man, mentioned in n. 39 above, who personally confronted Premier Président Molé on the barricade in the rue Saint-Honoré as the delegation of *parlementaires* filed out of the Palais-Royal. Guy Joly ([1667] 1854, 12) identifies him as a seller of pots and pans named Raguenet who commanded the quarter's militia. See also *Régistres de l'Hôtel de Ville de Paris pendant la Fronde* (1846), 1: 452.

50. Motteville [1723] 1855, 2: 179.

51. See Ormesson 1860, 1: 565, 568.

52. Talon 1732, 3: 265.

53. Descimon 1990, 411–12.

54. Mousnier 1949, 74.

55. On the perception and reality of the role played by Molé, see Motteville [1723] 1855, 2: 159, and Ranum 1993, 62.

56. Compare Mousnier's flat declaration: "The *parlement*, acting as a body, neither organized nor conducted the rebellion" (Mousnier 1949, 73).

57. A coadjutor was a high-ranking ecclesiastical official, appointed to assist a bishop or archbishop (in this case, the archbishop of Paris, Gondi's uncle). Though he would eventually rise to become Cardinal de Retz, I refer to him here as Gondi, his name at the time of the 1648 events. According to the character sketch provided by his contemporary Tallemont des Reaux, Gondi dreamed only of wearing a cardinal's robes, and "his dominant passion was ambition" (Retz [1717] 1854, 3).

58. Retz [1717] 1854, 66–67. G. Joly [1667] 1854, 9, says that Miron, Gondi's close friend and a militia captain in the Chevalier-du-Guet district, first proposed the building of barricades to him. Gondi tried to get Martineau, militia captain in the rue Saint-Jacques, to beat the assembly drum there. Finding Martineau drunk, he arranged with Martineau's wife (with whom, Joly says, Gondi was romantically involved) to

sound the call.

59. Guy Joly was Gondi's longtime and devoted assistant, but his memoirs, written after a bitter falling-out with his superior, do their best to blacken the latter's reputation. The irony is that Gondi and Joly—the one seeking to aggrandize, the other to vilify Gondi's influence on events—ended up providing roughly similar accounts of what happened, the accuracy of which has been seriously called into question in both cases. I am inclined to agree with Adolphe Chéruel, the d'Ormessons' editor, that "one should accord scant confidence to the narratives of this prelate, who strives to bring every event back to himself and portrays himself as the soul of the Fronde. He is much too self-interested a witness to be taken at his word. Other contemporary documents fail to assign him the importance on the Day of the Barricades that he attributes to himself" (Ormesson 1860, 1: 569n1). Roland Mousnier, the principal twentieth-century French historian who worked on the period, concluded that though Gondi had no doubt reached some kind of understanding with Miron, he had exaggerated his role in the events of August 1648, and that, in the final analysis, "No leader emerged in this revolt" (Mousnier 1949, 73–76).

60. Interestingly, Gondi himself, mere pages after boasting of his backstage role, emphasizes "the confused state things were in when the barricades were built, and the error of those who maintain that there is no reason to fear any partisan group as long as there is no leader, for leaders are sometimes born overnight" (Retz [1717] 1854, 69–70).

Joly too, soon after divulging Gondi's conspiratorial activities, found an indirect and backhanded way of suggesting that neither Gondi nor anyone else controlled the 1648 insurgents, observing that "there were many people in the city who shared the same desire [to revenge themselves on Cardinal Mazarin], and if they had had a chief like the duc de Beaufort, things would not have been left at that" (G. Joly [1667] 1854, 13). François de Bourbon, duc de Beaufort, had been imprisoned in 1643 for plotting to assassinate Mazarin.

61. The claim that there were 100,000 insurgents, derived from a period manuscript (Descimon 1990, 411–12), would imply an extraordinary rate of participation among the adult male population of a city of no more than a half million inhabitants. Similarly, the number of barricades, given by Retz [1717] 1854, 67, and Talon 1732, 5: 264—1,200 and 1,260 respectively—would place 1648 on a par with the February and June Days of 1848, even though, during the two-hundred-year interval, the city had time to expand its boundaries substantially and more than double its population. A handwritten memoir by Jean de Toulouse (also cited in Descimon 1990, 405) provides the lowest estimate I am aware of and, even then, his figure of 600 barricades actually turns out to refer to the number of sites where the pavement was torn up (based on a conversation the author had with an official in the association of paving-workers) rather than to actual structures.

Casualty figures appear to have been quite low in 1648. No more than twenty died on either side, according to the only contemporary observer to venture a guess at the overall total (Ormesson 1860, 1: 569). Based on a review of all primary sources, Feillet (in Retz [1717] 1872, 2: 619) estimates that a total of forty to fifty persons died, about equally divided between the two camps. It is true that Gondi claims that popular forces under the command of his friend Miron killed "twenty or thirty" members of the Swiss Guard in a single encounter (Retz [1717] 1854, 67), but this is an order of magnitude higher than any other account of that particular incident and should again be attributed to Gondi's tendency to inflate the role he and his associates played. Although it is nearly impossible to sort out the sometimes overlapping, sometimes contradictory reports of casualties found in contemporary sources, the number was by all accounts quite modest when compared to the great (or even to some of the smaller) insurrections of the nineteenth century.

62. Ranum 1993, 90.

63. Retz [1717] 1872, 2: 614.

64. Motteville [1723] 1855, 2: 159.

65. G. Joly [1667] 1854, 13.

66. Retz [1717] 1854, 67. A gorget (*hausse-col* or *hausse-cou*) is a piece of armor in the shape of a broad necklace worn as protection for the throat. According to Gondi, he reprimanded the officer and had the gorget publicly broken up on a smithy's anvil.

67. Descimon 1990, 402, provides maps showing the precise routes taken by participants in several of these incidents.

68. Ormesson 1860, 1: 567.

69. Though clearer in 1648, the selectively porous nature of barricades had already been demonstrated by the visit Catherine de Médicis made to the duc de Guise's residence during the First Day of the Barricades.

70. See Descimon 1990, 400.

71. Vallier [1648] 1902, 1: 88.

72. See *Régistres de l'Hôtel de Ville de Paris pendant la Fronde* (1846), 1: 29–31. I have unearthed one instance in which barricades could be said to have encouraged rather than restrained the activities of unruly elements in 1648. According to municipal records, two such structures were actually manned by vagabonds who allowed people to pass only after contributing money to buy wine. At one point, a group of homeless persons on the barricade at the entrance to the Pont-Marie went so far as to refuse passage to city officials and were even reported to have wounded one man. These incidents notwithstanding, violence on the part of the common people remained the rare exception. Of course, objective statistics, even had they been available at the time, would not likely have allayed Parisians' fears.

73. Motteville [1723] 1855, 2: 169.

74. Mousnier initially concluded that an appreciable shift occurred between the first and second days of the disorders, with greater bourgeois involvement over time (Mousnier 1949, 69–71). He appears to have muted this position in his later work, which assigns a greater role to the middle classes throughout the three-day uprising (Mousnier 1978, 259). Descimon (1990, 412) sees a decided shift on August 27 in the direction of greater organization, most evident in the appearance of the barricades themselves, but does not associate these developments with any change in the makeup of the insurgent crowds.

75. See Rochefoucauld 1925, 277; Turenne 1909, 1: 159; Tavannes 1858, 157; Brienne 1854, 143; and Aumale 1892, 187. The first three writers were among the most prominent military leaders of the Fronde.

76. Anne-Marie-Louise Montpensier, "la Grande Mademoiselle," daughter of the due d'Orléans and the richest woman in France, was also a staunch supporter of the princely rebellion (and had played an important personal role in the capture of Orléans). She also had a devoted following among Parisians sympathetic to the Fronde. As Ranum tells the story, she managed to browbeat her father who, as lieutenant general of France, had the authority to countermand existing orders (Ranum 1993, 327–29). Oddly enough, the directive to fire the cannon of the Bastille at Turenne's royal army was carried out by Broussel's own son, whom the Paris *parlement* had made governor of the fortress.

77. Following the battle of Bléneau in April 1652, Lorraine had taken up a position at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, southeast of Paris. His intention was to rejoin Condé, but when Turenne blocked his route of advance, he agreed to leave the region in exchange for a cash payment and the promise of two fortresses in his home province. With the disappearance of this immediate threat, Parisians apparently abandoned but did not dismantle these structures. This, at least, is what we are told by the editor of Tavannes's memoirs (1858, 157) who provides the most circumstantial detail. La Rochefoucauld (1925, 277) indicates that the structures had been built several days prior to the July 2 battle to prevent the faubourg Saint-Antoine from being pillaged by soldiers, though he did not specify whose. Aumale (1892, 6: 187) says that they had been erected three weeks earlier but gives no further details.

Note that the term "barricade" was used to designate still other temporary fortifications of that general period, even further removed from the usage adopted in this study, since they were actually built by soldiers for use against a foreign army. See Conrart 1971, 111; Dubuisson-Aubenay 1885, 2: 246; Montpensier 1928, 137–38; and the memoirs of the duke of York, the future King James II of England, who at the time

was fighting in the royal French army (James II 1854, 539–40).

78. Motteville [1723] 1855, 2: 163. Motteville notes the queen mother's intense displeasure at "the injury to her authority, which was bound to have dangerous and harmful consequences for the state because of the stir it would create among foreigners."

79. Pillorget 1975, 987–89.

80. Bercé 1974a, 682.

81. Nicolas 2002, appendix, 548–50, gives his typology of events, with subtotals.

82. G. Joly [1667] 1854, 13.

83. Vallier [1652] 1916, 3: 318–28.

84. Ranum 1968, 269.

CHAPTER 4. THE LONG-TERM INCIDENCE OF BARRICADE EVENTS AND THE LOST BARRICADES OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

Epigraph (used with the kind permission of Editions Gallimard): Duveau 1965, 178. According to Duveau, the August 1648 uprising under the Fronde was responsible for the "last barricades constructed under the Old Regime." Both this passage and the chapter epigraph appear in the various English editions of his book *1848*, but in translation his denial of the existence of barricades during the 1789 Revolution is even more categorical (see, e.g., Duveau 1967, 164).

1. The statistics reported here are based on the database presented in appendix A, which seeks to inventory every European barricade event between 1569 and 1900 that I have been able to identify. See the introduction to appendix A for a definition of the term "barricade event" and a discussion of the classification system used in this chapter.

2. The notions of initiator and spin-off events, as used here, are analogous to the concepts so usefully developed by the Political Process Model of social movement analysis. See, e.g., McAdam 1995.

3. That is, sixty of ninety-two French barricade events (65 percent) occurred in the twenty-six target years corresponding to these six clusters. Though I am confident that those six periods would stand out for anyone with a detailed knowledge of the history of French contention, my way of defining their precise temporal limits is certainly open to question. For example, I have extended the upsurge of 1830 to include the Lyon insurrections of 1831 and 1834 on grounds that these aftershocks of the July Days occurred as Louis-Philippe was still struggling to consolidate his rule. Similarly, I have treated the events of December 1851 as part of the upheaval resulting from the rapid rise and fall of the Second French Republic. Conversely, I have counted the events of 1869–70 as preliminaries to the Paris Commune, lumping them together as responses to the sudden collapse of the Second French Empire. Note, however, that even the most restrictive definition of the major peaks—just the six years 1588, 1648, 1789, 1830, 1848, and 1871—would still account for 22 events, or 24 percent of the total. This impressive degree of concentration (into fewer than 2 percent of all the years covered by the data set) suggests that this redrawing of the crucial intervals would require no fundamental revision of the points made in the text.

4. See the introduction to appendix A for further details on the scoring system.

5. This reflection from Argenson's "Pensées sur la réformation de l'Etat" is quoted in the introduction to his *Journal et mémoires* (1859, xlviii) and in Richet 1990, 391.

6. Rémusat 1958–67, 2: 204.

7. *Grande encyclopédie* (1887), 492.

8. See Edwards 1973, 158, and Weill 1928, 22. Hobsbawm 1962, 146, is more circumspect and technically quite correct when he states, "Though [the barricade's] revolutionary history in Paris goes back to at least 1588, it played no important part in 1789–94."

I should make clear that the existence of barricades during the French Revolution was not entirely unknown to contemporaries of the 1827 uprising—at least to those who opposed it. The author known only as Z. ([1828] n.d., 9–13), who wrote in the immediate aftermath of that insurrection, sought to justify the government’s repression of dissidents by explicit comparison to the events of 1795. Somewhat more obscurely, in a memoir resulting from a judicial inquiry into the 1827 insurrection, Isambert declared that “in nearly forty years, in two centuries perhaps, this is the first time barricades have been seen in Paris.” Since his text bears no date, it is impossible to tell whether he had 1789 or 1795 in mind. See Isambert n.d., 10.

9. Newman 1974, 51.

10. The erroneous assertion can be found in Labrousse 1964, 95.

11. For example, Anthony Vidler 1978, 82 appears to have relied upon Duveau for his conclusion that “The barricade was not a characteristic structure of the ’89 Revolution. . . . Only in 1827, some two centuries after their temporary appearance during the Fronde, did barricades block the public ways of Paris.” T. J. Clark also relied on Duveau when he affirmed that the 1827 barricades “were the first that Paris had seen for two centuries. The great Revolution had built no barricades and had left no imagery of them” (Clark 1973, 16). I can at least concur with this final statement: I have been unable to come up with any representation, contemporaneous or otherwise, of barricades in 1789, 1791, or 1795.

12. See Paris 1790, 276. This order is reproduced in Chassin 1889, 3: 514; Pitra 1892, clxxxv; and Legg 1905, 1: 63. It also appears to have served as the basis for Jacques Godechot’s acknowledgment of the existence of barricades on Bastille Day (Godechot 1970, 204), the only other such reference that I am aware of in a twentieth-century source.

The Assemblée générale des électeurs was the body initially formed in the spring of 1789 to select delegates to represent Paris at the upcoming meeting of the Estates General. As events rendered traditional municipal officials increasingly powerless, this entity attempted to fill the void, functioning as the effective precursor of the Commune of Paris. Beginning on July 12, it assumed authority over popular forces in the city and was responsible for setting up the bourgeois militia that in short order would become the Parisian National Guard. From its seat at the Hôtel de Ville, members of the “permanent committee” did their best to monitor events in the capital. The group justified its actions as “a signal proof of the faithful discharge of its duty and its devotion to the wishes of the king.” It should be noted that the July entries reproduced as part of the minutes of this body were actually reconstructed after the fact.

13. Louis-Philippe 1997, 44; 1973-74, 1: 75. Though just fifteen at the time, the duc de Chartres already held a colonelcy in the dragoons and tended to report the unfolding events from a military perspective.

14. La Tour du Pin 1920, 81.

15. This account, drawn from the “Procès-verbal Duveyrier,” is reproduced in Chassin 1888–89, 3: 539–40.

16. Pitra 1892, ccxlvii–ccxlviii. Although I have been unable to discover any contemporary estimate of how many barricades were constructed, this and other sources clearly indicate that they must have numbered in the dozens.

17. Denis 1891, 548.

18. *Journal général de l’Europe* 4, no. 89 (July 25, 1789): 172; also cited in Tassier 1930, 116–17.

19. The best modern source on the subject is Tackett 2003. Among contemporaneous accounts, the most useful are those of Choiseul 1822, Tourzel 1884, and Fournel 1890, in particular the second of the two reports prepared by the municipal authorities of Varennes. In his subsequent testimony before the National Assembly, Drouet explicitly spoke of “barricading the street and the bridge where the King had to pass” (Buche 1834, 353–56).

20. The term *sansculottes* referred to the lower strata of the urban Third Estate (too poor to afford the knee-breeches fashionable among those better off). It specifically referred to the members of the Paris

crowd, active during the radical phase of the French Revolution. The term *muscadins* referred to the relatively privileged youth of the propertied classes (sometimes simply called *les jeunes gens*) who rebelled against the Jacobin dictatorship and, in the post-Thermidorian period, formed roving bands in Paris that agitated for the royalist cause and participated in the White Terror.

21. Tarlé 1959, 203.

22. Ibid., 209.

23. In keeping with the Republic's secularization campaign, religious references had been removed from place-names like Saint-Antoine.

24. Tarlé 1959, 207.

25. We possess two eyewitness accounts of the Prairial barricades, both from the perspective of government supporters. The first is the report drafted by General Kilmaine himself. Though it may exaggerate the dangers faced by the corps that he commanded, while stressing the restraint and probity exhibited by his soldiers, there is no reason to question the accuracy of his description of troop movements and crowd reactions. The second is the narrative published by Louis Costaz, a member of the battalion of *muscadins* that also served under Kilmaine's orders. Costaz, who gave his occupation as a teacher of mathematics, became a volunteer late on the evening of 3 Prairial upon learning that the attempt to bring Féraud's presumed assassin to justice had been frustrated by the action of the crowd. Costaz's account indicates that he and many of his comrades had previous military experience. The 400 to 500 men of his volunteer battalion were suspected by the sansculottes of also having royalist sympathies, a claim denied by Kilmaine. Among the discrepancies that exist between the two narratives, Costaz mentions just two, not three, barricades; and the timetable he provides runs consistently two to three hours ahead of Kilmaine's. I have tended to rely on the general's more circumstantial version. For an extremely useful secondary account of the sequence of events, see Gendron 1979, 231–45.

26. Kilmaine 1795, 1; Tarlé 1959, 222.

27. According to Gendron 1931, 232, the reconnaissance patrols produced no intelligence because they were captured by insurgents. In any case, there was never any chance that they would join up with the units that General Kilmaine was expecting. As the latter would learn only subsequently, those units had been reassigned to the task of preventing residents of the faubourg Marceau from coming to the assistance of the insurgents in the faubourg Antoine. Three hundred mounted dragoons had been assigned to take their place, but the departure of this skeletal force had been seriously delayed. At the same time, new orders were dispatched to Kilmaine, countermanning those under which he had been operating. They instructed him not to enter the faubourg but to remain on guard at its main access points, awaiting the arrival of the larger force then being assembled to disarm the rebels. Those orders did get through, but far too late for him to obey the new directives.

28. Kilmaine 1795, 2; Neuville 1888, 125.

29. As Tarlé 1959, 223 notes, Kilmaine's estimates of 20,000 men and 40,000 women were gross exaggerations, presumably intended to magnify the dangers that his soldiers had faced.

30. Costaz 1795, 8.

31. Kilmaine 1795, 7.

32. Though fighting was limited and casualties were few, some 1,200 were arrested as terrorists and 36 were condemned to death.

33. Charles Lacretelle (1842, 263), who was one of those insurgents, made specific mention of these attempts to construct barricades.

34. Barras 1795, 11.

35. Ibid., 12.

36. Réal 1796, 77–78n2.

37. This statement is not meant to imply that artillery had never been used against barricades before

1795. The reader will recall, after all, that in the earliest barricade event I have been able to document (see chapter 2), the residents of Mont-de-Marsan used such structures to plug gaps breached in their town's fortifications by Monluc's field guns. Similarly, in an important 1635 event in Bordeaux, cannon (or at least the threat of cannon fire) was used to intimidate tax protestors who had built barricades (see appendix A). My claim is simply that in these earlier cases, the deployment of artillery was viewed either as part of normal siege warfare or as a ploy to force the submission of a rebellious city. Napoléon's use of cannon to quell the Vendémiaire uprising was a significant departure from this, because it was specifically designed to counter the use of barricades and because it redefined the tactics prescribed for dealing with irregular forces. Napoléon's actions became a model for commanders asked to put down subsequent outbreaks of civil unrest and thus influenced not only strategies of urban warfare but also, through the adjustments made by insurgents, the form and function of barricades themselves.

38. See Spitzer 1987.

39. For the record, even setting the events of the great Revolution aside, the claim that 1827 revived the barricade would still be unfounded. In March 1814, with the Napoléonic empire collapsing in the face of an invasion by more than 100,000 soldiers, Paris mounted a final defense, more in an effort to save the honor of the city than with any thought of being able to resist the military force arrayed against it. As part of that effort, two barricades were constructed at the foot of Montmartre.

CHAPTER 5. BARRICADES IN BELGIUM, 1787–1830

Epigraph: Chargé d'affaires Yves Hirsinger to Ministre des Affaires étrangères Armand Marc, comte de Montmorin Saint-Hérem, concerning events in Brussels on September 20, 1787. See Hubert 1920, 287.

1. I have focused almost exclusively on the Belgian case to illustrate the process of barricade diffusion, because the relatively well-documented Brussels uprising of September 20, 1787, initiating a sequence of related actions that continued through 1830, is the earliest non-French barricade event that I have been able to identify. Concerning the 1787–89 rebellions, I have relied heavily on Polasky 1987; Tassier 1930 and 1934; Pirenne 1920, vol. 5; Dinne 1791; Alton 1791; and Borgnet 1834. For what little is known of the January 26, 1789, barricade construction in Geneva, see appendix A.

2. For example, Brabançon territory could not be divided, administrative posts had to be filled by local notables, and new taxes could only be imposed with the express consent of the province's three estates. The name "Joyous Entry" referred to the triumphal arrival in Brussels, in person or by proxy, of each new ruler, who was accepted as sovereign only after swearing to uphold the provisions of this seminal document.

3. Joseph II had never set foot in the Austrian Netherlands before ascending the throne. In 1781, he traveled incognito on a whirlwind tour, which left him with the strong impression that Belgians living in the rural areas were dominated by the local nobility, while the urban population was completely under the sway of notables and the guilds, or "nations." He was equally disturbed by the intensity of religious sentiment and the power of the Catholic Church and considered traditionalist Belgian culture as a throwback to the Middle Ages. See Polasky 1987, 35–37.

4. His goal was to sweep away a congeries of seigniorial courts in favor of a centralized structure whose judges he could hand pick. The traditional provinces were to be replaced by nine "circles," each run by an *intendant* whom the emperor would appoint himself and whose authority would supersede even that of the Estates. The latter were prohibited from sitting in permanent session and were expected meekly to approve the emperor's biannual tax subsidy. On these reforms, see Pirenne 1920, 5: 419–23; Polasky 1987, 39–51; Borgnet 1844, 1: 49–56.

5. Polasky 1987, 45. Pirenne 1920, 5: 420, uses similar language to describe the emperor's attempt to curtail Belgian autonomy and absorb the provinces into the Austrian state.

6. In this at least, the French and Belgian cases were alike. In both cases, opposition originated in elite

circles but soon penetrated the masses, which seized the initiative and began operating on their own behalf. What set the Belgian case apart was the existence of a written “constitution” and institutions that for centuries had permitted an appreciable degree of local autonomy. As a result, popular action was aimed at preserving the status quo in religious and political terms, giving the movement a conservative cast.

7. The governors-general were, in point of fact, Joseph’s own sister Maria-Christine and her husband, Albert. They had been appointed by Maria Theresa and were continued in office by her son, though his high-handed political style effectively marginalized them from the exercise of power.

8. Pirenne 1920, 5: 434. In a June 3 letter, the emperor wrote Count Murray that he was resigned to a “bloodbath” and that if unrest occurred, it would present an excellent opportunity to do away with the *Joyeuse Entrée* and treat the Belgian provinces on the same footing as a brand-new conquest.

9. In adopting tricolor cockades, the Belgians were also in advance of the French. The emblematic red, yellow, and black derived from the official insignia of the province of Brabant. In recognition of the Brabançons’ leadership in the struggle for independence, these were adopted in 1831 as the national colors of Belgium.

10. Pirenne 1920, 5: 437.

11. Hubert 1920, 287; Polasky 1987, 62.

12. On the events of April to June 1789, see Polasky 1987, 86–88. They were, of course, taking place just as the French Estates General were convening in Versailles.

13. Tassier 1930, 51–87, 112–26, for example, speaks of “twenty years of revolutionary initiation from which the Brabant revolution quite naturally emerged.”

14. See Tassier 1930, 136–37; Dinne 1791, i–iv; Hubert 1924, 116n1.

15. According to E.-J. Dinne 1791, 9–13, Van der Mersch’s volunteers were poorly armed, when armed at all. On multiple occasions during the initial stages of their march, the commander had to calm their fears when false sightings of a distant enemy caused the men to disperse in panic. I have used Dinne’s estimate of the size of the rebel force, but Tassier 1930, 147, considers Vonck’s figure of 2,000 volunteers just prior to the battle for Turnhout to be more accurate.

16. Dinne 1791, 14–15.

17. Borgnet 1834, 2: 16–18. The captured cannon became the insurgent forces’ only artillery.

18. This was reported in a letter from Trauttmansdorff to Joseph II cited by Tassier 1930, 173n2.

19. Tassier 1930, 173.

20. On the expedition to Ghent, see Dinne 1791, 27–29; Alton 1791, 188–90, 296–98; Borgnet 1834, 2: 24–25; Tassier 1930, 174–77; and Smet 1839, 145–59.

21. Polasky 1987, 123.

22. On the events in and around Brussels, see Borgnet 1834, 2: 40–42.

23. Polasky 1987, 123.

24. On the French occupation of 1792–93, I have relied primarily on Tassier 1934 and Polasky 1987, 214–62.

25. See, e.g., Blanc 1846, Caron 1997, Wiese de Marmont 1857, Pilbeam 1995, Pinkney 1972a, and Rémusat 1959, any of which provides a useful starting point.

26. See Bibliothèque nationale, Département des cartes et plans, Ge DD 5711, a map that divides the capital among twelve full-size plates and whose legend goes so far as to estimate the number of trees cut down (1,300) and the number of paving stones torn up (3,125,000). It also makes clear that many small and evanescent structures were left out of the barricade total, notably those made of trees, building materials, vehicles, furniture and “human cadavers.”

27. Pinkney 1972a, 76, 90, 100–102, 113. There were fewer troops in Paris than usual (and it was harder to call in reinforcements) because of deployments associated with the June invasion of Algeria and concerns

over a possible Prussian intervention in the Belgian provinces.

28. Pinkney 1972a, 109–10.

29. On these various incidents, see Pinkney 1972a, 115–21.

30. The National Guard had been disbanded by Charles X in 1827 for having shown signs of disrespect and insubordination on the occasion of a royal review.

31. Demoulin 1950, 13.

32. Demoulin 1934, 69.

33. Jean-Claude Yon (1995, 2) has pointed out that, since the final act depicts the *crushing* of a rebellion, the symbolism of the piece remained ambiguous. Thus, Charles X, who had the opera performed at the Tuileries in 1829, declared that he was “highly satisfied” with the production. Soon after the July Days, a new production was launched in France, and the first public entertainment Louis-Philippe attended as king was this revival staged by the Paris Opera. The difference was that the 1830 version omitted the last act, so that the story ended with the triumph of the insurgents. Thanks to this directorial decision, the reaction of France’s new ruler was doubtless the same as his predecessor’s.

34. For descriptions of the Brussels fighting, see Mackintosh 1880, 30–32, Van Neck 1905, 23–25, and Demoulin 1934, 14–16. Only Mackintosh places barricade construction this early in the conflict, but his narrative contains enough circumstantial detail to make his version credible. According to Blanc 1846, 2: 82–83, during the night of August 25–26, residents of Brussels, whose ardor had been enflamed by emissaries newly arrived from France, flew the tricolor flag in the streets of the Belgian capital, shouting, “Let’s imitate the Parisians!”

35. See Kalken 1910, 123, and Demoulin 1950, 15, 17, which also mention incidents of Luddism in three other towns. Demoulin alludes to the influence of foreign agitators in inciting or carrying out such attacks but provides no concrete evidence in support of these assertions.

36. Demoulin 1934, 83–84; 1950, 16. According to this source, the militia grew to more than 8,000 men over the following month. Though it was initially limited to members of the bourgeoisie, about 1,000 working-class volunteers were enrolled by the end of September.

37. Demoulin 1934, 77.

38. Demoulin 1934, 82; 1950, 16–17. Responsibility for the construction of a few of these barricades was entrusted to two engineers, Roget and Teichmann. A Commission of Defense, charged with oversight of military fortifications, was created on September 8 (Demoulin 1950, 26–27).

39. Van Neck 1905, 34–35.

40. Demoulin 1950, 95–96.

41. In addition, on September 2, a shipment of rifles intended for Spain fell into the hands of the people. At about this time, a Dutch provincial governor estimated that 100,000 firearms were to be found in the city’s arms factories. See Demoulin 1950, 27, 95.

42. Demoulin 1934, 107, 113; Van Halen 1831, 25–26.

43. Demoulin 1934, 80 n. 6; 1950, 43. Note that the French word *étrangers* could apply equally to provincial Belgians and to individuals of foreign nationality.

44. Van Neck 1905, 40; Demoulin 1934, 112; 1950, 61.

45. Demoulin 1934, 116.

46. Despite claims that the fighting in Brussels was “bloodier than the July revolution in Paris” (Van Neck 1905, 76, 86), it is remarkably difficult to obtain reliable estimates of casualties. Demoulin, for example, gives discrepant figures of 300 and 430 insurgent dead in his first and second books (1934, 162; 1950, 149). The same lack of consistency plagues his attempts to gauge the number of Dutch soldiers committed to the attack on Brussels, which, even in a single work, varied from 12,000 to 15,000 to 10,000 (1934, 76, 116, 145). Guessing the number of insurgents is an even more hazardous enterprise. The best I

can offer are crude estimates based on the reports of contemporary informants like the patriot leader Juan Van Halen and the French ambassador, General Eléonor-Zoa Dufriche de Valazé. They ranged from a few hundred at the start of fighting on September 23 to a few thousand by the time the victory was won. These sources convey the general impression that casualties in the ranks of the patriots may have exceeded the number killed and wounded in the service of the king, despite the difference in the size of the respective contingents and the fact that royal forces lost the battle. In any case, all such figures should be treated as no more than rough approximations.

47. See Demoulin 1934, 121ff., on this and other aspects of the September combat.

48. Van Neck 1905, 44; Demoulin 1934, 128; Mackintosh 1880, 89, 120.

49. Demoulin 1934, 129n1. Mackintosh 1880, 97, mentions one barricade anchored by the bodies of six dead horses.

50. On this episode, see Demoulin 1934, 123–25, and Van Neck 1905, 44–50. The latter reports that one nearby barricade endured the entire four days of fighting without being taken.

51. Cf. Van Neck 1905, 64.

52. See Van Halen 1831, 12, 20–21; Demoulin 1934, 153; Van Neck 1905, 64; and Mackintosh 1880, 126.

53. The international character of the liberal movement is underscored by the participation of many foreigners in the Belgian revolution. As noted, Van Halen was, despite his name, a Spaniard (of Flemish extraction). Baron Fellner, who in 1830 organized a commando unit and served as Van Halen's aide de camp before being killed in an attack on the last day of fighting, was a German who had fought in the Austrian army. Though a more detailed examination of the French contribution will be reserved for later in this chapter, I might note that the Belgian "general staff" included General Mellinet and Charles Niellon, both Frenchmen. See Van Halen 1831, 31–32, Van Neck 1905, 75, 82, and Demoulin 1934, 115.

54. Demoulin 1950, 79–80.

55. Demoulin 1934, 122; 1950, 62.

56. Van Neck (1905, 64) claims that more than half a million paving stones were displaced, though he offers no clue as to how he arrived at such an estimate, which may have included those used as projectiles in addition to those employed as building materials.

57. Van Neck 1905, 100. When news of the victory in Tirlemont made its way back to Brussels on the morning of September 24, it helped shore up the flagging morale of insurgent forces, who set about reinforcing their own barricades (Mackintosh 1880, 126).

58. According to Demoulin (1950, 98–101), these tactics obliged General Dibbets, commander of the Dutch forces in Maastricht, to abandon the relief effort.

59. Demoulin 1950, 113–15, and Van Neck 1905, 102.

60. Demoulin 1950, 110.

61. Rogers 1983, 10–18.

62. In the formulation of Strang and Meyer 1992, 7, abstraction and generalization tend to encourage nonrelational diffusion. They hypothesize that the spread of modernity favors abstraction, and hence the homogenization of groups that are in general contact.

63. See McAdam and Rucht 1993.

64. By comparison, the Parisian insurrections of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, even though more distant in time, are much more richly documented.

65. Tassier 1930, 58–60.

66. Developments in France in this period were reported in great detail by the Belgian press, according to Tassier 1930, 104–6.

67. See *Journal général de l'Europe* 4, no. 89 (July 25, 1789): 172.

68. The preceding quotations all derive from Tassier (1930, 108–17), who also cites a warning from the British chargé d'affaires to his government that “this new fermentation in the minds of Belgians was only awakened by the one that took place in France.”

69. *Ibid.*, 121.

70. Demoulin 1950, 47. Public clamor for Napoléon may seem odd, since the emperor had died in 1821, but his nineteen-year-old son, the “eaglet,” was still living at that time.

71. Apparently their desire to evoke the spirit of the French Revolution without reviving memories of the Terror was satisfied by adopting the somewhat sanitized title of Comité de sûreté publique (Committee of Public Security), as opposed to the Jacobin Comité de salut public (commonly translated as “Committee of Public Safety”) that ruled in France at the height of the Jacobin dictatorship in 1793. A similar ambivalence surrounded the red flag, which was adopted as a banner by a column of 400 insurgents who plundered the residence of the provincial governor on August 26 but was generally considered too inflammatory a symbol by the passionately nationalist but otherwise rather conservative movement for Belgian independence. See Demoulin 1950, 15, 94.

72. See Leconte 1945, 27–30, 65–68, 95–98; 1949, 6n2. These colorful and, in some cases, even shady characters all played significant roles in crucial barricade events. Gregoire was responsible for readying the defenses of Brussels against the anticipated Dutch offensive. After the Dutch retreat on September 27, Culhat was placed in charge of “civic fortifications,” meaning the completion of the system of barricades intended to prevent the enemy’s return. Mellinet was recognized for his important role in the battle in the Parc Royal in Brussels.

73. It is impossible to make a definitive statement because Grandjonc 1975, 234, reports the total for Belgian and Dutch workers together as 7,410 individuals, or 21.0 percent of the total of all foreigners living in Paris. It is reasonable to assume that, due to linguistic and cultural affinities as well as the still smaller population of the Dutch provinces, the vast majority of those workers in 1831 were Belgians; but there is no way to establish whether, all on their own, Belgians outnumbered, for example, the combination of Italians and Savoyards that constituted the second largest category in Grandjonc’s tally, with 19.4 percent of the Paris total.

74. Leconte 1949, 3.

75. The pro-French camp in Brussels included Baron de Stassart and the Count de Celles, both of whom had served as French prefects under Napoléon, and Alexander Gendebien, one of the three members of the Comité de sûreté publique that briefly exercised a directing role in Brussels. See Demoulin 1950, 32.

76. Leconte 1949, 14.

77. *Ibid.*, 4, 9–10; Demoulin 1950, 134–37.

78. Leconte 1949, 8, 37–38. The address of the Café Belge is simply given as rue de Grenelle in Leconte 1945, 37.

79. Leconte 1949, 11.

80. See *ibid.*, 14–17. I have been unable to fully reconcile accounts from various sources, but the list of volunteer units that actually made their way to Brussels includes, at a minimum, the following (arranged by their date of arrival, indicated in parentheses): the 90-man “Belgian Legion of Paris,” led by Seghers-Coché (October 1); the “Paris Legion” (or “Belgian-Parisian Legion”) under Cruyplants (October 2); the “Gallo-Belgian Detachment” under Auger (October 2); the “Inseparable Belgian Parisians” (actually formed in Brussels under Black, an American associate of Lafayette’s, sometime between October 1 and 5, according to Demoulin 1950, 137–38, and Van Neck 1905, 99, who also mention an “English Legion”); Pontécoulant’s “Regiment of Parisian Sharpshooters” (October 4); and the “battalion” of 100 men sent by the Amis du peuple (October 7).

81. The quotation is from Polasky 1987, 109, paraphrasing Linguet’s comment. Further indication that the lines of influence ran in both directions is provided by the title that the revolutionary firebrand Camille

Desmoulins gave to his original Paris weekly, *Histoire des Révolutions de France et de Brabant* (History of the Revolutions of France and Brabant).

82. Demoulin 1950, 136.

83. The first Paris contingent arrived in Brussels on October 1, days after the Dutch had been chased from the city and a week and a half after the second wave of barricade construction had taken place. Bartels would later claim that the first volunteers sent by the Club Beige arrived in Brussels ten to twelve days before the great insurrection began, but Leconte (1949, 6–12) discredits that assertion, since the organization in question was not even formed until September 20, the day before combat began. Leconte also dismisses Capiaumont's contention that a mixed Belgian and French column crossed the border on September 5, speculating that it was possibly a piece of disinformation intended to boost the morale of patriot forces. Of course, even if these expeditions proceeded as claimed, their arrivals postdated the construction of the first barricades in late August and could have had no direct bearing on the initial Brussels events. Indeed, the only case I have found where French volunteers played a significant role in the fighting was one that involved no barricades. This was in Mons, where the appearance of a column from Valenciennes on September 30 is said to have hastened the outbreak of a rising against the Dutch.

84. Demoulin 1934, 263–64. In fact, whatever gratitude residents of Brussels may have felt for the support of sympathetic foreigners was remarkably short-lived. Despite the role that French symbols may have played in arousing Belgian nationalism, memories of the Napoléonic era inspired considerable ambivalence. Some Brussels residents were offended at the sight of French recruits walking the streets of Brussels dressed in the uniform of the Parisian National Guard, to which blue-white-and-red cockades were often pinned. And pro-French sentiment diminished markedly, even in the ranks of the favorably disposed Réunion centrale, when it was rumored that some of the foreign volunteers had found jobs in Brussels. A reaction against all things French soon set in. The Provisional Government began by prohibiting the display of foreign flags or emblems. Soon thereafter, it decreed that foreigners would be required to demonstrate that they had sufficient personal resources to support themselves or be sent home. By mid-October, volunteers arriving at the border were being disarmed and detained in military barracks before being repatriated. Leconte 1949, 14–16.

85. See the discussion in chapter 2 of the “prehistory” of the barricade.

CHAPTER 6. THE BARRICADE CONQUERS EUROPE, 1848

Epigraph: Garnier-Pagès 1861–72, 1, 2.

1. The two sequences are not, of course, entirely analogous, since notwithstanding Charles X's later intrigues, the 1814 Charter had already imposed certain constitutional limitations on the power of the monarchy. But it might also be said that the parallels were more extensive than I have suggested. Rather than ending with the turn to republican government, they continued in both the earlier and later periods, when the republican phases gave way to Napoléonic empires.

2. For more on the revolution of February 1848, see, e.g., Agulhon 1983b, Lamartine 1849, Rémusat 1958–67, vol. 4, Stern 1862, and Tocqueville 1971.

3. Thiers would later claim that he tried to persuade the king to follow the examples of Henri III and Louis XIV and make a strategic withdrawal to the provinces.

4. A more fully developed version of my argument for the paramount importance of these two organizations can be found in Traugott 1985. On the Garde mobile, see also Caspard 1974 and Price 1972. On the National Workshops, see McKay 1933 and Thomas 1848. The best empirically based description of the June arrestees is provided by Tilly and Lees 1975.

5. Significantly, the *Illustrated London News*, which had earlier reported on the insurrection in Palermo, made no mention of it when it proclaimed in its April 1, 1848, edition: “The Great Revolution of February,

1848, in Paris, has spread like an electric shock, and shaken the whole of Europe.” Modern writers seem to concur with this omission: “No one suggests that the February Days in Paris were inspired by the events of Palermo, whereas there are clear connections between the February Days and the wave of demonstrations and popular movements which swept into other countries in the following weeks” (Breuille 2004, 32); “Little did it matter that rumblings had been recorded since the beginning of the year; it was, after all, the February Days that triggered the revolution in Italy, Austria, and Germany” (Bourgin 1948d, 71). On this question, see also appendix B, “Did the Wave of Revolutionism in 1848 Originate in Paris or Palermo?”

6. Garnier-Pagès 1861, 1: 1–3, ascribes the rapidity with which reports of the revolution in France affected the rest of the European world to “novel modes of communication.” It is true that the semaphore telegraph alerted Lyon and Strasbourg to the declaration of the Republic and that a train carried the news of the February revolution to Brussels. But while the Continent was on the verge of being knit much more closely together, the modernization process had only just begun, and Garnier-Pagès’s stress on these changes seems overstated. See appendix C, “Technological Innovations and the Diffusion Process in 1848.”

7. The map of France provided by Arbellot 1973, 791, suggests how the speed of public transportation in 1780 might be graphically represented, but the data points are limited to the dozen or so main highways that connected Paris to major provincial cities. The relatively smooth contours of Arbellot’s circles would have been much more jagged had he been in a position to consider locations on secondary and tertiary roads (let alone the countless small and isolated rural villages scattered throughout the French countryside). The introduction of rail traffic, particularly in the middle years of the nineteenth century, when only a few main lines had been completed, would merely have accentuated this unevenness by increasing the disparity between the best- and worst-served locations. Regrettably, no one seems to have updated and expanded upon Arbellot’s work by establishing the speed of transmission speed among various European cities in the mid-1800s.

8. I have used a number rather than the actual date because a first report might variously refer to the outbreak of the Paris insurrection (which occurred on February 23), the fall of the French monarchy (dating from Louis-Philippe’s abdication in the early afternoon of February 24), or the formation of a provisional government and its declaration of the Second Republic (which occurred during the evening of February 24). Even within these broad slices of time, a good deal of variation is possible. For example, “news of the declaration of the Republic” might refer to the moment the decision was originally made by members of the provisional government, or to its announcement to the crowd assembled before the Hôtel de Ville, or to its official proclamation, or to the subsequent publication of that news in written form. In some ways, the timing of the outbreak of the insurrection is even more difficult to pin down, as this might refer to the building of the first barricades in preliminary clashes, to the massacre at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or to the generalized fighting that followed. Moreover, sources often fail to make clear whether they are referring to the arrival of a messenger or traveler bearing the news or to its actual appearance in local newspapers. Finally, it appears that some sources’ calculations may have been off by one full day because they overlooked the fact that 1848 was a leap year.

Because I have been obliged to extrapolate from an extremely limited number of data points, my representation of the transmission process can be no more than a rough approximation. The time lags depicted in map 4 are based on the following sources: Bensimon 2000, 189, 192; Bergier 1924, 8–9, 13, 23–24; Blaison 1933, 69; Deak 1979, 60, 66; Deme 1976, 15, 128; Dhondt 1948, 115n1; Droz 1957, 158; Duffy [1883] n.d., 533–37; Endres 1948, 252; Evans and von Strandmann 2000, 113; Fejtö 1948c, 312; Gilda 1987, 87; Ginsborg 1979, 81; Gooch 1963, 26; Hamerow 1972, 99; Hammen 1969, 195–96; Herzen 1871, 162; *Journées illustrées de la révolution de 1848* . . . 1848–49, 81; Leblanc 1908, 7; Lewald 1997, 23; Lougée 1972, 107; Noyes 1966, 60; Pech 1969, 47; Rath 1957, 34–35; and Stiles 1852, 2: 48.

9. Gooch 1963, 26; Bensimon 2000, 189–92.

10. Hammen 1969, 195–96, provides a more theatrical but less accurate version according to which Belgians were the first to hear the news of the proclamation of the Republic. He reported that inhabitants of Brussels crowded into the railroad station to await the night train from Paris. That train was delayed. “When

it arrived at 12:30 A.M. [on February 25], the engineer jumped from the cab even before the locomotive came to a full stop. In a ringing voice he called out the dramatic news, ‘The red flag flies over the towers of Valenciennes. The Republic is declared!’ In response to this hoped-for news, the crowd raised a cry of ‘*Vive la République.*’ ”

Dhondt’s account (1948, 115n1, on which I have relied) is more sober and better documented. It credits the count of Hompesch with having brought first news of France’s change of government on the evening of February 25. Hammen may have gotten his dates confused thanks to ambiguously phrased reports like Quentin-Bauchart’s (1907, 184), indicating only that word of the revolution reached Brussels at midnight on February 25 when some twenty travelers stepped off the train from Paris shouting, “Vive la République!”

11. Beecher 2001, 191–92. See also Gooch 1963, 29.

12. Dhondt 1948, 115–16. See also Ponteil [1937] 1955, 76–78.

13. Ponteil [1937] 1955, 76–78.

14. See Gooch 1963, 33.

15. Blaison 1933, v.

16. See Droz 1953, 153–55; Rath 1957, 35; Strandmann 2000b, 108; Bourgin 1948b, 98; and Stiles 1952, 1: 99–101.

17. Stadelmann 1975, 48.

18. The “French fright” of late March included spurious reports of “12,000 Frenchmen, who were sweeping through Baden burning and laying waste,” and “40,000 Frenchmen who were driving everything before them” in the vicinity of Stuttgart (Stadelmann 1975, 80). The rumors feeding this panic reaction dissipated within a few days.

19. Sperber 1991, 147; Noyes 1966, 62–63.

20. Stearns 1974, 94.

21. Sperber 1991, 148.

22. Stearns 1974, 141.

23. Noyes 1966, 60.

24. Cited in Hamerow 1972, 99.

25. Noyes 1966, 60.

26. Robertson 1967, 115.

27. Ponteil [1937] 1955, 73.

28. Lougée 1972, 116.

29. See Stadelmann 1975, 56–57, and Maurice 1887, 247–49. Among other authors, P. H. Noyes (1966, 66) claims that it was the arrival of news of the Vienna insurrection on March 16 that spurred the crowd to erect barricades, but it seems well established that Berliners had already been in a state of effervescence for over a week and independently adopted the tactic of barricade construction well before they knew of the Austrian events.

30. Robertson 1967, 121.

31. Blaison 1933, 5n2.

32. Duffy [1883] n.d., 533–37.

33. Bensimon 2000, 138 and n. 66.

34. See Sir Charles Gavan Duffy ([1883] n.d., 533–45), who describes Irish nationalists’ reactions to the news from Paris in some detail.

35. Ibid., 546, 550.

36. The text of the French foreign minister’s public statement, along with his own account of the Irish

delegation's visit, can be found in Lamartine 1849, 427–30.

37. Duffy [1833] n.d., 565–70.

38. See *ibid.*, 569–74. Duffy remarks that these representatives of Young Ireland were in Paris “under arms . . . on the night of April 16th, when an insurrection of the Red Republicans was expected.” On the Irish events, see appendix A. For a further indication of barricade consciousness among Irish leaders, see Sullivan et al. 1879, 137–38.

39. Rath 1957, 34.

40. *Ibid.*, 34–35 and n. 1. Rath specifies that while the initial published reports concerned only the outbreak of fighting in the French capital, and that news of Guizot's fall and the formation of a new ministry did not gain currency until March 1. On March 2, word came that the Second French Republic had been declared. This is contradicted by the statement in a letter from a Prussian diplomat stationed in Vienna, dated February 29, that “today everyone is talking about the resignation of Louis-Philippe” Deak 1979, 60. It is not clear whether the discrepancy is due to a simple dating error or to the delay that separated the arrival of the first reports in diplomatic circles and the publication of newspaper accounts.

41. Breunig 1977, 269.

42. See Stiles 1852, 1: 102; Rath 1957, 35; Deak 1979, 66.

43. Stiles 1852, 1: 102.

44. Word of Louis-Philippe's abdication reached Pozsony on March 3, “six days late,” according to Deme 1976, 15. However, the chronology that constitutes Appendix II of that same work (1976: 128) claims that news of the Paris revolution arrived on March 1 (which was actually six days after the event in question).

45. Stearns 1974, 107; Fejtő 1948c, 317–19. The latter source goes on to say that “Robespierre, Danton and Lamartine all inspired them; *L'Histoire des Girondins* was their Bible.”

46. This excerpt from the memoirs of Mór Jókai, a young cohort of Petöfi's, who would go on to become a novelist of some note, is cited in Deme 1976, 10.

47. Ginsborg 1979, 81.

48. Stiles 1852, 1: 291.

49. Sigmann 1973, 248.

50. Stiles 1852, 1: 190–91; Polisensky 1980, 103; Breunig 1977, 273; Smith 2000, 62.

51. Polisensky 1980, 110.

52. Rath 1957, 211.

53. See pp. 000–00 and Polisensky 1980, 154–59.

54. Both Droz 1957, 111, and Stadelmann 1975, 50, assert that in the German-speaking world, the insurgent movement leapt from the west German states to Vienna and then to Berlin. But at least as far as barricade use is concerned, the towns of that region were not affected until April (Freiburg and Mannheim) or May (Trier). It may be true that the Prussian king's response to the March days in Berlin was ultimately influenced by events in Vienna, including Metternich's fall on March 16, but the fact that insurgents in both cities began building barricades on the same day (March 13) suggests that the Prussian and Austrian uprisings began as largely independent reactions to the political changes precipitated by events in France.

55. In reconstructing the aftereffects of the Viennese uprisings, Stiles 1852, 1: 209, 253–59, 291, 376, conveys some of the intricacy of secondary and even tertiary transmission.

56. See, e.g., Robertson 1967, 227–28, and Stadelmann 1975, 84, 146.

57. Lougée 1972, 114.

58. Stadelmann 1975, 85. “It was for the interest of the Poles, the French, and other revolutionary spirits, to bring about a bloody conflict in Berlin, and there were many of them in the capital that spring, among whom must have been men who knew how to build barricades and organize revolts” (Ebers 1893, 123).

59. See Stadelmann 1975, 88, 185; Strandmann 2000a, 3; Acton 1961, 248–51; Polisensky 1980, 123–24. The “Marseillaise” was still being used in this way in May 1849 when, according to Wagner ([1911] 1983, 287–88), a column of volunteers from Erzgebirge, come to join the rebellion against the Saxon government, announced their arrival in Dresden to the strains of the melody that was to become the French national anthem. In much the same spirit, republicans in Berlin promoted an April 3, 1848, rally by printing up a poster that began with the words “Vive la République!” and Committees of public safety were formed in Sicily, Calabria, Vienna, and several south German cities.

60. Although this synopsis derives from passing mentions in many sources, fuller discussions of the 1848 demands can be found in Fejtő 1948a, especially the articles by Vermeil, Klima, Roller, and Fejtő himself.

61. See Noyes 1966, 75–76, 85–86. Noyes calls particular attention to a pamphlet by a tailor, J. C. Lüchnow, titled “The Organization of Work and Its Practicality,” which drew many of its ideas from French authors such as Fourier and Blanc. According to Polisensky (1980: 124), a similar proposal was made in Vienna.

62. Stadelmann 1975, 85, 190–91.

63. Rémusat 1958–67, 2: 325.

64. Edgar Newman 1974, 52, citing a manuscript source in the Bibliothèque nationale. Rémusat’s omission seems somewhat puzzling, given that, earlier in that same volume (2: 204–5), he shares his own first-hand impressions of the barricades of November 1827. Keep in mind also that at the time of which he was speaking, the barricade events of 1814 and even 1795 and 1789 were still within living memory.

65. Tocqueville 1971, 48.

66. Lamartine’s history “was as enthusiastically read in Bucharest and Athens as in Paris,” Fejtő observes (1948a, 24; 1948b, 365), and while acknowledging the influence of Blanc and Michelet, Thureau-Dangin 1892, 7: 41–51, singles out Lamartine’s works as “one of the causes of the February 24 revolution.”

67. Indeed, it is from such sources that I have drawn some of the illustrations that accompany chapters 2 and 3. To be specific, figures 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12 derive from Genouillac n.d., Anquetil 1851, and Bordier and Charton 1860. See also Lurine 1844.

68. *Procès des insurgés de Rouen* [1849] n.d., 46–49.

69. I have run across occasional reports of written instructions for building barricades or for the preparation of weapons or munitions, sometimes privately circulated or even published in newspapers, but these were exceptional. See, e.g., references in Edgar Newman 1974, 36–37, for France, and Duffy n.d. [1833], 573–74, 659, and Bensimon 2000, 136, for Ireland. The section entitled “Des barricades” in Blanqui’s *Instructions pour une prise d’armes* (Blanqui 1973) is the most noteworthy such primer, but it was drafted only in the 1860s and never read in his lifetime outside a closed circle of associates, so that its impact during the classic era of the barricade was minimal. Moreover, it prescribes a military style of construction and combat completely at odds with the practices employed in spontaneous uprisings. Blanqui even supplies images of the ideal barricade and a precise count of how many paving stones insurgents would need to dig up.

70. Indeed, we know for certain that Vitet’s play influenced Hugo’s *Cromwell* (and, perhaps more indirectly, *Les misérables*). Initially published in 1826, it portrayed the Parisian uprising of 1588, and was already in its third printing at the time of the April 1827 Paris insurrection. See Yon 1995, 4.

71. See Clark 1973, 24, 27–28, 37, and Marrinan 1988, 33–38; 67–76. Within months of his arrival in Paris, Heine commented extensively on Delacroix’s *Liberté guidant le peuple* in his review of the 1831 Salon of the Académie des Beaux-Arts, which showed more than forty pictures of the July revolution (Heine 1906, 4: 24–29).

In general, the arts provided a widely exploited and highly effective means of ensuring that the echoes of the July Days were sustained. When, for example, the German Jewish writer Fanny Lewald returned to

Berlin in the spring of 1848, she visited the studio of the sculptor Heidel, who had produced reliefs depicting “barricade fighters making bullets, fathers who are showing their sons the use of the rifle, young men tearing themselves away from the arms of their sweethearts in order to storm the barricades with their flag” (Lewald [1850] 1997, 112).

72. Evidence of Delacroix’s influence can be found not only in France (see, e.g., *Journées illustrées de la révolution de 1848* . . . 1848–49, 8), but also in Germany, where contemporaneous images reproduced the essential motif, often in some detail. See Badischen Landesmuseum Karlsruhe 1998, 349–50. It has frequently been asserted that Delacroix’s painting was a victim of Louis-Philippe’s displeasure at its political message, but cf. the more nuanced explanation of why it was withdrawn from public display after 1832 in Marrinan 1988, 68, 240 nn239–40.

73. For other German images of the Paris barricades in 1848, see Gall 1998, 310, and Blos 1893, 75.

74. Töpffer’s *Histoire d’Albert*, which dates from 1845 and, from which figure 18 derives, was widely circulated on the Continent in the years immediately preceding the 1848 revolutions and even more widely imitated thereafter. Pinkney has pointed to the publication of Töpffer’s first illustrated works in 1839 and the early 1840s as a significant turning point in the development of a mass culture. See Töpffer 1901; Pinkney 1986, 125; and *Les révolutions de 1848* (1998a), 114–15, 190.

75. Martin Nadaud’s autobiography, for example, relates how in 1834 he was regularly asked to read the latest issue of Cabet’s *Le Populaire* in a corner wine merchant’s shop. It was through this initially offhand involvement that he came to be recruited into the Society of the Rights of Man (Nadaud [1895] 1976). The life circumstances of Norbert Truquin, an illiterate and relatively unskilled laborer whose political awakening dated from the 1840s, were quite different. Yet he too was introduced to the revolutionary tradition by fellow workers and casual acquaintances well before the February Days gave him the opportunity to learn firsthand how to build a barricade. See Traugott 1993, 222, 276, 289.

76. Körner 2004b, 90, 95. A *goguette* was a “singing society,” an important site of sociability where people gathered to join in collective song as a form of entertainment. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Paris and its environs were host to many such establishments, which often served food and drink. The same source notes that some of the best-known airs from the 1840s were subsequently published in famous collections of barricade songs.

77. France, *Cour des pairs*, 1836, 81–82; Caussidière 1848, 1: 61–62.

78. See Traugott 1988 and 1989.

79. Le Men 1998, 26–27, 161. On the significance of adaptations to local culture in preserving and propagating the memory of barricade events, see also Pech 1969, 156.

80. Fox 1988, 309; Bensimon 2000, 189–92. The text-only dailies, notably the *Times* and *Morning Herald*, were locked in a fierce battle to scoop one another. This competition had reduced the time required to publish breaking news from France to roughly twelve hours. The illustrated weeklies could never match the dailies in terms of timeliness, but their ability to provide a visual rendering of momentous events gave them a different clientele.

81. Jackson 1885, 302. Although no figures are available for 1848, the size of the print run for the *Illustrated London News* had risen to 80,000 copies by 1851, far higher than rival weeklies and on a par with the *Times*.

82. See the *Illustrierte Zeitung* (Leipzig,) no. 245 (March 11, 1848): 177.

83. Le Men 1998, 78 and n. 16.

84. Figure 19 is a case in point. Spanish participation in the revolutionary wave of 1848 included a small-scale republican uprising in Madrid in late March and an even more limited mobilization in Seville, neither of which appears to have involved the use of barricades. The earliest Spanish barricade event I have been able to identify dates from 1869.

85. On these incidents, see respectively Maurice 1887, 269, and Holborn 1982, 88.

86. Recall that the place Maubert, the site where Cossé de Brissac putatively gave instructions for erecting the first barricades, was located mere blocks from the University of Paris. On students in the First Day of the Barricades, see “Amplification des particularités qui se passèrent à Paris” ([1588] 1836, 356).

87. Freycinet 1911, 4–6, stresses how certain schools—notably the Ecole Polytechnique, where he matriculated in 1848—had developed the tradition of participating in each successive Parisian insurrection. On the role of students in the 1848 revolution, see Gallaher 1980.

88. Events that did *not* involve barricades extend the scope of student participation much further. For example, Bourgin 1948b, 96–97, alludes to the role that Hessian and Saxon students educated in Paris played upon their return home. Markovitch 1948, 196–200, lists the names of leaders of the Serbian revolutionary movement who had enrolled in French universities or even fought on the February barricades. The relationship of the Serbian elite with the French university system was so close and long-standing that in Belgrade the Paris Faculté de Droit was called the “School of Ministers,” and returning graduates were simply called “the Parisians.”

89. Caron 1997 reminds us that the prominence of students, most often associated with the French revolution of 1830, was also characteristic of the insurrections of 1827, 1832, and 1834. Note, however, that Edgar Newman (1974, esp. pp. 27–31) uses casualty figures and contemporary accounts to argue that the student presence in the 1830 revolution occurred later and was numerically much less significant than has generally been assumed.

90. According to Stearns 1974, 172–73, a planned reform of 1847 would actually have made French the official language of instruction in Romanian schools.

91. See Campbell 1971, 103–16; Maier 2001, 192–93. Roller 1948, 301, notes that one such student, Tudor Diamant, tried to establish a phalanstery near Ploiesti in the early 1830s.

92. Campbell 1971, 152n112, 154; Fejtő 1948, 362; Roller 1948, 301. Maier 2001, 186, reports that during the February Days a first-aid station to treat wounded street fighters was set up in the “Romanian Library.” Berindei 1990, 48, records the names of specific students who participated in the fighting, remarking that many seemed to end up taking courses in the “school of modern democracy” or even the “school of revolution” rather than those offered by the university.

93. Berindei 1990, 48.

94. Roller 1948, 303.

95. Among those mentioned by Berindei 1990, 50–51, as having been banished after the movement’s repression were nine young intellectuals who had previously lived for several years in Paris. Roller 1948, 304, indicates that the movement’s “revolutionary committee” was in direct contact with the French provisional government.

96. See Campbell 1971, 156. Georgescu-Buzău 1965, 33, 48–49, rejects the idea of an “imported revolution,” however, attributing it to “bourgeois historians.” Though he is surely correct that the Romanian revolution was not simply an exotic implant, much less a mechanical imitation of events in Paris, even his account makes quite clear how much the initiative for and leadership of the local struggle depended on individuals who had regained their homeland after extended stays in France.

97. Robertson 1967, 202–18.

98. Polisensky 1980, 99.

99. Robertson 1967, 220–22.

100. Maurice 1887, 259. Though the March Days in Vienna were the primary precipitant for the initial mobilization in Prague, political ferment aimed at discovering “the best way of adapting the French movement to the needs of Bohemia,” began earlier, when “a young man named Gabler, who had been in Paris in 1846” read aloud an account of the February revolution in a Prague café (*ibid.*, 254).

101. Though Prague had its own university (founded in 1348, and therefore slightly older than the University of Vienna), some Czechs chose to pursue their studies at the larger institution in the imperial

capital. On the close ties between the student populations of the two cities and the extent to which the students of Prague modeled their actions on those of their Viennese counterparts, see Pech 1969, 315, and Polisensky 1980, 127, 134. See also Smets 1876, 1: 281, for a striking image of the “International Barricade” in the Stefansplatz in Vienna.

102. Since March, Prague had, like Vienna, weathered clashes between university students and troops, though without actual loss of life; but Czechs in general, and student liberals in particular, were increasingly aware of a fundamental divergence between the two cities. The opposition movement in the imperial capital, with which they had initially identified, envisioned the eventual integration of Austria into a federation of German peoples, which would have relegated non-German speakers to a peripheral and subordinate status. For their part, the Czechs and other subject peoples promoted the notion of a multinational empire that would allow them to claim a greater degree of independence from the political and cultural domination of Austria proper. The students of Prague were especially troubled by the black, red, and gold sashes that set off the colorful uniforms of the Academic Legion, just as they were offended by the German nationalist tone that pervaded Vienna’s political discourse.

Maurice 1887, 325–26, describes how a delegation of Czech students left Prague on June 5 with the hope of enlisting the support of Viennese students for their cause, no doubt thinking this a fair exchange for the assistance their own countrymen had recently provided in defending the Academic Legion against the Austrian government’s attack. However, reports of the insults that the Czechs had delivered to the German colors they had encountered en route to the capital caused the Viennese students to offer a chilly reception to the deputation from Prague, whose members were ordered to leave the city within twenty-four hours. In the months to come, this rift would widen. After Windischgrätz had put down the June uprising in Prague, a group of Viennese students came to offer him their congratulations (Maurice 1887, 332). The favor would be returned in October, when the army turned its attention to rebellious elements in Vienna. This time, “Czech nationalists cheered the exploits of General Windischgrätz’s troops and saw the events in Vienna as a victory for Slavic forces over German nationalism” (Sperber 1994, 217).

103. Pech 1969, 141.

104. Pech 1968, 352; 1969, 142; Polisensky 1980, 150.

105. Polisensky 1980, 152; Pech 1968, 351.

106. Pech 1969, 144.

107. Polisensky 1980, 154.

108. Ibid., 127, 158. Perhaps the most concrete evidence of the centrality of student participation in these events is the fact that this group accounted for roughly half of all casualties suffered in the fighting. See Pech 1968, 359.

109. Bourgin 1948a, 73; 1948b, 87; Carr 1975, 125.

110. Körner 2004, 8; Fejtő 1948, 359–62. Consider the following indirect indicators of the role played by Paris in expatriate politics: Paris was where the League of the Just was founded in 1837 (and to which the headquarters of that organization, by then renamed the Communist League, was moved in March 1848 at the behest of the new head of its Central Committee, Karl Marx); Mazzini launched his Young Europe movement from there in 1844; and the first issue of *Vorwärts* was published there by Börnstein and von Bornstedt in 1845. On these and other milestones of midcentury radicalism, see, e.g., Jones 2002, 15, 40, and Bourgin 1948b, 87.

111. Garnier-Pagès’s figure is cited by Quentin-Bauchart 1920, 204. His estimate is confirmed by Grandjonec 1975, 213.

112. Kramer 1988 similarly devotes entire chapters to Heine, Marx, and Mickiewicz as representatives of the exile experience in Paris between 1830 and 1848.

113. On the importance of this generation of radicals (and of generational phenomena more generally) to French revolutionary politics, see Spitzer 1987.

114. See Namier 1962, 42–44, who cites data indicating that 65 percent of Poles living abroad had relocated to France. According to the figures provided by Bourgin 1948b, 87, 90 percent of Polish émigré families resettled in France.

115. Chenu 1850, 190.

116. Lamartine 1849, 421, who had the responsibility of managing this volatile force, furnishes an acerbic summary of their role in Parisian politics: “These refugees had a voice in every club, a shout in every disturbance, and a hand in every act of popular violence.” The Polish question intersected with political developments in France in many ways, notably on May 15, when a rally in support of the liberation of Poland became the pretext for an abortive coup attempt against the recently elected French National Assembly. This was a savvy choice on the part of the organizers of the demonstration, as the cause of Polish freedom could be counted on to bring out large numbers of sympathetic liberals.

117. Stadelmann 1975, 64; Robertson 1967, 175; Namier 1962, 60. The memoirs of Leopold von Gerlach (cited in Eyck 1972, 55, 64), while contending that the mass of insurgents in those events was broadly representative of the Berlin population, confirm that both Poles and Frenchmen were key elements in inciting popular resistance during the March 18 uprising.

118. Ponteil [1937] 1955, 84–85.

119. Figure 22 conveys the spirit of the occasion, but it also introduces a regrettable inaccuracy. In the foreground, at the lower left of the image, lies an unopened crate clearly marked *fusils* (rifles). Though the republican authorities had principled motives for supporting Poles in their political goals (to say nothing of the self-interested desire to eliminate a drain on the treasury and remove a potentially disruptive influence from the French capital), they stopped short of direct military assistance and refused, despite repeated requests from exiled groups, to supply arms. If we are to credit the protestations of members of the provisional government—and in this case, unlike others to be discussed below, their version seems entirely credible—the Polish Legion was obliged to depart unarmed. According to Goriely 1948, 373, Polish émigrés had arranged to ship arms home, but these were privately procured and would certainly not have been on display in the streets of Paris.

Chenu 1850, 192–93 asserts that there were a number of French nationals who had joined the Polish Legion, assuming false identities. Their goal was to conceal their presence and avoid fueling fears that the new republic would revive the revolutionary proselytism of the 1790s. Adolphe Chenu himself traveled under the name Chenowski, claiming to have been born in Warsaw.

120. Bakunin 1977, 55 and 56. His comments should be read in light of the fact that the February insurrection constituted this passionate revolutionary’s first personal contact with a city in the throes of violent conflict. He considered the experience one of the highlights of his life.

121. Ibid., 63–67, 121–22.

122. Bakunin’s references to “the stupid students with their unheard-of demands” (ibid., 95–97) should be viewed in light of the fact that his *Confession* was written for (and actually read and annotated by) Tsar Nicholas while its author was detained in a Russian prison.

123. Ibid., 96 and 174 n. 87.

124. However, their testimony concerning Bakunin’s activities sometimes differed widely. See ibid., 190n149.

125. Ibid., 146. Most contemporary witnesses agreed that Bakunin’s role in the Dresden insurrection was central. The exception was Stephan Born, “who commanded the barricades during the last days of the fighting, [and] described Bakunin’s role as minimal and ineffectual” (ibid., 190n149).

126. Garnier-Pagès 1861, 204–7; Stearns 1974, 133.

127. The revolutionary lure of Paris did not require prior residence there. Acton 1961, 234, claims that responsibility for the first barricades in Naples at the time of the May 1848 uprising could be traced to Giovanni La Cecilia and Pietro Mileti, a pair of radical agitators who “had long been itching to imitate the

Parisian pioneers.”

128. Stadelmann 1975, 88–92. Herwegh was hardly alone among German revolutionaries in having been influenced by experiences in France, though in some cases the crucial events were of earlier date. Wagner’s biographer Ernest Newman asserts, for example, that the composer’s friend August Röckel, a leader of the 1849 insurrection in Dresden, “had come to Dresden in 1843 with the seeds of revolution already in him. In 1830, as a boy of sixteen, he had been an eyewitness to the July Revolution in Paris, and had there made the acquaintance of several of the democratic leaders; later he consorted a good deal with Spanish, Portuguese, and Polish political refugees” (Ernest Newman 1960, 2: 5).

129. Porschnev 1996, 18–19.

130. Noyes 1966, 52–53.

131. Indeed, after the collapse of the Dresden insurrection, Born managed to escape to Switzerland, where he ended up earning his living as a professor. On the intersections between the lives of Born, Marx, and Bakunin, see Hammen 1969.

132. Although the 1851 census used categories that lumped together the various German states and the Austrian empire and failed to discriminate between Spaniards and Portuguese, it does provide a broad outline of the distribution of non-citizens by national origin. Its top five rubrics are as follows,

<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Belgian	128,103	33.8
Italian	63,307	16.7
German,	57,061	15.0
Austro-Hungarian		
Spanish, Portuguese	29,736	7.8
Swiss	25,485	6.7

For a synopsis of national-level data on immigrants, see France, Ministère du commerce et de l’industrie 1893–94, xvi–xviii.

133. Mauco 1932, 36–37. See also Dupâquier 1995, 218, and Dupâquier and Kessler 1992, 382, for maps of the geographical distribution of foreign residents in 1851. Many, though by no means all, of these foreign nationals expected to return to their home countries. It has been estimated that “in 1847, 250,000 out of 340,000 immigrant workers in France were present on a temporary basis” (Noiriel 1990, 30).

134. The discussion here should be read keeping in mind the caveat of Grandjonc 1975, 217–20, that even for Paris, figures on flows of immigrants (as opposed to the number of foreigners actually residing in the city) prior to the 1851 census should be treated as rough approximations. Among the reasons for caution is the fact that estimates were typically based on the population living in boardinghouses and hotels catering to transients, thus overlooking a significant number of longer-term inhabitants who had established their own households. Even more problematic was the practice of equating the level of immigration (or emigration) with the differential between the number of entries and exits across France’s borders. Thus, quite large but equal movements into and out of France would yield the same result as no movement at all from the point of view of net immigration. This method gives no idea of the total number of border crossings, much less the length of the average stay, and can vastly understate the number of individuals affected, resulting in very significant distortions within any given reporting period. For example, in 1846, when such movements reached their zenith, the net immigration of 14,375 individuals reported by the Paris prefect of police actually represented the differential between 68,567 entries and 54,192 exits. Thus, as substantial as the number of foreign nationals living in Paris may have been at any given moment, the number who passed through the capital and were exposed to its influence must have been far greater. Grandjonc 1975, 222, 225, considers it plausible that official statistics on foreigners who lived for a time in

Paris accounted for only half their actual number.

135. See Grandjunc 1975, 290–91.

136. The low and high estimates are from Lequin 1992, 322, and Noyes 1966, 50. Carr 1975, 125, estimates 80,000. Grandjunc 1975, 233, notes that three occupational categories alone—shoemaker, cabinetmaker, and tailor—accounted for over 34,000 Germans.

137. On the mechanisms that linked the rural and urban manifestations of such breakdowns, see Labrousse 1948 and 1956.

138. Grandjunc 1975, 215, and Lequin 1992, 380. In referring to the protestors as “native-born,” I mean only that they were of French citizenship. In 1848, as throughout most of the nineteenth century, an absolute majority of Paris residents had been born in the provinces. Garnier-Pagès n.d., 2: 175–77, mentions incidents in major urban areas, ports, and border towns aimed at the expulsion of Belgians, English, Italians, and even Savoyards (who were still subjects of the king of Sardinia in 1848 and whose region would not be reincorporated into France until 1860). Among the sites affected were Lyon, Marseille, Le Havre, Valenciennes, Tourcoing, Grandcombe, and Chisy. In Paris, demonstrators shouted, “Down with Savoyards! Expel the foreigners!” Blaison 1933, 30–31, references clashes between French and foreign workers in Tours and Lillebonne that resulted in deaths on both sides. The Luxembourg Commission deemed the situation to be of sufficient gravity to issue a proclamation calling for an end to attacks against foreigners, basing its appeal both on abstract principle and on the pragmatic grounds that “a much greater number of French nationals earn their livelihood by working in England, Germany, Switzerland, America, and under distant skies.” Dupâquier 1995, 220, mentions a “wave of anti-Italian xenophobia,” and Bensimon 2000, 207, the anti-English demonstrations that overtook France at the time of the 1848 revolution. Amann 1975, 168–71, also makes reference to “a latent xenophobia that singled out the lowest-paid foreign workers, mostly Savoyards and Belgians, as chief victims.” Benoit 1968, 112, alludes indirectly to the persecution of foreign workers in Lyon during roughly this same period. According to Edgar Newman 1975, 23–24, 36nn46–47, and Grandjunc 1975, 223, anti-immigrant sentiment among French workers had also been high during economic downturns during the Restoration.

139. Garnier-Pagès n.d., 178 and 181, observes that on March 24, the government voted an initial appropriation of 60,000 francs toward the cost of transporting foreign workers as far as Strasbourg, and that three days later it decided to move up the payment of the quarterly subsidy of 150,000 francs to Polish residents of Paris, some of whom had resolved to rush to the aid of their native land.

140. See Robertson 1967, 171. The participation of foreigners in Parisian insurrections was hardly new. Bourgin 1948a, 73; 1948b, 87, for example, noted that a number of foreign workers had fought on the barricades of 12 and 13 May 1839, and a sprinkling even showed up among those decorated for their distinguished role in the French revolution of 1830. Still, the size of the foreign contingent in the February revolution appears to have been unparalleled.

141. Essentially the same list is provided by Blaison 1933, 27–28; Bourgin 1948a, 107, and 1948b, 87; Sigmann 1973, 230; and Ponteil [1937] 1955, 81–84, who refers to Paris in 1848 as “an international revolutionary center.” Garnier-Pagès n.d., 178, provides a somewhat different enumeration that covers much the same ground but also mentions Irish, Greek, Moldavian, and Savoyard organizations. Fejtő 1948, 362–63, mentions an Association of Parisian Hungarians.

142. Ginsborg 1979, 148.

143. Bourgin 1948b, 91. With regard to Antonini’s French connections, Ginsborg 1979, 219, remarks that he “had been to Moscow with Napoleon, fought in Poland in 1830 and with Mazzini’s [1834] expedition in Savoy.” After being exiled from his own country, he had taken up residence in Paris and was living there when the February Days arrived.

144. See Garnier-Pagès n.d., 186–87; Lamartine 1849, 420; and Benoit 1968, 113–14.

145. See Blaison 1933, 10, 15, 28.

146. See Lewald 1977, 59–60, 75. Her diary entry for March 15 speaks of Germans “demanding

weapons, clothing and money from the French to come to the aid of their German brothers on the other side of the Rhine. Collections were taken up in the churches for the German republicans. The Germans exercise on the Field of Mars.” A week earlier, a delegation speaking on behalf of Germans living in Paris delivered a document to the provisional government making similar demands, to which no fewer than 6,000 signatures were appended. Indeed, as early as March 6, Bornstedt had attracted four thousand German residents to an organizational meeting. See Quentin-Bauchart 1907, 167, and Blaison 1933, 35,

147. Ponteil [1937] 1955, 82; Bourgin 1948b, 91; Robertson 1967, 171–72; Blaison 1933, 48.

148. Quentin-Bauchart 1907, 167–71.

149. The French government published a decree aimed at breaking up concentrations of Germans in the staging area near the border, but it came too late to make a difference, as most of Herwegh’s forces had already crossed the Rhine. See Ponteil [1937] 1955, 84. On the additional steps taken by Lamartine to restrain this and other columns of volunteers, see Stern 1862, 2: 146.

150. Although the Legion consisted for the most part of workers from the various German states, its membership included a number of French citizens as well as men of other nationalities, notably Poles. The ubiquitous Bakunin turned up as the individual charged with the conduct of the Legion’s external affairs. See Droz 1957, 237, and Ponteil [1937] 1955, 82–83.

151. See Droz 1957, 240–41. Quentin-Bauchart 1907, 180, estimates insurgent losses at thirty dead and thirty wounded.

152. One of the original organizers of this group was, in fact, a Frenchman, Félix Becker, though leadership soon passed to Frédéric Blervacq, a Belgian-born wine merchant resident in Paris. The Paris Society was in regular contact with the Democratic Society of Brussels. See Quentin-Bauchart 1907, 187.

153. Dessal 1948, 108–9.

154. Lamartine 1849, 419–20, in his history of this period, is extremely circumspect in how he treats his colleagues’ activities. A more candid and revealing account is provided by Stern 1862, 2: 146–50. Some of the details reported here also come from Chenu 1850, 164–66, one of Caussidière’s lieutenants, who was assigned responsibility for carrying out the prefect’s plan. To escape a difficult political situation in Paris, Chenu would ultimately serve not only in the Belgian expedition but in the Polish Legion and as part of the force that invaded Baden. See Chenu 1850, 180–86.

155. See Dessal 1948, 110–13; Stern 1862, 2: 146–50; and Lewald 1997, 86, who by coincidence shared a train from Paris to Brussels with 300 members of one of the convoys and complained that they continually and raucously sang the “Marseillaise” throughout the night. Engels gives his disparaging assessment of these same events in a brief article in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, no. 93 (September 3, 1848), commenting on the outcome of the subsequent trial.

156. Quentin-Bauchart 1907, 204, who cites the casualty figures published in *Le Moniteur*.

157. Dhondt 1948, 117–19.

158. See *ibid.*, 119, 122, 130.

159. This mode of transmission was not limited to Europe. Algerian settlers were stirred into protest demonstrations when they learned of the birth of the Second Republic, and interior regions were soon made aware of the 1848 revolutions because “news of civil strife in Paris and Algiers was rapidly carried from the coastal cities to the southern Constantine by the ‘Biskris,’ or migrant workers from the oases” (Clancy-Smith 1994, 97).

160. See Namier 1962, 3, 7.

161. Workers of German nationality alone who fought during the February Days numbered in the thousands, according to Hammen 1969, 84, 201.

CHAPTER 7. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE BARRICADE

Epigraph: Trotsky 1923, 306.

1. Of course, it never paid to rely too heavily on this ability to lose oneself in the crowd. Following an unsuccessful revolt like the June Days, it might be more than one's life was worth to be caught with traces of black powder on the hands, forearms, or lips. Norbert Truquin, just fifteen at the time of the Parisian insurrection of June 1848, was a bystander at the capture of the monster barricade in the faubourg Saint-Antoine. As he made his way back to his own neighborhood, he was stopped by soldiers, who took him for an insurgent because his hands and lips were stained black. He was able to secure his release only when he produced from his pocket a handful of the black cherries he had been eating. Needless to say, in order to avoid a possibly fatal repetition of this encounter, he was careful to wash off all traces of them before proceeding further (Truquin 1977, 76–80).

2. Du Camp 1881, 2: 232.

3. Napoléon Gaillard, who headed the Barricade Commission in May 1871, was of the same opinion, according to Rossel 1960, 334–35. On the history of this curious institution, created by the Government of National Defense in September 1870 for use against the Prussians, but revived under the Commune to build fortifications for use against the army of the Versailles government, see Dalotel and Freiermuth 1982, 14.

4. Poulain [1588] 1836, 324.

5. In pointing to the dual purpose of early barricades—“to block the way and provide a reasonable degree of shelter”—Duveau 1967, 164, tends to emphasize their flimsy, insubstantial character, noting: “The people had not yet started overturning vehicles in the roadway, and contented themselves with placing a few hurdles (*barriques*).” It is true that these structures, whose primary purpose was to deny access to infantry and marauders, were often much less substantial than those built to resist the artillery barrages of nineteenth-century armies. We have nonetheless seen that the widespread use of barrels anticipated the later use of wheeled vehicles, in that both had the ability to be transformed from rolling stock to immovable object in the twinkling of an eye.

6. “Amplification des particularités qui se passèrent à Paris” ([1588] 1836), 356–57. *Trésor de la langue française* . . . (1971–77), 4: 211, also singles out this ability to interdict access as a defining characteristic of the barricade.

7. Poulain [1588] 1836, 300.

8. Recall that the queen-mother's mission required that she cross Paris from the Louvre to the Hôtel de Guise in a sedan chair, stopping at every barricade to persuade its defenders to open a breach just wide enough to allow her to pass. Though her efforts at conciliation were ultimately fruitless, this arduous journey across the city to hold a private interview with the duc de Guise demonstrated that the true function of the barricade was to regulate movement rather than prohibit it altogether, since insurgents were willing to relax their control when it appeared to serve their interests. See “Amplification des particularités qui se passèrent à Paris” ([1588] 1836), 357; “Histoire de la journée des barricades de Paris” ([1588] 1836), 387.

9. Lavissee 1978, 40.

10. See Barrot 1875, 1: 523–38. This episode has also been the subject of many secondary accounts, e.g., Thureau-Dangin 1892, 7: 472. As I have noted elsewhere, the king did have a choice but lacked the resolve to effect a strategic withdrawal from the capital and engage in a bloody fight to retain his crown.

11. *Collection complète des mémoires* . . . (1823), 36: 107n1.

12. Paris, Bureau de la ville, 1883–1921, 9: 118.

13. [Saint-Yon, F.?] [1588] 1836, 336–38.

14. Mariéjol 1911, 271–72.

15. Meindre 1855, 443.

16. Isambert 1828, 34, 39.

17. Fayot 1830–31, 1: 98.

18. The incident is related in Boigne 1921–23, 4: 98.
19. Duveau 1967, 165.
20. Guizot 1860, 447.
21. Monfalcon 1834, 228.
22. Nougarede de Fayet 1850, 97–101. On the events in Prairial 1795, see chap. 4.
23. Normanby 1857, 1: 93.
24. Proudhon 1875, 2: 282–83. Proudhon’s assessment should not be thought of as merely the opinion of an armchair observer. He had helped build barricades in the vicinity of the Paris Bourse during the February Days.
25. Caussidière 1849, 43–44.
26. Freycinet 1911, 8.
27. “Détails des troubles et désordres qui ont eu lieu à Paris” (1839), 6.
28. St. John 1848, 82–83.
29. Boigne 1921–23, 4: 39. On Napoléon II, see chapter 5, n 70, above.
30. Boigne 1921–23, 4: 40.
31. At a later stage in a successful uprising, bands of youths might reverse this process by making the rounds of neighborhoods where insurgents held sway and joining in a chorus of “Des lampions!” This served to place residents on notice that they needed either to show solidarity with the insurrection by displaying lighted candles or risk having their windows broken. In this way, insurgents crudely manipulated the level of illumination to either mask their riotous behavior or support their efforts to restore order in neighborhoods they now controlled. For descriptions of these contrasting behaviors in 1830—the breaking of lamps on July 27 and 28, the lighting of candles on July 29—see Pinkney 1972a, 90–91, 105, and 136. Shivelbusch 1988, 105–14, discusses both practices, mainly in the context of 1848, a year in which they spread to other European locations. Ebers 1893, 126, for example, notes the same pattern during the March 1848 uprising in Berlin.
32. St. John 1848, 82–83.
33. Nougarede de Fayet 1850, 60.
34. The story was recorded by the German novelist Fanny Lewald [1850] 1997, 51–53, who visited Heine in early March at the sanitarium outside Paris where he was being treated for tuberculosis.
35. Nougarede de Fayet 1850, 58. On a similar note, see Lewald [1850] 1997, 49. Such reports presumably furnished the basis for the similar incident related by Victor Hugo in *Les misérables*.
36. Alexandre Dumas père tells in his *Mémoires* how in 1830, his friend Etienne Arago (brother of François, the astronomer, who would become a member of the provisional government in 1848) persuaded such a crowd to begin barricade construction in the rue Saint-Honoré by approaching the driver of a wagon loaded with rubble:

“Pardon me, my friend,” said Etienne, as he unharnessed the horse, “but we need your vehicle.”

“What for?”

“To make a barricade, of course!”

“Yes, yes, barricades! Make barricades!” cried several others.

In the blink of an eye, the horses had been unhitched, the wagon turned on its side, and bits of stone strewn all across the street. (Dumas [1852–53] 1989, 2: 43)

37. This line of argument is, I suspect, so familiar today that it requires no elaboration. Its classic sociological expression is found in Emile Durkheim’s analysis, in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, of how religious rituals make manifest the passage from the state he labels “profane” to the one he calls “sacred.”

38. See also, e.g., Dayot [1901] n.d., 245; Edwards 1973, 159; Gall 1998, 96, 125; *Histoire illustrée de six ans de guerre et de révolution, 1870–76* (n.d.), 476; *L'Illustration*, February 12, 1870; *Le Monde illustré*, February 19, 1870, 124; Simond 1900, 2: 713; Tichý 1948.

39. Tocqueville 1971, 172–73.

40. The diary of the Lyonnais Joseph Bergier, who happened to be in Paris at the time of the June Days, records that a man arriving from the countryside by train had required four hours to cross the capital from the station to his residence, in part because he was forced to stop and help insurgents construct barricades all along his route. In times of insurrection, anyone who traveled the city's streets could expect to be greeted at successive barricades with the words "Your paving-stone, citizen!" (Bergier 1924, 120). The historian Edith Thomas reports that the same demand was made of Virginie Lenordez, a supporter of the Paris Commune (Thomas 1966, 152–53).

In addition to the sources already cited, the practice of forcing passersby to contribute to barricade construction in Paris insurrections is noted for 1834 by Girod de l'Ain, 1834, 356–57; for February 1848 by Weill 1928, 207; for June 1848 in *Procès des insurgés des 23, 24, 25 et 26 juin* (1848), 1: 6–14, and by Pardigon 1852, 75; and for 1871 by Blanchecotte 1872, 265; Edwards 1973, 61, 162; Horne 1965, 366; and Lissagaray 1871, 49.

41. *Times*, March 20, 1871, as cited in Edwards 1973, 56–62.

42. France, Archives nationales F⁹⁰, as cited in Laurent 1934, 22–24.

43. Briquet 1981, 315. Perdiguier, a skilled joiner, became widely known as the author of books on workers' brotherhoods (*campagnonnages*), which still flourished in the last years of the Bourbon Restoration. His publications brought him such acclaim that in 1848, after the French Second Republic declared universal manhood suffrage, Perdiguier was elected to the National Assembly, one of a handful of workers so honored. Though a political moderate, he was briefly imprisoned and then forced to live in exile for four years after Louis Napoleon's 1851 coup. Perdiguier's celebrated autobiography, *Mémoires d'un compagnon*, dates from that period.

44. Rossel 1960, 276.

45. In addition to the brief discussion of these "industrial barricades" in chapter 1, see Du Camp 1881, 229–31; Dalotel and Freiermuth 1982, 17–18; Martine 1971, 200; and Senisse 1965, 110.

46. Perdiguier's recalcitrance may not have been entirely without influence since he was clearly recognized by the insurgents, according to Briquet 1981, 314–16. They were therefore in a position to take his personal history and political views into account. In most such encounters—even the one with Corcelles, as far as we know—they had to rely on more ambiguous indicators, such as style of dress or manner of speech, or nonverbal cues like posture and facial expression, in forming their impressions.

47. On the events of 4 Prairial, see chapter 4.

48. See Tønnesson 1959, 319.

49. The account of this incident in Dommange 1969, 192, 197–98, is based on the insider's perspective of Lucien de la Hodde, who took part in the 1839 uprising (and was also a police spy). See Hodde 1850, 239–53.

50. Lucas-Dubreton 1932, 170–71. The individual who offered Carrel such facile assurance that the army would side with the insurgents appears to have been none other than Alexandre Dumas *père*. For what it is worth, Dumas himself offers this account of how potential insurgents debated the prospects for victory on the evening of July 27, 1830, before the magnitude of that earlier popular uprising had become apparent: "Some said that the movement under way at that hour had no more staying power than 1827 and that the riot, lacking the strength to rise to the level of revolution, would abort in the same way. Others—myself among them—claimed on the contrary that we had only arrived at the prologue of the play, and that the next day would see amazing things accomplished" (Dumas [1852–53] 1989, 2: 44).

Tocqueville 1971, 172, similarly notes in connection with the June Days that at the moment when the

first barricades went up, people were “still in doubt as to whether this meant a serious resort to arms.”

51. Clausel, who began his career as a volunteer in the republican armies of the 1790s, had delivered a spirited address at the funeral of General Lamarque, the event that provided the initial pretext for the 1832 demonstrations in Paris. This entire anecdote is recounted in Blanc 1846, 3: 288.

52. In the end, the members of the War Council must have credited this mitigating testimony, for while Jacquinet was convicted of having taken part in the insurrection and assisted the rebels in putting up barricades, he was acquitted on four other counts and sentenced to just one year of prison, a mere slap on the wrist compared to the punishments meted out to others found guilty of participation in the June Days. The transcripts of these trials can be found in *Procès des insurgés des 23, 24, 25 et 26 juin* (1848), 1: 72–78.

53. “Détails des troubles et désordres qui ont eu lieu à Paris” (1839), 6.

54. See Nougarede de Fayet 1850, 75–76. St. John 1848, 84, 94–95, skillfully evokes the sort of uncertainty that existed in the early stages of most barricade events.

55. Hugo [1862] 1982, 1045.

56. See Blanqui 1971, 218. Antoine-Alphonse Chassepot was the inventor of the bolt-action breech-loading rifle used by the French army at the time of the Paris Commune.

57. Cited in Tombs 1981, 149–50. Tombs rightly points out that Delescluze’s brash statement may have amounted to whistling past the graveyard, since there was no longer any realistic hope of a disciplined defense of Paris. The controversy on this point has nonetheless been unremitting.

58. For examples of such arguments, see Guizot 1860, 242; F. B. Smith 1979, 97; *Procès des insurgés de Rouen: Cour d’assises du Calvados* . . . ([1849] n.d.), 13; Perdu n.d., 27, 86; Tønnesson 1959, 314–21. These sources are, however, merely illustrative of the style of reasoning found throughout both the primary and secondary literature.

59. Monfalcon 1834, 230n1.

60. Girod de l’Ain, 1834, 232, 234, 237ff.

61. Charléty 1921, 104.

62. Truquin 1977, 62, 75. Despite his youth, Truquin was not a complete novice in such matters. He had not only helped build a barricade in the rue de l’Echaudé during the February Days but had also had the opportunity to think about barricade construction from a completely different point of view, having been fortunate enough, during the acute economic crisis that followed, to secure a job with two pavers who had been hired to repair streets torn up to make barricades.

63. Boigne 1921–23, 4: 24, 29.

64. Heine 1906, 7: 276. A successful insurrection typically resulted in a more ambiguous mix of motives, but the positions of opponents and supporters of the uprising tended to be reversed.

65. Caron 1997, 190.

66. Pinkney 1964, 5; 1972, 256.

67. Duprat 1997, 206, calls attention to the way that, in Delacroix’s presentation, “The violence of the combat in July 1830 as well as its origins were masked beneath the heroic figures of a people united by the presence of women on the barricades.” Hunt and Hall 1990, 15, similarly points out that while women were an important part of the crowd during the Great Revolution of 1789 and particularly central in specific *journées*, representations of many events of the period exaggerated their presence as part of “the mythical representation of bloody violence.” The inclusion of female figures is used to suggest that participation in revolutionary upheaval was universal, ethical, and legitimate. A similar dynamic applies to the depiction of monks in the Prague uprising of June 1848. Pech 1969, 149n33, notes how “popular memory extolled the members of the Franciscan order as barricade-fighters, and a well-known contemporary drawing immortalized them in that role.” In reality, he goes on to observe, although “some members of the order were compelled to take part in the building of the barricades by public threats,” the depiction of clerics as combatants was a fabrication intended to emphasize the broad-based character of the insurrectionary

response. On this same point, see also Hauch 2001, 670.

68. Marrinan 1988, 35–36.

69. Bruno Tavernier (1967, 240), who subjected the iconography of the July Days to close scrutiny, has focused attention on the process of stereotyping that results when a masterwork like Delacroix's *La Liberté guidant le peuple* comes to be adopted as a template for innumerable successor works. He argues that substitutions made for editorial reasons—for example, the way the décor and main protagonists were often faithfully copied from the original, while secondary figures had their attire transformed from the coats and frilly shirts of the middle class to the simple work smocks worn by artisans—were sometimes motivated by considerations like increasing the images' appeal to their intended audience. However, contrary to the general line of argument pursued by Tavernier, this very malleability impugns the validity of this sort of visual evidence as a form of historical documentation. As Thomas Bouchet (2003, 31, 37–39) has reminded us, such images are “filters rather than mirrors,” because they obey a logic foreign to the historian's preoccupation with the factual record: “We know how illusory it is to rely on paintings, lithographs, or sketches hastily completed on a street corner as a way of establishing what actually happened at some particular place, at some particular moment; and there is no reason why representations of insurrections should be an exception to the rule.”

70. For example, a band of “200 to 300 boys [*gamins*]” reportedly marched four abreast through the capital before throwing up three barricades in the boulevard Saint-Denis (Bergier 1924, 117).

71. I have already remarked on the pivotal role that students performed in the diffusion of the barricade across Europe in 1848, but it was less the result of their numbers than of their mobility and organizational resources. In France, the part played by students—in particular, those enrolled at the Ecole Polytechnique—made a huge impression on public consciousness. The exaggerated heed paid to the sixty odd *polytechniciens* who fought in July 1830 can to some degree be attributed to the fact that they were seen as reviving the struggle against the Bourbons by attacking the same General Marmont who had betrayed Napoléon in 1814. (See Marrinan 1988, 36.) Still, their ubiquitous presence in contemporary images must be ascribed in part to seemingly superficial considerations: their youth, their military bearing, and even their distinctive dark uniforms—highlighted by brilliant red stripes down each pant leg and rakish cocked hats—which rendered them instantly recognizable in a crowd.

72. This is borne out by comparisons of the average age of those who fought on both sides, which has consistently established that insurgents were appreciably older than the soldiers against whom they fought. Note that this finding, rather than being the key to interpreting the political orientation of insurgents and repressors, as has sometimes been assumed, appears to be a simple artifact of military recruitment practices. Whether they were conscripts or volunteers, the soldiers were almost always young, unmarried men. Even recruits to a militia like the Mobile Guard of 1848 followed this pattern, because those who enrolled had to be prepared to live in barracks and serve full-time. In contrast, the ranks of the insurgents remained open to whoever chose to participate and therefore tended to include the full spectrum of age cohorts. As a result, none of the compilations of casualty statistics that I have seen suggests that juveniles contributed more than a small share of barricade defenders.

73. Jean-Claude Caron cites the nineteenth-century historian Achille de Vaulabelle to the effect that the barricades of 1827 were built by “a band of fifty to sixty adolescents, dressed in tattered shirts or wearing work aprons” (Caron 1997, 188). The role that children (and, often, women) played in barricade construction is also noted, e.g., in Rude 1954, 34, and Perdu 1933, 32, for Lyon in 1831; *Le National*, October 2, 1869, 2, for Paris in 1869; and Blanchecotte 1972, 257, 265, and Lissagaray 1871, 38, 50, for May 1871.

74. Lucas-Dubreton 1932, 181, notes that “children loaded rifles, ripping posters off the walls and eventually tearing their shirts into strips to use as wadding.”

75. See, e.g., Martine 1971, 198.

76. Senisse 1965, 180–82. Delescluze also took an active part in both the 1832 and 1834 uprisings and

was the first to proclaim the Republic in Valenciennes in February 1848.

77. Heine, an eyewitness to the Parisian insurrection of 1832, remarks on the presence of “grey-bearded men” (1906, 7: 286, 311). Lucas-Dubreton 1932, 181, mentions “old men” who, along with veterans, gave advice, supervised construction, and even regulated the rate of fire.

78. See Traugott 1988. See also Price 1975, 183; Duveau 1967, 233; France, *Cour des pairs*, 1836, 81–82.

79. Even Hauch 2001, 667, a source that highlights female participation in street fighting, stipulates that in Prague, Vienna, Berlin, and other cities, women of all classes were primarily engaged in the building of barricades and the provision of food and drink. On this subject, see Caron 1997, 190, for Paris in 1830; Rude 1954, 85, and Perdu 1933, 32, for Lyon in 1831; Lucas-Dubreton 1932, 181, for Paris in 1832; Truquin 1977, 76, and Schmidt 1948, 44, for June 1848; and Edith Thomas 1966, 133 ff., for 1871. This last author points out that even during the Paris Commune, where female combatants played an especially prominent part, the roles of ambulance nurse or canteen worker were often combined with that of barricade fighter. On the elaborate but flexible division of labor of which insurgents were capable, even in a small-scale event like that of May 1839, see Dommanget 1969, 216.

80. See also Albert Kretschmer’s print entitled “Shot-maker behind a Barricade [in Berlin],” originally published in the *Illustrierte Zeitung* (Leipzig), no. 250 (15 April 1848): 254, and reproduced in Blos 1893, 145, which shows a woman removing the beading from a leaded window and several adolescents and young men engaged in melting the lead strips to pour it into a bullet mold.

81. Dumas [1852–53] 1989, 2: 835–36, 842–43. Lewald [1850] 1997, 48, likewise notes that in addition to melting “tin” utensils to make bullets, women and children prepared lint (in French, *charpie*) for bandages by tearing narrow strips from linen sheets and fraying the edges in order to make them more absorbent and better able to staunch the flow of blood. See also Pearson and MacLaughlin 1871, 4.

82. Women’s ability to move about the city was cause for comment in many French sources. Both Lucas-Dubreton 1932, 181, and Edith Thomas 1966, 154, mention their delivering cartridges or serving as couriers, and a similar observation concerning the Prague uprising of 1848 is offered by Hauch 2001, 667. This willingness to exploit women’s ability to circulate freely was presumably responsible for reports (quite possibly apocryphal) that a woman had been arrested for feigning pregnancy so as to transport ammunition hidden beneath her skirts (Normanby 1857, 2: 43).

83. *Grande encyclopédie* (1887), 493; [Saint-Yon, F.?] [1588] 1836, 336–38, 345.

84. *Régistres de l’Hôtel de Ville de Paris pendant la Fronde* (1846), 1: 451.

85. Moses 1830, 82.

86. See Orléans 1993, 515.

87. Women reportedly accounted for just over 10 percent of insurgent casualties in the fighting in Prague in June 1848 (Pech 1968, 361n70). See also the armed woman on a university barricade in Vienna in May 1848 in fig. 20.

88. Anecdotal reports of female combatants can be found, e.g., for 1830 in Orléans 1993, 515 ff.; for the Lyon insurrection of 1834 in Gelu 1971, 19; and for the June insurrections of 1848 in Prague and Paris in Hauch 2001, 667, and Normanby 1857, 2: 27–28, respectively. Data compiled by Pinkney 1964, Traugott 1988, and Tilly and Lees 1975 show that 3.4 percent of those who received government compensation for their participation in the July Days were women, as were 1.1 percent of those honored in the aftermath of the February Days and 2.4 percent of those arrested following the June Days. It should be noted that both compensation and arrest records are open to criticism on many grounds and may constitute an especially fallible measure of the rate of participation of a stratum of the population that was clearly violating gender norms. However, despite occasional references to the contrary—for example, Delio Cantimori’s (1948, 119) estimate that of those killed in the Milan uprising of March 1848, at least 10 percent were women and an additional 10 percent were children of both sexes—there appears to be little warrant for assuming that women constituted more than a small fraction of actual combatants through 1848.

89. The illustrated version of Garnier-Pagès's *Histoire de la Révolution de 1848* (n.d., 2: 145) contains an image identified as a guardroom of the Vésuviennes, but the accompanying text provides no details. Postgate 1955, 176, asserts that a June barricade was "manned, if that term is appropriate, by between fifty and sixty women." Based on the details furnished, this appears to originate in an account by Schmidt 1926, 40, which, though supplying no references of any kind, indicates that the barricade in question was crowned with a banner inscribed with the name of a specific unit of the Parisian National Workshops. Since women were prohibited from enrolling in that organization, both the Postgate and Schmidt reports have to be considered anomalous.

90. The best-known of these organizations were the Union des femmes pour la défense de Paris et les secours aux blessés (Women's Union for the Defense of Paris and Aid to the Wounded) and the Comité de vigilance féminine de Montmartre (Montmartre Feminine Vigilance Committee).

91. See, e.g., Edith Thomas 1966, x, who quotes Maxime du Camp's remark that "these bellicose viragos held out longer than the men did behind the barricades."

92. I have deliberately avoided mention of the celebrated "women's barricade" in the place Blanche because, notwithstanding the many visual representations created after the fact, the documentary record remains equivocal. Tombs 1981, 150, for example, cites Sutter-Laumann to the effect that this structure's last defenders were "a woman and seven or eight men, all very old or very young." For a remarkably dispassionate recent assessment bearing on the claim that this barricade was defended exclusively or predominantly by women, see Dalotel 1997. Despite the questions that have been raised concerning that specific episode, the broad scope of female involvement in the events of the Paris Commune is amply documented in such works as Blanchecotte 1872, B[rocher] 1909, Lissagaray 1871, and Edith Thomas 1966, as well as in the *Cri du peuple*, *Tribun du peuple*, *Vérité*, and other newspapers of the time.

The attention showered on the women's barricade of 1871 shows how images (and particularly caricature) could achieve precisely the opposite of the halo effect previously discussed in connection with barricade events like 1795 and 1830. Images of women on the barricade in the place Blanche (and, to an even greater extent, of the so-called *pétroleuses*, or women incendiaries, who were blamed for setting fire to buildings in Paris following the defeat of the Commune) similarly exaggerated the presence of women, but this time in an effort to cast insurgents in an *unfavorable* light. In 1871, female figures, often represented as furies or harpies bent on blood vengeance, became a way of signaling the depths to which insurgents (exemplified by those members of "the gentler sex" found among them) had been degraded.

93. Paul Martine (1971, 282–83) estimated the proportion of women among those who died to be roughly 20 percent, but that figure referred specifically to those killed "after the battle." More firmly established is the fact that just over a thousand women were arrested following the *semaine sanglante*, though more than half of them were subsequently released without going to trial. Unfortunately, the relationship between detention and combat participation is impossible to ascertain. See the discussion of these issues in Dalotel 1997, 352–55.

94. Heine 1906, 7: 285. It is worth pointing out that even Heine's American translator, Charles Godfrey Leland, was quick to object to this characterization. He inserted a footnote disputing the poet's contention, based on his own experience as a combatant in the February Days, to the effect that "the squad of about fifty whom I led at the barricades in 1848 were as thorough a set of roughs and finished specimens of 'the lower orders' as I have ever beheld, and such was the character of the vast majority of the insurgents everywhere" (ibid., n. 2).

Heine's comment also underscored the inherent limitations of conclusions based solely on personal experience or on some specific illustrative case. When Edgar Newman cites the example of a manufacturer who distributed "bullets fashioned from the lead pipes in his garden" to his workers, for example, or says that Barrot contributed five hundred francs for the purchase of powder and arms and had his secretaries make cartridges (Newman 1974, 36–37 and n. 54), he is no doubt alluding to facts, but they were hardly typical.

95. Isambert n.d., 8 and n. 1. Perhaps the most fascinating revelation of this report to the Council of State is that several police officers joined the barricade builders as agents provocateurs and that one of them was even responsible for the defection of some soldiers.

96. See Nadaud 1976, 256–57. Nadaud owed his celebrity in part to the fact that he had served as a member of the Luxembourg Commission in 1848 and was, like Perdiguier, one of the relative handful of authentic workers elected to the Legislative Assembly in 1849. His political views made him sufficiently visible to be among those driven into exile at the time of the coup of 1851.

97. *Procès des insurgés de Rouen: Cour d'assises du Calvados*. . . ([1849] n.d.), 5. A plaster worker (*plâtrier*) might do anything from quarrying limestone to interior finish work.

98. Senisse 1965, 87.

99. Gallaher 1980, 60.

100. These anecdotes can be found in Boigne 1921–23, 4: 39. 35, Wagner 1983, 395–96, and Martine 1971, 200. Engineers had also been enlisted to help in the construction of barricades during the Belgian revolution of 1830 (see chap. 5, n. 38, above).

101. On the critical role played by newspapers like Fabre's *La Tribune des Départements* in 1830, *Le National* and *La Réforme* in 1848, and *La Lanterne* and *La Marseillaise* in the years immediately preceding the Paris Commune, see, by way of examples, Weill 1928, 21–33, and Nougarede de Fayet 1850, 156.

102. Fayot 1830–31, 1: 84.

103. Lucas-Dubreton 1932, 193.

104. *Les barricades: Scènes les plus saisissantes* . . . (1848), 11.

105. *Procès des insurgés des 23, 24, 25 et 26 juin* . . . (1848), 1: 3–20. Pardigon 1852, 74, provides further details concerning National Guard officers who presided over barricade construction during the June conflict.

106. *Le National*, May 7, 1871, 3. On the Savoyard Arnaud, who gave the initial order to begin digging up paving stones in the Lyon insurrection of 1834, see also Girod de l'Ain, 1834, 238, and France, *Cour des pairs*, 1834, 238; 1836, 82–84.

107. Schmidt 1948, 45.

108. Caussidière 1849, 1: 76.

109. Heine 1906, 7: 513n1.

110. *Procès des insurgés des 23, 24, 25 et 26 juin* (1848), 107–8. According to documents in his own handwriting, Hibruit's authority extended over four entire streets in the faubourg Saint-Antoine. Of course, it was not only those sympathetic to the insurgents who felt the need to identify rebel leaders. "It is the government and police that need chefs de barricades; and when there are none, they may have to be invented," *Réforme*, February 11, 1870, 2, wryly commented. The authorities were quick to name a half-dozen firebrands presumed to have presided over the selection of sites, the unpaving of streets, and the physical construction of barricades in the Lyon uprising of April 1834. See Girod de l'Ain, 1834, 237–44; France, *Cour des pairs*, 1834, 237–44; 1836, 81–82. And even ordinary citizens were prepared to denounce ringleaders of failed insurrections, to judge by the testimony of the arresting officer in the court martial of Narcisse Dubois, who described the difficulty he had experienced in conducting his captive to the Abbaye prison, because civilians they encountered in the street cried out that Dubois was "the professor of the barricades" and insisted that he be executed on the spot (*Procès des insurgés des 23, 24, 25 et 26 juin* [1848], 2: 97–100).

111. Hugo [1862] 1982, 1022.

112. Of course, numbers *did* usually favor the army if the conflict lasted long enough for reserves stationed in more distant regions to be called in to supplement the limited complement of troops garrisoned in a particular city. In such cases, the insurgents' chances of winning diminished drastically, even if they enjoyed overwhelming support among the local population. For example, the Lyon uprising of silk workers

in November 1831 was of formidable scope, involving as many as 30,000 workers in the construction and defense of barricades (Rude 1953, 56–57). The rebellion was, in fact, robust enough to persuade some soldiers—a score of seasoned veterans as well as a number of noncommissioned officers—to go over to the insurgents. But the hope that the Lyon revolt would inspire a Parisian insurrection capable of toppling the government was never fulfilled, and troops were soon brought in from neighboring provinces to restore order in France’s second largest city.

Events in Lyon invite several observations concerning nineteenth-century European insurrections. First, those that succeeded occurred in capital cities to a disproportionate degree, for the rebels were ultimately safe from repression only if they managed to incapacitate the regime in power. Second, victory was generally achieved within the space of two or three days or not at all, since any greater time lapse would allow the government to rally its forces and destroy the insurgency, which it would then cast as a regional rebellion lacking broad appeal. Finally, the fact that urban insurrections were less likely to succeed—and eventually less likely to occur at all—as the century advanced, must be attributed in part to novel technologies like railroads and the telegraph, which further compressed the window of opportunity for insurgents.

113. Trotsky 1967, 1: 126.

114. See Chorley 1973, esp. 15–23. I would like to thank Theda Skocpol for having first alerted me, now long ago, to the relevance of Chorley’s analysis in connection with my earlier research on the determinants of political orientation in the June Days of 1848 (Traugott 1985).

115. Chorley notes a significant exception to this general rule, however: at the conclusion of a lengthy and unsuccessful war, the ascendancy of the officer corps over common soldiers may be so deeply undermined that the latter are prepared to support an insurrectionary movement even in the face of resistance from their superiors (Chorley 1973, 124–27). Russia in 1917 is the obvious case in point.

I have encountered a few exceptional cases where, even in the absence of the special circumstances to which Chorley pointed, high-ranking officers proved susceptible to insurgent appeals. One fascinating example occurred during a Lyon insurrection that broke out in response to the July Days of 1830 in Paris. As recounted by Montagne 1966, 97–98, when Colonel Verdière rode his horse into the very shadow of a barricade in order to engage a group of armed insurgents in debate, he little suspected that it was he who would end up yielding. Torn between his duty as a soldier and his sense of obligation as a Frenchman, he ended up resolving, not only to avoid bloodshed by suspending the mission he had been assigned, but also to throw his lot in with the insurgents. His decision to switch sides faced two unforeseen obstacles. On the one hand, the mass of barricade defenders were inclined to question the sincerity of the colonel’s sudden change of allegiance. On the other, the officers serving under him, who had maintained a stony silence throughout these negotiations, seemed prepared to resist their commander’s initiative. We shall never know how the situation would have turned out, because, after an agonizing period of indecision, an order arrived from higher authorities directing the regular army to withdraw and leave responsibility for policing the city to the National Guard. There is, however, every likelihood that, had the July revolution not triumphed in Paris, Verdière would have faced a court martial for treason.

A somewhat similar situation arose in February 1848, when General Bedeau came up against an especially well fortified barricade that insurgent Parisians had built in the boulevard Bonne Nouvelle and allowed himself to become embroiled in a lengthy exchange with the rebel leader, a National Guard officer named Fauvell-Delabarre. Bedeau, hesitant to force a passage through so many unarmed civilians, was somehow persuaded to request a clarification of his orders from his own commander, the redoubtable General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud. In this case, the initially brusque response of the commander in chief, who had acquired a well earned reputation for ruthlessness during his service in Africa, was so softened by his own subsequent exchange with Fauvell-Delabarre that he eventually ordered a cease-fire and had regular army units withdraw from their forward positions. As it happened, in the time required for these negotiations to take place, the troops had been surrounded by an enormous mass of demonstrators, and their morale had crumbled. When the order to withdraw was received, some soldiers mutinied, and others simply

handed their weapons over to the insurgents. See Duveau 1967, 35, and Thureau-Dangin 1892, 7: 460–75, whose accounts differ in some particulars.

A third such instance took place two months later in Rouen, during the disturbances that followed the elections of April 1848. This time, an unnamed colonel who had been ordered to capture a key barricade as quickly as possible displayed such hesitation and occasioned such delays in carrying out his mission that he was summarily relieved of his command and placed under arrest by his superior officer, General Gérard, who blasted the barricade with an artillery barrage (*Procès des insurgés de Rouen: Cour d'assises du Calvados* [1849] n.d., 75–76).

The rare cases of officer disloyalty I have been able to collect prompt me to offer a couple of observations. First, in only one of the three incidents—the one where the commander in chief was physically present and was himself equivocating—did actual defections take place. This confirms Chorley's conclusion that so long as the higher echelons hold firm, the military chain of command constitutes a highly effective mechanism for maintaining discipline, even when the rank and file might be sympathetic to the insurgent cause. Second, the two cases that stopped short of outright defections both occurred in provincial cities, whereas the single instance where units mutinied or allowed themselves to be disarmed took place in Paris. As great as the perils of desertion might be in the capital city, whether for a general officer or a simple soldier, they were greatly magnified elsewhere. In Paris, one could at least monitor the flow of insurrectionary events, knowing that the uprising's success would seal the fate of the regime in power. In the provinces, an insurrection might initially succeed in the local context yet be crushed by a central government that remained firmly in control of Paris and thus fully able to mobilize the repressive apparatus at its command.

116. Marx 1907, 70.

117. Of course, these situation-specific measures complement standard military procedures intended to minimize the sort of contact that could compromise strict discipline. These practices include assigning recruits to serve in regions other than their province of origin, garrisoning the bulk of military forces outside the major urban areas they might be called upon to police, and establishing a schedule of troop rotation to ensure that units do not form strong ties with the local population. Note that the same principles explain the French monarchy's traditional reliance on the Swiss Guard to provide personal bodyguards to the king. The fact that these mercenaries, whose acquaintance we made in chapters 2 and 3, were distinct from Parisians in nationality, culture, and even language (since recruits from the German cantons of the Swiss confederation were preferred) effectively ensured their isolation. Although overwhelmed by superior numbers in 1588 and 1648, they remained unwaveringly loyal and generally proved willing to fight to the death to defend the royal household.

118. For other striking images of the fraternization process, see, e.g., Simond 1900, 2: 396, and Martin 1867, 6: 193.

119. See Truquin 1977, 62. Nougarede de Fayet 1850, 98, whose political perspective was nearly the opposite of Truquin's, also commented on the competing efforts of military authorities and insurgents to secure the loyalty of soldiers during the February Days.

120. Rochefort 1896, 70–72.

121. Ibid., 71.

122. Pelletan 1848, 63.

123. Brocher 1909, 7–8. Alexandre Dumas *père* offers his own colorful anecdote of successful fraternization during the July Days (Dumas [1852–53] 1989, 2: 72–73).

124. Cited in Edith Thomas 1966, 54.

125. Cited in Montagne 1966, 253. The same idea is expressed in Bugeaud's treatise *La guerre des rues et des maisons* (1997), 114–15. His warning, intended to forestall all contact between the people and ordinary soldiers, may have been exaggerated, but it correctly assumed that insurgents were prepared to exploit the advantage that the presence of their wives and children could create. Tarlé 1959, 226 notes, for

example, that when Kilmaine's troops assembled at the entrance to the faubourg Saint-Antoine in 1795 for their foray against insurgent barricades, it was women who were sent forward to greet them, calling upon the soldiers to join the insurgent camp.

126. Both of these incidents are covered in Lucas-Dubreton 1932, 190–91.

127. See Marx 1976, 21. Engels does not actually specify just when barricades lost their former effectiveness or even assert that there was a discrete moment when this change occurred, but this and other comments clearly implied that the tide had begun to turn before 1848.

128. Mackintosh 1880, 119–20.

129. Rude 1954, 84.

130. Lucas-Dubreton 1932, 170–71, 194–95.

131. The quotation derives from *Les misérables*, a work of fiction to be sure, but one that contains an excursus of several pages on the June Days that purports to be factually based. See Hugo [1862] 1982, 992ff.

132. Du Camp 1881, 2: 283.

133. Lissagaray 1871, 61. It is worth pointing out yet again that this high level of effectiveness was associated with the spontaneous constructions of the revolutionary crowd but not the methodically erected structures of the Commune's Barricade Commission. Brocher's contemporary assessment (1909, 257) was unambiguous. Far more useful, in her view, were the unassuming creations of the common people "in the style of 1848, perfectly simple and without artistic pretensions." Writing more than a century later, Robert Tombs (1981, 156–57, 162) has painstakingly reconstructed how even small numbers of insurgents were at times able to use well-placed, impromptu barricades to retard the Versaillais advance, whereas the monumental and scientifically engineered structures that had been sited in advance were readily outflanked or completely bypassed by the attacking forces.

134. The most famous of the exceptions was doubtless the "whiff of grapeshot" Napoléon used in 1795 to suppress a royalist revolt against the National Convention, as described in chapter 4. Keep in mind, however, that Napoléon managed to produce a decisive outcome with just a single volley in 1795 and never had to resort to systematic artillery fire or bombardment. Consider the contrast with the more liberal and deadly use of cannon to put down a short-lived Cairo rebellion against France's occupying army in Egypt in 1898. See Jabartī 1975, 95–102; 1979, 71–74.

135. Supporting references can be found under the corresponding barricade events in appendix A. Artillery was also readied for use in Paris in 1839, but that insurrection did not last long enough for this tactic to come into play.

136. An entire article, including scale drawings and a lengthy discussion of tactical advantages, was devoted to the mobile barricade in the July 8, 1848, issue of *l'Illustration*. "Movable barricades" were merely proposed in 1848, but at least one such wheeled device was actually constructed and deployed in 1871, though there is no indication that such prototypes actually played a significant role in the fighting. These structures, which could be rolled forward, might be seen as distant precursors of the modern tank, inasmuch as they allowed soldiers to fight from behind protective armor. Needless to say, these devices would not qualify as "barricades" under the definition used in this study.

137. Du Camp 1876, 265–66, has left us a description of a pair of barricades near the rue du Delta that were used in just this way during the June Days. He also noted how the insurgents occupied the adjoining customs barrier in order to take advantage of the loopholes in its fortified walls to fire on his National Guard unit.

In 1871, the atmosphere in Paris had reached such a point of political delirium that the newspaper *Le Vengeur* could publish a letter to the editor like the one that appeared in its May 22 issue. Its author, identified only by his or her initials, touted the advantages of oblique barricades over the transversal variety in part on grounds that they were more solid and easier to repair, but mainly because they could be

constructed well in advance, since they allowed foot traffic to flow more smoothly through the city. Like the leaders of the Commune, “G. D.,” who thoughtfully appended a diagram that the newspaper made available for inspection at its office, unfortunately overlooked the crucial functions that could not be fulfilled by barricades constructed long in advance.

138. See Blanqui 1971, 214.

139. For Engels’s views on barricades, see, e.g., Marx and Engels 1976, 7: 157ff. Engels’s role in the Elberfeld event was abruptly cut short, but for reasons that were more political than military: he offended local sensibilities by replacing the tricolor German flags mounted on the barricades with red ones.

140. These are laid out in Engels’s introduction to Marx [1850] 1976, 21–25. In addition to the advantages that military forces derived from their equipment, training, discipline, and access to artillery and improved armaments, Engels also mentions the novel role of railroads and discusses other quite particular circumstances responsible for insurgents’ deteriorating prospects. He attributes, their success in holding their own through 1848, for example, to their ability to fabricate powder and bullets from basic raw materials. These simple techniques became inadequate once the army adopted breech-loading rifles that possessed superior accuracy, range, and killing power, because these required cartridges of precise caliber, which insurgents could not hope to duplicate. Engels stresses that like all other aspects of social life, military operations, including the repression of civil unrest, had been transformed by the application of industrial techniques. The changes worked systematically to the detriment of relatively unrationalized insurgent forces.

141. Marx 1976, 24.

142. Though the implications of Haussmann’s repaving projects for prospective barricade combat had already been the subject of prolonged debate (and would remain so right up to the time of the May 1968 barricades), it is worth noting that the assertion that macadam would bring an end to the era of barricades was being made well before the Second Empire. As early as 1836, Frances Trollope (1836, 79–80) complained about the noise and discomfort associated with the uneven pavement of Paris streets and pointed out the advantages to be gained by following the example of London. Her main argument remained that the introduction of macadam would make the French capital more livable, but she did not hesitate to add that it would also discourage “future heroes of the barricade.”

Du Camp 1892, 1: 277, shows that paving preferences remained a lively topic of discussion just prior to the June Days of 1848, when the Constituent Assembly considered using macadamization as a means of “forever bringing to an end the era of revolutions and muzzling the hydra of anarchy.” His mention of the subject is of added interest, because du Camp was a close friend of Gustave Flaubert, who fought side by side with him in the repression of the June Days. Flaubert included the following entry in his satirical *Dictionnaire des idées reçues*: “Macadam: Good for suppressing revolutions. No longer any way to build barricades. Is nonetheless quite inconvenient.” Unfortunately, since Flaubert worked on the draft of this work from 1850 to 1880 (and it was published only in 1911, well after he died), there is no way to know which nineteenth-century events occasioned his sardonic comment.

There are some indications that, at least for a short time after its initial introduction in Paris, the new paving material impeded barricade building, or at least turned insurgents’ efforts in new directions. The *Illustrated London News*, December 13, 1851, 679, 683, insisted that it “added greatly to the difficulty of constructing solid barricades” and noted that insurgents, stationed in those of the grand boulevards that had been macadamized, requisitioned “every cab, brougham, and cart” that came their way as well as “three or four omnibuses” as replacements for the customary paving stones.

143. In fact, macadam was introduced in Paris only over the objections of Haussmann and only on a limited basis. As his *Mémoires* ([1890] 1979, 135–42) make clear, he believed that this material would be more expensive both to install and to maintain and would produce more mud in winter and more dust in summer than the readily available alternatives, including paving stones. In the end, he was overruled by the emperor, but not, as it turns out, with a view toward safeguarding public order. The simple fact was that

Napoléon III, an avid horseman, preferred macadam because it gave better traction to his mounts.

144. This naturally did not prevent the outlying wards (which Paris formally annexed after 1860) from contributing their share of participants to the barricade events of the late Second Empire, but this demographic shift away from the traditional centers of insurrection is one of several factors that helps accounts for the secular decline in the number of such events in the last third of the nineteenth century. On the controversy surrounding the intended and actual effects of Haussmannization on Parisians' penchant for insurrection, readers may wish to consult, not only twentieth-century scholarship on the subject (e.g., Pinkney 1972b and Roncayolo 1983), but also the views of contemporaries, including inveterate critics of the government like Blanqui (1971), who were not convinced that the practical consequences of the rebuilding of Paris were uniformly inimical to insurgents.

145. The case against, among others, Guy Delavau, prefect of police at the time of the November 1827 insurrection, is summarized by Isambert n.d.; also 1828. The charges included the claim that some police officers acted as agents provocateurs by assisting in the construction of barricades. In assessing the evidence presented in that source, it is important to keep in mind that Isambert was a lawyer representing parties to a civil suit to recover damages suffered during the troubles. The judicial inquiry into the repression of the 1827 uprising did not result in a single conviction, but it did succeed in sullyng the reputation of certain public figures. The decision to hold back in the early stages of the conflict was also widely noted by contemporaries like Dumolart (1827, 8), who concluded that police had declined to intervene in the process of barricade construction because "the victory would have been less impressive, and the drama would not have produced the full effect on spectators that the authors expected."

146. Rémusat, 1958–67, 2, 205.

147. Chateaubriand [1848–50] 1982, 3: 595–99. For a somewhat more forgiving interpretation of the 1830 strategy, rendered after the repetition of the experiment in 1848, see Roguet 1850, 76–77, 148, 212.

148. Bugeaud "tried in [February] 1848 the inopportune tactics of [July] 1830" (Bourgin 1848a, 81). The result was fraternization and mass defections. Completely unsympathetic to the change of regime occasioned by the February Days, Nougarede de Fayet (1850, 97–101) explicitly notes the ruinous consequences of this approach, citing as evidence of the generally half-hearted military response the fact that the two cannonballs fired in the rue de l'Oseille constituted the only use of artillery during the February Days. On the strategy adopted in that conflict, see also Gallaher 1980, 56–60.

It is interesting to note that, even after the fact, Bugeaud seems to have been unconvinced that his strategy had been at fault. In his 1849 treatise on street warfare (1997, 119–22), he continued to advocate committing troops early to prevent the construction of barricades; and sending detachments of 150 to 200 men to as many as twenty or thirty separate locations within Paris. As previously noted, however, he had grown far more sensitive to the need to keep civilians at a distance from the rank and file in order to prevent fraternization.

149. See Schmidt 1948, 47. According to Caussidière 1849, 2: 222, Cavaignac's outburst came only after he had been questioned very aggressively by members of the Assembly as to why he had not immediately surrounded the insurrection.

150. Marx 1976, 23. Despite his disparaging assessment of the barricade's future military potential, even Engels recognized that it would endure, if only for a time. In a brief passage that was cut from the 1895 introduction to Marx's *The Class Struggles in France* (1976)—an editorial decision about which he complained bitterly in private letters—he asked, "Does this mean that in the future the street fight will play no further role? Certainly not. It only means that the conditions since 1848 have become far more unfavorable for civil fights, far more favorable for the military." See Marx 1976, 24 and 151n1. This grudging concession to the barricade's staying power does not even hint at the surprising dynamism the barricade would display over the course of the twentieth century, even in the face of innovations such as the use of helicopters and tear gas, which Engels could hardly have imagined.

151. On this question, see Ronald Aminzade's *Ballots and Barricades* 1993. Despite the book's title, it

does not really address the barricade phenomenon as it is understood here. What it does instead is to examine the experience of three French cities (Toulouse, Saint-Etienne, and Rouen) as a way of bringing into focus the choices that republicans were forced to make between overt revolutionary struggle and reformist politics conducted through institutional channels. The concluding chapter provides an incisive analysis of how the incentives to follow one or the other of these divergent paths shifted over the middle decades of the nineteenth century.

152. Hobsbawm 1992, 4. This entire section owes a considerable debt to Piette 1985, who called my attention to the ideas of Eric Hobsbawm and Bronislaw Baczko on this subject. Though her mention of barricades is ancillary to the main argument of her paper, the way she conceptualized the revolutionary tradition is perfectly consistent with my own way of thinking.

153. Baczko 1984, 34–35.

154. Periods of acute social upheaval like the great French Revolution can be extremely prolific in the symbols they create, though their meanings often conflict and vie for pre-eminence. The red flag was, after all, also an innovation of that period. Cast into disrepute with the overthrow of the “red republic,” it would be revived at the time of the 1832 insurrection in Paris where, in the words of Heine, it worked “like a magic charm,” causing those protesting the Orléanist monarchy’s theft of the July revolution to “take leave of their senses” (Vermeil 1939, 248).

These competing strands of revolutionary symbolism would collide head-on at the end of February 1848, when only Lamartine’s eloquence before a crowd on the place de Grève prevented the red flag from displacing the tricolor and reorienting the revolutionary movement toward the achievement of “the democratic and social republic.” The moderates’ rejection of the emblem, the slogan, and the program of the Left may have anticipated the defeat of the June insurrection, but it hardly effaced the symbol itself, which was revived by the Paris Commune and went on to become the informal standard of the international socialist movement.

155. As I use the term here, “icon” refers to a visually based master symbol that presents meanings so highly condensed—and often so highly charged with evaluative and emotional connotations—that it can instantly convey a comprehensive view of the world, without resort to discursive argument or reasoned appeals.

This definition and much of my orienting perspective on this subject derive from my reading of a study of the environmental justice movement by Andrew Szasz (1994, esp. 56–64). His use of the concept is based on a postmodernist analysis that tends to argue that the economically advanced societies of the late twentieth century have entered a qualitatively distinct phase and, more to the point, that the recent proliferation of icons is a period-specific development of those media-rich societies that should be treated as discontinuous with the past. Though Szasz himself considers such claims “overstated,” I find them simply untenable. Any student of barricades has to be struck by the extent to which their use fulfills the definition neatly, even if their iconization was mediated, not by modern electronic media, but by such distant precursors as the early illustrated press or *images d’Epinal*. I hasten to acknowledge that my application of the concept to the nineteenth century, essentially at odds with his postmodern thrust, is one from which Szasz undoubtedly would wish to distance himself.

156. An incident from the 1834 insurrection in Lyon helps make the point. On April 11, in the hope of shoring up support for the silk workers’ rebellion, militants from the Saint-Paul district drafted a public notice alluding to the success of an uprising in nearby Vienne and urging combatants to hold out until the anticipated arrival of “our brothers from [other] departments” (Girod de l’Ain, 1834, 1: 273). As it happened, the message was largely inaccurate, for the Vienne uprising had quickly faltered, and the hoped-for reinforcements would never materialize. But its temporary effectiveness in rallying those gathered at the barricade at one end of the Pont-du-Change could be partly attributed to the fact that its authors dated their statement “the 22nd of Germinal, year 42 of the Republic.” This use of the long-defunct republican calendar of 1793 allowed them to frame their actions and locate themselves within a revolutionary tradition. It could

be seen as the discursive equivalent of erecting a barricade (something they had, of course, already done).

157. In the terminology employed by certain sociological analysts, barricades constituted a “resource” that social movements could exploit to overcome the inertia that even the most favorably disposed members of the target audience experienced (the so-called free-rider problem.)

In brief, the dilemma has always been that for the individual, social movement participation implies, at a minimum, significant effort or investment and, not infrequently, an appreciable level of risk. These costs and risks, borne by the individual, can rise precipitously in the case of an unsuccessful movement whose members may, for example, be subject to legal sanctions or violent repression. Yet even in the case of a successful movement, where the achievement of movement objectives is assured, the payoff generally comes in the form of a “common good” from which all members of the target constituency derive benefit, whether or not they have “paid their dues.” Thus, costs are individual, while benefits are social. The purely rational actor should therefore abstain from participating in a social movement even if he agrees with its objectives, secure in the knowledge that if it is destined to succeed, he will gain most of the desired benefits without incurring the risks that failure would entail.

However sound this logic, observation proves that social movements *do* attract followers and *do* occasionally succeed. Consequently, a great deal of effort on the part of social movement analysts has been focused on explaining why certain individuals out of all those who may passively agree with a movement’s goals set aside the free-rider’s rational calculation and pass to the stage of active mobilization. The argument here is that tried-and-true techniques like barricade construction can help facilitate that transition by emphasizing the ritual character of established routines, intensifying feelings of solidarity among participants, and legitimating risky behaviors by relating them to heroic exploits of the past. The effect, in every instance, is to submerge individualistic calculations in favor of identification with one’s reference group.

CHAPTER 8. BARRICADES AND THE CULTURE OF REVOLUTION

Epigraph: Marx [1852] 1907, 5.

1. There are two apparently contradictory ways of characterizing the dynamic of revolutionary change that have dominated the social science literature on the subject. At one extreme are studies—ranging from Le Bon 1897 to Smelser 1971 and Swanson 1973—emphasizing the spontaneous, ephemeral, and unstructured character of the “collective behavior” that emerges as a crowd first coalesces. At the other end of the continuum, we find perspectives nearly as venerable (e.g., Michels 1959’s “iron law of oligarchy”) and at the same time just as up-to-the-minute (compare the resource mobilization and political process perspectives on social movements of the present day). These stress the deliberate and organized character of what they prefer to call “collective action” and seek explanations in the nature of social structures and institutional arrangements. Though I find the “macro” orientation of the latter approach more useful for understanding the enduring aspects of large-scale revolutionary action and its social change implications, I have found that a “micro” focus that highlights the interactional and emotional aspects of crowd dynamics can sometimes shed light on specific topics like how the early stages of a barricade event unfold.

2. Tocqueville 1971, 67.

3. Heine 1887, 377

4. See Tilly 1978, 151; 1986b, 4; Tilly and Tilly 1981, 19.

5. This more self-conscious approach was perhaps best exemplified by the detailed plan for an ideal barricade in Blanqui 1973, which advocates the inclusion of a *glacis*, or sloped embankment, that would have served much the same function as the modifications in form mentioned here.

6. Tarrow. 1994, 32. See also Tarrow 1993a, 300; 1993b, 77; Tilly 1993, 272; 1995, 46.

7. The importance of these peaks would actually appear to be still greater if we were to replace the simple enumeration of events with a measure of their magnitude. Of course, there is an inevitable arbitrariness in identifying six specific intervals as cyclical high points and excluding other moments of heightened activity that, one might reasonably claim, were of comparable significance. In the case of France, two additional periods merit consideration in this regard, both dating from the volatile nineteenth century. The twelve provincial uprisings in December 1851, all protests against Louis-Napoléon's overthrow of the Second Republic, have already been addressed in chapter 4. The second group consists of seven events recorded in the southwest of France in 1841. Although they possess a substantial coherence as a group (since all arose from a property census intended as a preliminary to the imposition of new taxes), most of the individual incidents were small-scale and produced few or no casualties. This flurry of regional activity ended up having little resonance in the rest of the country.

8. Goldstone 1991's use of demographic oscillations to explain global patterns of revolutionary activity and Tarrow 1988's demonstration of the efficacy of local and national cycles in the context of the Isolotto religious community in Florence, Italy, shed light on the logic of such cyclical variations.

9. On the significance of such peaks and their relationship to repertoires, see Tarrow 1994, esp. 153–58, on which I have drawn freely in what follows.

10. See Tarrow 1993a, who borrowed the phrase “moments of madness” from the title of a 1972 article by Aristide R. Zolberg.

11. Citron 1961, 1: 233.

12. The discussion that follows draws heavily on Tilly 1983, 464–73. On the eighteenth-century repertoire in France, see Tilly 1976, 22, 24–25; 1982, 14. On the nineteenth-century repertoire in France, see Tilly 1976, 25, 29; 1982, 14, 36; 1986b, 391; and Tilly and Tilly 1981, 19–20.

13. Tilly 1982, 14, also lists the “planned insurrection” as a novel introduction of this modern style of protest. Elsewhere, he concedes that “one might make a case for the Protestant Reformation or the English Revolution as full-fledged social movements” but insists that prior to that time, “no one tried to combine seizures of grain, field invasions, turnouts, and the like into visibly sustained challenges to established authorities” (Tilly 1983, 467).

The study of barricades suggests a more complex reality. The Parisian insurrection of May 1588, which dates back nearly as far as the barricade itself, represented a serious and coordinated threat to the constituted government of France. The Paris Sixteen was effectively the local affiliate of the Holy League, a coalition of French cities with national reach. For leadership, it looked to the duc de Guise, whose ambitions were most definitely a threat to the Valois monarchy.

A still better and even more precocious example of social movement organization would be Etienne Marcel's 1358 rebellion, discussed in chapter 2. It used public meetings and demonstrations to challenge royal authority, engaged in negotiations with major power-holders, and forced the dauphin of France to rescind important state policies—for example, his plan to introduce new coinage and exchange rates. Additional signs of the sort of outlook associated with modern social movements include participants' efforts to define a common insurgent identity (through the adoption of symbols like the red-and-blue caps worn by members) and Marcel's attempts, not only to link the Parisian insurgency with provincial cities (and even some in Flanders), but to forge an alliance with Guillaume Cale, better known to his followers as “Jacques Bonhomme,” leader of the peasant revolt from which the generic term *jacquerie* is derived. The goal of this union of urban and rural rebels was to mount a siege of the dauphin's fortress at Meaux. (See Cohn 2006, 162–63.) Though Marcel's initiatives ultimately foundered (and though their only connection with the barricade was through the chains that he introduced in Paris), it is still possible to recognize many of the identifying features that have been posited by some as unique to the modern social movement.

14. See Tilly 1983, 468, 469.

15. The original formulation of this argument can be found in Tilly 1977, 494–95, 502–4.

16. The core argument can be found in Sewell 1990. The controversy between Tilly and Sewell is

discussed in Tarrow 1993b and Traugott 1993b.

17. Though William Sewell acknowledges that events called insurrections long predated 1789, his point is that the term took on a new and distinctive meaning with the fall of the Bastille. Thereafter, he argues, it signified an uprising of the sovereign people that, when successful, could form “the very basis of the state’s legitimacy” (Sewell 1990, 540). I am not prepared to embrace this logic fully for two reasons. First, since unqualified legitimacy could only be accorded to an insurrection that had succeeded in overthrowing the government, this meaning, as a practical matter, would normally apply exclusively to uprisings in Paris. Provincial events, which by their nature never benefited from the “capital cities” effect, would rarely if ever fulfill this meaning of the term “insurrection.”

The second reason is that certain early-modern events (including at least some of those that took place in Paris) are all but impossible to distinguish from nineteenth-century uprisings that I suspect Sewell would agree to call insurrections. The 1831 or 1834 clashes in Lyon and the 1839 uprising in Paris were just as local and nearly as corporatist in orientation, whether judged by the demands advanced or the social composition of the insurgent forces, as the First Day of the Barricades of 1588 or even Etienne Marcel’s rebellion of 1358, both of which managed to institute an alternative government that enjoyed—admittedly only briefly and mainly in Paris—an aura of legitimacy. I am not convinced that Sewell’s more restrictive definition of insurrection would be any easier to apply consistently than Tilly’s dictum that only mobilizations of the modern era should qualify as social movements.

18. Tilly 1997, 11, emphasis added.

19. See Freycinet’s *Souvenirs* (1912, 1–21), composed in later life, for a full account of this adventure of his student years. I should make clear that the role that Freycinet envisioned for the students of the Ecole Polytechnique was as much to mediate between the people and the authorities in advocating for a truce as to put their talents as engineers in training to use in actual barricade construction. Freycinet would go on to become four-time prime minister of France under the Third Republic.

APPENDIX A. DATABASE OF EUROPEAN BARRICADE EVENTS

1. Information can be sent by email to traugott@ucsc.edu, or by regular mail to Mark Traugott, Stevenson College, U.C.S.C., Santa Cruz, CA 96064, U.S.A.

APPENDIX B. DID THE WAVE OF REVOLUTIONISM IN 1848 ORIGINATE IN PARIS OR PALERMO?

1. Garnier-Pagès 1861–72, 1: 41–43.
2. Marx [1850] 1976, 40.
3. Ginsborg 1979, 81.
4. Godechot 1971, 207, 210.
5. Koselleck 2004, 215. Because he supplies no specific argument or evidence to support his inference, the reader is left to conclude that the link is based on timing alone.
6. Stearns 1974, 169; Maurice 1887, 220–21. Cf. also the views of Halévy, as reported by Bury 1848, 191.
7. See Droz 1953, 201.
8. Wagner [1911] 1983, 359.
9. For a recent restatement of the dominant view, see Strandmann 2000a, 5–6, and 2000b, 104.

APPENDIX C. THE BARRICADE AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS IN TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Dumas [1852–53] 1989, 62.
2. See also Stern 1862, 2: 149.
3. Pinkney 1986, 57–59; Blanning 2000, 102. As for the international dimension, see the *Illustrated London News*, December 13, 1851, 676, regarding the first direct transmission from Paris to London of telegraphic news of this sort.
4. Droz 1957, 601–6.

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